PREFACE

1. Scope

   a. This publication is the keystone document for joint planning. It provides the doctrinal foundation and fundamental principles that guide the Armed Forces of the United States in planning joint campaigns and operations.

   b. Joint planning is the process of identifying military ways and means (with associated risk) the President can integrate with other instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, and economic) to implement strategic guidance.

   c. The crises and contingencies the joint force faces cut across multiple combatant commands, domains, and functions. Global integration addresses transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional challenges.

2. Purpose

   This publication provides planning considerations for the Armed Forces of the United States’ interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners. It does not restrict the authority of joint force commanders from organizing forces and executing the mission as they deem best to ensure unity of effort and the achievement of objectives.

3. Application

   a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, the National Guard Bureau, and combat support agencies.

   b. This doctrine constitutes official advice concerning the enclosed subject matter; however, the judgment of the commander is paramount in all situations.

   c. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance
or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

STUART B. MUNSCH
Vice Admiral, United States Navy
Director for Joint Force Development
SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 5-0
DATED 16 JUNE 2017

• Reorganizes to clarify the joint planning process and operational design:
  • Separates the planning process (Chapter III, “Joint Planning Process”) from operational design (Chapter IV, “Operational Design”).
  • Adds updated global integration processes and terms (global integration framework [GIF] and GIF development and review process).
  • Changes the definition of decisive point to “key terrain” vice “geographic place” to account for operations in cyberspace.
  • Expands discussion on global campaigning and campaign planning.
  • Updates and edits Chapters I, “Joint Planning,” and Chapter II, “Strategic Guidance and Coordination.”
    • Removes redundancies.
    • Eliminates references to Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) and GEF-directed objectives.
  • Edits Appendix K, “Operation Assessment Plan.”
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

- Discusses the critical purposes of joint planning at the strategic and operational levels.
- Describes how strategic direction is established and how it is implemented within the joint planning and execution community to develop military plans and orders.
- Outlines the four planning functions, the planning process, and an operational design methodology.
- Discusses how operational art and operational design enable understanding, provide context for decision making, and enable commanders and planners to identify hazards, threats, consequences, opportunities, and risk.
- Describes how combatant commanders develop campaigns to support the global campaign and shape the operational environment in a manner that supports strategic objectives.
- Outlines how operation assessment provides perspective, insight, and the opportunity to correct, adapt, and refine planning and execution to make military operations more effective.
- Discusses the three possible conditions for transitioning planning to execution.

Joint Planning

Joint planning is the deliberate process of determining how to implement strategic guidance: how (the ways) to use military capabilities (the means) in time and space to achieve objectives (the ends) within an acceptable level of risk.

Leaders conduct joint planning to understand the strategic and operational environments to determine the best methods for employing the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) capabilities to achieve national objectives.

Joint planning serves two critical purposes at the combatant command (CCMD) and subordinate joint force level:
At the strategic level, joint planning provides the President and the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) with options and advice to achieve the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* [short title: *National Security Strategy* (NSS)] objectives through the employment of the joint force.

At the operational level, joint planning translates national level guidance into specific activities aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives and attaining the military end state.

**Strategy, Plans, Operations, and Assessments Cycle**

Plans translate the broad intent provided by a strategy into operations; successful operations achieve the strategy’s objectives.

The four planning functions of strategic guidance, concept development, plan development, and plan assessment are generally sequential, but they often run simultaneously to accelerate the process.

**Strategy, Strategic Art, Operational Art, and Operational Planning**

Strategy is a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and multinational objectives.

Strategic art is the formulation, coordination, and application of ends, ways, and means to implement policy and promote national interests.

Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, means, and evaluating risks.

Strategic art and operational art are mutually supporting. Strategic art provides policy context to objectives, while operational art demonstrates the feasibility and efficacy of a strategy. Operational planning translates strategy into executable activities, operations, and campaigns, within resource and policy limitations to achieve objectives.
**Principles of Planning**

**Focused on the Objective.** Joint planning is oriented on achieving an objective: plans and actions should contribute to achieving national objectives.

**Globally Integrated and Coordinated.** Integrated planning synchronizes resources and integrates timelines, decision points, and authorities across CCMDs to enable the achievement of strategic and operational objectives.

**Resource Informed.** Joint planning is resource informed and time constrained.

**Risk Informed.** Planners assess and articulate risks and identify potential mitigation.

**Framed within the Strategic Environment and Operational Environment (OE).** Planning requires an understanding of the OE as it exists and as it changes.

**Informs Decision Making.** Joint planning must be agile and flexible enough to provide senior leadership with information to make critical decisions.

**Adaptive and Flexible.** Planning is an adaptive process that occurs in a networked, collaborative environment.

**Planning Products**

While the planning process is generally the same for campaign, contingency, or crisis planning, the output or products may differ. Campaign and contingency planning encompasses the preparation of plans that occur in non-crisis situations with a timeline generally not driven by external events. Crisis planning uses the same process but is typically driven by external events and is almost always time constrained. **Combatant command campaign plans (CCPs)** provide the means to translate strategic guidance into activities executable by CCMDs.

The two basic types of plans are campaign and contingency plans.
Executive Summary

**Shared Understanding**

**Civilian-Military Dialogue.** Strategy is developed and joint planning is conducted at the United States Government (USG) department level. Joint planning supports the interaction between senior DOD civilian leadership, combatant commanders (CCDRs), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to help the President and SecDef decide when, where, and how to employ US military forces and resources.

**Adaptive planning provides a range of options at the operational and strategic levels.** The complexity, rate of change, and inherent political nature of the strategic environment often drive policy makers to seek maximum strategic and operational flexibility.

**Providing Options and Aligning Resources.** CCDRs provide options for the use of the military in conjunction with other instruments of national power. Further planning enables CCDRs to develop courses of action (COAs) that identify costs (including casualties) and risks associated with the options, a timeline, required resources and capabilities, and probability of success or failure of the military objectives in contributing to the desired national strategic objectives.

**Risk Identification and Mitigation**

**Identifying Risk.** Risk is the probability and consequence of an event causing harm to something valued. Commanders and senior leaders should account for risk when evaluating the likelihood of mission success. Risk can be assessed through the cost imposed by, or the impact on, achievement of the objective. Military risk is the estimated probability and consequence of the joint force’s projected inability to achieve current or future military objectives (risk-to-mission), while providing and sustaining sufficient military resources (risk-to-force).

**Mitigating Risk.** Planners and CCDRs identify methods to mitigate risk as part of the plan.

**Assessment**

Commanders continually assess plans. At the CCMD-level, the joint planning and execution community (JPEC) and senior DOD leadership share
this task. Assessments continuously measure the effectiveness of military operations and project the expected effectiveness of plans against contingencies as the OE changes. Assessments support decision making by measuring the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, achieving an objective, or attaining a military end state.

**Interorganizational Planning and Coordination**

Interorganizational planning and coordination is the interaction among elements of DOD; participating USG departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government departments and agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector to achieve an objective. Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. Coordination of interorganizational and multinational plans facilitates unity of effort among multiple organizations by promoting common understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and consequences of military and nonmilitary actions.

**Multinational Planning and Coordination**

Multinational operations is a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations. Such operations are usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance, although other possible arrangements include supervision by an international organization (e.g., the United Nations or Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). Key to any multinational operation is unity of effort among national and military leaders of participating nations emphasizing common objectives and shared interests as well as mutual support and respect.

**Strategic Guidance and Coordination**

Strategic direction is contained in key documents, generally referred to as strategic guidance. Strategic direction may change rapidly in response to changing situations, whereas strategic guidance documents are typically updated cyclically and may not reflect the most current strategic direction.
National and the Department of Defense (DOD) Guidance

**The President.** The President provides strategic guidance through the NSS, executive orders, and other strategic documents, in conjunction with additional guidance and refinement from the National Security Council (NSC). The President also signs the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and the 2018-2020 Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) [short title: Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG)], which are both developed by DOD.

**SecDef.** SecDef executes authority, direction, and control over DOD components. SecDef oversees the development of broad defense policy goals and priorities for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of US military forces based on the NSS. For planning, SecDef provides guidance to ensure military action supports national objectives. SecDef approves assignment and allocation of forces.

**CJCS.** The CJCS serves as principal military advisor to the President, SecDef, and other members of the NSC and assists the President and SecDef with providing unified strategic direction to the Armed Forces of the United States.

National Security Council System

The NSC is the President’s principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with senior national security advisors and cabinet officials, including SecDef and the CJCS. NSC decisions may be directed to any department or agency.

National Security Strategy

The NSS is prepared by the Executive Branch of the USG for Congress and outlines the major national security concerns of the United States and how the administration plans to address them using all instruments of national power.

Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development

The Department of State (DOS) is the lead US foreign affairs agency within the Executive Branch and the lead institution for the conduct of American diplomacy. The Secretary of State is the President’s principal foreign policy advisor. The Secretary of State implements the President’s foreign policies worldwide through DOS and its employees. The
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is an independent federal agency that receives overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State. USAID serves as the USG lead for international development and foreign disaster assistance.

**DOD**

**National Defense Strategy (NDS).** The NDS is signed by SecDef and outlines DOD’s approach to implementing the President’s NSS.

**UCP.** The UCP, signed by the President, establishes CCMDs and responsibilities and missions of the CCDRs.

**CPG.** The CPG, signed by the President, fulfills the statutory requirement in Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 113. SecDef, with the approval from the President, and with advice from the CJCS, provides written policy guidance on the preparation and review of campaign and contingency plans.

**Joint Strategic Planning System**

The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is the primary system the CJCS uses to execute statutory responsibilities assigned by Title 10, USC, Section 153. The JSPS enables the CJCS to conduct assessments; provide military advice to the President, SecDef, NSC, and Homeland Security Council; and assist the President and SecDef in providing strategic direction to the Armed Forces of the United States.

**Combatant Commanders**

CCDRs use strategic guidance and direction to prepare command strategies focused on their command’s specific capabilities and missions to link national strategic guidance to theater or functional strategies and joint operations. The command strategy, like national strategy, identifies the command’s broad, long-range objectives that contribute to national security. The command strategy provides the link between national strategic guidance and joint planning.

**Commander’s Communication Synchronization**

Commander’s communication synchronization is the DOD process to coordinate and synchronize narratives, themes, messages, images, operations, and actions to ensure their integrity and consistency down
to the lowest tactical level across all relevant communication activities.

**Application of Guidance**

*Joint Planning and Execution Community*  
The headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in joint planning or committed to a joint operation are collectively termed the JPEC.

- **The supported CCDR** has primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the CPG; CJCS Instruction 3110.01, *(U)* 2018 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) [short title: JSCP]; or other joint planning directives.

- **Supporting commanders** provide forces, assistance, or other resources to a supported commander in accordance with the principles set forth in global force management policies and procedures. Supporting commanders prepare supporting plans as required.

- **Coordinating Authority.** Coordinating authority is the authority delegated to a commander or individual for coordinating specific functions and activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service (e.g., joint security coordinator exercises coordinating authority for joint security area operations among the component commanders) and may include USG departments and agencies and partner nations (e.g., as part of security cooperation planning).

*Adaptive Planning*  
The intent of adaptive planning is to develop plans that contain military options for the President and SecDef as they seek to shape the environment and respond to contingencies. This facilitates responsive plan development that provides up-to-date planning and plans for civilian leaders.

*Operational Activities*  
Operational activities comprise a sustained cycle of situational awareness, planning, execution, and
assessment that occur continuously to support leader decision-making cycles at all levels of command.

**Joint Planning Process**

**Planning is Commander’s Business**

Commands own the planning process and must continuously participate in planning to provide guidance and expertise. The planner develops possible solutions to a problem presented in strategic or commander’s guidance.

**Planning Teams**

Planners should establish a team of experts to support the planning process. These are often called joint planning groups, operational planning teams, operational planning groups, or cross-functional teams and are normally led by either the plans directorate of a joint staff or the operations directorate of a joint staff.

**Transregional, All-Domain Planning**

When the scope of contemplated military operations exceeds the authority or capabilities of a single CCDR to plan and execute, the President, SecDef, or CJCS, when designated by the President or SecDef, identify a CCDR to lead the planning for the designated strategic challenge or threat. The commander’s assessment supporting this decision could be either the assessments of multiple CCDRs addressing a similar threat in their areas of responsibility (AORs) or a single threat assessment from a CCDR addressing the threat from a global, cross-AOR, or functional perspective. Situations that may trigger this assessment range from combat operations that span UCP-designated boundaries to the threat of asymmetric attack that overlaps CCMD boundaries and functions, thereby requiring strategic integration of two or more CCDRs’ campaigns and operations.

**Overview of Planning and the Planning Functions**

Although planning has an input (guidance) and an output (the plan or order), the planning process is a recursive, assessment-informed process and not linear. Issues discovered in later steps of the planning process can require adjustments to earlier steps.

Planning consists of four functions, the planning process, and an operational design methodology.
The four planning functions of strategic guidance, concept development, plan development, and plan assessment are generally sequential, although often run simultaneously to deepen the dialogue between civilian and military leaders and accelerate the overall planning process. SecDef, the CJCS, or CCDR may direct the planning staff to refine or adapt a plan by reentering the planning process at any of the earlier functions.

The relationship between the application of operational art, operational design, and the joint planning process (JPP) continues throughout the planning and execution of the plan or order. By applying the operational design methodology in combination with the procedural rigor of the JPP, the command can monitor the dynamics of the mission and OE while executing operations in accordance with the current approach and revising plans as needed.

**The Joint Planning Process**

Through the use of operational design and the application of operational art, commanders develop innovative, adaptive alternatives to solve complex challenges. These broad alternatives are the operational approach.

The JPP is an orderly, analytical set of logical steps to frame a problem; examine a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative COAs; select the best COA; and produce a plan or order:

- Planning Initiation (Step 1)
- Mission Analysis (Step 2)
- COA Development (Step 3)
- COA Analysis and Wargaming (Step 4)
- COA Comparison (Step 5)
- COA Approval (Step 6)
- Plan or Order Development (Step 7)
Operational Design

**Operational design** is the analytical framework that underpins planning. Operational design supports commanders and planners in organizing and understanding the OE as a complex interactive system. Commanders must understand the audience and political environment to give the best military advice to civilian decision makers. Planners must consider how they will translate often-times confusing military jargon and concepts into a universally understood language; interagency partners are critical to this discussion. Operational design is interwoven with the planning process to fill in gaps in guidance and information and provide a framework in which to plan, enabling planners to address the complexity of the OE, support mission analysis and COA development, and develop a concept of operations with the highest likelihood of success.

**Operational Design Methodology.** The general methodology for operational design is:

- Understand the strategic direction and guidance.
- Understand the strategic environment (e.g., policies, diplomacy, and politics) and the related contested environments.
- Understand the OE and relevant contested environments.
- Define the problem (create shared understanding; planning with uncertainty).
- Identify assumptions needed to continue planning (strategic and operational assumptions).
- Develop options (the operational approach).
- Identify decisions and decision points (external to the organization).
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- Refine the operational approach(es).
- Develop planning and assessment guidance.

**Operational Design Methodology Steps**

- Understand the Strategic Directions and Guidance.
- Understand the Strategic Environment.
- Understand the OE.
- Define the Problem.
- Identify Assumptions.
- Develop Operational Approaches.
- Identify Decisions and Decision Points.
- Refine the Operational Approach.
- Prepare Planning Guidance.

**Elements of Operational Design**

The elements of operational design are considered in four broad categories: overarching, space (OE), time, and forces:

- **Overarching** elements of operational design are those that drive the operation. Some, such as the objective or military end state, may be provided in higher-level guidance.

- The space of the OE requires planners to consider the physical characteristics, conditions, and geometry of the environment, to include how the commander should divide the operation for command and control (C2) purposes.

- **Time** considerations lead planners to identify how long it could take to conduct operations from an initial decision to commit forces through planning, mobilization, deployment, and execution.
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• **Force** requires planners to know the science of warfare, the capabilities and limitations of blue force weapon systems and tactics, and the capabilities and limitations of the enemy’s weapon systems and tactics.

**Objective.** The objective is the single most important element of operational design. The objective is why the mission is being conducted and should be determined first. **Objectives may be broad or defined by a military end state as directed or informed by policy and strategy.**

**Operational Environment**

The OE includes tangible and intangible factors that affect combat and support operations. Tangible factors include, but are not limited to, physical size, weather/climate, and geography (including lines of communication, distances, interior/exterior lines). Intangible factors include culture (including gender considerations), the information environment (including cyberspace), and population.

**Time**

**Arranging Operations.** Commanders must determine the best arrangement of joint force and component operations to conduct the assigned tasks and joint force mission. This arrangement will often be a combination of simultaneous and sequential operations to attain the end state conditions with the least cost in personnel and other resources.

**Anticipation.** Anticipation is key to effective planning. Joint force commanders (JFCs) must consider what might happen and look for indicators of forecasted events. During execution, JFCs should remain alert for the unexpected and be prepared to exploit opportunities.
Forces and Functions

Commanders and planners can plan campaigns and operations that focus on defeating either enemy or adversary forces, functions, or a combination of both. Typically, JFCs structure operations to attack both forces and functions concurrently to create the greatest possible impact on the enemy and chance for success.

JFCs can focus on destroying and disrupting critical enemy or adversary functions such as C2, sustainment, and protection. Attacking an enemy’s or adversary’s functions normally intends to destroy their balance, thereby creating vulnerabilities for exploitation.

Defeat Mechanisms. Defeat mechanisms are the methods used by friendly forces in combat operations against an enemy force. Defeating an enemy means creating the conditions necessary to impose the desired strategic outcome on the enemy against the enemy’s will to oppose or resist that outcome. These aim at defeating armed enemies through the organized application of force to kill, destroy, or capture. The three basic defeat mechanisms are: destruction, attrition, and exhaustion.

Balancing

Commanders will rarely have all the resources or time desired for an operation. By understanding the relationship between the elements of operational design, commanders and planners can balance different factors to maximize the likelihood of success in the most efficient manner.

The operational commander must decide which tradeoffs will produce the best balance. For example, commanders may decide to use an indirect approach and several phases, due to insufficient forces, or a direct assault on a center of gravity. Similarly, a commander may plan for an operational pause to use additional time to mobilize, deploy, or reconstitute forces.

Check the Plan

During all steps of planning, and again on completion of the plan, commanders and planners should review the plan to ensure:
The plan does not violate any principles of joint operations.

The joint functions are addressed, interlaced, and reinforcing.

The plan achieves the objective or attains the military end state within an acceptable level of risk.

The plan does not foreclose future options.

**Campaigning**

DOD is tasked to conduct operations in support of achieving national objectives. To support the national strategy (as identified in the NSS and NDS), the CJCS oversees the development of the national military strategy, JSCP, global campaign plans, and global integration frameworks. In turn, CCDRs develop campaigns to support the global campaign and shape the OE in a manner that supports those strategic objectives. They conduct their campaigns primarily through military engagement, operations, posture, and other activities that seek to achieve US national objectives, protect US national interests, and prevent the need to resort to armed conflict while setting conditions to transition to contingency operations when required.

**Campaign Planning**

Campaigns and campaign planning follow the **principles of joint operations** while synchronizing efforts throughout the OE with all participants. Examples include:

- **Objective.** Clear campaign objectives must be articulated and understood across the joint force.

- **Unity of Command.** Unity of command means all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose.
- **Economy of Force.** Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces to achieve campaign objectives.

- **Legitimacy.** Legitimacy is based on the actual and perceived legality, morality, and rightness of actions from the perspectives of interested audiences.

**Resource-Informed Planning (Capability Assignment, Apportionment, Allocation)**

JSCP-directed campaigns, unlike contingency plans, are not just plans, they are campaigns in execution. They are constrained by the readiness and availability of resources and authorities and forecast future requirements based on projected results of current ongoing operations and activities.

Campaign planning requires planning across four resource timeframes (fiscal year [FY] 1, Current Year; FY 2, Budget Year; FY 3, Program Year, and; FY 4, Out Year):

- The commander develops and briefs the campaign plan for the upcoming year, considering the budget year forecast, assigned and allocated forces, and force apportionment tables.

- The commander uses the current and budget year allocation, combined with the assessment, to develop a budget and resource request for the program years.

**Elements of a Combatant Command Campaign Plan**

The CCP consists of all plans contained within the established theater or functional responsibilities, to include contingency plans, subordinate and supporting plans, posture plans, country-specific security cooperation sections for country plans (for CCMDs with designated AORs), and operations in execution.

**Assessing Campaign Plans**

Campaign plan assessments determine the progress toward creating the conditions necessary to achieve campaign plan objectives. Campaign assessments enable the CCDR and supporting organizations to refine or adapt the campaign plan and supporting plans to achieve the campaign objectives or, with
SecDef approval, to adapt the JSCP-directed objectives to changes in the strategic and operational environments.

**Risk**

CCMDs assess how strongly US interests are held within their respective areas, how those interests can be threatened, and their ability to execute assigned missions to protect them and achieve US national objectives. This is documented in the CCDR’s strategic estimate and input to the annual joint assessment.

**Opportunity**

CCDRs need to identify opportunities they can exploit to influence the situation in a positive direction. Limited windows of opportunity may open and the CCDR must be ready to exploit these to set the conditions that will lead to successful transformation of the conflict and thus to transition. This should be done in collaboration with interagency partners, international partners, and partner nations who may have assessment tools that look for opportunities to enhance resilience and mitigate conflict.

**Operational Assessment**

The starting point for operation assessment activities coincides with the initiation of joint planning. Integrating assessments into the planning cycle helps the commander ensure the operational approach remains feasible and acceptable in the context of higher policy, guidance, and orders. This integrated approach optimizes the feedback senior leadership needs to appropriately refine, adapt, or terminate planning to be effective in the OE.

**The Purpose of Operation Assessment in Joint Operations**

Operation assessments help the commander and staff determine progress toward mission accomplishment. Assessment results enhance the commander’s decision making, enable more effective operations, and help the commander and the staff to keep pace with a constantly evolving OE.

**Tenets of Operation Assessment**

The following tenets should guide the commander and the staff throughout assessment:
Executive Summary

- **Commander Centricity.** The commander’s involvement in operation assessment is essential.

- **Subordinate Commander Involvement.** Assessments are more effective when used to support conversations between commanders at different echelons.

- **Integration.** Staff integration is crucial to planning and executing effective assessments.

- **Integration into the Planning Process and Battle Rhythm.** To deliver information at the right time, the operation assessment should be synchronized with the commander’s decision cycle.

- **Integration of External Sources of Information.** Operation assessment should allow the commander and staff to integrate information that updates the understanding of the OE to plan more effective operations.

- **Credibility and Transparency.** Assessment reports should cite all sources of information used to build the report.

- **Continuous Operation Assessment.** While an operation assessment product may be developed on a specific schedule, assessment is continuous in any operation.

**Staff Organization for Operation Assessment**

Cross-functional staff representation is required to effectively analyze progress toward achieving objectives. This provides the assessment activity with varied perspectives and broad expertise that are necessary for the assessment’s credibility and rigor.

**Conducting Operation Assessment**

The assessment process is continuous. Throughout the JPP, assessment provides support to and is supported by operational design and operational art. The assessment process complements and is concurrent with the JPP in developing specific and measurable task-based end states, objectives, and effects during operational design.
Transition to Execution

Effective planning enables transition. Integrated staff effort during planning ensures the plan is a team effort and the knowledge gained across the staff in the planning process is shared and retained. This staff work assists in identifying changes in the OE and guidance, speeding transition to execution.

The decision to execute will often be presented as an examination of options in response to a developing crisis or action by a competitor state or threat (state or non-state) rather than a specific directive to execute a specific concept plan or operation plan.

Types of Transition

There are three possible conditions for transitioning planning to execution.

- **Contingency Plan Execution.** Contingency plans are planned in advance to typically address an anticipated crisis.

- **Crisis Planning to Execution.** Crisis planning is conducted when an emergent situation arises.

- **Campaign Plan Execution.** Activities within CCPs are in constant execution.

Transition Process

The transition process to contingency plan execution originates in the planning section with significant support from the intelligence staff. Planners synthesize strategic guidance from intelligence and existing plans. The output of this synthesis is a hand-off briefing to the crisis planning lead for the command. For crisis planning execution, plan transition follows similar steps but within the staff section responsible for crisis planning.

Tools to Aid Transition

**Rehearsals, Exercises, and Staff Walks.** For most likely contingencies, the commander may hold rehearsals to ensure transition activities are understood and the staff assessed.

**Transition Book.** Commands may develop a condensed primer for the commander and staff that
provides a rapid overview of options and requirements for a response.

**Staff Checklists.** Staff section should develop detailed checklists by both functional areas and timeline on actions required to support crisis execution.

**Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs).** Which of the CCIRs fall within the staff’s responsibilities? What else does the commander need to know within the staff’s responsibilities?

**Points of Contact (POCs) Lists.** Although not specifically part of the plan, planners should have available a list of key POCs.

**Conclusion**

This publication is the keystone document for joint planning. It provides the doctrinal foundation and fundamental principles that guide the Armed Forces of the United States in planning joint campaigns and operations.
CHAPTER I
JOINT PLANNING

I tell this story to illustrate the truth of the statement I heard long ago in the Army: Plans are worthless, but planning is everything. There is a very great distinction because when you are planning for an emergency you must start with this one thing: the very definition of “emergency” is that it is unexpected, therefore it is not going to happen the way you are planning.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower
34th President of the United States
1953-1961

1. Overview

a. Joint planning is the deliberate process of determining how to implement strategic guidance: how (the ways) to use military capabilities (the means) in time and space to achieve objectives (the ends) within an acceptable level of risk. Ideally, planning begins with specified national strategic objectives and military end states to provide a unifying purpose around which actions and resources are focused. Leaders conduct joint planning to understand the strategic and operational environments to determine the best methods for employing the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) capabilities to achieve national objectives. Joint planning identifies military ways and means the President can align with other instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, economic). In the process, joint planning frames the problem; aligns ends, ways, and means; develops operational approaches; accounts for risk; and gives leaders decision space with proposed military options. Combatant commanders (CCDRs) may propose objectives for the President and Secretary of Defense’s (SecDef’s) consideration before beginning detailed planning. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), as the principal military advisor to the President and SecDef, may offer military advice on the proposed objectives and global prioritization.

b. The strategic environment is uncertain, complex, and dynamic. The joint force will increasingly operate in a transregional (across multiple areas of responsibility [AORs]), all-domain (land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace), and multifunctional (integration of the seven joint functions) environment. Rapid advancements in cyberspace and information capabilities such as artificial intelligence, digital editing, and Internet applications enable rapid sharing of information and narratives, from areas of conflict to national leaders and the global public. This shared information can include digitally manufactured events. An expanding range of adversaries, both state and non-state, can purchase, manufacture, and employ high-tech, homemade weapons that may create problems for nation-states. Although the character of conflict is evolving, the nature of war remains constant—the ability to impose our will on another party to achieve a national objective through the sanctioned use of force.

c. Global integration is the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to address transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional challenges. The joint force pursues global integration for SecDef through a top-down, CJCS-led approach to integrate
planning, prioritize resources, mitigate risk, and assess joint force progress toward strategic objectives. Strategies, operations, and plans are coordinated worldwide and nested in a whole-of-government approach. Worldwide coordination includes not only within the United States Government (USG) but also our partners and allies.

d. Joint planning serves two critical purposes at the combatant command (CCMD) and subordinate joint force level:

(1) At the strategic level, joint planning provides the President and SecDef with options and advice to achieve the National Security Strategy of the United States of America [short title: National Security Strategy (NSS)] objectives through the employment of the joint force. Planning supports decision making by identifying courses of action (COAs) available along with probable outcomes, costs, and risks.

(2) At the operational level, joint planning translates national-level guidance into specific activities aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives and attaining the military end state as directed in the (U) National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2018 [short title: (U) National Military Strategy (NMS)]; 2018-2020 Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) [short title: Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG)]; and Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.01, (U) 2018 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) [short title: JSCP]. Joint planning ties the training, mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities of joint forces to achieve military objectives in the service of enduring national interests.

2. Strategy, Plans, Operations, and Assessments Cycle

a. The strategy, plans, operations, and assessments are inexorably intertwined. Plans translate the broad intent provided by a strategy into operations; successful operations achieve the strategy’s objectives. The effects of operations, successful or otherwise, change the strategic environment and the operational environment (OE). To maintain a competitive advantage, the joint force should constantly evaluate effects and objectives, align them with strategic objectives, and verify that they are still relevant and feasible. Joint forces, through their assessments, identify when their actions begin to negatively affect the OE and change their operations and activities to create the desired effects and better align actions and objectives.

b. Throughout planning and execution, commanders and staffs assess conditions and effects to identify whether changes in the OE support national strategic interests. In developing the commander’s information requirements, the commander and staff identify key elements of the OE as indicators for success or failure to continuously align the strategy with national strategic interests. The commander updates the command’s strategy or operational approach to reflect the changed OE and ensure continued coherence with national policy. Simultaneously, the commander also updates operations to reflect the changed OE and updated strategy.
3. Planning

a. Joint planning is the art and science of interpreting direction and guidance, translating them into executable activities within imposed limitations, and assessing the environment to place the joint force in the best position to achieve objectives. Planning enables leaders to identify cost-benefit relationships, risks, and tradeoffs to determine the preferred COA.

b. The four planning functions of strategic guidance, concept development, plan development, and plan assessment are generally sequential, but they often run simultaneously to accelerate the process. Leaders may direct staffs to refine or adapt a plan by entering the planning process through any of the functions. Planners adapt to changes in guidance and the OE during each planning function. The joint planning and execution community (JPEC) synchronizes plans in the USG through ongoing civil-military dialogue. For the discussion on planning functions, see Chapter III, “Joint Planning Process,” paragraph 5, “Planning Functions.”

c. Strategy, Strategic Art, Operational Art, and Operational Planning

(1) Strategy is a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and multinational objectives. Strategy is also the art and science of determining a future state or condition (ends), conveying this to an audience, determining the possible approaches (ways), and identifying the authorities and resources (e.g., time, forces, equipment, and money—means) to achieve the intended objective, all while managing the associated risk.

(2) Strategic art is the formulation, coordination, and application of ends, ways, and means to implement policy and promote national interests. Practitioners evaluate the competing interests and objectives of state and non-state actors in the OE, organize joint forces to implement policy, and sense when revision is prudent. Strategies should provide a coherent narrative to bridge the present to the future. Enduring, effective strategy provides the conceptual basis for an integrated military operation or campaign. Visualization and conceptualization of strategic success achieved or supported by military means is the foundation of operational art and operational design. The essence of strategic art is distillation—organizing and articulating the complex interrelationship between national interests, policy, strategic ends, and practice, in clear terms.

(3) Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, means, and evaluating risks. In planning, many activities are done through a scientific methodology. These include identifying strengths and weaknesses of the opponent, validating requirements through checklists, and comparing the outcomes of analysis. However, planning for conflict and war is best based on operational art and the broad knowledge of commanders and planners that are not easily categorized.
(4) Strategic art and operational art are mutually supporting. Strategic art provides policy context to objectives, while operational art demonstrates the feasibility and efficacy of a strategy. Operational planning translates strategy into executable activities, operations, and campaigns, within resource and policy limitations to achieve objectives.

d. Understanding Problems

(1) To provide definitive focus for the development of a strategy or plan, a clear, concise, and precise problem statement is essential. At its most basic, the problem statement answers the question “what is the nature of our problem?” While the problem statement should be as factual as possible, it is fundamentally a contextual hypothesis regarding the underlying causes of situations in complex and ambiguous environments. Even relatively minor differences in the hypothesis can drive substantial differences in the resultant strategy and plan. Problem statements may need to be refined, revisited, or validated as operations unfold and the OE becomes better understood or changes.

(2) The second question commanders and staffs need to ask themselves before beginning work is, “Who is best suited to lead and/or resolve the problem?” In many cases along the competition continuum, it may be a non-DOD lead or require extensive efforts from non-DOD assets or organizations. After this analysis, the requisite interorganizational entity can be brought into the beginning of the planning process. Assessment of the OE, including contributing CCMDs and other organizations, keeps the commander’s strategic estimate current, increases its influence, strengthens planning, and improves execution.

(3) Planners distinguish symptoms from root causes when defining problems and developing strategies and plans. Before planning, commanders and staffs should ask, “What problem are we really being asked to solve?” The root cause may not be articulated in strategic guidance. Identifying root causes should begin the civilian-military dialogue at the national level, as well as dialogue between the CCDR and JPEC stakeholders at the theater and functional level. For instance, killing or detaining insurgents seldom addresses the underlying causes of an insurgency. In fact, military action may exacerbate problems rather than solve them. Identifying the underlying problems informs commanders so they can develop operation or campaign plans to prevent, prepare for, or mitigate contingencies.

(4) Understanding the problem enables planners to define desired objectives early in the planning process. By correctly identifying and understanding objectives and military end states, the planner should be able to articulate whether proposed planning tasks address only symptoms of the problem, rather than providing a solution. If strategic guidance appears to address only symptoms, other options for using the military instrument of national power should be raised through civil-military discussions.

*See Chapter IV, “Operational Design,” for more detailed discussion of identifying and understanding problems.*
4. Principles of Planning

a. Focused on the Objective. Joint planning is oriented on achieving an objective: plans and actions should contribute to achieving national objectives. Planning begins by identifying the associated national objectives. The commander and staff evaluate strategic guidance, analyze the OE, and coordinate with senior leadership to identify national objectives. Joint planners align plans with national priorities and direct them to achieve national objectives. Planning also identifies and articulates the problem set against which military effort might be applied. The Joint Staff (JS), CCDR, Service, and National Guard Bureau (NGB) staffs work with DOD leadership in this effort. The CCDR, staff, Services, NGB, and SecDef (or designated representative) view problems from different perspectives. Examining and discussing the different perspectives is essential, because a directed military end state or objective may not necessarily result in the strategic objective envisioned by policymakers. Commanders, with their staffs, identify gaps between the directed military end states, the capabilities and limitations of employing the military, and the desired national objectives and then discuss such gaps with DOD leaders.

b. Globally Integrated and Coordinated. Integrated planning synchronizes resources and integrates timelines, decision points, and authorities across CCMDs to enable the achievement of strategic and operational objectives. It should produce a shared understanding across the joint force of the threat environment, required decisions, resource prioritization, and risk. Integrated planning increases collaboration through robust JPEC coordination and across the whole-of-government to address the challenges facing the United States. Integrated planning recognizes the necessity to inform strategy that spans the competition continuum, requiring alignment of campaign and contingency planning.

(1) Integrated planning addresses complex strategic challenges that span multiple CCMD AORs and functional responsibilities. Integrated planning synchronizes resources and integrates timelines, decision matrices, and authorities across CCMDs, the JS, NGB, DOD agencies, interagency partners, and multinational partners. Integrating plan development, in-progress reviews (IPRs), and assessment provides national leadership a holistic understanding of how a conflict could realistically develop, options for response, and how operations by one CCMD could affect the broader global OE.

(2) Military forces alone cannot achieve national objectives. Joint forces must coordinate with USG departments and agencies (e.g., Department of State [DOS] for foreign operations and Department of Homeland Security for domestic efforts), allied and partner nations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations, commercial entities (e.g., contractors), and local and regional stakeholders. Within an operational area (OA), the commander will also utilize network engagement, seeking to partner with friendly networks, engage neutral networks, and counter threat networks. In most cases, these networks will have ties with diasporas or links with international elements of a particular network. Networks that will form, evolve, dissolve, and reform in different arrangements. Individuals will often belong to several types of networks at the same time. Joint force commanders (JFCs) and staffs consider how to interact with friendly and neutral networks and how to counter threat networks. Planners coordinate and
Chapter I

synchronize joint force actions with the operations of these networks and align military actions and resources with international organizations’ and NGOs’ functions, consistent with legal authorities. For more information on network engagement, see Joint Publication (JP) 3-25, *Countering Threat Networks*.

c. **Resource Informed.** Joint planning is resource informed and time constrained. When translating strategic guidance into joint plans and orders, planners must provide a realistic proposal for the application of forces, given current readiness, availability, location, posture, available transportation, and speed of movement. Planning assumes operations will employ forces and capabilities currently available—not future capabilities or capacities. Planners must consider that available resources may change during plan execution.

d. **Risk Informed.** Planners assess and articulate risks and identify potential mitigation. Identification and communication of risk is fundamental in joint planning. In general, risk entails the probability and severity of loss linked to hazards. The severity of risk is determined by both likelihood of occurrence and magnitude of damage if the risk manifests.

(1) In most cases risk and resources have an inverse relationship. As the level of resource commitment to a plan increases, the level of risk to that plan decreases. Planning can identify additional resources that would reduce risk associated with the plan. However, national resources are inherently finite, and their use, or even planned use, may weaken overall US security by creating opportunity costs and elevated risk elsewhere.

(2) Assumptions are suppositions taken as true in the absence of proof. They are unavoidable in planning, but using assumptions incurs risk. Planners must identify the role of assumptions in their plans and the impact if key assumptions are invalid. Similarly, planners must also identify the impact of constraints and restraints on the operation. Any assumption that is not validated, to include assumptions from strategic or higher headquarters guidance, becomes a risk to either the mission, force, or both.

(3) There is no magic formula for quantification of risk. Planners must provide decision makers an assessment of the expected risks, costs, and benefits, as well as the potential consequences of proposed military actions. This facilitates decisions to reduce, control, or accept risk through a shared knowledge of potential consequences.

e. **Framed within the Strategic Environment and OE.** Planning requires an understanding of the OE as it exists and as it changes. Unlike concepts and future development, adaptive planning is based on continuous monitoring and analysis of conditions affecting the OE (e.g., current friendly and threat postures, readiness, geopolitical conditions, and perceptions of relevant state and non-state actors). Adaptive planning identifies changes that will improve the probability of success or mitigate risks (i.e., additional forces; partner nation contributions; agreements, access, basing, and overflight permissions; preparation activities, including prepositioning). However, until those changes are implemented, the starting position for any plan is the current OE.
Joint Planning

Planners should not assume away contentious issues or conditions. Adversaries can be expected to take action to set the conditions to their advantage in the theater and information environment and, perhaps, globally during competition and times of crisis. Adversaries’ actions, and the changes they cause to the OE, may challenge the assumptions of US plans or campaigns.

f. Informs Decision Making. Joint planning must be agile and flexible enough to provide senior leadership with information to make critical decisions. It must identify the most significant contextual issues, key assumptions, likely resource requirements, costs and cost-benefit trade-offs, and risks associated with different COAs. It must do this in a manner that enables key leaders to make decisions that best serve national interests.

g. Adaptive and Flexible. Planning is an adaptive process that occurs in a networked, collaborative environment. It requires dialogue among senior leaders; concurrent plan development; and collaboration across strategic, operational, and tactical planning levels. Early planning guidance and frequent interaction between senior leaders and planners promotes a shared understanding of the complex operational problem, strategic and military objectives, mission, assumptions, considerations, risks, and other factors. Clear strategic guidance ensures joint planners are in sync with senior leaders as they prepare, refine, and adapt plans to an ever-changing OE. If clear strategic guidance has not been provided, or incongruities emerge, clarification of strategic objectives becomes paramount. This enables adaptive planning to produce and maintain up-to-date plans and to provide viable, flexible COAs for commanders, or in the case of top priority plans, for SecDef or the President to consider.

5. Planning Products

Joint planning encompasses the preparation of a number of planning and execution-related products. While the planning process is generally the same for campaign, contingency, or crisis planning, the output or products may differ. Campaign and contingency planning encompasses the preparation of plans that occur in non-crisis situations with a timeline generally not driven by external events. Crisis planning uses the same process but is typically driven by external events and is almost always time-constrained. Combatant command campaign plans (CCPs) provide the means to translate strategic guidance into activities executable by CCMDs. CCPs link current operations to contingency plans. The planner needs to know the type of plan and the detail required. The two basic types of plans are campaign and contingency plans. Both can have four levels of detail: commander’s estimate, base plan (BPLAN), concept plan (CONPLAN), and operation plan (OPLAN).

**KEY TERM**

Adaptive planning is the ability to develop options, update, or change a plan rapidly, based on changes in the operational and strategic environment, such as changes in policy guidance or objectives, resources and available forces, threat assessments, and posture.
a. **Campaign Plans.** Campaign plans organize the day-to-day operations of the joint force to shape the OE and achieve national objectives. They establish objectives, conditions, and tasks under which the CCMD and Service components build operations, activities, and investments to achieve objectives (set conditions) in support of national policy. CCMD campaigns are proactive and rarely feature a single measure of military success implying victory in the traditional sense.

1. A campaign is a series of related military operations to achieve strategic and operational objectives in a given time and space. Campaigns are planned when contemplated objectives exceed the scope of a single operation. Thus, campaigns are often the most extensive joint operations in terms of time and other resources. CCDRs document the full scope of their campaigns in plans that include the campaign plan and all of its subordinate and supporting plans.

   - CCDRs plan and conduct campaigns and operations, while Service and functional components conduct operations, activities, battles, and engagements but not independent campaigns. CCDRs can plan and conduct subordinate campaigns or operations in support of another CCDR’s campaign. While intended primarily to guide the use of military power, discussions and decisions at the national level provide guidance for employing the different instruments of national power and should be included in the campaign plan, as should the efforts of various interorganizational partners, to achieve national objectives.

   - Campaign plans implement a CCDR’s strategy by integrating all CCMD current activities and establishing the conditions for contingency (potential) operations. A CCDR’s strategy and resultant campaign plan should be designed to achieve prioritized campaign objectives and integrate and synchronize all subordinate and supporting planning and operations. Campaign plans also help the CCDR identify resources required to achieve objectives and tasks directed in the CPG and JSCP for input into budget and force allocation requests.

   - Daily operations and activities should be designed to achieve national strategic objectives; to compete, deter, and prepare for crises identified in the *2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge* [short title: *(U)* National Defense Strategy (NDS)], NMS, CPG, JSCP, and other strategic guidance; and to facilitate transition into a contingency operation. The campaign plan is the primary vehicle to organize, integrate, and execute security cooperation activities. Country-specific security cooperation plans are codified within the country-specific security cooperation section (CSCS) of the campaign plan.

   - Under this construct, plans developed to respond to contingencies are best understood as branches to the overarching campaign plan (global, functional, CCMD, or regional). They address scenarios that put one or more US strategic objectives in jeopardy and leave the United States no recourse other than to address the problem through military actions, not as part of an ongoing campaign or operation. Military actions can be in response to many scenarios, including armed aggression, regional instability, a
humanitarian crisis, or a natural disaster. Contingency plans should provide a range of military options, to include flexible deterrent options (FDOs) or flexible response options (FROs), and should be coordinated with the total USG response.

(e) United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) leads collaborative planning efforts to align and harmonize logistics functions and recommend sequencing of logistics actions primarily by guiding the development of theater distribution plans (TDPs) that support the CCP and other OPLANs.

(2) Types of Campaign Plans

(a) **Global Campaign Plans (GCPs).** GCPs address threats and challenges that significantly affect US interests across the globe and require coordinated planning across all, or nearly all, CCMDs. GCPs are identified in the JSCP based on guidance in the NDS and NMS and are managed by the CJCS in the role as global integrator on behalf of SecDef. GCPs form the base of the JSCP.

(b) **Regional Campaign Plans (RCPs).** Regional planning guidance addresses regional threats or challenges that require coordination across multiple CCMDs. Generally, issues that require RCPs are not as significant a threat to US interests as GCPs but require attention to ensure they do not devolve into a more significant crisis. If necessary, SecDef, through the CJCS, could direct an RCP with a designated coordinating authority.

(c) **Functional Campaign Plans (FCPs).** FCPs address functional threats or challenges that are not geographically constrained and require coordination across multiple CCMDs.

(d) **CCPs.** CCPs are the centerpiece of the CCMDs’ planning construct and operationalize CCMD strategies. CCPs incorporate intermediate objectives and tasks assigned to the CCMD from the GCPs, RCPs, and FCPs within their geographic AOR or functional area. They link support and contingency plans, set priorities, and identify risks in requirements placed on the CCMD. CCPs focus the command’s day-to-day activities, which include ongoing operations and military engagement, including security cooperation, exercises, deterrence, and other shaping or preventive activities. CCPs organize and align operations, activities, and investments with resources to achieve the CCMD’s objectives and complement related USG efforts in the theater or functional areas. CCDRs identify the resources assigned and allocated to the CCMDs, prioritize objectives, and commit those resources to shape the OE and support the national strategic objectives. CCDRs evaluate the commitment of resources and make recommendations to civilian leadership on future resources and national efforts associated with executing the command’s missions.

b. **Contingency plans** are typically prepared in advance to address an anticipated crisis and must be modified during execution to respond to conditions at the time of
execution. If there is an approved contingency plan that closely resembles the emergent scenario, that plan can be refined or adapted as necessary and executed.

(1) Contingency plans are branches of GCPs, FCPs, or RCPs that are planned for designated threats, catastrophic events, and contingent missions without a crisis at-hand, pursuant to the strategic guidance in the Unified Command Plan (UCP), CPG, and JSCP and guidance given by the CCDR. The UCP, CPG, and JSCP guide the development of contingency plans, which address potential threats that put one or more national interest at risk in ways that warrant military operations. Contingency plans are built to account for the possibility that campaign activities could fail to prevent aggression, preclude large-scale instability in a key state or region, or respond to a natural disaster. An integrated contingency plan coordinates the activities of multiple CCMDs in time and space to respond to a single contingency that spans CCMD geographic boundaries or functional responsibilities. Designated coordinating authorities lead planning and assessments across CCMDs and provide recommendations to the CJCS for specific problem sets or missions.

(2) Global integration frameworks (GIFs) are strategic frameworks for decision making and integrating joint force activities across the competition and conflict continuum. The JS develops GIFs to facilitate CJCS advice to SecDef and the President on global risks, trade-offs, and opportunity costs across and within campaigns during a global crisis or conflict. GIFs are informed by existing campaign and contingency plans, including GCPs and integrated contingency plans. A GIF identifies tasks, priorities, considerations, and decisions associated with the joint force’s ability to meet global requirements during a crisis or conflict. GIFs also identify potential President or SecDef decisions required to execute the global response to a priority challenge. These decisions may include risk mitigation options, reallocation and escalation management decisions, or early actions to preserve optionality.

(3) Planners use the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG), Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP), existing contracts, and task orders to identify forces available for campaign and contingency plans. Planning for contingencies is based on hypothetical situations and therefore relies heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist when a crisis arises. Planning for a contingency encompasses the activities associated with the development of plans for the deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of forces and resources in response to potential crises identified in joint strategic planning documents. An existing plan with a similar scenario may be used to initiate planning in an emergent crisis situation. To accomplish this, planners develop a concept of operations (CONOPS) that details the assumptions; adversary forces; operation phases; prioritized missions; and force requirements, deployment, and positioning. Detailed, wargamed planning identifies force requirements and training in preparation for the most likely operational requirements. It also enables rapid comparison of the hypothetical conditions, operation phases, missions, and force requirements of existing contingency plans to the actual requirements of an emergent crisis. Contingency planning allows the JPEC to deepen its understanding of the OE and sharpen its analytical and planning expertise.
(a) The President or SecDef may issue an out-of-cycle directive or other guidance in response to new situations. The CJCS implements the President or SecDef’s planning guidance into orders or policy to direct the initiation of planning.

(b) Contingency plans are produced, reviewed, and updated periodically to maintain their relevance. Contingency planning most often addresses situations in which military options focus on combat operations but can address contingencies in which the joint force is in support from the onset. These include defense support of civil authorities, support to stabilization efforts, and foreign humanitarian assistance.

(c) Contingency plans are created by the entire JPEC in a collaborative process. The JPEC addresses all problem sets directed by the JSCP and other strategic guidance. The JPEC reviews JSCP-tasked plans prior to SecDef approval. Concurrently, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]) also reviews those plans for policy considerations. CCDRs may request a JPEC review for any tasked or untasked plans that pertain to their AOR. CCDRs may direct the development of additional plans by their commands to accomplish assigned or implied missions.

c. GIF Development and Review Process. The GIF development and review process begins with a detailed assessment of global implications for the joint force in the event of a crisis that may lead to contingency plan execution. The GIF review process begins with Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)-provided policy end states and an examination of the environment, including threat capabilities and likely enemy COAs. The process then analyzes the family of plans related to the designated problem set to determine friendly resource requirements and identify potential global shortfalls in readiness, resources, and capabilities. The output of the review is the GIF, which provides a framework for joint force-integrated activities while in crises or conflict and outlines decisions required by the President and SecDef for execution. The GIF also includes global options to manage escalation on terms favorable to the United States.

d. Planning Detail. Commanders develop plans to one of the four levels of planning detail or into an operation order (OPORD) (for execution).

(1) Level 1 Planning Detail—Commander’s Estimate. This level of planning has the least detail. It produces multiple COAs to address contingencies. The product for this level can be a COA briefing, command directive, commander’s estimate, or a memorandum with a proposed force list. The commander’s estimate provides SecDef with military COAs to meet a potential contingency. The estimate reflects the commander’s analysis of the various COAs and recommends a COA.

(2) Level 2 Planning Detail—BPLAN. A BPLAN describes the CONOPS, major forces, concepts of support, and anticipated timelines for completing the mission. It normally does not include annexes. A BPLAN may contain alternatives, including FDOs and FROs, to provide multiple options to address contingencies as they develop or to shape the developing situation.
(3) **Level 3 Planning Detail—CONPLAN.** A CONPLAN is an OPLAN in an abbreviated format. It may require considerable expansion or alteration to be converted into a complete and detailed level 4 OPLAN or an OPORD. It includes a plan summary; a BPLAN; and usually includes the following annexes: A (Task Organization), B (Intelligence), C (Operations), D (Logistics), J (Command Relationships), K (Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems), S (Special Technical Operations), V (Interagency-Interorganizational Coordination), and Z (Distribution). If the development of time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) is directed for the CONPLAN, the planning level is designated as 3T and requires consideration of intelligence community-assessed contested environment impacts on deployment and distribution operations. A CCMD may request a national intelligence support plan (NISP) be developed for level 3T contingency plans. A troop list and TPFDD also require an annex E (Personnel) and annex W (Operational Contract Support).

(4) **Level 4 Planning Detail—OPLAN.** An OPLAN is a complete and detailed plan. The OPLAN identifies the force requirements, functional support, and resources to execute the plan. It contains a full description of the CONOPS, all applicable annexes, a time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL) and a transportation-feasible notional TPFDD, as well as analysis of the impact of a potentially contested environment on the joint deployment and distribution enterprise (JDDE). A TPFDD phases unit requirements into the theater of operations to support the CONOPS and provide closure estimates. A CCMD may request a NISP be developed for level 4 OPLANS. An OPLAN is normally prepared when:

(a) The contingency threatens national security and requires detailed prior planning.

(b) The magnitude or timing of the contingency requires detailed planning.

(c) Detailed planning is required to support multinational planning.

(d) Detailed planning is necessary to determine force deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment requirements; identify resources to fill requirements; and validate shortfalls.

e. **Products of Planning in Crises**

(1) **Overview**

(a) A crisis is an incident or situation that creates a condition of such national security importance that the President or SecDef may consider a commitment of US military forces and resources to achieve or defend national objectives. Crises may evolve over time (e.g., escalating civil war, humanitarian crisis) or develop quickly (e.g., hostage rescue, natural disaster) with little or no warning and require accelerated decision making. Sometimes a single crisis may generate other crises elsewhere. Multiple crises can also concurrently impact two or more CCRDs. Furthermore, there may be a single threat with
transregional implications that simultaneously threaten two or more CCDRs. In these situations, supported and supporting command relationships may be fluid. Forces and capabilities committed to mitigate emergent threats will likely require dynamic reallocation or reprioritization. These situations, increasingly the norm, highlight the importance of integrated planning and making force management decisions from a risk-informed, global perspective. Planning in response to a crisis generally results in the publication of an order and the execution of an operation. Crisis planning should help senior leaders determine if a military response can help achieve the desired objective at acceptable cost and risk levels.

(b) Planning initiated in response to an emergent event or crisis uses the same construct as all other planning but is compressed to the time available. When possible, planners leverage previously prepared plans as a starting point in a crisis, modifying as required to meet the operational circumstances. If no previously developed plan is suitable, then planning begins from scratch. Regardless of whether a plan exists, a similar plan will be modified, or planning begins from scratch; the basic tenets of integrated planning always apply. In some cases, commanders and staffs may need to develop and approve a feasible COA with a notional TPFDD and assess possible contested environments, publish the plan or order, prepare forces, verify high-demand forces or capabilities (e.g., communications systems; lift; precision munitions; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR]) are sufficient, develop and execute an integrated intelligence plan [annex B (Intelligence)], and arrange sustainment for the employment of US military forces. Figure I-1 provides a comparison of planning for a contingency and planning in a crisis.

(c) In crises, planners’ situational awareness is updated by continuous all-source intelligence and operations reports and assessment of operational activities. Identifying suitable and feasible military options in a crisis requires flexible procedures that evaluate time available, utilize rapid and effective internal and external communications, and consider previous planning products.

(d) In a crisis or time-sensitive situation, the CCDR reviews previously prepared plans for suitability. The CCDR may refine or adapt these plans into an executable OPORD or develop an OPORD from scratch when no useful contingency plan exists.

(e) Planning, whether performed as part of the command’s daily operations or in response to a crisis, uses the same construct to facilitate unity of effort and the transition from planning to execution. These planning functions can be compressed or truncated in time sensitive conditions. Planning activities may be performed sequentially or concurrently, with supporting and subordinate plans or OPORDs being developed concurrently. The exact flow of activities is largely determined by the time available and by the significance of the crisis. The following paragraphs summarize a compressed planning process.

1. When the President, SecDef, or CJCS decides to develop military options, the CJCS issues a planning directive to the JPEC initiating the development of COAs. This planning directive may request that the supported commander submit a commander’s estimate of the situation with a recommended COA. Normally, the directive
Planning Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning for a Contingency</th>
<th>Planning in a Crisis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time Available</strong></td>
<td>As defined in authoritative directives (normally 6+ months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environment</strong></td>
<td>Distributed, collaborative planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Facts and Assumptions</strong></td>
<td>Significant use of assumptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JPEC Involvement</strong></td>
<td>Full JPEC participation (Note: JPEC participation may be limited for security reasons.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operational Activities</strong></td>
<td>Situational awareness Planning Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planning Functions</strong></td>
<td>Strategic guidance Concept development Plan development Plan assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Document Assigning Planning Task</strong></td>
<td>1. JSCP (CJCS)/CPG (SecDef) 2. Planning directive 3. WARNORD (for short suspense planning)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Forces for Planning</strong></td>
<td>Apportionment tables in GFMAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planning Guidance</strong></td>
<td>CJCS issues JSCP or WARNORD. CCDR issues PLANDIR and TPFDD LOI.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COA Selection</strong></td>
<td>CCDR prepares COAs and submits to CJCS and SecDef for review. Specific COA may or may not be selected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONOPS Approval</strong></td>
<td>SecDef approves planning or directs additional planning or changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Final Planning Product</strong></td>
<td>Campaign plan. Level 1–4 contingency plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Final Planning Product Approval</strong></td>
<td>CCDR submits final plan to CJCS for review and SecDef for approval.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Execution Document</strong></td>
<td>Not applicable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output</strong></td>
<td>Plan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend**

- ALERTORD: alert order
- CCDR: combatant commander
- COA: course of action
- CONOPS: concept of operations
- CPG: Contingency Planning Guidance
- EXORD: execute order
- JSCP: Joint Strategic Campaign Plan
- LOI: letter of instruction
- OPORD: operations order
- PLANDIR: planning directive
- PLANNORD: planning order
- SecDef: Secretary of Defense
- TPFDD: time-phased force and deployment data
- WARNORD: warning order community

**Figure I-1. Planning Comparison**

will be a warning order (WARNORD), but a planning order (PLANORD) or alert order (ALERTORD) may be used if the crisis warrants accelerated planning. In a quickly
developing crisis, the initial WARNORD may be communicated verbally with follow-on documentation to inform the JPEC. If the directive contains a force deployment preparation order or deployment order (DEPORD), SecDef approval is required.

2. The WARNORD should describe the situation, establish command relationships, and identify the mission and any planning constraints. It may identify forces and strategic mobility resources, or it may request that the supported commander develop these factors. It may establish tentative dates and times to commence mobilization, deployment, or employment, or it may solicit the recommendations of the supported commander regarding these dates and times. The WARNORD should also identify any planning assumptions, restraints, or constraints the President or SecDef have identified to shape the response. If the President, SecDef, or CJCS directs development of a specific option or especially a COA, the WARNORD will describe the COA and request the supported commander’s assessment. The amount of detail in the WARNORD depends on the known facts and time available. A WARNORD sample is in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance.

3. In response to the WARNORD, the supported commander, in collaboration with subordinate and supporting commanders and the rest of the JPEC, reviews existing joint contingency plans for applicability; accounts for contested environments; then develops, analyzes, and compares COAs and prepares a commander’s estimate. The commander’s estimate provides recommendations and advice to the President, SecDef, or higher headquarters for COA selection. Based on the supported commander’s guidance, supporting commanders begin their planning activities.

4. Although an existing plan almost never completely aligns with an emerging crisis, it can be used to facilitate rapid COA development and be modified to fit the specific situation. TPFDDs developed for specific plans are stored in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) database and are made available to the JPEC for review.

5. The CJCS, in consultation with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and JPEC, reviews and evaluates the supported CCDR’s estimate and provides recommendations and advice to the President and SecDef for COA selection. The supported CCDR’s COAs may be accepted, refined, or revised, or a new COA(s) may have to be developed. The President or SecDef selects a COA and directs that detailed planning be initiated.

6. Upon receiving directions from the President or SecDef, the CJCS issues a SecDef-approved ALERTORD to the JPEC. The order is a record communication stating the President or SecDef has approved the detailed development of a military plan to help resolve the crisis. The contents of an ALERTORD may vary depending upon the crisis and amount of prior planning accomplished, but it should always describe the selected COA in sufficient detail to allow the supported commander, in collaboration with
other members of the JPEC, to conduct detailed planning to deploy, employ, and sustain forces. However, the ALERTORD does not authorize execution of the approved COA.

7. The supported commander then develops an OPORD using the approved COA. The speed with which the OPORD is developed depends upon the amount of prior planning and the planning time available. The supported commander and subordinate commanders identify force requirements, contracted support requirements and management, existing contracts and task orders, and mobility resources, then describe the CONOPS in OPORD format. The supported commander reviews assigned and allocated forces that can be used. If a gap exists, the supported commander submits a request for forces (RFF) to the JS.

For a detailed description of the global force management (GFM) allocation process refer to CJCSM 3130.06, (U) Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures.

8. The supported CCDR submits the completed OPORD through the CJCS for SecDef or presidential approval. The President or SecDef may decide to begin deployment in anticipation of execution, execute the operation, place planning on hold, or cancel planning pending resolution by some other means. Detailed planning may transition to execution, as directed. If execution is not directed, the CCDR will maintain continuous situational awareness and adjust planning products as required.

9. Plan development continues after the President or SecDef’s execution decision. When the crisis does not lead to execution, the CJCS provides guidance regarding continued planning.

(f) Abbreviated Procedures. The preceding discussion describes planning activities sequentially. During a crisis, they may be conducted concurrently or be compressed, depending on conditions. The President or SecDef may also decide to commit forces shortly after an event occurs, significantly compressing planning activities. Although the allocation process has standard timelines, they may be accelerated. No specific length of time can be associated with any particular planning activity. Severe time constraints may require planning participants to pass information verbally, including the decision to commit forces. Verbal orders are followed up, as soon as practical, with written orders.

(2) Joint Orders. Upon approval, CCDRs and Services issue orders directing action (see Figure I-2). Formats for orders are in CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance. By the CJCS’s direction, the Joint Staff J-3 [Operations Directorate] develops, coordinates, and prepares orders. The JS J-3 prepares and coordinates the Secretary of Defense Orders Book to present recommendations to SecDef for decision.

(a) WARNORD. A WARNORD initiates the development and evaluation of military COAs by a supported commander and requests that the supported commander submit a commander’s estimate. If the order contains the deployment of forces, SecDef’s authorization is required.
Joint Orders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Order Type</th>
<th>Intended Action</th>
<th>Secretary of Defense Approval Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Warning Order</td>
<td>Initiates development and evaluation of COAs by supported commander. Requires commander's estimate be submitted.</td>
<td>No. Required when WARNORD includes deployment or deployment preparation actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Order</td>
<td>Begins planning for anticipated President or SecDef-selected COA. Directs preparation of OPORDs or contingency plan.</td>
<td>No. Conveys anticipated COA selection by the President or SecDef.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alert Order</td>
<td>Begins execution planning on President or SecDef-selected COA. Directs preparation of OPORD or contingency plan.</td>
<td>Yes. Conveys COA selection by the President or SecDef.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Order</td>
<td>Effect coordinated execution of an operation.</td>
<td>Specific to the OPORD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare To Deploy Order</td>
<td>Increase/decrease deployability posture of units.</td>
<td>Yes (if allocates force). Refers to five levels of deployability posture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment/ Redeployment Order</td>
<td>Deploy/redeploy forces. Establish C-day/L-hour. Increase deployability. Establish joint task force.</td>
<td>Yes (if allocates force). Required for movement of unit personnel and equipment into combatant commander's AOR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Execute Order</td>
<td>Implement President or SecDef decision directing execution of a COA or OPORD.</td>
<td>Yes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmentary Order</td>
<td>Issued as needed after an OPORD to change or modify the OPORD execution.</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-day</td>
<td>unnamed day on which a deployment operation begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-hour</td>
<td>specific hour on C-day at which deployment operation commences or is to commence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SecDef</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure I-2. Joint Orders

(b) **PLANORD.** A PLANORD provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of plan development before the directing authority approves a military COA.

(c) **ALERTORD.** An ALERTORD provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of plan development after the directing authority approves a military COA. An ALERTORD does not authorize execution of the approved COA.

(d) **Prepare to Deploy Order (PTDO).** A PTDO orders the force provider (FP) to have a unit ready and available to deploy within a specified response time. Unless otherwise stated, units placed on PTDO by the FP remain under the command and control...
(C2) of the FP. CJCSM 3130.06, (U) Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures, and the GFMIG discuss the PTDOs in more detail.

(e) **DEPORD.** A DEPORD, a planning directive from SecDef, issued by the CJCS, authorizes the transfer and allocation of forces among CCMDs, Services, and DOD agencies. It specifies the authorities the gaining CCDR will exercise over specified forces to be transferred. The GFMAP is a global DEPORD for all allocated forces. FPs deploy or prepare forces to deploy on a time frame as directed in the GFMAP. CJCSM 3130.06, (U) Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures, and the GFMIG discuss the DEPORD in more detail.

(f) **Execute Order (EXORD).** An EXORD is a directive to implement an approved CONOPS. Only the President and SecDef have the authority to approve and direct the initiation of military operations. The CJCS, by the authority of and at the direction of the President or SecDef, may subsequently issue an EXORD to initiate military operations. Supported and supporting commanders and subordinate JFCs use an EXORD to implement the approved CONOPS.

(g) **OPORD.** An OPORD is a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders to coordinate execution of an operation. Joint OPORDs are prepared under joint procedures in prescribed formats during a crisis.

(h) **Fragmentary Order (FRAGORD).** A FRAGORD is a modification to any previously issued order. It is issued to change an existing order or to execute a branch or sequel of an existing OPORD. It provides brief and specific directions that address only those parts of the original order that have changed.

For more information on plan and orders formats, see CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance, and Appendix A, “Joint Operation Plan Example.”

6. **Shared Understanding**

   a. **Civilian-Military Dialogue.** Strategy is developed and joint planning is conducted at the USG department level. Joint planning supports the interaction between senior DOD civilian leadership, CCDRs, and CJCS to help the President and SecDef decide when, where, and how to employ US military forces and resources. This interaction is iterative and collaborative and includes close coordination with the chief of mission, DOS, Department of Justice, and other USG interagency partners, depending on the mission.

   b. **Bridging Perspectives**

   (1) **Adaptive planning provides a range of options at the operational and strategic levels.** The complexity, rate of change, and inherent political nature of the strategic environment often drive policy makers to seek maximum strategic and operational flexibility. Consequently, policy guidance may lack sufficient specificity to guide joint planning. This lack of specificity may be driven by insufficient information, uncertainty
about available options or resources or evolving political considerations. SecDef, the CJCS, and the CCDRs may be able to provide information to help clarify policy guidance, but joint planners will continue planning with even only the broadest of policy aims.

(2) CCDRs identify how planned campaign activities and events achieve national security objectives. When objectives are poorly defined, military leaders should seek clarification. Dialogue between civilian policymakers and military leaders informs national policy. SecDef, the CJCS, and the CCDRs provide policy makers assessment of the impact of the campaign’s activities and the opportunities and risks associated with execution, delay, or cancellation of those activities. The dialogue should also evaluate how the campaign could establish conditions to prevent, prepare for, or mitigate contingencies. Planning should not halt due to unclear objectives; in these cases, commanders make assumptions necessary to continue planning.

c. Identifying Purpose, Objectives, and Desired Military End States

(1) Purpose. The purpose explains why the military action is being conducted. The purpose can help the force pursue the mission in the absence of further orders, even when actions do not unfold as planned. Thus, if an unanticipated situation arises, commanders understand the purpose of the action and can act decisively and within the higher commander’s intent.

(2) Objectives. Objectives and attainable goals are clearly defined, toward which operations are directed. They are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound. Objectives are markers used to assess the strategy and develop decision points.

(a) At the operational level, CCDRs identify, prioritize, and sequence intermediate objectives that support the achievement of the national-level objectives and associated conditions to support attainment of military end states. Intermediate objectives help assess progress toward the longer-range objectives established by the NDS, NMS, or JSCP. As intermediate objectives are achieved, commanders and their staffs reassess their vision of the military end state (for contingencies), their progress toward the longer-range objectives, and the need to change or alter the objectives or methods. Intermediate objectives also represent multiple actions that occur between initiation of a CCP and the achievement of campaign objectives. Intermediate objectives should identify discrete, identifiable, and measurable conditions or effects.

(b) At the tactical level, forces are arranged and employed to execute specific immediate tasks or missions. Although tactical tasks may not directly achieve operational or strategic objectives, the cumulative effects of the tactical events, coupled with operational and strategic events, should achieve those objectives. Both desired and undesired effects should be evaluated.

(3) Military End State. A military end state describes conditions that define mission success. It also describes how reaching the JFC’s military end state supports
higher headquarters’ national objectives. The military end state normally represents a period in time or set of conditions beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of national power to achieve remaining national objectives. Commanders and planners constantly assess the stated military end state against the OE, resources, or policy.

d. Providing Options and Aligning Resources

(1) CCDRs provide options for the use of the military in conjunction with other instruments of national power. Further planning enables CCDRs to develop COAs that identify costs (including casualties) and risks associated with the options, a timeline, required resources and capabilities, and probability of success or failure of the military objectives in contributing to the desired national strategic objectives.

(2) DOD seeks input from other USG departments and agencies to develop a shared understanding. Civilian and military leaders use shared understanding to identify and synchronize all instruments of national power to achieve strategic success.

(3) Partner-nation contributions can vary significantly based upon their capacity and current geopolitical situations and can dramatically alter the options and COAs available to a CCDR. Civilian and military leaders should identify partner-nations’ contributions early in the planning process to best integrate partner-nation contributions and capabilities and mitigate limitations. DOD and DOS leadership should identify who opens discussions with partner nations and when.

(4) The joint planning process (JPP) is a problem-solving technique designed for military planning. The planning staff typically uses the JPP to conduct detailed planning to fully develop options, identify resources, and identify and mitigate risk. Planners develop the CONOPS, force plans, deployment plans, and supporting plans that contain multiple COAs. Multiple COAs can provide joint forces options to adapt to a changing OE, while remaining consistent with the JFC’s intent. Such action should create acceptable options for military and civilian decision makers. Chapter III, “Joint Planning Process,” discusses the JPP in more detail.

7. Risk Identification and Mitigation

a. Identifying Risk

(1) Risk is the probability and consequence of an event causing harm to something valued. Commanders and senior leaders should account for risk when evaluating the likelihood of mission success. Risk can be assessed through the cost imposed by, or the impact on, achievement of the objective. Military risk is the estimated probability and consequence of the joint force’s projected inability to achieve current or future military objectives (risk-to-mission), while providing and sustaining sufficient military resources (risk-to-force). Risks may result from enemy action, incorrect assumptions, limited resources, lack of preparation, friendly force activities, environment and terrain, and public opinion, among others. The most serious risks are the ones that
endanger mission success or pose significant threats to US national interests. The most likely risks are commonly the security of forces, sustainability of equipment, or delayed timelines.

(a) Operational risk (risk-to-mission) reflects the current force’s ability to achieve military objectives in the NMS with acceptable human, material, and financial costs. Operational risk is a function of the probability and consequence of failure to achieve mission objectives while protecting the force from unacceptable losses.

(b) Force management risk (risk-to-force) reflects a Service or joint force provider’s (JFP’s) ability to generate trained and ready forces within established rotation ratios and surge capacities to meet campaign and contingency mission requirements. Force management risk is a function of the probability and consequence of not maintaining force generation balance (“breaking the force”). This risk subset considers the capacity to execute plans today (e.g., “fight tonight” on the Korean peninsula) compared to contingency requirements (e.g., potential conflict arising over an economic exclusion zone or a disputed territory) in the near-to mid-term. This may identify dilemmas for DOD’s leadership, related to available forces for campaigns or contingencies and their assessment of risk to other planned or potential missions, and the overall NSS.

For more information on joint risk; analysis methodology; and guidance for identifying, assessing, and managing risk, see CJCSM 3105.01, Joint Risk Analysis.

(2) Risk assessment is initially conducted during mission analysis and is updated throughout the planning process. During planning, assumptions that are logical, realistic, and essential for planning are used in the absence of facts. Assumptions are reviewed continuously to determine their continued validity. An assumption used in planning may subsequently cause the development of a branch plan. When sufficient information is received to invalidate an assumption, it may create the need to make changes to the plan or develop a new COA or plan.

(3) If there is a reasonable expectation that required resources will not be available, the CCMD will develop an alternative approach with available resources or resources that are expected to be available. CCMDs should solicit the advice of the Services, other CCMDs, JFPs, Joint Staff J-35 [Joint Force Coordinator], joint functional managers (JFMs) as applicable, and other FPs in identifying preferred forces. For more information on shortfall identification, see Chapter III, “Joint Planning Process,” subparagraph 7.h.(4), “Shortfall Identification.”

b. Mitigating Risk. Planners and CCDRs identify methods to mitigate risk as part of the plan. Methods to mitigate risk include:

(1) Reducing the Likelihood of Occurrence. Reduce risk by decreasing the likelihood of events that can negatively affect our efforts. Mitigation measures may include protective safety measures (e.g., mandating the use of malaria prophylaxis in high-risk areas), funding installation resiliency efforts (e.g., redundancy in critical infrastructure
and systems at forward locations), informing an audience about the risk involved to discourage behavior in support of the event, and avoiding a potential hazard (e.g., using proven low-water crossings rather than untested bridges).

(2) **Reducing the Cost of Occurrence.** Reduce risk by decreasing the potential negative effect of these events if they were to occur. Mitigation measures may include reactive safety measures (e.g., placing a corpsman/medic with an infantry platoon) and dispersion (e.g., placing capabilities at multiple locations so that an attack at one will affect only capacity).

(3) **Increasing Nonorganic Support.** Reduce risk by use of contracted support or host-nation support (HNS) to address shortfalls in forces and limitations associated with strategic lift and to enable the deployment of combat forces in lieu of combat service support forces.

c. **Residual Risk.** Risk cannot be completely eliminated, regardless of mitigation efforts. Identification of residual risk to senior leaders builds common understanding and clarifies decisions they must make and their potential effects. Commanders should understand the impact of residual risk prior to mission execution.

d. **Risk Discussion.** Commanders will discuss risk with senior leaders. Strategic-level risk is primarily political (e.g., impact on the US public, allies, adversaries, enemies, US objectives, and future US status). Consultations with interagency counterparts can supplement CCDRs’ risk assessments with additional perspectives vital to senior leader decision making.

(1) Risk discussions should be based on concrete terms and contextual accuracy to enable and support decision making. Not all elements of risk can be quantified; analytic and modeling outputs are not always accurate. However, quantifying statements by using phrases such as “in our analysis, the mission will take six months versus two months,” or “we expect casualties to increase from x to y,” planners can better inform commanders and senior leaders of the differences between COAs.

(2) CCDRs provide their analysis of risk and its implications to senior civilian leaders and stakeholders associated with joint operations. Although CCDRs focus on military operations, they often have broad exposure to the implications and impact of the employment of the military, both at home and abroad. As a result, discussions with senior leaders may reveal issues that overlap with other instruments of national power (e.g., diplomatic, informational, and economic).

(3) The President and SecDef may identify options to mitigate risk not previously available to the CCDR and planners.

*See CJCSM 3105.01, Joint Risk Analysis, for additional information on risk assessment and communicating risk.*
8. Assessment

a. Commanders continually assess plans. At the CCMD-level, the JPEC and senior DOD leadership share this task. Assessments continuously measure the effectiveness of military operations and project the expected effectiveness of plans against contingencies as the OE changes. Assessments support decision making by measuring the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, achieving an objective, or attaining a military end state.

b. Assessments monitor and analyze changes in the OE, determine the most likely potential causes for those changes, identify opportunities and risks, and provide recommendations to improve operation or campaign performance. Integrating assessment throughout plan development and post-approval refinement and adaptation keeps the plan relevant and ready for transition to execution.

c. Commanders drive assessment. They are assisted by their staffs, supporting commanders, and subordinate commanders, along with interagency and multinational partners and other stakeholders. Operation assessment applies during all military activities and operations, providing the opportunity for correction and adaptation. Assessment mechanisms and the assessment processes may differ at the tactical, operational, theater, global, and strategic levels, depending upon the commander’s pace of decision making and the OE analysis capabilities. Some assessments may be qualitative vice quantitative, making evaluation more challenging.

(1) Operation assessments link the employment of forces and resources to intelligence analysis of the OE. An operation assessment framework helps organize and analyze data and communicate recommendations to the commander. This enables the commander to build processes that optimize the command’s capacity to monitor progress or regression and implement corrective changes during execution.

(2) Assessments help commands analyze changes in the OE, changes in strategic guidance, and other challenges facing the joint force throughout planning and execution. They can enable commanders to adapt and update plans and orders to achieve objectives. The OE changes because of constant interaction between enemy, adversary, friendly, and neutral elements. This interaction includes seemingly random and unpredictable events or friction, which further complicates and challenges execution.

(3) CCDRs with coordinating authority provide input to coordinate assessment requirements for integrated contingency plans. In execution, coordinating authority assessments evaluate global progress against the problem set or functional objectives to align execution with the achievement of national objectives.

See Chapter VI, “Operation Assessment,” for additional information on planning and conducting operation assessment.
Chapter I

9. Interorganizational Planning and Coordination

Interorganizational planning and coordination is the interaction among elements of DOD; participating USG departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government departments and agencies; international organizations; NGOs; and the private sector to achieve an objective. Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. Coordination of interorganizational and multinational plans facilitates unity of effort among multiple organizations by promoting common understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and consequences of military and nonmilitary actions. It also identifies common objectives and how military and civilian capabilities best complement each other to achieve these objectives.

a. Interagency Coordination. Interagency coordination is interaction among USG departments and agencies, including DOD, to achieve an objective. Interagency coordination links the US military and the other instruments of national power.

b. Strategic objectives are achieved through unified action built on unity of effort. This is accomplished by collaboration, synchronization, and coordination of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power. Military power is most effectively used in conjunction with the other instruments of national power to advance and defend US values, interests, and objectives. To accomplish this integration, the CCMDs, Services, and DOD agencies interact with non-DOD agencies and organizations to build mutual understanding of the OE, requirements, capabilities, limitations, and consequences of military and nonmilitary actions, as well as the understanding of the desired objectives and, if applicable, military end state. They also identify how military and civilian capabilities best complement each other. The National Security Council (NSC) integrates the instruments of national power by facilitating mutual understanding and cooperation and overseeing interagency planning efforts. Further, military and civilian organizations share information, cooperate, and strive together to make unity of effort possible. JFCs seek cooperation and build consensus to achieve unity of effort. Interagency and multinational consensus building is a key element to unity of effort.

c. CCDRs seek to involve relevant USG departments and agencies in all stages of planning, as directed in strategic guidance. CCDRs through the JS and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD[P]) to identify supporting and supported USG departments and agencies.

d. Collaboration and coordination with interagency partners is critical to successful operation and campaign activities, as well as transitions when JFCs may operate in support of other USG departments and agencies. JFCs and their staffs must evaluate how DOD capabilities can be synchronized with other USG departments and agencies’ capabilities to most effectively achieve broader national strategic objectives. CCMDs should coordinate directly with interagency representatives in their own command and with those in the
National Capital Region. This cooperation addresses key issues such as overflight rights and access agreements. Coordination with NGOs should normally be done through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) senior development advisor assigned to each geographic CCMD, the field-level civil-military coordinator assigned to the USAID mission, or the lead federal agency for contingencies in the United States.

e. The JPP allows for interagency review of plans or annexes when approved by the OUSD(P). Interagency plan reviews differ from DOD JPEC plan reviews in that inputs from non-DOD agencies are requested but not required. Additionally, non-DOD agency inputs are advisory and, while a valued part of the process, do not carry veto authority. Nevertheless, participating agencies can follow up on issues identified in the review, in accordance with guidance from the OUSD(P). Interagency plan-reviews issues may be raised with the NSC, if warranted.

f. Planning and Coordination with Other Agencies. Commanders integrate interagency inputs and concerns into joint plans. Annex V (Interagency-Interorganizational Coordination) of an OPLAN or OPORD is one tool that can be used to collaborate with interagency partners. CCMDs should seek approval from OSD to release this annex to relevant USG departments and agencies during development to gather their input at the earliest stage practicable. Annex V (Interagency-Interorganizational Coordination) should identify the anticipated capabilities required to accomplish tasks. Common understanding enables interagency planners to suggest other activities or partners that could contribute to the operation and to better determine support requirements. The staff considers interagency participation for each phase of the operation (see Chapter IV, “Operational Design,” for a discussion of phases).

g. Interagency Considerations

(1) Interagency coordination is complex. USG departments or agencies sometimes embrace differing and even conflicting policies, legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, procedures, decision-making processes, security classification constraints, communications and planning systems, and culture. Operations may be executed by nonmilitary organizations or NGOs with the military in support. In such instances, the understanding of military authorities, objectives, and, if appropriate, military end states may vary among the participants. The JFC must clearly articulate military capabilities, requirements, operational limitations, liaison, and legal considerations to interagency partners. Military planners must understand the relationships and the types of support they can provide interagency partners. Planners must also learn the supported organization’s processes, policies, and operational limitations to identify areas where they can assist. The joint force planner should also understand the supported organization’s planning process and products (such as federal interagency operational plans, or incident command systems for crisis planning) and how those processes align with the JPP. When other USG departments and agencies have provided institutional points of contact (POCs) for defense planning, planners should coordinate directly with these individuals. The JFC’s civil-military operations center, with oversight by the civil-military operations directorate of the command’s staff, can facilitate these relationships. Annex G (Civil-Military Operations)
should be closely coordinated with annex V (Interagency-Interorganizational Coordination). Products developed for network engagement will help inform other annexes and provide additional local and regional information that might not be identified in the JIPOE process. In the absence of a formal command structure, JFCs may need to build consensus to achieve unity of effort. Robust liaison efforts facilitate understanding, coordination, and mission accomplishment. Annex V (Interagency-Interorganizational Coordination) to the plan or order should address these considerations.

(2) Commanders and planners must identify the desired contributions of other agencies and organizations and communicate the desired contributions to OSD. Further, commanders and planners should identify limitations in their planning, such as indicating where agencies cannot act. It is critical to identify and communicate interagency-related risk to mission accomplishment. Potential mitigation should include COAs that do not entail the use of the military.

(3) When DOD supports other USG departments and agencies, coordination during the planning with key interagency stakeholders will improve unity of effort. As the situation evolves, interagency plans that include DOD are continuously assessed.

(4) The President, advised by the NSC, provides strategic direction to guide the efforts of USG departments and agencies and organizations that represent all instruments of national power.

For additional information on interagency considerations, see JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation; CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance, provides a planning outline for annex V (Interagency-Interorganizational Coordination).

10. Multinational Planning and Coordination

a. General. Multinational operations is a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations. Such operations are usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance, although other possible arrangements include supervision by an international organization (e.g., the United Nations [UN] or Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). Key to any multinational operation is unity of effort among national and military leaders of participating nations emphasizing common objectives and shared interests, as well as mutual support and respect. Agreement on clearly identified strategic and military end states for the multinational force (MNF) is essential to guide all multinational coordination, planning, and execution. Additionally, the cultivation and maintenance of personal relationships between counterparts in the participating nations are fundamental to achieving success. At times, US national interests may not be in complete agreement with those of the multinational organization or some of its individual nation states. In such situations, additional consultations and coordination will be required at the political and military levels for the establishment of a common set of operational objectives to support unity of effort among nations.
b. Joint planning will frequently be accomplished within the context of multinational planning. JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allied joint publication (AJP) doctrine covers US and allied multinational operations. However, there is no single doctrine for multinational action, and each MNF develops its own protocols, OPLANs, CONPLANs, and OPORDs. US planning for multinational operations should accommodate and complement such protocols and plans. JFCs must also anticipate and incorporate planning factors such as domestic and international laws, regulations, and operational limitations on the use of contributed forces, various weapons, and tactics.

(1) Joint forces should be trained and equipped for combat and noncombat operations with forces from other nations within the framework of an MNF under US or foreign command.

(2) MNF commanders develop multinational strategies and plans in multinational channels. Supporting US JFCs perform planning for multinational operations in US national channels. Coordination for these separate planning channels occurs at the national level through established multinational bodies or member nations. Coordination at the theater strategic and operational levels is conducted by JFCs who are responsible within both channels for planning matters. US doctrine and procedures for joint planning are also applicable to multinational challenges. The general considerations for interaction with international organizations and partner-nation organizations are similar to those for interaction with USG departments and agencies.

c. Operational-Level Integration

(1) The commander of US forces dedicated to a multinational military organization integrates joint planning with multinational planning at the operational level. Normally, this will be the CCDR or the subordinate JFC responsible for the geographic area where multinational operations are to be planned and executed. These commanders always function within two chains of command during any multinational operation: the multinational chain of command and the US national chain of command. Operating within multinational organizations, they command or support the designated MNF and plan, as appropriate, for multinational employment in accordance with the strategic guidance provided by multinational leadership. Operating within the US chain of command, they command US forces and prepare plans in response to strategic guidance from the President, SecDef, and the CJCS. These tasks include developing plans to support each multinational commitment within the AOR and planning for unilateral US contingencies within the same area. In this dual capacity, the US commander coordinates multinational planning with US planning.

(2) For NATO’s operations, the United States and other NATO countries have developed and ratified an Allied joint doctrine hierarchy of publications outlining the doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures that should be used during NATO operations. JFCs, their staffs, and subordinate forces should review and train with these publications prior to participating in NATO operations.
11. Strategic Guidance for Multinational Operations

a. Multinational operations start with diplomatic efforts to create a coalition or justify action of an alliance. Discussion and coordination between potential participants initially addresses basic questions at the national strategic level. These senior-level discussions could involve international organizations such as the UN or NATO, existing MNFs, or individual nations. The result of these discussions should:

   (1) Determine the nature and limits of the response.

   (2) Determine the command structure of the response force.

   (3) Determine the essential strategic guidance, to include military objectives and the desired strategic and military end states, for the response force.

b. A hierarchy of bilateral or multilateral bodies are established to support each MNF. The bodies define strategic and military objectives and end states, develop strategies, and coordinate strategic guidance for planning and executing multinational operations. Through dual involvement in national and multinational security processes, US national leaders integrate national and theater strategic planning with the MNF. Within the multinational structure, US participants develop objectives and strategies that are compatible with US capabilities and complement US interests, assigned missions, and tasks for participating US forces. Within the US national structure, international commitments impact the development of the NMS and CCDRs should adequately address relevant concerns in strategic guidance for joint planning.

c. Much of the information and guidance provided for unified action and joint operations remains applicable to multinational operations. However, commanders and staffs consider differences, including, but not limited to, partners’ laws, doctrine, organization, weapons, equipment, terminology, culture, politics, religion, language, and caveats on authorized military action throughout the entire operation. CCDRs and JFCs develop plans to align US forces, actions, and resources in support of the multinational plan.

d. When directed, designated US commanders participate directly with the armed forces of other nations in preparing bilateral contingency plans. Commanders and their staffs assess the potential constraints, opportunities, security risks, and any additional vulnerabilities resulting from bilateral planning and how these plans impact the ability of the United States to achieve its objectives. Bilateral planning involves the preparation of combined, mutually developed, and approved plans governing the employment of the forces of two nations for a common contingency. Bilateral planning may be accomplished within the framework of a treaty or alliance but may be accomplished in the absence of such arrangements. Bilateral planning is accomplished in accordance with specific guidance provided by the President, SecDef, or CJCS and captured in bilateral strategic guidance signed by the leadership of both countries.
12. Review of Multinational Plans

US joint strategic plans or contingency plans prepared in support of multinational plans are developed, reviewed, and approved exclusively within US channels. Selected portions and/or applicable planning and deployment data may be released in accordance with CJCSI 5714.01, Policy for the Release of Joint Information. USG representatives and commanders within each multinational organization participate in multinational planning and exchange information in mutually devised forums, documents, and plans. The formal review and approval of multinational plans is accomplished in accordance with specific procedures adopted by each multinational organization and may or may not include separate US review or approval. Multilateral contingency plans routinely require national-level US approval.

For more details, see JP 3-16, Multinational Operations. The Multinational Planning Augmentation Team Multinational Force Standing Operating Procedures, available at https://community.apan.org/wg/mpat, provides commonly agreed upon formats and procedures that may assist with planning efforts in a multinational environment.
CHAPTER II
STRATEGIC GUIDANCE AND COORDINATION

“The future is the product of choices that have not yet been made by others and events that have not yet occurred . . . . Our strategy process includes continuous reassessment and adaptation in the face of a dynamic, unpredictable, and competitive environment. If we fail to recognize the inherent uncertainty of the future and remain agile, this will be a brittle document unworthy of the trees cut down to print it.”

Foreword to the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge

1. Overview

a. This chapter introduces some of the major sources of planning guidance available to the commander and staff. It describes how strategic direction is established and how it is implemented within the JPEC to develop military plans and orders. Finally, it discusses how to integrate other USG departments and agencies and multinational partners into overall joint planning efforts.

b. The President, SecDef, and CJCS provide their orders, intent, strategy, direction, and guidance via strategic direction to the military to pursue national interests within legal and constitutional limitations. They generally communicate strategic direction to the military through written documents but may communicate by any means available. Strategic direction is contained in key documents, generally referred to as strategic guidance. Strategic direction may change rapidly in response to changing situations, whereas strategic guidance documents are typically updated cyclically and may not reflect the most current strategic direction.

SECTION A. NATIONAL AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GUIDANCE

2. Introduction

The President’s decisions drive SecDef’s strategic guidance, which the CJCS operationalizes.

3. Strategic Guidance and Direction

a. The President. The President provides strategic guidance through the NSS, executive orders, and other strategic documents in conjunction with additional guidance and refinement from the NSC. The President also signs the UCP and the CPG, which are both developed by DOD.

b. SecDef. SecDef executes authority, direction, and control over DOD components. SecDef oversees the development of broad defense policy goals and priorities for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of US military forces based on the NSS. For
planning, SecDef provides guidance to ensure military action supports national objectives. SecDef approves assignment and allocation of forces.

c. **USD(P).** USD(P) assists SecDef with preparing written policy guidance for the preparation of plans, reviewing plans, and other duties, as directed.

d. **CJCS**

(1) The CJCS serves as principal military advisor to the President, SecDef, and other members of the NSC and assists the President and SecDef with providing unified strategic direction to the Armed Forces of the United States. The CJCS uses the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) as the formal mechanism to fulfill responsibilities under Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 153, to maintain a global perspective, conduct assessments, develop the force, and develop military advice for SecDef and the President. The JSPS also supports the CJCS’s interactions with Congress, the Services, and the CCMDs.

*The JSPS is detailed in CJCSI 3100.01, Joint Strategic Planning System.*

(2) Per Title 10, USC, Section 153, the CJCS is responsible for strategic direction for the Armed Forces of the United States, strategic and contingency planning, global military integration, comprehensive joint readiness, joint capability development, and joint force development activities. Of these, the following four responsibilities relate to planning:

(a) Strategic and contingency planning. In this capacity, the CJCS develops the NMS and the JSCP, which provide military implementation strategies and planning direction. Title 10, USC, makes the CJCS responsible for global military integration, providing advice to the President and SecDef on ongoing military operations, and advising on the allocation and transfer of forces among CDRs, as necessary, to address transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional threats. The CJCS provides additional strategic planning guidance and policy to the CCMDs and Services from CJCS directives, joint doctrine, force apportionment tables, and PLANORDs. The CJCS also issues orders on behalf of the President or SecDef.

(b) Joint force development. Joint force development consists of training, education, concept and doctrine development, and lessons learned.

(c) Joint capability development. Joint capability focuses on the future force. Planning supports this function through assessment of ongoing operations and the identification of capability gaps.

(d) In addition to these responsibilities, the CJCS serves as the global integrator for SecDef. In this role, the CJCS guides coordination across geographic, functional, and Service seams to ensure the joint force collectively expands its competitive advantage across the range of global challenges. As the global integrator, the CJCS
aggregates, analyzes, and balances competing risk perspectives of the CCDRs and Services across command and Service seams to provide SecDef and the President a holistic, global perspective.

See CJCSI 3100.01, Joint Strategic Planning System, for additional information.

4. National Security Council System

a. The President uses the NSC system for national security policy development and decision making. In addition to NSC meetings chaired by the President, the NSC system includes the Principals Committee, Deputies Committee, policy coordination committees, and a dedicated NSC staff. Along with the NSC staff, issue-specific interagency working groups support these higher-level committees.

b. The NSC is the President’s principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with senior national security advisors and cabinet officials, including SecDef and the CJCS. NSC decisions may be directed to any department or agency. For additional information, see National Security Presidential Memorandum-4, Organization of the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and Subcommittees, and CJCSI 5715.01, Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs.

5. National Security Strategy

a. The NSS is required annually by Title 50, USC, Section 3043. It is prepared by the Executive Branch of the USG for Congress and outlines the major national security concerns of the United States and how the administration plans to address them using all instruments of national power. The document is often purposely general in content, and its implementation by DOD relies on elaborating direction provided in supporting documents (e.g., the NDS and NMS).

b. JFCs and their staffs can derive the broad, overarching policy of the United States from the NSS but must check other DOD and military sources for refined guidance, as the NSS is too broad for detailed planning.

6. Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development

DOS is the lead US foreign affairs agency within the Executive Branch and the lead institution for the conduct of American diplomacy. The Secretary of State is the President’s principal foreign policy advisor. The Secretary of State implements the President’s foreign policies worldwide through DOS and its employees. USAID is an independent federal agency that receives overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State. USAID serves as the USG lead for international development and foreign disaster assistance.

a. DOS conducts planning at the department, bureau, and country levels. The following are key DOS/USAID planning documents that commanders and planners consult when developing their campaign plans.
(1) DOS and USAID develop the four-year joint strategic plan (e.g., *Joint Strategic Plan FY [2018-2022]*) as their primary strategy, to set forth the direction and priorities to implement US foreign policy and development assistance for the coming years.

(2) **Joint Regional Strategies.** A joint regional strategy is a four-year regional strategy developed jointly by the regional bureaus of DOS and USAID. It articulates the priorities, goals, and areas of strategic focus within the region. Joint regional strategies also provide a flexible framework within which regional bureaus and missions prioritize desired objectives and military end states, identify supporting resources, and respond to unanticipated events. Where an end state is not feasible or attainable, for example when conducting long-term counter weapons of mass destruction or combating terrorism activities and operations, intermediate objectives may be used instead.

(3) **Integrated Country Strategies.** An integrated country strategy is a four-year, whole-of-government strategy developed by a US country team for a particular country. It articulates a common set of USG priorities and goals by setting the mission goals and objectives through a coordinated and collaborative planning effort. It provides the basis for the development of annual mission resource requests for DOS and USAID, as well as all USG security sector assistance. The chief of mission leads the development process and has final approval authority.

(4) **Country Development Cooperation Strategy.** A country development cooperation strategy, typically a five-year strategy, defines a mission's chosen approach in a country, articulates the self-reliance trajectory, and details expected results. The country development cooperation strategy provides a road map for how USAID will design and implement projects and activities. It is used to inform dialogue with Congress and engage host nation (HN) partners and other stakeholders, including the private sector and civil society.

b. Establishing and maintaining unity of effort requires commanders and planners to stay abreast of these planning products, develop mutually supporting theater and FCPs, and develop applicable country-specific security cooperation plans.

7. **Department of Defense**

a. **NDS.** The NDS, required by Title 10, USC, Section 113(g), is signed by SecDef and outlines DOD’s approach to implementing the President’s NSS. The NDS supports the NSS by establishing a set of overarching defense objectives that guide DOD’s security activities and provide direction for the NMS. The NDS objectives serve as links between military activities and those of other DOD agencies in pursuit of national goals.

b. **UCP.** The UCP, signed by the President, establishes CCMDs and responsibilities and missions of the CCDRs. The unified command structure identified in the UCP is flexible and changes as required to accommodate evolving US national security needs. Title 10, USC, Section 161, tasks the CJCS to conduct a review of the UCP “not less often than every two years” and submit recommended changes to the President through SecDef.
This document provides broad guidance from which CCDRs and planners can derive tasks and missions during CCMD plan development and modification.

**c. CPG.** The CPG, signed by the President, fulfills the statutory requirement in Title 10, USC, Section 113. SecDef, with the approval from the President, and with advice from the CJCS, provides written policy guidance on the preparation and review of campaign and contingency plans.

### 8. Joint Strategic Planning System

**a.** The JSPS is the primary system the CJCS uses to execute statutory responsibilities assigned by Title 10, USC, Section 153. The JSPS enables the CJCS to conduct assessments; provide military advice to the President, SecDef, NSC, and Homeland Security Council; and assist the President and SecDef in providing strategic direction to the Armed Forces of the United States. The NMS and JSCP are core strategic guidance documents the CJCS uses to augment and amplify other strategic documents (e.g., UCP, CPG, GFMIG) and provide direction and policy essential to implementation of the NSS. Other elements of JSPS, such as the CJCS risk assessment, the Joint Force Readiness Review, and the annual joint assessment (AJA), inform decision making and identify new contingencies that may warrant planning and the commitment of resources. Figure II-1 illustrates these relationships.

*The JSPS is described in detail in CJCSI 3100.01, Joint Strategic Planning System.*

**b. Strategic Direction.** The President, SecDef, and CJCS provide strategic direction by communicating broad objectives and issue-specific guidance to DOD. It provides the common thread that integrates and synchronizes the planning activities and operations of the JS, CCMDs, Services, joint forces, combat support agencies (CSAs), and other DOD agencies. It provides purpose and focus to the planning for employment of military force. Strategic direction identifies a desired military objective or end state, national-level planning assumptions, and national-level limitations. In addition to previously mentioned documents, additional strategic direction will emerge as orders or as part of the iterative plans dialogue.

1. **Policy and Strategic Assumptions.** Strategic guidance and specific strategic direction should include specific assumptions US leadership is willing to make for each planning effort. These assumptions should cover both domestic and international unknowns to better define the OE in which the commander is expected to operate. Similarly, the commander should identify and question strategic assumptions to determine if they are reasonable and offer suggestions for improvements and clarification.

2. **Policy and Political Limitations.** The President and SecDef (or representatives) provide the commander and the command planning team any limitations (constraints or restraints) they expect will be imposed on the planning problem. These could be mandates for partner participation, restrictions on military personnel levels, or expected basing limitations.
Providing for the Strategic Direction of the Armed Forces of the United States

The Joint Strategic Planning System is the method by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff fulfills his statutory responsibilities, maintains a global perspective, and develops military advice.

Figure II-1. Providing for the Strategic Direction of the Armed Forces of the United States
c. **NMS.** The NMS is the CJCS’s central strategy document. Title 10, USC, Section 153, directs the CJCS to determine for each even-numbered year whether to prepare a new NMS or update an existing strategy.

(1) The NMS provides the CJCS’s amplifying guidance for planning, force employment, posture, and future force development. It provides the strategic framework to prioritize planning, resource allocation, and risk management. As such, this classified military strategy serves as the starting point for all other JSPS actions and constitutes the CJCS’s military advice to SecDef and the President.

(2) The NMS defines the national military objectives (ends) and how to achieve these objectives (ways) and addresses the military capabilities (means) required to execute the strategy. The national military objectives may often be the same as the national defense objectives identified in the NDS. The NMS provides focus for military activities by defining a set of interrelated military objectives and joint operating concepts from which the Service chiefs and CCDRs identify required capabilities and against which the CJCS assesses risk. The NMS also looks beyond the near-term to identify long-range operational requirements and provides guidance in other areas within the CJCS’s statutory requirements, such as joint force development and joint capability development.

**d. JSCP.** The JSCP fulfills the CJCS’s statutory responsibilities in Title 10, USC, Section 153, to assist the President and SecDef in providing for strategic direction to the joint force and implementing the strategic guidance in the NSS, NDS, NMS, and CPG. The JSCP provides this guidance to CCDRs, Service chiefs, CSAs, and applicable DOD agencies for preparation of plans based on current military capabilities and strategic guidance, as well as contingency planning guidance identified to the CJCS in the CPG. In addition to communicating to the CCMDs’ specific planning guidance, the JSCP operationalizes the strategic vision described in the NMS and nests with the strategic direction delineated by the NSS, NDS, and GFMIG. The JSCP also provides integrated planning guidance and direction for planners to fulfill the CJCS’s role as the global integrator.

(1) **Global Posture.** The NDS, CPG, NMS, and JSCP provide global defense posture (GDP) (i.e., forces, footprint, and agreements) guidance, to include DOD’s broad strategic themes for posture changes and overarching posture planning guidance, which inform JSCP theater and functional posture planning guidance. CCDRs submit posture plans every two years (with annual updates) to support campaign and contingency plans. Posture plans align basing and forces to ensure theater and global functional security, readiness to respond to contingency scenarios, and provide strategic flexibility.

*For more information on posture plans, see Appendix G, “Posture Plans.”*

(2) **Global Distribution.** The NDS, NMS, and JSCP describe DOD’s broad strategic themes for global distribution and posture that are coordinated through USTRANSCOM’s horizontal and vertical synchronization of global distribution planning. As a “plan of plans,” some CCPs include regional country plans, posture plans, and TDPs
that facilitate synchronization of resources, authorities, processes, and timelines to favorably affect conditions within the CCDRs’ AORs. Global distribution establishes the requirement for geographic CCDRs to submit TDPs annually to support campaign and contingency plans. Distribution plans support GCPs by interfacing with the relevant posture plans to support strategic lift, infrastructure, distribution enablers, agreements, policies, processes, and information systems.

For additional information on the JSCP, see CJCSI 3110.01, (U) 2018 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP).

e. GFMIG. The GFMIG integrates complementary policy and guidance on directed readiness, assignment, allocation, apportionment, and assessment into a single authoritative GFM document in support of DOD strategic guidance. It provides required procedures prescribed by SecDef in accordance with Title 10, USC, Section 162, to assign and allocate forces. These processes are applied within the force management and force planning constructs to better support resource-informed planning and enable the force to be dynamically employed, while allowing senior decision makers to quickly and accurately assess the impact and risk of proposed changes in force assignment, apportionment, and allocation. For detailed strategic guidance see the current GFMIG.

See Appendix D, “Global Force Management,” for additional information and descriptions.

9. Combatant Commanders

a. CCDRs use strategic guidance and direction to prepare command strategies focused on their command’s specific capabilities and missions to link national strategic guidance to theater or functional strategies and joint operations. The command strategy, like national strategy, identifies the command’s broad, long-range objectives that contribute to national security. The command strategy provides the link between national strategic guidance and joint planning.

b. Global and Transregional Missions

(1) Since threats and/or opportunities presented by allies, partners, competitors, enemies, adversaries, and natural disasters do not restrict their operations by boundaries, CCDRs and their planners must integrate their plans with other CCDRs to ensure unified actions in support of strategic and operational objectives. Integrated planning also synchronizes resources and integrates timelines, decision points, and authorities across multiple CCMDs to achieve directed campaign objectives and attain contingency end states.

(2) CCDRs can be tasked to address missions that cross geographic CCMD boundaries. CCDRs tasked with global missions provide planning and assessment expertise to identify tasks and missions other CCMDs (supporting commands) must perform to ensure success of global missions. Commands include supporting tasks as part of their campaign and contingency planning and coordinate to ensure assessments are
complete. CCDRs with global responsibilities use the planning process to provide an assessment of risk from the global, cross-AOR perspective to ensure the military advice provided to the President and SecDef includes these considerations. Chapter II, “Strategic Guidance and Coordination,” and Chapter V, “Campaigning,” discuss this in more detail.

c. **Planning Organization.** CCMDs use joint planning groups (JPGs), operational planning groups, or operational planning teams (OPTs) to direct planning efforts across the command, including implementation of plans and orders.

d. **Strategic Estimate.** The CCDR and staff, with input from subordinate commands and supporting commands and agencies, prepare a strategic estimate by analyzing and describing the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) factors and trends; key relationships and links between relevant actors or networks; and the threats and opportunities that facilitate or hinder achievement of the objectives over the time frame of the strategy.

   (1) The strategic estimate is a tool available to commanders as they develop plans. CCDRs use strategic estimates to facilitate the employment of military forces. The strategic estimate is more comprehensive than estimates of subordinate commanders, encompasses all aspects of the CCDR’s OE, and is the basis for the development of the theater strategies.

   (2) The CCDR, the CCDR’s staff, and supporting commands and agencies evaluate the broad, strategic-level factors that influence the theater strategy.

   (3) The estimate should include an analysis of strategic direction received from the President, SecDef, or the authoritative body of an MNF; an analysis of all states, groups, or organizations in the OE that may threaten or challenge the CCMD’s ability to advance and defend US interests in the region; visualization of the relevant geopolitical, geoeconomic, and cultural factors in the region; an evaluation of major strategic and operational challenges facing the CCMD; an analysis of known or anticipated opportunities the CCMD can leverage; and an assessment of risks inherent in the OE.

   (4) The result of the strategic estimate is a visualization and better understanding of the OE, to include allies, other partners, neutrals, adversaries, and enemy combatants. The strategic estimate process is continuous and provides input used to develop strategies and implement plans. The broad strategic estimate is also the starting point for conducting the commander’s estimate of the situation for a specific operation.

   (5) Supported and supporting CCDRs and subordinate commanders all prepare strategic estimates based on assigned tasks. CCDRs who support multiple JFCs prepare estimates for each supporting operation.

   See Appendix B, “Strategic Estimate,” for a notional strategic estimate format.
10. Commander’s Communication Synchronization

a. **Commander’s communication synchronization** is the DOD process to coordinate and synchronize narratives, themes, messages, images, operations, and actions to ensure their integrity and consistency down to the lowest tactical level across all relevant communication activities.

b. Within the USG, DOS has primary responsibility for strategic communication abroad. DOS describes strategic communication as the focused USG efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, and preserve conditions for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. It is led by the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and is the overall mechanism by which the USG coordinates public diplomacy among interagency participants.

c. The US military plays an important supporting role in communication efforts, primarily through commander’s communication synchronization, public affairs, operations in the information environment, and defense support to public diplomacy. Communication synchronization considerations should be integrated in all joint planning for military operations from routine, recurring, military activities during periods of cooperation through armed conflict.

d. To support the CJCS’s responsibility as the global integrator, the joint force synchronizes operations in the information environment to shape the perceptions, decisions, and actions of relevant actors, which includes strategic messaging. Strategic messaging is coordinated and deliberate communication activities to influence the OE in support of US strategic objectives. Strategic messaging is developed in concert with other USG departments and agencies, partner nations, and NGOs, as appropriate. CCDRs should develop staff procedures for implementing communication synchronization guidance into all joint planning and targeting processes, as well as collaborative processes for integrating communication synchronization activities with nonmilitary partners and subject matter experts.

See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 3-61, Public Affairs, for additional information.

**SECTION B. APPLICATION OF GUIDANCE**

11. Joint Planning and Execution Community

a. The headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in joint planning or committed to a joint operation are collectively termed the **JPEC**. Although not a standing or regularly meeting entity, the JPEC consists of the stakeholders shown in Figure II-2.

(1) The supported **CCDR** has primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the CPG, JSCP, or other joint planning directives. In the context of joint
planning, the supported commander can initiate planning at any time based on command authority or in response to direction or orders from the President, SecDef, or CJCS. The designated supporting commanders provide planning assistance, forces, or other resources to a supported commander, as directed.

(2) **Supporting commanders** provide forces, assistance, or other resources to a supported commander in accordance with the principles set forth in GFM policies and procedures. Supporting commanders prepare supporting plans as required. A commander may be a supporting commander for one operation while being a supported commander for another.

(3) **Coordinating Authority.** Coordinating authority is the authority delegated to a commander or individual for coordinating specific functions and activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service (e.g., joint security coordinator exercises coordinating authority for joint security area operations among the component commanders) and may include USG departments and agencies and partner nations (e.g., as part of security cooperation planning). To fulfill the requirements of global integration, the global integrator may also designate individuals as a coordinating authority. In this context, a coordinating authority is generally a CCDR with the preponderance of responsibility for developing plans in support of a GCP and associated contingencies but who does not receive additional command authority or authority to compel agreement beyond that
already assigned in the UCP. Coordinating authorities convene collaborative forums to perform three functions: planning, assessing, and recommending changes to plans.

b. The President, with the advice and assistance of the NSC and CJCS, issues policy and strategic direction to guide the planning efforts of DOD and other USG departments and agencies that represent all of the instruments of national power. SecDef, with the advice and assistance of the CJCS, organizes the JPEC for joint planning by establishing appropriate command relationships among the CCDRs and by establishing appropriate support relationships between the CCDRs and the CSAs for that portion of their missions involving support for operating forces. A supported commander is identified for specific planning tasks, and other JPEC stakeholders are designated as appropriate. This process provides for increased unity of command in the planning and execution of joint operations and facilitates unity of effort within the JPEC.

See CJCSI 3141.01, Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans, for a more complete discussion of the JPEC and coordinating authority. See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, for a more complete discussion of command relationships.

12. Adaptive Planning

Adaptive planning supports decision making and facilitates the transition from planning to execution.

a. The intent of adaptive planning is to develop plans that contain military options for the President and SecDef as they seek to shape the environment and respond to contingencies. This facilitates responsive plan development that provides up-to-date planning and plans for civilian leaders. The JPP incorporates policies and procedures to facilitate responsive planning and foster a shared understanding through frequent dialogue between civilian and military leaders to provide viable military options to the President and SecDef. Continuous assessment and collaborative technology provide increased opportunities for consultation and updated guidance during the planning and execution processes.

b. IPRs are an integral part of adaptive planning. Iterative dialogue among civilian and military leaders at the strategic level enable a shared understanding of the situation, inform leadership, and influence planning. Topics such as planning assumptions, interagency and multinational participation guidance, supporting and supported activity requirements, desired objectives, key capability shortfalls, acceptable levels of risk, and SecDef decisions are typically discussed. Further, IPRs expedite planning by ensuring the plan addresses the most current strategic assessments and objectives. IPR participants are based on the requirements of the plan.

See CJCSI 3141.01, Management and Review Campaign and Contingency Plans, which discusses integrated planning and IPRs in more detail.
13. Operational Activities

a. Operational activities comprise a sustained cycle of situational awareness, planning, execution, and assessment that occur continuously to support leader decision-making cycles at all levels of command.

b. Situational Awareness

(1) Situational awareness addresses procedures for understanding the OE, including threats to national security. This occurs during continuous monitoring of the national and international political and military situations so CCDRs, JFCs, and their staffs can determine and analyze emerging crises, notify decision makers, and determine the specific nature of the threat. Persistent or recurring theater military engagement activities contribute to maintaining situational awareness.

(2) Situational awareness encompasses activities such as monitoring the global situation, identifying that an event has occurred, recognizing the event is a problem or a potential problem, reporting the event, and reviewing enduring and emerging warning concerns and the CCMD’s running intelligence estimate (based on continuous joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment [JIPOE]). An event is a national or international occurrence assessed as unusual and viewed as potentially having an adverse impact on US national interests and national security. The recognition of the event as a problem or potential problem follows from the observation.

c. Planning

(1) Planning translates strategic guidance and direction into campaign plans, contingency plans, and OPORDs. Joint planning is usually based on defined tasks identified in the UCP, CPG, and JSCP. Alternatively, joint planning may be based on the need for a military response to an unforeseen current event, emergency, or time-sensitive crisis.

(2) CCMD planning for contingencies is normally tasked in the JSCP based on the CPG or other directive. Planners derive assumptions needed to continue planning and reference the force apportionment and force assignment tables to provide the number of forces reasonably expected to be available.

(3) Planning for crises is initiated to respond to an unforeseen current event, emergency, or time-sensitive crisis. It is based on planning guidance, typically communicated in orders: WARNORD, PLANORD, or ALERTORD. Commanders evaluate the availability of assigned and currently allocated forces to respond to the event. They also determine what other force requirements are needed and begin putting together a rough order-of-magnitude force list.

d. Execution
(1) Execution begins when the President or SecDef authorizes the initiation of a military operation or other activity. The CJCS, at the direction of the President or SecDef, issues an EXORD or other authorizing directive to initiate or conduct military operations. Depending upon time constraints, an EXORD may be the only order a CCDR or subordinate commander receives. The EXORD defines the time to initiate operations and may convey guidance not provided earlier.

(2) The CJCS monitors the deployment and employment of forces, makes recommendations to SecDef to resolve shortfalls, and transmits presidential- and SecDef-directed orders to support the successful execution of military operations. Execution continues until the mission is accomplished and a new order transitions operations. In execution, based on continuous assessment activities, the planning process is repeated as circumstances and missions change.

(3) The CCDR monitors the deployment, distribution, and employment of forces; measures task performance and progress toward mission accomplishment; and adapts and adjusts operations as required to achieve the objectives and attain the military end state. This continual assessment and adjustment of operations creates an organizational environment of learning and adaptation. This adaptation can range from minor operational adjustments to a radical change of approach. When fundamental changes have occurred that challenge existing understanding or indicate a shift in the OE/problem, commanders and staffs may develop a new operational approach that recognizes that the initial problem has changed, thus requiring a different approach to solving the problem. The change to the OE could be so significant that it requires a review of the strategic objectives and military end states and necessitates discussions with higher authority to determine whether the objectives and/or military end states are still viable.

(4) Changes to the original plan may be necessary because of tactical, intelligence, or environmental considerations; force and non-unit cargo availability; availability of strategic transportation; and port capabilities. Therefore, ongoing refinement and adjustment of deployment requirements and schedules and close coordination and monitoring of deployment activities are required.

(5) The CJCS-issued EXORD defines D-day (the unnamed day on which operations commence or are scheduled to commence) and H-hour (the specific time an operation begins) and directs execution of the OPORD. Date-time groups are expressed in universal time. While OPORD operations commence on the specified D-day and H-hour, deployments providing supporting forces, equipment, and sustainment are defined by C-day (an unnamed day on which a deployment operation begins) and L-hour (a specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to commence). The CJCS’s EXORD is a record communication that authorizes execution of the COA approved by the President or SecDef and detailed in the supported commander’s OPORD. It may include further guidance, instructions, or amplifying orders. In a fast-developing crisis, the EXORD may be the first record communication generated by the CJCS. The record communication may be preceded by a voice authorization. The issuance of the EXORD is time-sensitive. The format may differ depending on the amount of previous
correspondence and the applicability of prior guidance. CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance, contains the format for the EXORD. Information already communicated in previous orders should not be repeated unless previous orders were not made available to all concerned. The EXORD need only contain the authority to execute the operation and any additional essential guidance, such as D-day and H-hour (see Figure II-3).

(6) Throughout execution, the JS, JFPs, Services, CCDRs, and CSAs monitor movements, assess accomplishment of tasks, and resolve shortfalls as necessary. This allows guidance to be changed and the plan to be modified, if necessary.

(7) The supported commander issues an OPORD to subordinate and supporting commanders prior to or upon receipt of an EXORD issued by the CJCS at the direction of the President or SecDef. The OPORD may provide detailed planning guidance resulting from updated or amplifying orders, instructions, or guidance the EXORD does not cover. Supporting commanders may develop OPORDs in support of the supported commander’s OPORD. The supported commander also implements an operation assessment, which evaluates the progress toward or achievement of military objectives. This assessment informs the commanders’ recommendations to the President and SecDef. If significant changes in the OE or the problem are identified which call into question viability of the current operational approach or objectives, the supported commander should consult with subordinate and supporting commanders and higher authority.

(8) Following the GFM allocation process as detailed in CJCSM 3130.06, (U) Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures, the supported CCDR’s approved and validated force requests that have been allocated by SecDef’s decision are entered in the GFMAP annexes. The JFPs subsequently release GFMAP annex schedules reflecting specific deployment directions.

(9) CCMDs coordinate with USTRANSCOM, other supporting CCMDs, JFPs, the JS, and FPs to provide an integrated transportation plan from origin to destination. CCMDs control the flow of requirements into and out of their theater, using the validation

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**Key Planning Times**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C-Day</th>
<th>The day deployment begins</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D-Day</td>
<td>The day operations began or are scheduled to begin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-Hour</td>
<td>The time (on D-Day) the operation is scheduled to begin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-Hour</td>
<td>The time (on C-Day) deployment operations begin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-Day</td>
<td>The day mobilization (partial or full) begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-Day</td>
<td>The day a unit (active duty) is notified for deployment or redeployment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Figure II-3. Key Planning Times
process outlined in their TPFDD letter of instruction. Supporting and supported CCMDs’ staff, Service components, and CSAs submit unit line numbers for validation.

e. **Assessment.** Before changes in the OE can be observed, a baseline or initial assessment is required. During planning, analysis associated with assessment helps facilitate greater understanding of the current conditions of the OE, as well as identify how the command will determine the achievement of objectives if the plan is executed.

CHAPTER III
JOINT PLANNING PROCESS

“Because we cannot be certain when, where, or under what conditions the
next fight will occur, the Joint Force must maintain a boxer’s stance—with the
strength, agility, endurance, resilience, flexibility, and awareness to fight and
win against any potential enemy.”

2018 National Military Strategy Framework,
Joseph Dunford Jr., 19th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Planning is Commander’s Business

Commanders own the planning process and must continuously participate in planning
to provide guidance and expertise. The planner develops possible solutions to a problem
presented in strategic or commander’s guidance.

2. Planning Teams

As part of the plan initiation, planners identify expertise needed from within and
outside their headquarters.

a. Planners in a headquarters’ plans branch or division rarely have the full expertise,
manpower, or time necessary to conduct planning by themselves. Planners should establish
a team of experts to support the planning process. These are often called JPGs, OPTs,
operational planning groups, or cross-functional teams and are normally led by either the
plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5) or the operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3).

b. Membership should include:

(1) Members of adjacent, supporting, or collaborating commands. At the CCMD
level, this will usually include functional commands to address their specific capabilities;
CCMDs that might provide staging, logistics, or transload locations; CSAs with significant
support or coordination roles such as the Defense Logistics Agency or NGB; and, if
appropriate and authorized, ally and partner planners. For some plans, USTRANSCOM,
United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), United States Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM), United States Space Command (USSPACECOM), and United States
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) could be the supported command. For joint
task forces (JTFs) below CCMDs, it should include Service component commands.

(2) Staff Expertise. Regular members would include the intelligence directorate
of a joint staff (J-2) to provide intelligence analysis, updates, and planning; the logistics
directorate of a joint staff for sustainment planning; the communications system directorate
of a joint staff for communications planning; information planners including public affairs;
and the staff surgeon for medical planning. The command assessor should also be involved
to ensure assessments are built into the plan early on. Considerations should include the
nature of operations; for example, for noncombatant evacuation and foreign humanitarian
assistance operations, medical planners, the civil-military J-3, and other joint enablers may be critical. Staff judge advocate, chaplains, cyberspace operations planners, space operations planners, public affairs officers, fires, the commander’s gender adviser, and other joint enablers should also be considered based on the mission. Initial consultation with these additional planners at the beginning of mission analyses allows the additional planners to assist the lead planner in determining whether their further involvement is warranted.

(3) Service Component and Component Command Representation. The CCMD Service representatives and component commands are essential in developing supporting plans, as well as identifying required capabilities and probable availability. Additionally, component representatives are usually responsible for developing a TPFDL in appendix 1 (Time-Phased Force Deployment List) to annex A (Task Organization) of the OPLAN and building a TPFDD in the JOPES database. In time-sensitive planning situations, component headquarters can conduct simultaneous planning better if involved in the decision and analysis process early.

3. Transregional, All-Domain Planning

a. When the scope of contemplated military operations exceeds the authority or capabilities of a single CCDR to plan and execute, the President, SecDef, or CJCS, when designated by the President or SecDef, identify a CCDR to lead the planning for the designated strategic challenge or threat. The commander’s assessment supporting this decision could be either the assessments of multiple CCDRs addressing a similar threat in their AORs or a single threat assessment from a CCDR addressing the threat from a global, cross-AOR, or functional perspective. Situations that may trigger this assessment range from combat operations that span UCP-designated boundaries to the threat of asymmetric attack that overlaps CCMD boundaries and functions, thereby requiring strategic integration of two or more CCDRs’ campaigns and operations.

b. Per Title 10, USC, SecDef may direct the CJCS to perform responsibilities as the global integrator for overseeing the activities of the CCMDs. Such assignment by SecDef does not confer any command authority on the CJCS and does not alter CCDRs’ responsibilities prescribed in Title 10, USC, Section 164.

c. When designated by SecDef, the CJCS or CCDR with coordinating authority issues a planning directive and may be tasked to lead the planning effort. The CJCS or CCDR performs a mission analysis; issues initial global planning guidance based on national strategic objectives and priorities; and develops COAs in coordination with the affected CCMDs, Services, and CSAs. These COAs should mitigate operational gaps, seams, and vulnerabilities from a global perspective and provide an improved understanding of how actions in one AOR impact ongoing or potential plans and operations in other AORs. This will be achieved through a recommendation for the optimal allocation, prioritization, or reallocation of forces and capabilities required to develop a cohesive global CONOPS. These planning procedures detail how CCDRs will employ forces and capabilities in support of another CCDR. COAs are based largely on recommendations of
the affected CCDRs. However, they should also take a global perspective when framing cumulative risk beyond a limited time horizon. These COAs may require refinement as initial planning apportionments are adjusted across the global CONOPS. Planners must be aware of competing requirements for limited resources such as ISR, cyberspace, space, and transportation capabilities. GFM policies and procedures inform global planning activities.

d. All planning should be collaborative and integrated. Integrated planning addresses complex threats that span multiple AORs and functional responsibilities and provides the President and SecDef a clear understanding of how the entire military, not just a portion, responds to those threats. The CJCS or delegated CCDR is required to mitigate operational gaps, seams, and vulnerabilities and resolve the conflict over forces, resources, capabilities, or priorities from a global perspective. Risks, benefits, and trade-offs must inform employment of all joint force capabilities. Early identification and submission of requests for forces and authorities along with clear articulation of intent and risk can expedite decision making associated with employment of these capabilities.

e. When directing the execution of a contingency plan or OPORD, the President or SecDef also selects a CCDR as the supported commander for implementation of the plan. This commander is responsible for all aspects of a mission, to include the integration of plans or orders of supporting CCDRs in response to higher headquarters requirements.

f. **Supporting Plans.** Supporting CCDRs, subordinate JFCS, component commanders, and CSAs prepare supporting plans as tasked by the JSCP or other planning guidance. Supporting commanders and staffs prepare plans in the tasked format, describing how they intend to achieve their assigned objectives and/or tasks. Supporting commanders and staffs develop these plans in collaboration with the supported commander’s planners.

*CJCSI 3141.01, Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans,* **governs the formal review and approval process for plans.**

**SECTION A. OVERVIEW OF PLANNING AND THE PLANNING FUNCTIONS**

4. **Overview**

a. Although planning has an input (guidance) and an output (the plan or order), the planning process is a recursive, assessment-informed process and not linear. Issues discovered in later steps of the planning process can require adjustments to earlier steps. For example, COA wargaming may identify additional assumptions that could affect viability of options or COAs within an option.

b. Planning is commander-led but informed by staff analysis and expertise.

c. Planning consists of four functions, the planning process, and an operational design methodology as depicted in Figure III-1. For additional information, see Chapter IV, “Operational Design.”
d. Operational design and the JPP are complementary tools of the overall planning process. Operational design provides an iterative process that enables the commander’s vision and mastery of operational art to help planners answer ends—ways—means—risk questions and appropriately structure campaigns and operations in a dynamic OE. The commander, supported by the staff, gains an understanding of the OE, defines the problem, and develops an operational approach for the campaign or operation through the application of operational design during the initiation step of the JPP. Commanders communicate their operational approach to their staff, subordinates, supporting commands, agencies, and multinational/nongovernmental entities as required in their initial planning guidance so that their approach can be translated into executable plans. As the JPP is applied, commanders may receive updated guidance, learn more about the OE and the problem, and refine their operational approach. Commanders provide their updated approach to the staff to guide detailed planning. This iterative process facilitates the continuing development and refinement of possible COAs into a selected COA with an associated initial CONOPS and eventually into a resource-informed executable plan or order.

e. The relationship between the application of operational art, operational design, and the JPP continues throughout the planning and execution of the plan or order. By applying the operational design methodology, in combination with the procedural rigor of the JPP,
the command can monitor the dynamics of the mission and OE while executing operations in accordance with the current approach and revising plans as needed. By combining these approaches, the friendly force can maintain the greatest possible flexibility and do so proactively (see Figure III-2).

5. Planning Functions

The four planning functions of strategic guidance, concept development, plan development, and plan assessment are generally sequential, although often run

![Joint Planning Overview](image.png)

Figure III-2. Joint Planning Overview
simultaneously to deepen the dialogue between civilian and military leaders and accelerate the overall planning process. SecDef, the CJCS, or CCDR may direct the planning staff to refine or adapt a plan by reentering the planning process at any of the earlier functions. The time spent accomplishing each activity and function depends on the circumstances. In time-sensitive cases, planning functions may be compressed and decisions reached in an open forum. Orders may be combined and initially communicated orally.

a. **Strategic Guidance**

   (1) Strategic guidance initiates planning, provides the basis for mission analysis, and enables the JPEC to develop a shared understanding of the issues, OE, objectives, and responsibilities.

   (2) The CCDR provides input through sustained civilian-military dialogue that may include IPRs. The CCDR crafts objectives that support national strategic objectives with the guidance and consent of SecDef; if required, the CJCS offers advice to SecDef. This process begins with an analysis of existing strategic guidance such as the CPG and JSCP or a CJCS WARNORD, PLANORD, or ALERTORD issued in a crisis. This includes mission analysis, threat assessment, and development of assumptions, which are briefed to SecDef during the strategic guidance IPR.

   (a) Some of the primary end products of the strategic guidance planning function are assumptions, identification of available/acceptable resources, conclusions about the strategic and operational environment (nature of the problem), strategic and military objectives, and the supported commander’s mission.

   (b) The CCDR will maintain dialogue with DOD leadership to ensure a common understanding of the above topics and alignment of planning to date. This step can be iterative, as the CCDR consults with the staff to identify concerns with or gaps in the guidance.

b. **Concept Development.** During planning, the commander develops several COAs, each containing an initial CONOPS that should identify threats to the JDDE, major capabilities and authorities required and task organization, major operational tasks to be accomplished by components, a concept for employment and sustainment, and complete OE modeling and simulation that informs the CCDR’s assessment of risk. Each COA may contain multiple embedded alternatives to achieve designated objectives as conditions change (e.g., OE, problem, strategic direction). In time-sensitive situations, a WARNORD may not be issued, and a PLANORD, ALERTORD, or EXORD might be the first directive the supported commander receives with which to initiate planning. Using the guidance included in the directive and the CCDR’s mission statement, planners solicit input from supporting and subordinate commands to develop COAs based upon the outputs of the strategic guidance planning function.

   (1) During concept development, if an IPR is required, the commander outlines the COA(s) and makes a recommendation to higher authority for approval and further development.
(a) The commander recommends a COA that is most appropriate for the situation.

(b) Concept development should consider a range of COAs that integrate robust options to provide greater flexibility and to expedite transition during a crisis. CCDRs should be prepared to continue to develop multiple COAs to provide options to national-level leadership should the crisis develop.

(c) For CCPs, CCDRs should address resource requirements, expected changes in the strategic environment and OEs, and how each COA supports achieving national objectives.

(d) The commander also requests SecDef guidance on interorganizational planning and coordination and makes appropriate recommendations, based on the interorganizational requirements identified during assessments, mission analysis, and COA development.

(2) One of the main products from the concept development planning function is approval for continued development of one or more COAs. Detailed planning begins upon COA approval in the concept development function.

c. Plan Development. This function is used to develop a feasible plan or order that is ready to transition into execution. This function fully integrates mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, transition, redeployment, and demobilization activities. When the CCDR believes the plan is sufficiently developed to become a plan of record, the CCDR briefs the final plan to SecDef (or a designated representative) for approval.

d. Assessment

(1) Assessment is a continuous operation activity in both planning and execution functions and informs the commander’s decision making. It determines whether current actions and conditions are creating the desired effects and changes in the OE toward the desired objectives and ensures that plans remain appropriate for the changing conditions in the OE and resources.

(2) Operation Assessment

(a) Assessment reveals the progress of the joint force toward mission accomplishment. Assessment involves comparing desired conditions of the OE with actual conditions to determine the overall effectiveness of the campaign or operation. More specifically, assessment helps the JFC measure task performance; determine progress toward or regression from accomplishing a task, creating an effect, achieving an objective, or attaining an end state; and issue the necessary guidance for change to guide forward momentum. As follow-on assessments occur, they are compared to the initial (ideally pre-
execution) baseline and previous follow-on assessments; historical trends can aid the analysis and provide more definitive and reliable measures and indicators of change.

(b) During execution, assessment helps the command adapt and adjust operations as required to attain the desired end state (or achieve strategic objectives). This analysis and adjustment of operations creates an organizational environment of learning and adaptation. Adaptation can range from minor operational adjustments to a radical change of approach, including termination of the operation. When fundamental changes have occurred that challenge existing understanding or indicate a shift in the OE, commanders and staffs may develop a new operational approach that recognizes that the initial problem has changed, thus requiring a different approach toward the solution. The change to the OE could be so significant that it may require a review of the national strategic, theater strategic, and military objectives and discussions with higher authority to determine whether the military objectives or national strategic end states are still viable.

(c) Operation assessment identifies when changes to the current plan are required.

(3) Plan Assessment. (Refine, Adapt, Terminate Planning, Execute). Commanders continually review and evaluate the plan to determine one of four possible outcomes—refine, adapt, terminate planning or cancel the plan, or execute—and then act accordingly. Commanders and the JPEC continue to evaluate the situation for any changes that would require changes in the plan. The CCDR briefs SecDef during plan update IPRs on modifications and updates to the plan, based on the CCDR’s assessment of the situation, changes in resources or guidance, and the plan’s feasibility and suitability.

(a) Refine. During all planning efforts, plan refinement is typically an orderly process that follows plan development and is part of the assessment function. Refinement is facilitated by continuous operation assessment to confirm changing OE conditions related to the plan or potential contingency. In a crisis, continuous operation assessment accommodates the fluidity of the crisis and facilitates continuous refinement throughout plans or OPORD development. Planners frequently adjust the plan or order based on evolving commander’s guidance; results of force planning, support planning, or deployment planning; shortfall identification; adversary or MNF actions; changes to the OE; or changes to strategic guidance. Based on continuous operation assessment, refinement continues throughout execution, with changes typically transmitted in the form of FRAGORDs rather than revised copies of the plan or order.

(b) Adapt. Planners adapt plans when major modifications are required, which may be driven by one or more changes in the following: strategic direction, OE, or the problem facing the JFC. Planners continually monitor the situation for changes that necessitate adapting the plan, to include modifying the commander’s operational approach and revising the CONOPS. When this occurs, commanders may need to initiate a plan revision.

(c) Terminate. Commanders recommend termination of a plan when they determine that the plan is no longer required. For CPG- or JSCP-tasked plans, the CCDR
requests permission to archive the plan through the Joint Staff J-5 [Strategic Plans and Policy], who will staff the request through the JPEC. Recommendations on CPG-tasked plans are sent through the appropriate OSD staff for approval by SecDef (with a CJCS recommendation attached). For plans tasked in the JSCP, transition recommendations will be sent to the CJCS for approval.

(d) **Execute.** When ordered, commanders review the plan, validate assumptions and previously issued guidance, issue orders, and conduct operations as directed. ALERTORDs, WARNORDs, and EXORDs will identify any changes to plans and specific forces allocated for the operation. Additional information on transitioning to execution is in Chapter VII, “Transition to Execution.”

**SECTION B. THE JOINT PLANNING PROCESS**

**Joint Planning Overview Commander’s Role.** The commander is the central figure in planning due to knowledge, experience, and because the commander’s judgment and decisions are required to guide the staff through the process. Generally, the more complex a situation, the more critical the role of the commander early in planning by leveraging their knowledge, experience, judgment, intuition, responsibility, and authority to generate a clearer understanding of the conditions needed to focus effort and achieve success.

a. Commanders distinguish the unique features of their current situations to enable development of innovative or adaptive solutions. They understand that each situation requires a solution tailored to the context of the problem. Through the use of operational design and the application of operational art, commanders develop innovative, adaptive alternatives to solve complex challenges. These broad alternatives are the operational approach (Figure III-3).

b. Commanders use the knowledge and understanding gained from operational design, along with any additional guidance from higher headquarters, to provide guidance that directs and guides the staff through the JPP. Developing meaningful touch-points throughout the planning process with the supported and supporting commanders and other stakeholders enables a shared understanding of the OE.

c. Operational design requires the commander to encourage discourse and leverage dialogue and collaboration to identify complex, ill-defined problems. To that end, the commander must empower organizational learning and develop methods to determine whether modifying the operational approach is necessary during the course of an operation or campaign. This requires assessment and reflection that challenge understanding of the existing problem and the relevance of actions addressing that problem. Partners can be sources of additional information on the problem or OE, and can provide differing perspectives, which can broaden understanding and challenge institutional biases. Red teaming can also be a means to improve understanding by challenging assumptions. Due to complexity and constant change, commanders should be comfortable in the recognition that they will never know everything about the given OE and will never be able to fully
define its problems. As such, many of the problems in the OE may not have solutions. Success in complex OEs may require innovation and rapid, iterative adaptation based on assessment of results from activities and changes in the OE.

6. Joint Planning Process Steps

a. The JPP is an orderly, analytical set of logical steps to frame a problem; examine a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative COAs; select the best COA; and produce a plan or order. The application of operational design provides the conceptual basis for structuring campaigns and operations. The JPP provides a proven process to organize the work of the commander, staff, subordinate commanders, and other partners to develop plans that will appropriately address the problem. It focuses on defining the military mission and development and synchronization of detailed plans to accomplish that mission. It applies to both supported and supporting JFCs and to joint force component commanders when the components participate in joint planning. Together with operational design, the JPP facilitates interaction between and among the commander, staff, and subordinate and supporting headquarters throughout planning. The JPP helps commanders and their staffs organize their planning activities, share a common understanding of the mission and commander’s intent, and develop effective plans and orders. Figure III-4 shows the primary steps of the JPP.
(1) The JPP is applicable for all planning. Like operational design, it is a logical process to approach a problem and determine a solution. It is a tool to be used by planners but is not prescriptive. Based on the nature of the problem, other tools available to the planner, expertise in the planning team, time, and other considerations, the process can be modified as required. Similarly, some JPP steps or tasks may be performed concurrently, truncated, or modified as necessary, depending upon the situation, subject, or time constraints of the planning effort. For example, force planning, as an element of plan development, is different for campaign planning and contingency planning.

(2) In a crisis, the steps of the JPP may be conducted simultaneously to speed the process. Supporting commands and organizations often conduct the JPP simultaneously and iteratively with the supported CCMD. In these cases, once mission analysis begins, it continues until the operation is complete. Moreover, steps 4-7 are repeated as often as necessary to integrate new requirements (missions) into the development of the plan.

b. Planning Initiation (Step 1)

(1) Joint planning begins when an appropriate authority recognizes potential for military capability to be employed in support of national objectives or in response to a potential or actual crisis. At the strategic level, that authority—the President, SecDef, or CJCS—initiates planning by deciding to develop military options. Presidential directives, the NSS, UCP, CPG, NDS, NMS, JSCP, and related strategic guidance documents serve as the primary guidance to begin planning.

(2) CCDRs, subordinate commanders, and supporting commanders also initiate planning on their own authority when they identify a planning requirement not directed by
higher authority. Additionally, analyses of the OE or developing or immediate crises may result in the President, SecDef, or CJCS directing military planning through a planning directive. CCDRs normally develop military options in combination with other nonmilitary options so the President can direct a whole-of-government approach that involves all the appropriate instruments of national power. Whether or not planning begins as described here, the commander may act within approved authorities and rules of engagement (ROE)/rules for the use of force (RUF) in an immediate crisis.

(3) The commander and staff will receive and analyze the planning guidance to determine the time available until mission execution; current status of strategic and staff estimates; and intelligence products, to include JIPOE, and other factors relevant to the specific planning situation. The staff gathers and analyzes relevant information about friendly, neutral, and threat networks. This information can be obtained by both military and nonmilitary elements. The commander will typically provide initial planning guidance based upon current understanding of the OE, the problem, and the initial operational approach for the campaign or operation. It could specify time constraints, outline initial coordination requirements, or authorize movement of key capabilities within the JFC’s authority.

(4) While planning is continuous once execution begins, it is particularly relevant when there is new strategic direction, significant changes to the current mission or planning assumptions, or the commander receives a mission for follow-on operations.

(5) Planning for campaign plans is different from contingency plans in that contingency planning focuses on the anticipation of future events, while campaign planning assesses the current state of the OE and identifies how the command can shape the OE to deter crisis and support strategic objectives.

(6) Operational design supports this step in the planning process by building understanding of strategic direction, the strategic environment, and the OE. This helps the commander and staff define the problem as they begin mission analysis.

For more information, see Chapter IV, “Operational Design.”

c. Mission Analysis (Step 2)

(1) The CCDR and staff develop a restated mission statement that allows subordinate and supporting commanders to begin their own estimates and planning efforts for higher headquarters’ concurrence. The joint force’s mission is the task or set of tasks, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. Mission analysis is used to study the assigned tasks and to identify all other tasks necessary to accomplish the mission. Mission analysis focuses the commander and the staff on the problem at hand and lays a foundation for effective planning. When the commander receives a mission tasking, analysis begins with the following questions:
(a) What is the purpose of the mission? (What problem is the commander being asked to solve or what change to the OE is desired?)

(b) What tasks will accomplish the mission?

(c) Will the mission achieve the desired objectives?

(d) What limitations have been placed on my own forces’ actions?

(e) What forces are needed to support my operation?

(f) How will I know when the mission is accomplished successfully?

(g) How will friendly, neutral, and threat networks affect the accomplishment of the mission?

(2) The primary inputs to mission analysis are strategic guidance; the higher headquarters’ planning directive; and the commander’s initial planning guidance, which may include a description of the OE, a definition of the problem, the operational approach, initial intent, and the JIPOE (see Figure III-5). The primary outputs of mission analysis are the identified essential, specified, and implied tasks; friendly and threat centers of gravity (COGs) and their critical vulnerabilities; staff estimates; the mission statement; a refined operational approach; the commander’s intent statement; updated planning guidance; and initial commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs).

(3) Mission analysis helps the JFC understand the problem and purpose of the operation and issue appropriate guidance to drive the rest of the planning process. The JFC and staff can accomplish mission analysis through a number of logical activities, such as those shown in Figure III-6. Liaison officers from adjacent, supporting, and subordinate organizations should be included in the planning process as soon as possible to ensure coherent planning across the command and with higher and adjacent units.

(a) Although some activities occur before others, mission analysis typically involves substantial concurrent processing of information by the commander and staff, particularly in a crisis situation.

(b) During mission analysis, the tasks (specified and implied) and their purposes must be clearly stated to ensure planning encompasses all requirements, including any limitations on actions that the commander or subordinate forces may take. Mission analysis should also ensure the correlation between the commander’s mission and intent and those of higher and other commanders is understood. Resources and authorities must also be evaluated to ensure there is not a mission-resource-authority mismatch and to enable the commander to prioritize missions and tasks against limited resources.

(c) Specific information may need to be captured and tracked to improve the end products. This includes requests for information regarding forces, capabilities, and other resources; questions for the commander or special assistant (e.g., legal); and proposed
Chapter III

(4) Analyze Higher Headquarters’ Planning Directives and Strategic Guidance

(a) Strategic guidance is essential to joint planning and operational design. The President, SecDef, and CJCS promulgate strategic guidance documents that cover a broad range of situations, and CCDRs provide guidance that covers a narrower range of theater or functional situations. Documents such as the UCP, NMS, CPG, and JSCP provide near-term (0-2 years) strategic guidance, and the CCDR’s theater or functional
strategy provides the mid- to long-term (greater than 3 years) CCMD vision for the AOR or global employment of functional capabilities prepared in the context of SecDef’s priorities. CCDR strategy links national strategic direction to joint planning.

(b) For a specific crisis, an order provides guidance, typically including a description of the situation, purpose of military operations, objectives, anticipated mission or tasks, and pertinent limitations. The GFMIG assignment and apportionment tables identify forces planners can reasonably expect to be available. Planners must not include future capabilities or posture because plans should be immediately executable. Supported and supporting plans for the same military activity rely on the same resources. Additionally, there are likely to be operations in execution and other activities already ongoing at crisis execution. Planners must remain aware that most plans will not be executed individually and the finite resource pool for all operations and plans is the same.

(c) The CJCS may amplify apportionment guidance if appropriate. This planning can confirm or modify the guidance for an existing contingency plan or order.

Mission Analysis Activities

- Begin logistics supportability analysis.
- Analyze higher headquarters planning activities and strategic guidance.
- Review commander’s initial planning guidance, including his initial understanding of the operational environment, of the problem, and description of the operational approach.
- Determine known facts and develop planning assumptions.
- Determine and analyze operational limitations.
- Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks.
- Develop mission statement.
- Conduct initial force identification.
- Develop risk assessment.
- Develop course of action evaluation criteria.
- Develop initial military objectives.
- Develop commander’s critical information requirements.
- Prepare staff estimates.
- Prepare and deliver mission analysis brief.
- Publish commander’s updated planning guidance, intent statement, and refined operational approach.

Steps are not necessarily sequential.

Figure III-6. Mission Analysis Activities
This might simplify the analysis step, since consensus should already exist between the supported command and higher authority on the nature of the OE in the potential joint operations area (JOA)—such as the political, economic, social, and military circumstances—and potential US or multinational responses to various situations described in the existing plan. But even with a preexisting contingency plan, planners need to confirm the actual situation matches the hypothetical situation that the contingency plan was based on, as well as validating other assumptions. Significant changes may require refining or adapting the existing contingency plan. The dynamic nature of an emerging crisis can change many key aspects of the OE compared with earlier assumptions. These changes can greatly affect the plan’s original operational approach upon which the commander and staff based decisions about COA alternatives and tasks to potential subordinate and supporting commands. In particular, planners must continuously monitor, assess, and adjust objectives, planning assumptions, and criteria that comprise the military objectives.

(d) In time-compressed situations, especially with no preexisting plan, the higher headquarters’ assessment of the OE and objectives may be the only guidance available. However, this circumstance is one that can benefit the most from the commander’s and staff’s independent assessment of circumstances to ensure a common understanding with higher headquarters assessment of the OE, strategic objectives, and the tasks or mission assigned to achieve these objectives. This is why CCMD JIPOE efforts should be continuous; these efforts maintain the intelligence portions of the CCDR’s strategic estimate. Keeping the strategic estimate up to date greatly facilitates planning in a crisis, as well as the transition of contingency plans to execution in crisis situations.

(e) **Multinational Strategic Guidance.** CCDRs, subordinate JFCs, component and supporting commanders, and their staffs must clearly understand both US and partner nation strategic and military objectives and conditions that the national or multinational political leadership want the multinational military force to achieve in terms of the internal and external balance of power, regional security, and geopolitics. To ensure unity of effort, planners should identify and attempt to resolve conflicts between participating nations’ objectives and identify possible conflicts between different nations’ national political and military objectives to ensure strategic planning accounts for these divergences. When multinational objectives are unclear, the senior US military commander must seek clarification and convey the positive or negative impact of continued ambiguity to the President and SecDef. For additional information on multinational operations, see JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*. For specific information on NATO operations, see AJP-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine*; AJP-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*; and AJP-5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations*.

(5) **Review Commander’s Initial Planning Guidance.** Staff members and representatives from supporting organizations should maintain an open dialogue with the commander to better develop an appropriate solution to the problem and be able to adapt solutions to match the evolving OE and any potentially changing problems. Staffs should analyze the CCDR’s initial planning guidance for the campaign or operation, which
provides a basis for continued detailed analysis of the OE and of the tasks that may describe the mission and its parameters.

(6) **Determine Known Facts and Develop Planning Assumptions.** The staff assembles both facts and assumptions to support the planning process and planning guidance.

(a) A fact is a statement of information known to be true (such as verified locations of friendly and adversary force dispositions). Planners must acknowledge higher headquarters assumptions and assess the impact (risk) should they prove to be incorrect. If subordinate headquarters have information that may invalidate a higher headquarters’ assumption, that should be raised; however, it does not relieve subordinate headquarters from planning within the confines of the given assumption.

(b) An assumption provides a supposition about the current situation or future course of events, presumed to be true based on an assessment of available facts. Valid assumptions have three characteristics: logical, realistic, and essential for planning to continue. Commanders and staffs should never assume away adversary capabilities or assume unrealistic friendly capabilities will be available. Assumptions address gaps in knowledge critical for the planning process to continue. **All assumptions are continually reviewed to ensure their validity and challenged if unrealistic, including those provided in strategic guidance or from higher headquarters.** Subordinate commanders do not develop assumptions that contradict valid higher headquarters assumptions.

1. Commanders and staffs should anticipate changes to the plan if an assumption proves to be incorrect. Because of assumptions’ influence on planning, planners must either validate the assumptions (treat as facts) or invalidate the assumptions (alter the plan accordingly) as quickly as possible.

2. During wargaming or red teaming, planners should review both the positive and negative aspect of all assumptions. They should review the plan from both the perspective that the assumption will prove true and from the perspective that the assumption will prove false. This can aid in preventing biases or tunnel vision in a crisis.

*For more discussion on red teams, see Appendix J, “Red Teams.”*

3. Commanders should assess the impact higher headquarters assumptions have on the plan during wargaming. Although higher headquarters assumptions are followed in framing planning, they are treated as assumptions and validated for execution.
4. Assumptions made in contingency planning should be addressed in the plan. Activities and operations in the plan can be used to validate, refute, or render unnecessary contingency plan assumptions.

5. Plans may contain assumptions that cannot be resolved until a crisis develops. As a crisis develops, assumptions should be replaced with facts as soon as possible. The staff accomplishes this by identifying the information needed to validate assumptions and submitting an information request to an appropriate agency as an information requirement. If the commander needs the information to make a key decision, the information requirement can be designated a CCIR. Although there will be exceptions, the staff should strive to resolve all assumptions before issuing the order.

6. Planners work to limit assumptions to only those necessary for continued planning. By definition, assumptions introduce possibility for error. If the assumption is not necessary to continue planning, its only effect is to introduce error and add the likelihood of creating a bias in the commander’s and planner’s perspective. Since most plans require refinement, a plan with fewer assumptions allows the commander and staff to act and react with other elements of the OE (including enemies, adversaries, allies, and the physical element). However, assumptions are useful to identify those issues the commander and planners must validate on execution, and strategic plans are heavily reliant on assumptions due to the ambiguity inherent in the strategic environment.

7. All assumptions should be identified in the plan or decision matrix to ensure they are reviewed and validated prior to execution.

(7) **Determine and Analyze Operational Limitations.** Operational limitations are actions required or prohibited by higher authority and other restrictions that limit the commander’s freedom of action, such as diplomatic agreements, political and economic conditions in affected countries, and partner nation and HN issues.

(a) A **constraint** is a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that **dictates an action** (“must do”), thus restricting freedom of action. For example, General Dwight D. Eisenhower was required to enter the continent of Europe instead of relying upon strategic bombing to defeat Germany.

(b) A **restraint** is a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that **prohibits an action** (“cannot do”), thus restricting freedom of action. For example, General Douglas MacArthur was prohibited from striking Chinese targets north of the Yalu River during the Korean War.

(c) Many operational limitations transition to ROE/RUF. Operational limitations may restrict or bind COA selection or may even impede implementation of the chosen COA. Commanders must examine the operational limitations imposed on them, understand their impacts (including risk posed by limitations), and develop options within these limitations to promote maximum freedom of action during execution.
(d) Some operational limitations may arise due to the inherent informational aspect of military activities, the effects of which are not geographically constrained or limited to a joint force’s intended audiences. The joint force cannot control the spread of information or its impact on audiences, within or beyond an OA. This may restrict a commander's freedom of action if the informational aspect of a COA undermines higher priority national objectives. Based upon their understanding of the information impact on the OE, joint force planners need to determine limitations related to relevant actors, the use of certain capabilities, and the use of specific themes or messages.

(e) Other operational limitations may arise from laws or authorities, such as the use of specific types of funds or training events. Commanders are responsible for ensuring they have the authority to execute operations and activities.

8 Determine Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks. The commander and staff will typically review the planning directive’s specified tasks and discuss implied tasks during planning initiation to resolve unclear or incorrectly assigned tasks with higher headquarters. If there are no issues, the commander and staff will confirm the tasks in mission analysis and then develop the initial mission statement.

(a) Specified tasks are those that have been assigned to a commander in a planning directive. These are tasks the commander wants the subordinate commander to accomplish, usually because they are important to the higher command’s mission and/or objectives. One or more specified tasks often become essential tasks for the subordinate commander.

**EXAMPLES OF SPECIFIED TASKS**

- Ensure freedom of navigation for United States forces through the Strait of Gibraltar.
- Defend Country Green against attack from Country Red.

(b) Implied tasks are additional tasks the commander must accomplish, typically to accomplish the specified tasks, support another command, or otherwise accomplish activities relevant to the operation or achieving the objective. In addition to the higher headquarters’ planning directive, the commander and staff will review other sources of guidance for implied tasks, such as multinational planning documents and the CCP, enemy and friendly COG analysis products, JIPOE products, relevant doctrinal publications, interviews with subject matter experts, and the commander’s operational approach. The commander can also deduce implied tasks from knowledge of the OE, such as the enemy situation and political conditions in the assigned OA. However, implied tasks do not include routine tasks or standard operating procedures inherent for most operations, such as conducting reconnaissance and protecting a flank.
(c) **Essential tasks** are those that the command must execute successfully to attain the desired end state defined in the planning directive. The commander and staff determine essential tasks from the lists of both specified and implied tasks. Depending on the scope of the operation and its purpose, the commander may synthesize certain specified and implied task statements into an essential task statement. See the example mission statement below for examples of essential tasks.

(9) **Develop Mission Statement.** The mission statement describes the mission in terms of the elements of who, what, when, where, and why. The commander’s operational approach informs the mission statement and helps form the basis for planning. The commander includes the mission statement in the planning guidance, planning directive, staff estimates, commander’s estimate, CONOPS, and completed plan.

(10) **Conduct Initial Force and Resource Analysis**

(a) **Initial Force Analysis.** During mission analysis, the planning team begins to develop a rough-order-of-magnitude list of required forces and capabilities necessary to accomplish the specified and implied tasks. Planners consider the responsiveness of assigned and currently allocated forces. While more deliberate force requirement identification efforts continue during concept and plan development, initial identification of readily available forces during mission analysis may constrain the scope of the proposed operational approach.

1. In some cases, joint force capacity limits the range of possible objectives a military force can achieve without substantially impacting other military objectives. In these cases, JFCs should identify these limitations early and develop COA options that include objectives the joint force can achieve with less risk. However, planners also develop the best COAs possible for any military objective directed by a higher headquarters. Higher headquarters can make more informed cost-benefit-risk decisions when presented with multiple COAs that are distinguishable by the manner in which
objectives are achieved. COA comparison that includes COAs with different objectives helps higher headquarters make informed cost-benefit-risk decisions.

2. Force requirements for a plan are developed from forces that are assigned, allocated, and apportioned and initially documented in a TPFDL. The TPFDL is a list that depicts general details of the CCDR’s force requirements (e.g., type of force, required delivery in theater) and is contained in appendix 1 (Time-Phased Force Deployment List) to annex A (Task Organization) of the OPLAN. Later in the planning process, these requirements are entered into an information technology system (i.e., JOPES) as a baseline of forces with a more specific level of detail to support subsequent time phasing. From the start, planners should document forces in a format and system that enables GFM allocation to simplify plan execution.

3. In a crisis, assigned and allocated forces currently deployed to the geographic CCMD’s AOR may be the most responsive during the early stages of an emergent crisis. Planners may consider assigned forces as likely to be available to conduct activities unless allocated to a higher priority. Re-missioning previously allocated forces may require SecDef approval and should be coordinated through the JS using procedures outlined in CJCSM 3130.06, (U) Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures.

4. Planners should also consider the time required for call up and mobilization of reserve forces.

5. Planners should evaluate appropriate requirements against existing or potential contracts or task orders to determine if the contracted support solution could meet the requirements.

6. Force requirements for supported and supporting plans draw from the same quantity of apportioned forces and compete with other global requirements for military activities and ongoing operations during plan execution. The risk associated with reallocation or diversion of forces from one mission to another should be addressed early in the planning process, to facilitate SecDef-directed GFM allocation decisions during execution.

7. Finally, planners compare the specified and implied tasks to the forces and resources available and identify shortfalls.

8. Plans should only use forces/capabilities available in the joint force inventory during the development of the plan. Plans that incorporate unfielded capabilities are unlikely to achieve the commander’s objectives.

(b) Identify Non-Force Resources Available for Planning. In many types of operations, the commander (and planners) may have access to non-force resources, such as commander’s initiative funds, other funding sources (e.g., train and equip funding, support to foreign security forces funding), or can work with other security assistance programs (e.g., foreign military sales, excess defense article transfers). Planners and
commanders can weave together resources and authorities from several different programs to create successful operations. Only currently available resources should be part of planning. For example, planners should not expect to have bases or facilities the military plans to build or acquire in the future.

See JP 3-20, Security Cooperation, for additional information on integrating multiple resources. See the GFMIG for more information on the GFM processes and CJCSM 3130.06, (U) Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures, for additional guidance on GFM allocation.

(11) Develop Military Objectives

(a) Military objectives are clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goals toward which a military operation is directed. During plan development, military objectives are used to develop a line of operation (LOO) or line of effort (LOE) during formulation of the operational approach. Describing military objectives early helps commanders and staffs visualize and describe how effects in each LOO or LOE contribute to attaining the desired end state.

(b) Military objectives describe in broad terms what the JFC wants to achieve within each line of the operational approach. Each military objective establishes a clear goal toward which all the actions and effects of a LOO or LOE are directed. While military objectives commonly describe the condition and/or the relative position of the joint or enemy forces, the JFC may also express objectives as a particular behavior that the military operation will bring about. Military objectives are written as short phrases in active voice. Clear objectives will be concise, specific, unambiguous, and prescriptive (from the point of view of the entire joint force). Military objectives may also be scoped to focus resources on particular points in time, space, or action.

(c) Military objectives are not friendly tasks. Each objective should be broad enough to describe the net outcome of multiple subordinate actions. In this way, the military objectives serve as a bridge between end states and friendly tasks. They also provide a foundation for effective operational assessment by describing discrete conditions which military actions must change to accomplish the JFC’s mission.

(d) A complete set of military objectives serves as a focal point for joint, multinational, and interagency partners by contextualizing military action in relation to other instruments of national power and explaining the military’s contributions to unity of effort.

(e) The military objectives should be discussed during IPRs to ensure they are consistent with the next higher headquarters’ vision of mission accomplishment.

(12) Develop COA Evaluation Criteria. Evaluation criteria are standards the commander and staff will later use to measure the relative effectiveness and efficiency of one COA relative to other COAs. Developing these criteria during mission analysis or as
part of commander’s planning guidance helps to eliminate a source of bias prior to COA analysis and comparison.

(a) Evaluation criteria address factors (e.g., hazards, threats, and mitigation measures) that affect success and those that can cause failure. Criteria change from mission to mission and must be clearly defined and understood by all staff members before starting the wargame to test the proposed COAs. Commanders adjust criterion selection and weighting according to their own experience and vision. The staff member responsible for a functional area scores each COA using those criteria.

(b) The commander and staff use evaluation criteria during follow-on COA comparison (JPP step 5) for the purpose of selecting the best COA. The commander and staff consider various potential evaluation criteria during wargaming and select those that the staff will use following the wargame during COA comparison to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of one COA relative to others. These evaluation criteria help focus the wargaming effort and provide the framework for data collection by the staff. These criteria are those aspects of the situation (or externally imposed factors) that the commander deems critical to mission accomplishment. Figure III-7 shows examples of potential evaluation criteria.

(c) The staff presents the proposed evaluation criteria to the commander at the mission analysis brief for approval.

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![Figure III-7. Potential Course of Action Evaluation Criteria](image-url)
(13) **Develop Risk Assessment**

(a) Planners conducting a preliminary risk assessment must identify the obstacles or actions that may preclude mission accomplishment and then assess the impact of these impediments to the mission. Once planners identify the obstacles or actions, they assess the probability of achieving objectives and severity of loss linked to an obstacle or action, and characterize the military risk. Based on judgment, military risk assessment is an integration of probability and consequence of an identified impediment.

(b) The probability of the impediment occurring may be ranked as **very likely**: occurs often, continuously experienced; **probable**: likely to occur or occurs several times; **improbable**: unlikely, but could occur at some time; or **highly unlikely**: can assume it will not occur (see Figure III-8). Similarly, planners need to judge the consequence of the action should it occur (see Figure III-9) on a scale of minor harm to extreme harm. Harm is generally estimated considering vulnerability, the scale of damage, and the speed of recovery/resiliency (permanence). Looking at both these considerations, commanders and planners can make a risk judgement: military risk may be **high**: critical objectives cannot be achieved; **significant**: only the most critical objectives can be achieved; **moderate**: can partially achieve all objectives; or **low**: can fully achieve all objectives (see Figure III-10).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Probability of Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Likely (~81-100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improbable (~21-50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probable (~51-80%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly Unlikely (~0-20%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure III-8. Probability of Event**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consequence Levels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extreme harm to something of value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major harm to something of value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate harm to something of value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor harm to something of value</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure III-9. Consequence Levels**
(c) Determining military risk is more art than science. Planners use historical data, intuitive analysis, and judgment. Military risk characterization is based on an evaluation of the probability that the commander’s end state will be attained. The level of risk is high if achieving objectives or attaining end states is unlikely, significant if achieving objectives or attaining end states is questionable, moderate if achieving objectives or attaining end states is likely, and low if achieving objectives or attaining end states is very likely.

(d) Planners and commanders must be able to explain military risk to civilian leadership who may not be as familiar with military operations. Additionally, since military risk is often a matter of perspective and personal experience, they must be able to help decision makers understand how they evaluated the probability of achieving objectives, how they characterized the resultant military risk, and the sources or causes of that risk.

(e) During decision briefs, risks must be explained using standard terms that support the decision-making process, such as mission success (which missions will and
which will not be accomplished), **time** (how much longer will a mission take to achieve success), and **forces** (e.g., casualties, future readiness), and political implications.

*See CJCSM 3105.01, Joint Risk Analysis, for additional information and guidance on risk determination.*

**Determine Initial CCIRs**

(a) **CCIRs are elements of information the commander identifies as being critical to timely decision making.** CCIRs help focus information management and help the commander assess the OE, validate (or refute) assumptions, identify achievement of intermediate objectives, and identify decision points during operations. **CCIRs belong exclusively to the commander. They are situation-dependent, focused on predictable events or activities, time-sensitive, and always established by an order or plan.** The CCIR list is normally short so the staff can focus its efforts and allocate resources. The CCIR list is not static; JFCs add, delete, adjust, and update CCIRs throughout plan development, assessment, and execution based on the information they need for decision making. Priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and friendly force information requirements (FFIRs) constitute the total list of CCIRs (see Figure III-11).

1. **PIRs** focus on the adversary and the OE and are tied to commander’s decision points. They drive the collection of information by all elements of a command, requests for national-level intelligence support, and requirements for additional intelligence capabilities. All staff sections can recommend potential PIRs they believe

![Figure III-11. Commander’s Critical Information Requirements](image-url)
Joint Planning Process

meet the commander’s guidance. However, the joint force J-2 has overall staff responsibility for consolidating PIR nominations and for providing the staff recommendation to the commander. **Commander-approved PIRs are automatically CCIRs.**

*For more information on PIRs, see JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.*

2. **FFIRs** focus on information the JFC must have to assess the status of the friendly force and supporting capabilities. All staff sections can recommend potential FFIRs they believe meet the commander’s guidance. **Commander-approved FFIRs are automatically CCIRs.**

   (b) CCIR is information required by the commander for timely decision making.

   (c) **Decision Support.** CCIRs support the commander’s future decision requirements and are often related to measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs). All are developed to support specific decisions the commander must make.

(15) **Prepare Staff Estimates**

   (a) A staff estimate is an evaluation of how factors in a staff section’s functional area support and impact the mission. The purpose of the staff estimate is to inform the commander, staff, and subordinate commands how the functional area supports mission accomplishment and to support COA development and selection.

   (b) Staff estimates are initiated during mission analysis, when functional planners are focused on collecting information from their functional areas to help the commander and staff understand the situation and conduct mission analysis. Later, during COA development and selection, functional planners fully develop their estimates providing functional analysis of the COAs, as well as recommendations on which COAs are supportable. They should also identify critical shortfalls or obstacles that impact mission accomplishment. Staff estimates are continually updated based on changes in the situation. Operation assessment provides the means to maintain running staff estimates for each functional area. Staff estimates can be expanded to the relevant annex or appendix during plan development.

   (c) Not every situation will require or permit a lengthy and formal staff estimate process. In a crisis, staff estimates may be given orally to support the rapid development of plans. However, with sufficient time, planning will demand a more formal and thorough process. Staff estimates should be shared with subordinate and supporting commanders to help them prepare their supporting estimates, plans, and orders. This will improve parallel planning and collaboration efforts of subordinate and supporting elements and help reduce the planning times for the entire process.
(d) Intelligence support to joint planning includes Defense Intelligence Agency-produced dynamic threat assessments for each JSCP-directed problem set and select CCMD contingency plans and theater intelligence assessments with a two-to-five-year outlook to support CCP development and assessment. CCMD joint intelligence operations centers (JIOCs) and subordinate JFC’s joint intelligence support elements produce intelligence assessments and estimates resulting from theJIPOE process. The intelligence estimate constitutes the intelligence portion of the commander’s estimate and is typically published as appendix 11 (Intelligence Estimate) to annex B (Intelligence) to a plan or an order. These are baseline information and finished intelligence products that inform the four continuous operational activities of situational awareness, planning, execution, and assessment.

For additional information on the intelligence estimate format and its relationship to the commander’s estimates, see CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures), and CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance.

(e) During mission analysis, intelligence planners lead the development of PIRs and a collection plan(s) to close critical knowledge gaps in initial estimative intelligence products or to validate threat and OE-related planning assumptions and provide indications of changes in the OE. Throughout the JPP, additional PIRs may be nominated to support critical decisions needed throughout all phases of the operation. The intelligence planner then prepares a J-2 staff estimate, which is an appraisal of available capabilities within the intelligence joint function to satisfy commanders’ PIRs. This estimate drives development of annex B (Intelligence) to a plan or an order. In annex B, the J-2 publishes the commander’s PIRs, describes the concept of intelligence operations, specifies intelligence procedures, and assigns intelligence tasks to subordinate and supporting agencies. Coordinating authority or CCMD J-2 may also request a NISP for any level 3 or 4 plan. A NISP synchronizes and coordinates defense intelligence enterprise support to the CCDR’s plan. CSAs and Service intelligence centers prepare annexes to the NISP called functional support plans (FSPs). FSPs present supporting capabilities to CCDRs for employment in either a deployed or reachback mode. Through the intelligence planning (IP) process, intelligence planners identify gaps and shortfalls in DOD intelligence capabilities. Should these be left unmitigated, they may present risks to the execution of the supported plan to be considered during plan assessment.

For additional information on the IP process, see JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, and CJCSM 3314.01, Intelligence Planning.

(f) The commander’s logistics staff and Service component logisticians develop a logistics overview, which includes, but is not restricted to, critical logistics facts, assumptions, and information requirements that must be incorporated into CCIRs; current or anticipated HNS and status; identification of existing contracts and task orders available for use; identifying aerial and sea ports of debarkation; any other distribution infrastructure and associated capacity; inventory (e.g., on-hand, prepositioned, theater reserve); combat support and combat service support capabilities; known or potential capability shortfalls;
and contracted support required to replace or augment unavailable military capabilities. From this theater logistics overview (TLO), a logistics estimate can identify known and anticipated factors that may influence the logistics support.

(g) The commander’s gender advisor assists in the development of the gender analysis, if required. The gender analysis consists of information on gender differences and social relations to identify and understand inequities and power dynamics based on gender. For example, military planning activities should assess the different security concerns of women and men and girls and boys in the OA or take account of power relations in the community to ensure equal access to assistance where the military is supporting humanitarian assistance. Other examples would include understanding how customary conflict-resolution mechanisms affect women and men differently and how their social status may change as a result of armed conflict.

For more information on gender advising, see United States Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security.

For more information on staff estimates and sample formats, see Appendix C, “Staff Estimates,” and CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance. For more information on operational contract support (OCS), see JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support; Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS); and CJCSM 4301.01, Planning Operational Contract Support.

(16) Prepare and Deliver Mission Analysis Brief

(a) Upon conclusion of the mission analysis, the staff will present a mission analysis brief to the commander. This brief provides the commander with the results of the staff’s analysis of the mission, offers a forum to discuss issues that have been identified, and ensures the commander and staff share a common understanding of the mission. The results inform the commander’s development of the mission statement. The commander provides refined planning guidance and intent to guide subsequent planning. Figure III-12 shows an example mission analysis briefing.

(b) The mission analysis briefing may be the only time the entire staff is present and the only opportunity to make certain all staff members start from a common reference point. The briefing focuses on relevant conclusions reached as a result of the mission analysis.

(c) Immediately after the mission analysis briefing, the commander approves a restated mission. This can be the staff’s recommended mission statement, a modified version of the staff’s recommendation, or one that the commander has developed personally. Once approved, the restated mission becomes the unit mission.

(d) At the mission analysis brief, the commander will likely describe an updated understanding of the OE, the problem, and the vision of the operational approach to the entire assemblage, which should include representatives from supporting CCMDs,
Example Mission Analysis Briefing

- **Introduction**
- **Situation overview**
  - Operational environment (i.e., operational area) including contested environments extending beyond the operational area and threat overview
  - Political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure strengths and weaknesses
  - Enemy (including center[s] of gravity) and objectives
  - Neutral assessment (vulnerabilities and protection)
  - Nonmilitary threat networks (e.g., violent extremist organization, terrorist, criminal and insurgent) organization, composition, and disposition
- **Friendly assessment**
  - Facts and assumptions
  - Limitations—constraints/restraints
  - Vulnerabilities
  - Capabilities allocated
  - Legal considerations
  - Nonmilitary friendly networks (e.g., local police, local defense groups, local or regional civic groups) and their organization, composition, and disposition
  - Nonmilitary networks
  - Ability to help or hinder mission
- **Communication synchronization**
- **Objectives, effects, and task analysis**
  - United States Government interagency objectives
  - Higher commander's objectives/mission/guidance
  - Objectives and effects
  - Specified/implied/essential tasks
  - Centers of gravity
- **Operational protection**
  - Operational risk
  - Mitigation measures (existing/planned)
- **Proposed initial commander's critical information requirements**
- **Mission**
  - Proposed mission statement
  - Proposed commander’s intent
- **Command relationships analysis and options**
- **Conclusion—potential resource shortfalls**
- **Mission analysis approval and commander’s course of action planning guidance**

**Figure III-12. Example Mission Analysis Briefing**

subordinate commands, and other partner organizations. This provides the ideal venue for facilitating unity of understanding and vision, which is essential to unity of effort.
(17) **Publish Commander’s Refined Planning Guidance.** After approving the mission statement and issuing the intent, the commander may provide the staff (and supporting commands and subordinates in a collaborative environment) with additional guidance (including preliminary decisions) to focus the staff and subordinate planning activities during COA development. This refined planning guidance could include new substantive threats (capabilities and intent), military objectives or end states and their relation to the national strategic end state, initial thoughts on the conditions necessary to achieve objectives, targeting guidance, acceptable or unacceptable levels of risk in key areas and where tradeoffs may be made, and the JFCs visualization of the operational approach to achieve the objectives in broad terms. The commander should provide as much detail as appropriate to provide the right level of freedom to the staff in developing COAs. Planning guidance should also address the role of interorganizational and multinational partners in the pending operation and any related special considerations as required.

(a) Commanders describe their visualization of the forthcoming campaign or operations to help build a shared understanding among the staff. Enough guidance (preliminary decisions) must be provided to allow the subordinates to plan the action necessary to accomplish the mission consistent with commander’s intent. The commander’s guidance must focus on the essential tasks and associated objectives that support the achievement of the assigned national objectives. It emphasizes in broad terms when, where, and how the commander intends to employ military capabilities integrated with other instruments of national power to accomplish the mission within the higher JFC’s intent.

(b) The JFC may provide the planning guidance to the entire staff and/or subordinate JFCs, or meet each staff officer or subordinate unit individually, as the situation and information dictates. The guidance can be given in a written form or orally. No format for the planning guidance is prescribed. However, the guidance should be sufficiently detailed to provide a clear direction and to avoid unnecessary efforts by the staff or subordinate and supporting commands.

(c) Planning guidance can be very explicit and detailed, or it can be very broad, allowing the staff and/or subordinate commands wide latitude in developing subsequent COAs. However, no matter its scope, the content of planning guidance must be arranged in a logical sequence to reduce the chances of misunderstanding and to enhance clarity. Moreover, one must recognize that all the elements of planning guidance are tentative only; planning is conducted to enhance preparedness of the CCMD, and the staff must be flexible enough to leverage a given plan and adjust accordingly to address the actual OE. The JFC may issue successive planning guidance during the decision-making process, yet the focus of the JFC’s staff should remain upon the framework provided in the initial planning guidance. The commander should continue to provide refined planning guidance during the rest of the planning process while understanding of the problem continues to develop.

(18) **Operational Design Implications.** The commander and staff continue to develop their understanding of the OE and refine their understanding of strategic direction
During mission analysis, they continue to define the problem and begin to identify assumptions to support COA development. At this time, the commander should determine whether multiple options are required. Options identify different ways, generally broadly defined in scope, to support differing end states in support of the objective. COAs are subsets of options that identify specific military operations to attain the end state described in an option. The purpose of options is to provide senior decision makers, usually SecDef or the President, the opportunity to better integrate the military within policy decisions. Mission analysis usually concludes with the commander providing refined planning guidance, to include the option for which COAs should be developed.

d. COA Development (Step 3)

   (1) Introduction

      (a) A COA is a potential way (solution, method) to accomplish the assigned mission. Staffs develop multiple COAs to provide commanders with options to attain the military end state. A good COA accomplishes the mission within the commander’s guidance, provides flexibility to meet unforeseen events during execution, and positions the joint force for future operations. It also gives components the maximum latitude for initiative. All COAs must be suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete.

      (b) Figure III-13 shows the key inputs and outputs of COA development. The products of mission analysis drive COA development. Since the operational approach contains the JFC’s broad approach to solve the problem at hand, each COA will expand this concept with the additional details that describe who will take the action, what type of military action will occur, when the action will begin, where the action will occur, why the action is required (purpose), and how the action will occur (method of employment of forces). Likewise, the essential tasks identified during mission analysis (and embedded in the draft mission statement) must be common to all potential COAs.

      (c) Planners can vary COAs by adjusting the use of joint force capabilities in the physical domains, information environment (including cyberspace), and electromagnetic spectrum throughout the OE. At the strategic level (national and theater), planners may adjust the military end states as one aspect of creating distinguishable COAs. COAs with different military end states offer senior military leaders and policy makers the opportunity to evaluate military options based on the broader objectives they can plausibly achieve at various levels of cost, risk, and force deployments.

   (2) COA Development Considerations

      (a) The inputs to COA development include the staff estimates (to include assessed most likely/most dangerous enemy COAs), mission statement, refined operational approach, and CCIRs.
(b) The products of COA development are potential **COAs**, with a sketch for each if possible. Each COA describes, in broad but clear terms, what is to be done throughout the campaign or operation, including consolidation, stabilization, and transition from combat operations; operations in and across the physical domains, the information environment (which includes cyberspace), and the electromagnetic spectrum; the size of forces deemed necessary; time in which joint force capabilities need to be brought to bear; and the risks associated with the COA. These COAs will undergo additional validity testing, analysis, modeling/simulation, wargaming, and comparison, and they could be eliminated at any point during this process. These COAs provide conceptualization and broad descriptions of potential CONOPS for the conduct of operations that will attain the desired end state.
(c) Developing valid COAs is critical, despite constraints on time and planning resources available. The JFC gives the staff additional considerations early in COA development to focus the effort, helping the staff concentrate on developing the most appropriate COAs. There are always multiple ways to accomplish the mission, but normally, the staff must strike a balance between the time desired for innovation and the time needed to build complete COAs that meet JFC guidance and the operational approach. Many staffs find they have time and resources to develop only two or three distinct COAs per operational approach. If time and personnel resources permit, different COAs could be developed by different teams working in parallel. This technique may ensure uniqueness while enabling greater output without sacrificing time for creative and critical thinking.

(d) Under some circumstances, COAs are an effective vehicle for a broader conversation between senior leaders, who may include civilians, about what a JFC can accomplish with available forces and acceptable levels of cost and risk. This requires the JFC to develop at least one COA to attain the end state directed by the higher headquarters. Then the JFC builds one or more COAs to attain a modified end state. The COA briefing should compare the anticipated costs, benefits, and risks for all COAs. When presented to a higher headquarters, this expanded range of alternatives offers an opportunity to achieve a shared vision between the JFC and senior leaders, early in the planning process, about acceptable cost-benefit-risk tradeoffs, before the JFC commits planning resources to COAs that require greater costs, risks, or forces than the outcomes are worth. This methodology can apply to both planning for contingencies and planning in a crisis at the discretion of the JFC.

(e) For each COA, the commander must envision the employment of all participants in the operation as a whole—US military forces, MNFs, and interagency and multinational partners—while accounting for input from senior leaders during plans reviews, operational limitations, political considerations, the OA, and existing FDOs. However, COA success should only depend on support from participants outside the JFC’s control with the explicit approval of higher headquarters. Different levels of outside support often provide a good way to make alternate COAs unique.

(f) During COA development, the commander and staff consider all feasible enemy COAs. Other factors in the OE may also create difficult conditions that must be considered during COA development.

(g) Each COA typically has an associated initial CONOPS with a narrative and sketch and usually includes the following:

1. OE.

2. Objectives.

3. Essential tasks and purpose.
4. Forces and capabilities required, to include anticipated interagency roles, actions, and supporting tasks.

5. Integrated timeline.

6. Task organization.

7. Operational concept.

8. Sustainment concept.

9. Communication synchronization.

10. Risk.

11. Required decisions and decision timeline (e.g., mobilization, DEPORD).

12. Deployment concept.

13. Main and supporting efforts.

(3) **COA Development Techniques and Procedures**

(a) **Review information** contained in the mission analysis and commander’s operational approach, planning guidance, and intent statement. All staff members must understand the mission and the tasks that must be accomplished within the commander’s intent to achieve mission success.

(b) **Determine the COA Development Technique**

1. The first decision in COA development is whether to conduct simultaneous or sequential development of the COAs. Each approach has distinct advantages and disadvantages. The advantage of simultaneous development of COAs is potential time savings. Separate groups are simultaneously working on different COAs. The disadvantage of this approach is that the synergy of the JPG may be disrupted by breaking up the team. The approach is manpower-intensive and requires component and directorate representation in each COA group, and there is an increased likelihood the COAs will lack distinctiveness. While there are potential time savings, experience has demonstrated that it is not an automatic result. The simultaneous COA development approach can work, but its inherent disadvantages must be addressed and some risk accepted up front.

2. There are several planning sequence techniques available to facilitate COA development. One option is the step-by-step approach (see Figure III-14), which uses the backward-planning technique (also known as reverse planning).
Review objectives and tasks and develop ways to accomplish tasks. Planners must review and refine objectives from the initial work done during the development of the operational approach. These objectives establish the conditions necessary to help achieve the national strategic objectives. Tasks are shaped by the CONOPS—intended sequencing and integration of air, land, maritime, special operations, cyberspace, and space forces. Tasks are prioritized while considering the enemy’s objectives and the need to gain advantage.

1. Regardless of the eventual COA, the staff should plan to accomplish the higher commander’s intent by understanding its essential task(s) and purpose and the intended contribution to the higher commander’s mission success.

2. The staff must ensure all COAs developed fulfill the command mission and the purpose of the operation by conducting a review of all essential tasks.
developed during mission analysis. They should then consider ways to accomplish the other tasks.

(d) Once the staff has begun to visualize COA alternatives, it should see how it can best synchronize (arrange in terms of time, space, and purpose) the actions of all the elements of the force. The staff should estimate the anticipated duration of the operation. One method of synchronizing actions is the use of phasing, as discussed earlier. Phasing assists the commander and staff to visualize and think through the entire operation or campaign and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. Planners should then **integrate and synchronize** these requirements by using the joint functions of C2, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, sustainment, and information. At a minimum, planners should make certain the synchronized actions answer the following questions:

1. How do land, maritime, air, space, cyberspace, and special operations forces integrate across the joint functions to accomplish their assigned tasks?

2. How does the joint force leverage the informational aspects of military activities to create relevant actor perceptions and drive relevant actors to behave in ways that support achieving the JFC’s objectives?

(e) The COAs should focus on **COGs and decisive points**. The commander and the staff review and refine their COG analysis, begun during mission analysis, based on updated intelligence, JIPOE products, and initial staff estimates. The refined enemy and friendly COG analysis, particularly the critical vulnerabilities, is considered in the development of the initial COAs. The COG analysis helps the commander become oriented to the enemy and compare friendly strengths and weakness with those of the enemy. By looking at friendly COGs and vulnerabilities, the staff understands the capabilities of their own force and critical vulnerabilities that will require protection. Protection resource limitations will probably mean the staff cannot plan to protect every capability but, rather, will look at prioritizing protection for critical capabilities and developing overlapping protection techniques. The strength of one force or capability may provide protection from the weakness of another.

(f) **Identify the sequencing** (simultaneous, sequential, or a combination) of the actions for each COA. Understand which resources become available, and when, during the operation or campaign. Resource availability will significantly affect sequencing operations and activities.

For a discussion on defeat and stability mechanisms, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 3-07, Stability.

(g) **Identify main and supporting efforts by phase**, the purposes of these efforts, and key supporting/supported relationships within phases.

(h) **Identify decision points and assessment process**. The commander will need to know when a critical decision has to be made and how to know specific objectives
have been achieved. This requires integration of decision points and assessment criteria into the COA, as these processes anticipate a potential need for decisions from outside the command (SecDef, the President, or other command).

(i) **Identify component-level missions/tasks** (who, what, and where) that will accomplish the stated purposes of main and supporting efforts. Think of component tasks in terms of the joint functions. Display them with graphic control measures as much as possible. A designated LOO or LOE will help identify these tasks.

(j) **Task Organization**

1. The staff should develop an outline task organization to execute the COA. The commander and staff determine appropriate command relationships and appropriate missions and tasks.

2. **Determine command relationships and organizational options.** Joint force organization and command relationships are based on the operation or campaign CONOPS, complexity, and degree of control required. Establishing command relationships includes determining the types of subordinate commands and the degree of authority to be delegated to each. Clear definition of command relationships further clarifies the intent of the commander and contributes to decentralized execution and unity of effort. The commander has the authority to determine the types of subordinate commands from several doctrinal options, including Service components, functional components, and subordinate joint commands. Regardless of the command relationships selected, it is the JFC’s responsibility to ensure these relationships are understood and clear to all subordinate, adjacent, and supporting headquarters. The following are considerations for establishing joint force organizations:

   a. Joint forces will normally be organized with a combination of Service and functional components with operational responsibilities.

   b. Functional component staffs should be joint with Service representation in approximate proportion to the mix of subordinate forces. These staffs should be organized and trained prior to employment to be efficient and effective, which will require advanced planning.

   c. Commanders may establish support relationships between components to facilitate operations.

   d. Commanders define the authority and responsibilities of functional component commanders, based on the strategic CONOPS, and may alter their authority and responsibility during the course of an operation.

   e. Commanders must balance the need for centralized direction with decentralized execution.
Major changes in the joint force organization are normally conducted at phase changes.

(k) **Sustainment Concept.** No COA is complete without a proper **sustainment plan.** The sustainment concept is more than just gathering information on various logistic and personnel services. It entails identifying the requirements for all classes of supply and services and creating distribution, transportation, OCS, and disposition plans to support the commander’s execution. Sustainment concepts also organize capabilities and resources into an overall campaign or operation sustainment concept. It concentrates forces and material resources strategically so the right force is available at the designated times and places to conduct decisive operations. It requires thinking through a cohesive sustainment for joint, single-Service, and supporting forces relationships in conjunction with CSAs, multinational, interagency, nongovernmental, private-sector, or international organizations.

(l) **Deployment Concept.** A COA must consider the deployment concept to describe the general flow of forces (organic and nonorganic) into theater. There is no way to determine the feasibility of the COA without including the deployment concept and how the force will respond to a contested environment with enemy attacks on force flow. While the detailed deployment concept will be developed during plan synchronization, enough of the concept must be described in the COA to visualize force buildup, sustainment requirements, and military-political considerations. The concept should account for how cohesive military actions in time, space, and purpose will address transregional, all-domain, multifunctional challenges.

(m) **Nuclear Planning.** COA development includes nuclear planning, as required. Commanders assess the military and strategic impact of nuclear weapons employment on joint operations. Nuclear planning guidance is provided in presidential policy documents and further clarified in other DOD documents, such as the nuclear supplement to the JSCP. Guidance issued to the CCDR is based on national-level considerations and supports the achievement of US objectives. USSTRATCOM is the lead organization for nuclear planning and coordination with appropriate allied commanders. USSTRATCOM, in collaboration with the other CCMDs, ensures optimal integration of US nuclear and conventional forces prior to, during, and after conflict. USSTRATCOM uses this framework to develop detailed mission plans to be executed by the appropriate nuclear forces. Due to the strategic and diplomatic consequences associated with nuclear operations and plans, only the President has the authority to direct the planning and employment of nuclear weapons.

*For additional information, see JP 3-72, Nuclear Operations.*

(n) **Define the OA**

1. The OA is an overarching term that can encompass more descriptive terms for geographic areas. It will provide flexibility/options and/or limitations to the
commander. The OA must be precisely defined, because the specific geographic area will impact planning factors such as access, basing, overflight, and sustainment.

2. OAs include, but are not limited to, such descriptors as AOR, theater of war, theater of operations, JOA, amphibious objective area, joint special operations area, and area of operations. CCDRs, with assigned AORs and their subordinate JFCs, designate smaller OAs on a temporary basis. OAs have physical dimensions composed of some combination of air, land, maritime, and space domains. JFCs define these areas with geographical boundaries, which facilitate the coordination, integration, and deconfliction of joint operations among joint force components and supporting commands. The size of these OAs and the types of forces employed within them depend on the scope and nature of the crisis and the projected duration of operations.

See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, for additional information on OAs.

(o) Integrate special access program (SAP)-protected capabilities into COAs. This may include:

1. Conducting operations with authorized allies and other partners.

2. Supporting allies and other partners requests for use of US capabilities through integrated joint special technical operations.

3. Including SAP capabilities into CONPLANs and OPLANs and seeking early approval.

4. As appropriate, training and exercising all aspects of integrated SAP planning and execution.

(p) **Develop Initial COA Sketches and Statements.** Each COA should answer the following questions:

1. Who (type of forces) will execute the tasks?

2. What are the tasks?

3. Where will the tasks occur? (Start adding graphic control measures, [e.g., areas of operation, amphibious objective areas].)

4. When will the tasks begin?

5. What are key/critical decision points?

6. How (but do not usurp the components’ prerogatives) should the commander provide “operational direction” so the components can accomplish “tactical actions.”
7. Why (for what purpose) will each force conduct its part of the operation?

8. How will the commander assess mission accomplishment?

9. What is the initial intelligence support concept?

(q) **Test the Validity of Each COA.** All COAs selected for analysis must be valid, and the staff should reject COA alternatives that do not meet all five of the following validity criteria:

1. **Suitable**—Can accomplish the mission within the commander’s guidance. Preliminary tests include:
   
   a. Does it accomplish the mission?
   
   b. Does it meet the commander’s intent?
   
   c. Does it accomplish all the essential tasks?
   
   d. Does it meet the conditions for the relevant end state?
   
   e. Does it take into consideration the enemy and friendly COGs?
   
   f. Are security objectives informed by the gender dynamics of the local population?

2. **Feasible**—Can accomplish the mission within the established time, space, and resource limitations.

   a. Does the commander have the force structure, posture, transportation, and logistics (e.g., munitions) (means) to execute it? The COA is feasible if it can be executed with the forces, support, and technology available within the constraints of the OE and against expected enemy opposition.

   b. Although this process occurs during COA analysis and the test at this time is preliminary, it may be possible to declare a COA infeasible (for example, resources are obviously insufficient). However, it may be possible to fill shortfalls by requesting support from the commander or other means.

3. **Acceptable**—Must balance cost and risk with the advantage gained.

   a. Does it contain unacceptable risks? (Is it worth the possible cost?) A COA is considered acceptable if the estimated results justify the risks. The basis of this test consists of an estimation of friendly losses in forces, time, position, and opportunity.
b. Does it take into account the limitations placed on the commander (constraints, “must do;” restraints, “cannot do;” other physical or authority limitations)?

c. Are COAs reconciled with external limitations, including US and international law, USG policy, ROE, and acceptable risk? This requires visualization of execution of the COA against each enemy capability.

d. Although this process occurs during COA analysis and the test at this time is preliminary, it may be possible to declare a COA unacceptable if it violates the commander’s definition of acceptable risk. Acceptability is considered from the perspective of the commander by reviewing the strategic objectives.

4. **Distinguishable**—Must be sufficiently different from other COAs in the following:

   a. The focus or direction of main effort.

   b. The scheme of maneuver, including integration and sequencing of actions in the physical domains, information environment (including cyberspace), and electromagnetic spectrum.

   c. Sequential versus simultaneous maneuvers.

   d. The primary mechanism for mission accomplishment.

   e. Task organization(s).

   f. The use of reserves.

5. **Complete**—Does it answer the questions who, what, where, when, how, and why? The COA must incorporate:

   a. Objectives, desired effects to be created, and tasks to be performed.

   b. Major forces and capabilities required, to include the forces and capabilities of international partners.

   c. Concepts for deployment, employment, and sustainment.

   d. Time estimates for achieving objectives.

   e. Military end state and mission success criteria (including the assessment: how the commander will know they have achieved success).
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Conduct COA Development Brief to Commander. Figure III-15 provides suggested sequence and content.

Example Course of Action Development Briefing

- Operations Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-3)/Plans Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-5)
  - Context/background (i.e., road to war)
  - Initiation—review guidance for initiation
  - Strategic guidance—planning tasks assigned to supported commander, forces/resources apportioned, planning guidance, updates, defense agreements, theater campaign plan(s), Contingency Planning Guidance/Joint Strategic Campaign Plan
  - Forces allocated/assigned

- J-2 [Intelligence Directorate of a Joint Staff]
  - Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment
  - Enemy objectives
  - Enemy courses of action (COAs)—most dangerous, most likely; strengths and weaknesses
  - Nonmilitary threat networks effect on possible COAs

  - Update facts and assumptions
  - Mission statement
  - Commander’s intent (purpose, method, end state)
  - End state: political/military
    - termination criteria
  - Center of gravity analysis results: critical factors; strategic/operational
  - Joint operations area/theater of operations/communications zone sketch
  - Shaping activities recommended (for current theater campaign plan)
  - Flexible deterrent options with desired effect
  - For each COA, sketch and statement by phase
    - task organization
    - component tasking
    - timeline
    - recommended command and control by phase
    - lines of operation/lines of effort
    - logistics estimates and feasibility
    - COA risks
    - synchronization matrices
  - COA summarized distinctions
  - COA priority for analysis
  - Operations in the information environment
  - COA risks and opportunities from friendly nonmilitary networks and by friendly military forces.
  - COA risks and opportunities from neutral networks.

- Update COA Development Briefing to Include:
  - Red objectives

- Commander’s Guidance

Figure III-15. Example Course of Action Development Briefing
(s) **JFC Provides Guidance on COAs**

1. Review and approve COA(s) for further analysis.

2. Direct revisions to a COA(s), combinations of COAs, or development of an additional COA(s).

3. Direct priority for which an enemy COA(s) (most dangerous/most likely) will be used during wargaming of a friendly COA(s).

(t) **Continue the Staff Estimate Process.** The staff must continue to conduct their staff estimates of supportability for each COA.

(u) **Conduct Vertical and Horizontal Concurrent Planning**

1. Discuss the planning status of staff counterparts with both commander’s and JFC components’ staffs.

2. Coordinate planning with staff counterparts from other functional areas.

3. Permit adjustments in planning as additional details are learned from higher and adjacent echelons, and permit lower echelons to begin planning efforts and generate questions (e.g., requests for information).

(4) **The Planning Directive**

(a) The planning directive identifies planning responsibilities for developing joint force plans. It provides guidance and requirements to the staff and subordinate commands concerning coordinated planning actions for plan development. The JFC normally communicates initial planning guidance to the staff, subordinate commanders, and supporting commanders by publishing a planning directive to ensure everyone understands the commander’s intent and to achieve unity of effort.

(b) Generally, the J-5 coordinates staff action for planning for the CCMD campaign and contingencies, and the J-3 coordinates staff action in a crisis situation. The J-5 staff receives the JFC’s initial guidance and combines it with the information gained from the initial staff estimates. The JFC, through the J-5, may convene a preliminary planning conference for members of the JPEC who will be involved with the plan. This is the opportunity for representatives to meet face-to-face. At the conference, the JFC and selected members of the staff brief the attendees on important aspects of the plan and may solicit their initial reactions. Many potential conflicts can be avoided by this early exchange of information.

c. **COA Analysis and Wargaming (Step 4)**
(1) **Introduction**

(a) COA analysis is the process of closely examining potential COAs to reveal details that enable the commander and staff to tentatively evaluate COA validity and identify the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed friendly COA. The commander and staff analyze each COA separately according to the commander’s guidance. COA analysis is a valuable use of time that ensures COAs are valid.

(b) **Wargaming** is a primary means for COA analysis. Wargames are representations of conflict or competition in a synthetic environment, in which people make decisions and respond to the consequences of those decisions. COA wargaming is a conscious attempt to visualize the flow of the operation, given joint force strengths and dispositions, adversary capabilities and possible COAs, the OA, and other aspects of the OE. Each critical event within a proposed COA should be wargamed based upon time available using the action, reaction, and counteraction method of friendly and/or opposing force interaction. The basic COA wargaming method can be modified to fit the specific mission and OE and be applied to combat, noncombat, and CCP activities. Wargaming is most effective when it involves the following elements:

1. A well-developed, valid COA.
2. People making decisions.
3. A fair, competitive environment (i.e., the game should have no rules or procedures designed to tilt the playing field toward one side or another).
4. Adjudication.
5. Consequences of actions.
6. Iteration (i.e., new insights will be gained as games are iterated).

(c) COA wargaming involves a detailed evaluation of each COA as it pertains to the enemy and the OE. Each of the selected friendly COAs is then wargamed against selected enemy or OE COAs, as well as other relevant actor actions as applicable (e.g., wargaming CCMD campaign activities can provide insights about how an HN or others might react/respond). The commander selects the COAs for wargaming and provides guidance along with refined evaluation criteria.

(d) Wargaming stimulates thought about the operation so the commander can obtain ideas and insights that otherwise might not have emerged. An objective, comprehensive analysis of COA alternatives is difficult even without time constraints. Based upon time available, the commander should wargame each COA against the most likely and the most dangerous adversary COAs (or most difficult objectives in noncombat and campaign operations) identified through the JIPOE process. Figure III-16 shows the key inputs and outputs associated with COA analysis.
(2) **Analysis and Wargaming Process**

(a) The analysis and wargaming process can be as simple as a detailed narrative effort that describes the action, probable reaction, counteraction, forces, and time used. A more comprehensive version is the “sketch-note” technique, which adds operational sketches and notes to the narrative process to gain a clearer picture. Sophisticated wargames employ more extensive means to depict the range of actions by competitors and the consequences of the synthesis of those actions. The most sophisticated form of wargaming is one where all competitors in a conflict are represented (and emulated to the best degree possible, to include sustainment considerations) and have equal decision space to enable a full exploration of the competition within the OE. Modeling and simulation are distinct and separate analytic tools and not the same as wargames. Modeling
and simulation can be complementary and assist wargaming through bookkeeping, visualization, and adjudication for well-understood actions.

(b) Analysis of multiple COAs is vital to the commander’s estimate process. The items selected for wargaming and COA comparison will depend on the nature of the mission. For plans or orders involving contested deployment and combat operations, the staff considers opposing COAs based on enemy capabilities, objectives, an estimate of the enemy’s intent, and activities of other relevant actors that would not be favorable or that would challenge achievement of the objective. For noncombat operations or CCPs, the staff may analyze COAs based on partner capabilities, partner and US planned activities and objectives, likely actions of other relevant actors, criticality, and risk.

(c) In the analysis and wargaming step, the staff analyzes the probable effect each opposing COA has on the chances of success of each friendly COA. The objective is to develop a sound basis for determining the feasibility and acceptability of the COAs. Analysis also provides the planning staff with a greatly improved understanding of their COAs and the relationship between them. COA analysis identifies which COA best accomplishes the mission while best positioning the force for future operations. It also helps the commander and staff to:

1. Determine how to maximize combat power against the enemy while protecting the friendly forces and minimizing collateral damage in combat or maximize the effect of available resources toward achieving CCMD and national objectives in noncombat operations and campaigns.

2. Have as near an identical visualization of the operation as possible.

3. Anticipate adversary, enemy, and other relevant actor actions/events in the OE and potential reaction options.

4. Determine conditions and resources required for success, while also identifying gaps and seams.

5. Determine when and where to apply the force’s capabilities.

6. Plan for and coordinate authorities to integrate information activities early.

7. Focus intelligence collection and operation assessment requirements.

8. Determine the most flexible COA.

9. Identify potential decision points.

10. Determine task organization options.
11. Develop data for use in a synchronization matrix or related tool.

12. Identify potential plan branches and sequels.

13. Identify high-value targets.


15. Determine COA advantages and disadvantages.

16. Recommend CCIRs.

17. Validate end states and objectives.

18. Identify contradictions between friendly COAs and expected enemy end states.

(d) Wargaming is a disciplined process, with rules and steps that attempt to visualize the flow of the operation. The process considers friendly dispositions, strengths, and weaknesses; adversary, enemy, and other relevant actor capabilities and intent set forth as probable COAs; and characteristics of the political, information, commercial/economic, and physical environment. It relies heavily on joint doctrinal foundation, tactical judgment, and operational and regional/area experience. It focuses the staff’s attention on each phase of the operation in a logical sequence. It is an iterative process of action, reaction, and counteraction. Wargaming stimulates ideas and provides insights that might not otherwise be discovered. It highlights critical tasks and provides familiarity with operational possibilities otherwise difficult to achieve. Wargaming is a critical portion of the planning process and should be allocated significant time. **Each retained COA should be wargamed against both the most likely and most dangerous enemy COAs and address contested environments across both the strategic environment and the OE.**

(e) During the wargame, the staff takes a COA statement and begins to add more detail to the concept, while determining the strengths or weaknesses of each COA, including the associated deployment and distribution requirements. Wargaming tests a COA and can provide insights that can be used to improve upon a developed COA. The commander and staff (and subordinate commanders and staffs if the wargame is conducted collaboratively) may change an existing COA or develop a new COA after identifying unforeseen critical events, tasks, requirements, or problems.

(f) For the wargame to be effective, the commander should indicate what aspects of the COA should be examined and tested. Wargaming guidance should include the list of friendly COAs to be wargamed against specific threat COAs (e.g., COAs 1, 2, and 3 against the enemy’s most likely and most dangerous COAs), including contested environments impacting deployment and distribution operations, the timeline for the phase or stage of the operations, a list of critical events, and level of detail (i.e., two levels down).
For a valid COA comparison (JPP step 5), each friendly COA must be wargamed against the same set of threat COAs.

(g) **COA Analysis Considerations.** Evaluation criteria and known critical events are two of the many important considerations as COA analysis begins.

*For more information, see Appendix F, “Course of Action Comparison.”*

1. Evaluation criteria change from mission to mission. It will be helpful during future wargaming steps for all participants to be familiar with the criteria so any insights that influence a criterion are recorded for later comparison. The criteria may include anything the commander desires. If they are not received directly, the staff can derive them from the commander’s intent statement. Evaluation criteria do not stand alone. Each must be clearly defined. Precisely defining criteria reduces subjectivity and ensures consistent evaluation. The following sources provide a good starting point for developing a list of potential evaluation criteria:

   a. Commander’s guidance and commander’s intent.

   b. Mission accomplishment at an acceptable cost, including impacts to other global requirements.

   c. The principles of joint operations.

   d. Doctrinal fundamentals for the type of operation being conducted.

   e. The level of residual risk in the COA and to other global requirements.

   f. Implicit significant factors relating to the operation (e.g., need for speed, security).

   g. Factors relating to specific staff functions.

   h. Elements of operational design.

   i. Other factors to consider: diplomatic or political constraints, residual risks, financial costs, flexibility, simplicity, surprise, speed, mass, sustainability, C2, and capability and infrastructure survivability.

2. **List Known Critical Events.** These are essential tasks, or a series of critical tasks, conducted over a period of time that require detailed analysis (such as the series of component tasks to be performed on D-day).

   a. This may be expanded to review component tasks over a phase(s) of an operation or over a period of time (C-day through D-day). The planning staff may
wish at this point to also identify decision points (those decisions in time and space that the commander must make to ensure timely execution and synchronization of resources). These decision points are most likely linked to a critical event (e.g., commitment of the reserve force).

b. For CCMD campaigns, this includes identifying linked events and activities: the staff must identify if campaign activities are sensitive to the sequence in which they are executed and if subsequent activities are dependent on the success of earlier ones. If resources are cut for an activity early in the campaign, the staff must identify to the commander the impact of the loss of that event (or if the results were different from those anticipated), a decision point to continue subsequent events, and alternates if the planned events were dependent on earlier ones.

(h) **There are two key decisions to make before COA analysis begins.** The first decision is to decide what type of wargame will be used. This decision should be based on commander’s guidance, time and resources available, staff expertise, and availability of simulation models. The second decision is to prioritize the enemy COAs or the partner capabilities, partner and US objectives for noncombat operations, and the wargame that it is to be analyzed against.

(3) **Conducting the Wargame**

(a) The primary steps are: prepare for the wargame, conduct the wargame, evaluate the results, and prepare products. Figure III-17 shows sample wargaming steps.

(b) Prepare for the Wargame

1. The two forms of wargames are computer-assisted and manual. There are many forms of computer-assisted wargames; most require a significant amount of preparation to develop and load scenarios and then to train users. However, the potential to utilize the computer model for multiple scenarios or blended scenarios makes it valuable. For both types, consider how to organize the participants in a logical manner.

2. For manual wargaming, three distinct methods are available to run the event:

    a. **Deliberate Timeline Analysis.** Consider actions day-by-day or in other discrete blocks of time. This is the most thorough method for detailed analysis when time permits.

    b. **Phasing.** Used as a framework for COA analysis. Identify significant actions and requirements by functional area and/or JTF component.

    c. **Critical Events/Sequence of Essential Tasks.** The sequence of essential tasks, also known as the critical events method, highlights actions necessary to
Joint Planning Process

Sample Wargaming Steps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| 1    | Prepare for the Wargame  
   • Gather tools  
   • List and review friendly forces and capabilities  
   • List and review opposing forces and capabilities  
   • List known critical events  
   • Determine participants  
   • Determine opposing course of action (COA) to wargame  
   • Select wargaming method  
     ◦ manual or computer-assisted  
   • Select a method to record and display wargaming results  
     ◦ narrative  
     ◦ sketch and note  
     ◦ war game worksheets  
     ◦ synchronization matrix |
| 2    | Conduct Wargame and Assess Results  
   • Purpose of wargame (identify gaps, visualization)  
   • Basic methodology (e.g., action, reaction, counteraction)  
   • Record results |
| 3    | Prepare Products  
   • Results of the wargame brief  
     ◦ potential decision points  
     ◦ evaluation criteria  
     ◦ potential branches and sequels  
   • Revised staff estimates  
   • Refined COAs  
   • Time-phased force and deployment data refinement and transportation feasibility  
   • Feedback through the COA decision brief |

Figure III-17. Sample Wargaming Steps

establish the conditions for future operations, such as a sustainment capability and engage enemy units in the deep battle area. At the same time, it enables the planners to adapt if the enemy or others in the OE react in such a way that necessitates reordering of the essential tasks. This technique also enables wargamers to analyze concurrently the essential tasks required to execute the CONOPS. Focus on specific critical events that encompass the essence of the COA. If necessary, different measures should be developed for assessing different types of critical events (e.g., destruction, blockade, air control, neutralization, ensure defense). As with the focus on phasing, the critical events discussion identifies significant actions and requirements by functional area and/or by JTF component and enables a discussion of possible or expected reactions to execution of critical tasks.

3. **Red Cell.** The J-2 staff, augmented by supporting CCMD J-2 personnel, will provide a red cell to role-play and model the enemies and others in the OE during planning and specifically during wargaming.
a. A robust, well-trained, imaginative, and skilled red cell that aggressively pursues the enemy’s point of view during wargaming is essential. By accurately portraying the full range of realistic capabilities and options available to the enemy (to include all aspects of operations in the information environment, which includes cyberspace and some electromagnetic and counter-space capabilities), they help the staff address friendly responses for each enemy COA. For campaign and noncombat operation planning, the red cell provides expected responses to US actions, based on their knowledge and analysis of the OE.

b. The red cell should be composed of personnel from the joint force J-2 staff and augmented by other subject matter experts.

c. The red cell develops critical decision points, projects enemy and other OE reactions to friendly actions, and estimates impacts and implications on the enemy forces and objectives. By trying to win the wargame, the red cell helps the staff identify weaknesses and vulnerabilities before a real enemy does.

d. Given time constraints, as a minimum, the most dangerous and most likely COAs should be wargamed and role-played by the red cell during the wargame and include plausible enemy contested environment actions targeting deployment and distribution operations.

4. **White Cell.** A small cell of arbitrators normally composed of senior individuals familiar with the plan is a smart investment to ensure the wargame does not get bogged down in unnecessary disagreement or arguing. The white cell will provide overall oversight to the wargame and any adjudication required between participants. The white cell may also include the facilitator and/or highly qualified experts as required.

5. In addition to a red cell and a white cell, there should also be a blue cell that represents friendly forces, a green cell representing transnational groups, NGOs, and others in the OE.

(c) **Conduct the Wargame and Evaluate the Results**

1. The facilitator and the red cell chief get together to agree on the rules of the wargame. The wargame begins with an event designated by the facilitator. It could be an enemy offensive or defensive action, a friendly offensive or defensive action, or some other activity such as a request for support or campaign activity. They decide where (in the OA) and when (H-hour or L-hour) it will begin. They review the initial array of forces and the OE. Of note, they must come to an agreement on the effectiveness of capabilities and previous actions by both sides prior to the wargame. The facilitator must ensure all members of the wargame know what events will be wargamed and what techniques will be used. This coordination within the friendly team and between the friendly and the red team should be done well in advance.

2. Each COA wargame has a number of turns, each consisting of three total moves: action, reaction, and counteraction. If necessary, each turn of the wargame
may be extended beyond the three basic moves. The facilitator, based on JFC guidance, decides how many total turns are made in the wargame.

3. During the wargame, the participants must continually evaluate the COA’s feasibility. Can it be supported? Can this be done? Will it achieve the desired results? How will adversaries, enemies, and other relevant actors react? Are more forces, resources, intelligence collection capabilities, or time needed? Are necessary logistics and communications available? Is the OA large enough? Has the threat successfully impacted key enablers, like logistics or communications, or countered a certain phase or stage of a friendly COA? Based on the answers to the above questions, revisions to the friendly COA may be required. Major revisions to a COA are not made in the midst of a wargame. Instead, stop the wargame, make the revisions, and start over at the beginning.

4. The wargame is for comparing and contrasting friendly COAs with the enemy COAs. Planners compare and contrast friendly COAs, and the associated outcomes and risks, with each other in JPP step 5—COA comparison. Planners avoid becoming emotionally attached to a friendly COA and avoid comparing one friendly COA with another friendly COA during the wargame so they can remain unbiased. The facilitator ensures adherence to the timeline. The facilitator must allocate enough time to ensure the wargame will thoroughly test a COA.

5. A synchronization matrix is a decision-making tool and a method of recording the results of wargaming. Key results that should be recorded include decision points, potential evaluation criteria, CCIRs, COA adjustments, branches, and sequels. Using a synchronization matrix helps the staff, supporting commands, and component commands visually synchronize the COA across time and space in relation to the enemy’s possible COAs and (or) other activities that may impact the OE and broader strategic environment. The wargame and synchronization matrix efforts will be particularly useful in identifying cross-component support resource requirements.

6. The wargame considers friendly dispositions, strengths, and weaknesses; enemy forces and likely COAs; and characteristics of the OA. Through a logical sequence, it focuses the participants on essential tasks to be accomplished. In addition to the synchronization matrix, the wargame will capture tasks to specific units, which should be recorded. The ultimate goal of the planning process, to include wargaming, is to produce an order or plan providing direction and tasks to subordinate and supporting organizations.

7. When the wargame is complete and the worksheet and synchronization matrix are filled out, there should be enough detail to flesh out the bones of the COA and begin orders development (once the COA has been selected by the commander in a later the JPP step).

8. Additionally, the wargame will produce a refined event template and the initial decision support template (DST), decision points (and the CCIR related to them), or other decision support tools. Wargaming can help predict what adversaries, enemies,
and other relevant actors will do and how partner nations or others will react to US actions or take advantage of the situation to achieve their respective objectives. Wargaming also provides the commander options for employing forces to counter an enemy action. Wargaming will prepare the commander (coach) and the staff (team) for a wide range of possibilities and a choice of immediate solutions.

9. The wargame relies heavily on doctrinal foundation, tactical and operational judgment, and experience. It generates new ideas and provides insights that might have been overlooked. The dynamics of the wargame require the red cell to be aggressive, but realistic, in the execution of threat activities. The wargame:

   a. Records advantages and disadvantages of each COA as they become evident.

   b. Creates decision support tools (a game plan).

   c. Focuses the planning team on the threat and commander’s evaluation criteria.

   d. Provides insights on what pre-conflict campaign activities could reduce risk and improve the chances of operational success.

(d) Prepare Products. Certain products should result from the wargame in addition to wargamed COAs. Planners enter the wargame with a rough event template and must complete the wargame with a refined, more accurate event template. The event template with its named areas of interest (NAIs) and time-phase lines will help the J-2 focus the intelligence collection effort. An event matrix can be used as a “script” for intelligence reporting during the wargame. It can also tell planners if they are relying too much on one or two collection platforms and if assets have been overextended.

1. A first draft of a DST should also come out of the COA wargame. As more information about friendly forces and threat forces becomes available, the DST may change.

2. The critical events are associated with the essential tasks identified in mission analysis. The decision points are tied to points in time and space when and where the commander must make a critical decision. Decision points should be tied to the CCIRs. CCIRs generate two types of information requirements: PIRs and FFIRs. The commander approves CCIRs. From a threat perspective, PIRs tied to a decision point will require an intelligence collection plan that prioritizes and tasks collection assets to gather information about the threat. JIPOE ties PIRs to NAIs, which are linked to enemy COAs. The synchronization matrix is a tool that will help determine if adequate resources are available. Primary outputs are:

   a. Wargamed COAs with graphic and narrative. Branches and sequels identified.
b. Information on commander’s evaluation criteria.

c. Initial task organization.

d. Critical events and decision points.

e. Newly identified resource shortfalls.

f. Refined/new CCIRs and event template/matrix.

g. Initial DST/decision support matrix (DSM).

h. Refined synchronization matrix.

i. Refined staff estimates.

j. Assessment plan and criteria.

3. The outputs of the COA wargame will be used in the JPP steps COA comparison, COA approval, and plan or order development. The results of the wargame are an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of each friendly COA, the core of the back brief to the commander.

4. The commander and staff will normally compare advantages and disadvantages of each COA during COA comparison. However, if the suitability, feasibility, or acceptability of any COA becomes questionable during the analysis step, the commander should modify or discard it and concentrate on other COAs. The need to create additional combinations of COAs may also be identified.

f. **COA Comparison (Step 5)**

   (1) **Introduction**

   (a) COA comparison is both a subjective and objective process, whereby COAs are considered independently and evaluated/compared against a set of criteria that are established by the staff and commander. The objective is to identify and recommend the COA that has the highest probability of accomplishing the mission and is acceptable.

   (b) Figure III-18 depicts inputs and outputs for COA comparison. Other products not graphically shown in the chart include updated JIPOE products, updated CCIRs, staff estimates, and commander’s identification of branches for further planning.

   (c) COA comparison facilitates the commander’s decision-making process by balancing the **ends, means, ways, and risk** of each COA. The end product of this task is a briefing to the commander on a COA recommendation and a decision by the commander. COA comparison helps the commander answer the following questions:
1. What are the differences between each COA?

2. What are the advantages and disadvantages?

3. What are the risks?

(2) COA Comparison Process

(a) In COA comparison, the staff determines which COA performs best against the established evaluation criteria. The commander reviews the criteria list and adds or deletes, as required. The number of evaluation criteria will vary, but there should be enough to differentiate COAs. COAs are not compared with each other within any one criterion, but rather, they are individually evaluated against the criteria that are established by the staff and commander. Their individual performances are then compared to enable the staff to recommend a preferred COA to the commander.

(b) Staff officers may each use their own matrix, such as the example in Figure III-19, to compare COAs with respect to their functional areas. Matrices use the evaluation criteria developed before the wargame. Decision matrices alone cannot provide decision solutions. Their greatest value is providing a method to compare COAs against criteria that the commander and staff believe will produce mission success. They are analytical tools that staff officers use to prepare recommendations. Commanders provide the solution by applying their judgment to staff recommendations and making a decision.
(c) The staff helps the commander identify and select the COA that best accomplishes the mission. The staff supports the commander’s decision-making process by clearly portraying the commander’s options and recording the results of the process. The staff evaluates feasible COAs to identify the one that performs best within the evaluation criteria against the enemy’s most likely and most dangerous COAs.

(d) **Prepare for COA Comparison.** The commander and staff use the evaluation criteria developed during mission analysis to identify the advantages and disadvantages of each COA. Evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of one COA facilitates comparing its advantages and disadvantages with another COA.

1. Determine/define comparison/evaluation criteria. As discussed earlier, criteria are based on the particular circumstances and should be relative to the situation. There is no standard list of criteria, although the commander may prescribe several core criteria that all staff directors will use. Individual staff sections, based on their estimate process, select the remainder of the criteria. Criteria are based on the particular circumstances and should be relative to the situation.

   a. Review commander’s guidance for relevant criteria.

   b. Identify implicit significant factors relating to the operation.

   c. Identify criteria relating to that staff function.

2. Define and determine the standard for each criterion.
a. Establish standard definitions for each evaluation criterion. Define the criteria in precise terms to reduce subjectivity and ensure the interpretation of each evaluation criterion remains constant between the various COAs.

b. Establish definitions prior to commencing COA comparison to avoid compromising the outcome.

c. Apply standards for each criterion to each COA.

3. The staff evaluates COAs using those evaluation criteria most important to the commander to identify the one COA with the highest probability of success.

(3) **Determine the comparison method and record.** Actual comparison of COAs is critical. The staff may use any technique that facilitates reaching the best recommendation and the commander making the best decision. There are a number of techniques for comparing COAs. Examples of several decision matrices can be found in Appendix F, “Course of Action Comparison.”

(4) **COA comparison is subjective and should not be turned into a strictly mathematical process.** The key is to inform the commander why one COA is preferred over the others in terms of the evaluation criteria and the risk.

(5) If the COAs are developed for significantly different options, a side-by-side comparison for selection may not be appropriate, as they have differing end states. However, this provides the commander the ability to show senior leaders the costs and risks of differing options rather than just different COAs within a single option to support strategic decision making.

g. **COA Approval (Step 6)**

(1) **Introduction**

(a) In this JPP step, the staff briefs the commander on the COA comparison and the analysis and wargaming results, including a review of important supporting information. The staff determines the preferred COA to recommend to the commander. Figure III-20 depicts the COA approval inputs and outputs.

(b) The nature of the OE or contingency may make it difficult to determine the desired end state until the crisis actually occurs. In these cases, the JFC may choose to present two or more valid COAs for approval by higher authority. A single COA can then be approved when specific circumstances become clear. However, in a crisis, the desired end state should be based on the set of objectives approved by the President or SecDef.

(2) **Prepare and Present the COA Decision Briefing.** The staff briefs the commander on the COA comparison, COA analysis, and wargaming results. The briefing
should include a review of important supporting information such as the current status of the joint force, the current JIPOE, and assumptions used in COA development. All principal staff directors and the component commanders should attend this briefing (physically or virtually). Figure III-21 shows a sample COA decision briefing guide.

(3) **Commander Selects/Modifies the COA.** COA selection is the end result of the COA comparison process. Throughout the COA development process, the commander conducts an independent analysis of the mission, possible COAs, and relative merits and risks associated with each COA. The commander, upon receiving the staff’s recommendation, combines personal analysis with the staff recommendation, resulting in a selected COA. It gives the staff a concise statement of how the commander intends to accomplish the mission and provides the necessary focus for planning and plan development. During this step, the commander should:

(a) Review staff recommendations.

(b) Apply results of own COA analysis and comparison.

(c) Consider any separate recommendations from supporting and subordinate commanders.

(d) Review guidance from the higher headquarters/strategic guidance.

(e) The commander may:

1. Concur with staff/component recommendations, as presented.

2. Concur with recommended COAs, but with modifications.

3. Select a different COA from the staff/component recommendation.
4. Combine COAs to create a new COA.
5. Reject all and start over with COA development or mission analysis.

6. Defer the decision and consult with selected staff/commanders prior to making a final decision.

(4) **Refine Selected COA.** Once the commander selects a COA, the staff will begin the refinement process of that COA into a clear decision statement to be used in the commander’s estimate. At the same time, the staff will apply a final “acceptability” check.

(a) Staff refines commander’s COA selection into clear decision statement.

1. Develop a brief statement that **clearly and concisely** sets forth the COA selected and provides whatever information is necessary to develop a plan for the operation (no defined format).

2. Describe what the force is to do as a whole, and as much of the elements of when, where, and how as may be appropriate.

3. Express decision in terms of what is to be accomplished, if possible.

4. Use simple language so the meaning is unmistakable.

5. Include statement of what is acceptable risk.

6. Realize that many simulations are unable to capture qualitative data within the information environment, which must be taken into account when assessing results from wargames.

(b) Apply final “acceptability” check.

1. Apply experience and an understanding of situation.

2. Consider factors of acceptable risk versus desired objectives consistent with higher commander’s intent and concept. Determine if gains are worth expenditures.

(5) **Prepare the Commander’s Estimate**

(a) Once the commander selects the COA, provides guidance, and updates intent, the staff then completes the commander’s estimate. The commander’s estimate provides a **concise narrative statement** of how the commander intends to accomplish the mission and provides the necessary focus for campaign planning and contingency plan development. Further, it responds to the establishing authority’s requirement to develop a plan for execution. The commander’s estimate provides a continuously updated source of information from the perspective of the commander. Commanders at various levels use estimates during the JPP to support COA determination and plan or order development.
(b) A commander uses a commander’s estimate as the situation dictates. The commander’s initial intent statement and planning guidance to the staff can provide sufficient information to guide the planning process. The commander will tailor the content of the commander’s estimate based on the situation and ongoing analysis. A typical format for a commander’s estimate is in CJCSM 3130.03, _Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance_.

1. Contents may vary, depending on the nature of the plan or contingency, time available, and the applicability of prior planning. In a rapidly developing situation, the formal commander’s estimate may be impractical, and the entire estimate process may be reduced to a commanders’ conference.

2. With appropriate horizontal and vertical coordination, the commander’s COA selection may be briefed to and approved by SecDef. In the strategic context, where military operations are strategically significant, even a commander’s selected COA is normally briefed to and approved by the President or SecDef. The commander’s estimate then becomes a matter of formal record keeping and guidance for component and supporting forces.

(c) The supported commander may use simulation and analysis tools in the collaborative environment to evaluate a variety of options, and may also choose to convene a concept development conference involving representatives of subordinate and supporting commands, the Services, JS, and other interested parties. Review of the resulting commander’s estimate requires collaboration and coordination among all planning participants. The supported commander may highlight issues for future interagency consultation, review, or resolution to be presented to SecDef during the IPR.

(d) **CJCS Estimate Review.** The estimate review determines whether the scope and concept of planned operations satisfy the tasking and will accomplish the mission, determines whether the assigned tasks can be accomplished using available resources in the timeframes contemplated by the plan, and ensures the plan is proportional and worth the expected costs. As planning is approved by SecDef (or designated representative) during an IPR, the commander’s estimate informs the refinement of the initial CONOPS for the plan.

h. **Plan or Order Development (Step 7)**

(1) **CONOPS**

(a) The CONOPS clearly and concisely expresses what the JFC intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. It describes how the actions of the joint force components and supporting organizations will be integrated, synchronized, and phased to accomplish the mission, including potential branches and sequels. The CONOPS:

1. States the commander’s intent.
2. Describes the central approach the JFC intends to take to accomplish the mission.

3. Provides for the application, sequencing, synchronization, and integration of forces and capabilities in time, space, and purpose (including those of multinational and interagency organizations, as appropriate).

4. Describes when, where, and under what conditions the supported commander intends to conduct operations and give or refuse battle, if required.

5. Focuses on friendly, allied, partner, and enemy COGs and their associated critical vulnerabilities.

6. Provides for controlling the tempo of the operation.

7. Visualizes the campaign in terms of the forces and functions involved.

8. Relates the joint force’s objectives and desired effects to those of the next higher command and other organizations as necessary. This enables assignment of tasks to subordinate and supporting commanders.

(b) **Planning results in a plan that is documented in the format of a plan or an order. If execution is imminent or in progress, the plan is typically documented in the format of an order.** During plan or order development, the commander and staff, in collaboration with subordinate and supporting components and organizations, expand the approved COA into a detailed plan or OPORD by refining the initial CONOPS associated with the approved COA. The CONOPS is the centerpiece of the plan or OPORD.

(c) The staff writes (or graphically portrays) the CONOPS in sufficient detail so subordinate and supporting commanders understand their mission, tasks, and other requirements and can develop their supporting plans. During CONOPS development, the commander determines the best arrangement of simultaneous and sequential actions and activities to accomplish the assigned mission consistent with the approved COA, and resources and authorities available. This arrangement of actions dictates the sequencing of activities or forces into the OA, providing the link between the CONOPS and force planning. The link between the CONOPS and force planning is preserved and perpetuated through the sequencing of forces into the OA via a TPFDD. The structure must ensure unit integrity, force mobility, and force visibility, as well as the ability to rapidly transition to branches or sequels as operational conditions dictate. Supported CCDRs determine the sequencing of forces in concert with supporting commands and capture this sequencing in the TPFDD as the commander’s required delivery dates. Planners ensure the CONOPS, force plan, deployment plans, and supporting plans provide the flexibility to adapt to changing conditions and are consistent with the JFC’s intent.
(d) If the scope, complexity, and duration of the military action contemplated to accomplish the assigned mission warrants execution via a series of related operations, then the staff outlines the CONOPS as a campaign. They develop the preliminary part of the operation in sufficient detail to impart a clear understanding of the commander’s concept of how the assigned mission will be accomplished.

(e) During CONOPS development, the JFC must assimilate many variables under conditions of uncertainty to determine the essential military conditions, sequence of actions, and application of capabilities and associated forces to create effects and achieve objectives. **JFCs and their staffs must be continually aware of the higher-level objectives and associated desired and undesired effects that influence planning at every juncture.** If operational objectives are not linked to strategic objectives, the inherent linkage or “nesting” is broken and eventually tactical considerations can begin to drive the overall strategy at cross-purposes.

*CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance, provides detailed guidance on content and format of orders and plans.*

(2) **Format of Military Plans and Orders.** Plans and orders can come in many varieties from very detailed campaign plans and contingency plans to simple verbal orders. They may also include orders and directives such as OPORDs, WARNORDs, PLANORDs, ALERTORDs, EXORDs, FRAGORDs, PTDOs, and DEPORDs. The more complex directives will contain much of the amplifying information in appropriate annexes and appendices. However, the directive should always contain the essential information in the main body. The information contained may depend on the time available, the complexity of the operation, and the levels of command involved. In most cases, the directive will be standardized in the five-paragraph format that is described in *CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance.*

(3) **Plan or Order Development**

(a) For most plans and orders, the CJCS monitors planning activities, resolves shortfalls when required, and reviews the supported commander’s plan for adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, completeness, and compliance with policy and joint doctrine. When required, the commander will conduct one or more IPRs with SecDef (or designated representative) to confirm the plan’s strategic guidance, assumptions (including timing and national-level decisions required), any limitations (restrictions and constraints), the mission statement, the operational approach, key capability shortfalls, areas of risk, acceptable levels of risk, and any further guidance required for plan refinement. During the IPRs, the CJCS and USD(P) will separately address issues arising from, or resolved during, plan review (e.g., key risks, decision points). Commanders should show how the plan supports the objectives identified in the NDS, CPG, NMS, or JSCP and identify the links to other plans, both within the AOR (or functional area) and with those of other CCMDs. The result of an IPR should include an endorsement of the planning to date or acknowledgement of friction points and guidance to shape continued planning. All four operational activities (situational awareness, planning, execution, and assessment)
continue in a complementary and iterative process. CJCSI 3141.01, Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans, provides further details on the IPR process.

(b) The JFC guides plan development by issuing a PLANORD or similar planning directive to coordinate the activities of the commands and agencies involved. A number of activities are associated with plan development, as Figure III-22 shows. These planning activities typically will be accomplished in a concurrent, collaborative, and iterative fashion rather than sequentially, depending largely on the planning time available. The same flexibility displayed in COA development is seen here again, as planners discover and eliminate shortfalls and conflicts within their command and with the other CCMDs.

(c) The CJCS planning family of documents referenced in CJCS Guide 3130, Adaptive Planning and Execution Overview and Policy Framework, provides policy, procedures, and guidance on these activities for organizations required to prepare a plan or order. These are typical types of activities that supported and supporting commands and Services accomplish collaboratively as they plan for joint operations.

1. Application of Forces and Capabilities

a. When planning forces and capabilities, the commander is constrained by the forces listed as “available for planning” in the force apportionment tables. If additional resources are deemed necessary to reduce risk, CJCS approval is required. The supported commander should address the additional force requirement as early as possible in the IPR process, justify the requirement, and identify the risk associated if the forces are not made available. Risk assessments will include results using both apportioned capabilities and augmentation capabilities.

b. The supported commander should designate the main effort and supporting efforts as soon as possible and identify interdependent missions (especially subsequent tasks dependent on the successful completion of earlier tasks). This action is necessary for economy of effort. The main effort is based on the supported JFC’s prioritized objectives. It identifies where the supported JFC will concentrate capabilities

Plan Development Activities

- Force planning
- Support planning
- Deployment and redeployment planning
- Shortfall identification
- Feasibility analysis
- Refinement
- Documentation
- Plan review and approval
- Supporting plan development

Figure III-22. Plan Development Activities
or prioritize efforts to achieve specific objectives. Designation of the main effort can be addressed in geographical (area) or functional terms. **Area tasks and responsibilities** focus on a specific area to control or conduct operations. An example is the assignment of areas of operations for Army forces and Marine Corps forces operating in the same JOA. **Functional tasks and responsibilities** focus on the performance of continuing efforts that involve the forces of two or more Military Departments operating in the same OA or where there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. An example is the designation of the Navy component commander as the joint force air component commander when the Navy component commander has the preponderance of the air forces and the ability to effectively plan, task, and control joint air operations. In either case, designating the main effort will establish where or how the JFC concentrates friendly forces and/or prioritizes effort to achieve an objective of an operation or campaign or establish conditions that enable future operations that best support achieving subsequent objectives.

**c.** Designating a main effort facilitates the synchronized and integrated employment of the joint force by identifying priority missions when resources are limited while preserving the initiative of subordinate commanders. After the main effort is identified, joint force and component planners determine those tasks essential to achieving objectives. The supported JFC assigns these tasks to subordinate commanders along with the capabilities and support necessary to accomplish them. As such, the CONOPS must clearly specify the nature of the main effort.

**d.** The main effort can change during the operation based on numerous factors, including changes in the OE, adversary reactions to friendly operations, successful accomplishment of previous missions, or achievement of objectives. When the main effort changes, support priorities must change to ensure success. Both horizontal and vertical coordination within the joint force and with multinational and interagency partners is essential when shifting the main effort. Secondary efforts are important but are ancillary to the main effort. They are normally planned to complement or enhance the success of the main effort (for example, by diverting enemy resources or setting conditions to enable the main operation). Only necessary secondary efforts, whose potential value offsets or exceeds the resources required, should be undertaken, because these efforts may divert resources from the main effort. Secondary efforts normally lack the operational depth of the main effort and have fewer forces and capabilities, smaller reserves, and more limited objectives.

### 2. Force Planning

**a.** The primary purposes of force planning are to identify all forces needed to accomplish the CONOPS, accounting for attrition and capability decrements resulting from contested environments, and effectively phase the forces into the OA. Force planning consists of determining the force requirements by operation phase, mission, mission priority, mission sequence, and operating area. It includes force requirements review, major force phasing, integration planning, and force list refinement. Force planning is the responsibility of the supported CCDR, supported by component commanders, the supporting CCDRs, and in coordination with the JS and FPs. Force planning begins early during plan
Joint Planning Process

development and focuses on applying the right force to the mission at the right time, while ensuring force visibility, force mobility, and adaptability. Proper force planning allows the identification of preferred forces to be selected for planning and included in the supported commander’s CONOPS by operation phase, mission, and mission priority. Service components and supporting CCDRs then collaboratively determine the specific decision points that enable deployment and sustainment capabilities required in accordance with the CONOPS. Upon direction to execute, those CCMDs with approved level 4 plans will provide unsourced TPFDD requirements to the JS J-35 for sourcing. Should CCMDs require force augmentation in addition to TPFDD forces, the CCDR submits RFFs to the JS. CJCSM 3130.06, (U) Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures, provides a detailed discussion of the GFM allocation process.

b. Considerations. The total force identified for supporting and supported plans is constrained by competing global priorities and the quantity of forces identified in the force apportionment tables or otherwise prescribed force planning limitations. To support building a plan that can transition to execution, force requirements should be documented with the requisite data and information to support the GFM allocation process. This information informs the Services of the mission, tasks, purpose, priority, and specialized requirements for forces and facilitates timely SecDef decisions.

c. TPFDD Development. Force requirements may be documented in a TPFDD and phased/sequenced during plan development to support the CONOPS. The TPFDD depicts force requirements and force flow. It is used to assess sourcing and transportation feasibility. When developed, the TPFDD will be entered into JOPES as the basis for this analysis. A notional TPFDD contains force sourcing based on planning assumptions derived from preferred force identification or contingency sourcing and is used as assumptions to satisfy planned force requirements throughout the planning process. The notional TPFDD does not contain execution sourced units. Planners should leverage the expertise of the JS J-35 and FPs in the development of specific unit assumptions. An execution-sourced TPFDD contains execution-sourced forces.

For additional information on TPFDDs, see JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations.

d. Mobilization Planning. Initial requirements for mobilization of Reserve Component force, to include the scope and authorities, should be identified early in planning. As preferred forces are refined, additional Reserve Component forces may also be identified. Timelines for mobilization should be developed in coordination with Service components and Service headquarters and incorporated into plan development.

e. Non-DOD Capabilities. Planners should document and refine non-DOD capabilities that are part of a plan’s CONOPS. Consideration should be made for interagency and nongovernmental capabilities, including contracted support and multinational capabilities. Nonorganic movement requirements for non-DOD capabilities should be documented in a TPFDD to facilitate subsequent transportation feasibility analysis.
f. **Rotational Requirements.** Rotational requirements are relevant if force rotations are envisioned to provide the requisite forces for long-term operations. When planning for operations that may be lengthy, consideration should be given to force rotations. Typically force rotations are planned by Service headquarters in accordance with Service policy. Unit rotations should be timed so as to limit the impact on operations, and rotational planning should consider joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI); turnover time; relief-in-place and transfer of authority; and time for the outbound unit to redeploy.


g. **Force Planning During Crisis.** Given the time constraints of a crisis, force planning may transition into execution sourcing vice preferred force identification or contingency sourcing. When force requirements are execution-sourced, the TPFDD is populated by FPs with unit and movement data and becomes available for execution.

3. **Support Planning.** Support planning is conducted concurrently with force planning to determine and sequence logistics and personnel support in accordance with the plan CONOPS. Support planning includes all core logistics functions in permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments: deployment and distribution, supply, maintenance, logistic services, OCS, joint health services, and engineering. Any environment may have a portion that is contested from a deployment and distribution perspective.

   a. **Concept of Logistics Support.** Developed from the initial logistics staff estimate, the concept of logistics support is the foundation for logistics planning. This document provides an overview of the concept of support, priorities for movement of combat support forces and sustainment, identifies key logistics capabilities, and identifies metrics for assessing logistics effectiveness. CCMD planners must also consider the assignment of specific support responsibilities.

   For additional information on the joint deployment and distribution operation center and the CCDR’s options for assigning logistics responsibilities, see JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

   b. **Logistics supportability analysis (LSA)** is conducted by supporting organizations to determine the logistics support they must provide, in accordance with resource-informed planning guidance, and to determine the adequacy of resources needed to support mission execution. LSAs ensure logistics is phased to support the CONOPS; establishes logistics C2 authorities; and integrates support plans across the supporting commands, Service components, and agencies. LSAs are conducted by each supporting organization to the lowest level of detail needed to quantify the logistics requirements (national stock number level). These LSAs are then integrated by supporting organizations to coordinate roles and responsibilities, capabilities, and ensure all understand the sourcing of the support. A joint LSA is created and presented to the CCDR who confirms this support will provide the sustainment needed to successfully execute and complete his mission. If there are gaps and shortfalls or high levels of risk that cannot be
mitigated internally by supporting organization, the LSA provides the process for presenting issues to senior leaders for resolution.

c. **Transportation refinement** simulates the planned movement of resources that require lift, ensuring the plan is transportation feasible. Contingency sourcing using current and projected unit readiness and mobilization timelines supports TPFDD refinement, enabling a more accurate sourcing and transportation feasibility analysis. If required, the supported commander evaluates and adjusts the CONOPS to achieve end-to-end transportation feasibility, if possible given resource-informed constraints, or requests additional resources if the level of risk is unacceptable, recognizing additional transportation resources may not be available. Transportation plans must be consistent and reconciled with plans and timelines required by providers of Service-unique combat and support aircraft to the supported CCDR. Planning must consider contested environments; requirements of international law; commonly understood customs and practices; agreements or arrangements with foreign nations with which the United States requires permission for overflight, access, and diplomatic clearance; en route infrastructure; and destination port and airfield capacities. If significant changes are made to the CONOPS, it should be reassessed for transportation feasibility and refined to ensure it is acceptable. CJCSM 3130.06, *(U) Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures*, provides a detailed discussion on the contingency sourcing procedures.

4. **Deployment and Redeployment Planning.** Deployment and redeployment planning is conducted on a continuous basis for all approved contingency plans and as required for specific plans. Planning for redeployment should be considered throughout the operation and is best accomplished in the same time-phased process in which deployment was accomplished. In all cases, mission requirements of a specific operation define the scope, duration, and scale of both deployment and redeployment operation planning. Unity of effort is paramount, since both deployment and redeployment operations involve numerous commands, agencies, and functional processes. Procedures and standards to attain and maintain visibility of personnel must be formulated. Because the ability to adapt to unforeseen conditions is essential, supported CCDRs must ensure their deployment plans for each plan support global force visibility requirements. When operations that may be lengthy are planned, consideration must be given to force rotations. Units must rotate without interrupting operations. Planning should consider the OE, JRSOI, turnover time, relief-in-place, transfer of authority, and the time it takes for the outbound unit to redeploy. This information is vital for the FPs and JS J-35 to develop force rotations and order them in the GFMAP if the operation is executed.

a. **OE.** For a given plan, deployment planning decisions are based on the anticipated OE, which may be permissive, uncertain, or hostile. The anticipated OE dictates the deployment concept, which may require forcible entry operations. Normally, supported CCDRs, their subordinate commanders, and their Service components provide detailed situation information, mission statements by operation phase, theater support parameters, strategic and operational lift allocations by phase (for both force movements and sustainment), HNS information and environmental standards, OCS aspects of the OE information, and pre-positioned equipment planning guidance.
b. Deployment and Redeployment Concept. Supported CCDRs must develop a deployment concept and identify specific predeployment standards necessary to meet mission requirements. Services and supporting CCDRs provide trained and mission-ready forces to the supported CCMD deployment concept and predeployment standard. Services recruit, organize, train, and equip interoperable forces. The Services’ predeployment planning and coordination with the supporting CCMD must ensure predeployment standards specified by the supported CCDR are achieved, supporting personnel and forces arrive in the supported theater fully prepared to perform their mission, and deployment delays caused by duplication of predeployment efforts are eliminated. The Services and supporting CCDRs must ensure unit contingency plans are prepared; forces are tailored and echeloned; the contested environment is accounted for; personnel and equipment movement plans are complete and accurate; command relationship and integration requirements are identified; mission-essential tasks are rehearsed; mission-specific training is conducted; force protection is planned and resourced; and deployment, distribution, logistics, and personnel services support sustainment requirements are identified. Careful and detailed planning makes certain that only required personnel, equipment, and materiel deploy; unit training is exacting; missions are fully understood; deployment changes are minimized during execution; and the flow of personnel, equipment, and movement of materiel into theater aligns with the CONOPS. Supported CCDRs should also develop a redeployment CONOPS to identify how forces and materiel will either redeploy to home station or to support another JFC’s operation. This redeployment CONOPS is especially relevant and useful if force rotations are envisioned to provide the requisite forces for a long-term operation. CCDRs may not have all planning factors to fully develop this CONOPS, but by using the best available information for redeployment requirements, timelines, and priorities, the efficiency and effectiveness of redeployment operations may be greatly improved. Topics addressed in this early stage of a redeployment CONOPS may include a proposed sequence for redeployment of units, individuals, materiel, and contract closeout and changes to the contractor management plan. Responsibilities and priorities for recovery, reconstitution, and return to home station may also be addressed along with transition requirements during mission handover. As a campaign or operation moves through the different operational plan phases, the CCDR will be able to develop and issue a redeployment order based on a refined redeployment CONOPS. Effective redeployment operations are essential to ensure supporting Services and rotational forces have sufficient time to fully source and prepare for the next rotation.

For additional information on deployment and redeployment planning, see JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations. For additional information on the contractor management plan, see CJCSM 4301.01, Planning Operational Contract Support.

c. Movement Planning. Movement planning is the collaborative integration of movement activities and requirements for transportation support. Forces may be planned for movement either by self-deploying or the use of organic lift and nonorganic, common-user, strategic lift resources identified for planning. Competing requirements for limited strategic transportation, support facilities, and intra-theater transportation will be considered by the supported commander in terms of impact on
mission accomplishment. If additional resources are required, the supported commander will identify the requirements and rationale for those resources.

(1) **TPFDD Letter of Instruction.** Commanders will often publish revised TPFDD development guidance articulating the commander’s deployment and redeployment priorities. Planners then develop a final refinement of the plan’s TPFDD in accordance with this revised guidance.

(2) **TPFDD Development.** To conduct movement planning, the TPFDD must have specific unit assumptions identified for the required forces (organic and nonorganic) and equipment. These specific unit assumptions can be identified through preferred forces or contingency sourcing. Planners should leverage the expertise of the JS J-35 and FPs in the development of specific unit assumptions.

(3) **Coordination with USTRANSCOM.** The CCMDs and USTRANSCOM coordinate to resolve transportation feasibility issues impacting intertheater and intratheater movement and sustainment delivery. USTRANSCOM and other transportation providers identify air, land, and sea transportation resources to support the CONOPS. These resources may include intertheater transportation and CCMD-controlled theater transportation. USTRANSCOM and other transportation providers develop transportation schedules for movement requirements identified by the supported commander. A transportation schedule does not imply the supported commander’s plan is transportation feasible; rather, the schedule provides the most effective and realistic use of available transportation resources in relation to the plan.

(4) **JRROI Planning.** Following the development of movement infrastructure concepts, the supported commander’s planning team develops the air and sea reception plan, staging plan, and completed JRROI plan. The requirements to conduct JRROI may precipitate additional force requirements and cause iterative changes to force planning. JRROI constraints (e.g., port clearance, intratheater movement capacity, staging-base limitations) imposed on strategic movement must be considered in JRROI planning and reflected in the TPFDD and TPFDL.

(4) **Shortfall Identification.** Along with hazard and threat analysis, shortfall identification is conducted throughout the plan-development process. The supported commander continuously identifies limiting factors, capability shortfalls, and associated risks as plan development progresses. Where possible, the supported commander resolves the shortfalls and required controls and countermeasures through planning adjustments and coordination with supporting and subordinate commanders. If the shortfalls and necessary controls and countermeasures cannot be reconciled or the resources provided are inadequate to perform the assigned task, the supported commander reports these limiting factors and assessment of the associated risk to the CJCS. The CJCS and other JCS members consider shortfalls and limiting factors reported by the supported commander and coordinate resolution. However, the completion of plan development is not delayed pending the resolution of shortfalls. If shortfalls cannot be resolved within the prescribed
time frame, the completed plan will include a consolidated summary, including the impact of unresolved shortfalls and associated risks.

(5) **Feasibility Analysis.** This step in plan or order development is similar to determining the feasibility of a COA. The focus in this step is on ensuring the assigned mission can be accomplished using available resources within the time contemplated by the plan. The results of force planning, support planning, deployment and redeployment planning, and shortfall identification will affect feasibility. The primary factors to consider are the capacity of lift and throughput constraints of transit points and JRSOI infrastructure that can support the plan. The primary factors analyzed for transportation feasibility include forces, resources, and transportation.

(a) **Forces.** The supported commander, in coordination with the JS J-35, JFPs, FPs, and supporting CCDRs, should determine the feasibility of sourcing the plans required forces. For all planning, the sourcing feasibility analysis should consider the total force requirements of supported and supporting plans. Contingency sourcing that considers current and projected unit readiness and mobilization timelines leads to TPFDD refinement, which enables a more accurate sourcing and transportation feasibility analysis. Force requirements should be documented in the plan’s TPFDD for subsequent transportation feasibility and enable execution sourcing should the plan transition to execution. CJCSM 3130.06, (U) *Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures*, provides a detailed discussion on the contingency sourcing procedures.

(b) **Sustainment Resources.** The supported commander, in coordination with Military Departments, supporting CCDRs, and CSAs such as the Defense Logistics Agency, should determine the feasibility of providing the resources required to execute the plan. Supporting organizations must provide subject matter experts to identify sustainment requirements and gaps. As with forces, analysis of sustainment requirements should consider the total requirements of supported and supporting plans. Sustainment requirements that require movement should be documented in the plan’s TPFDD for inclusion in overall transportation feasibility.

(c) **Transportation.** The supported commander, in coordination with the JS and USTRANSCOM, determines the transportation feasibility of a plan and addresses the impacts of a contested deployment. Transportation feasibility requires the assumed sourcing of forces through preferred force identification or contingency sourcing to create a notional TPFDD. The plan’s notional TPFDD reflects these sourcing assumptions and identifies transportation requirements of forces and resources for this analysis.

(6) **Documentation.** When the TPFDD is complete and end-to-end transportation feasibility has been achieved and is acceptable to the supported CCDR, the supported CCDR completes the documentation of the plan or OPORD and coordinates access with respective JPEC stakeholders to the TPFDD as appropriate.

(7) **Movement Plan Review and Approval.** When the plan or OPORD is complete, JS J-5 coordinates with the JPEC for review. The JPEC reviews the plan or
OPORD and provides the results of the review to the supported and supporting CCDRs and the CJCS. The CJCS reviews and provides recommendations to SecDef, if necessary. The JCS provides a copy of the plan to OSD to facilitate parallel review of the plan, decisions, and authorities required and to inform USD(P)’s recommendation of approval/disapproval to SecDef. After the CJCS and USD(P)’s review, SecDef or the President will review, approve, or modify the plan. The President or SecDef is the final approval authority for OPORDs, depending upon the subject matter.

See CJCSI 3141.01, Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans, for more information on plan review and approval.

i. Transition. Transition is an orderly turnover of a plan or order as it is passed to those tasked with execution of the operation. It provides information, direction, and guidance relative to the plan or order that will help to facilitate situational awareness. Additionally, it provides an understanding of the rationale for key decisions necessary to ensure there is a coherent shift from planning to execution. These factors coupled together are intended to maintain the intent of the CONOPS, promote unity of effort, and generate tempo. Successful transition ensures those charged with executing an order have a full understanding of the plan. Regardless of the level of command, such a transition ensures those who execute the order understand the commander’s intent and CONOPS. Transition may be internal or external in the form of briefs or drills. Internally, transition occurs between future plans, future operations, and current operations. Externally, transition occurs between the commander and subordinate commands.

(1) Transition Brief. At higher levels of command, transition may include a formal transition brief to supporting, subordinate, or adjacent commanders and, to the staff supervising, provides an overview of the mission, commander’s intent, task organization, and the assessed enemy and friendly situation. It is given to ensure all actions necessary to implement the order are known and understood by those executing the order. The brief may include items from the order or plan such as:

(a) Higher headquarters’ mission and commander’s intent.

(b) Mission.

(c) Commander’s intent.

(d) CCIRs.

(e) Task organization.

(f) Situation (friendly and enemy forces and other threats).

(g) Neutral networks and nonmilitary considerations.

(h) CONOPS.
(i) Execution (including branches and potential sequels).

(j) Planning support tools (such as a synchronization matrix).

(2) **Confirmation Brief.** A confirmation brief is given by a subordinate commander after receiving the order or plan. Subordinate commanders brief the higher commander on their understanding of commander’s intent, their specific tasks and purpose, and the relationship between their unit’s missions and the other units in the operation. The confirmation brief allows the higher commander to identify potential gaps in the plan, as well as discrepancies with subordinate plans. It also gives the commander insights into how subordinate commanders intend to accomplish their missions.

(3) **Transition Drills.** Transition drills increase the situational awareness of subordinate commanders and the staff and instill confidence and familiarity with the plan. Sand tables, map exercises, and rehearsals are examples of transition drills.

(4) **Plan Implementation.** Military plans and orders should be prepared to facilitate implementation and transition to execution. For a plan to be implemented, the following products and activities must occur:

(a) Confirm assumptions. Analyze the current OE and establish as fact any assumptions made during plan development.

(b) Model the TPFDD to confirm the sourcing and transportation feasibility assessment. Validate that force and mobility resources used during plan development are currently available. Many critical capabilities reside in the Reserve Component (e.g., air and sea port opening), so planners need to know the mobilization authorities as they relate to deployment timelines. Additionally, as reserve units deactivate due to force structure changes, staffs have to re-validate TPFDDs.

(c) Establish execution timings. Set timelines to initiate operations to allow synchronization of execution.

(d) Confirm authorities for execution. Request and receive the President or SecDef authority to conduct military operations.

(e) Conduct execution sourcing from assigned and available forces. If force requirements exceed the capability and capacity of assigned and available forces, submit an emergent RFF through the GFM process, which facilitates a risk-informed SecDef decision to allocate/re-allocate forces from other CCMDs or Services. Develop new assumptions, if required.

(f) Issue necessary orders for execution. The CJCS issues orders implementing the directions of the President or SecDef to conduct military operations. CCDRs subsequently issue their own orders directing the activities of subordinate commanders.
SECTION C. ADDITIONAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

7. Overview

a. Elements of Operational Design

(1) The elements of operational design (see Figure III-23) can be used by the commander and staff to organize their thoughts, break down and identify the problem, understand the strategic environment and associated implications, organize the OE, and orient the joint force on the objective or end state.

(2) Use of these elements provides a common construct for planning and execution. However, not all of the elements of operational design are required, or appropriate, for all plans.

See Chapter IV, “Operational Design,” for more detail on the elements of operational design.

b. Joint Functions. Joint functions are related capabilities and activities grouped together to help JFCs integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations (see Figure III-24). Joint functions can facilitate planning by providing a framework to ensure planners have addressed all aspects of an operation. Some functions, such as C2, information, and intelligence, apply to all operations. Others, such as fires, apply as the mission requires.

(1) Inadequate integration and balancing of these functions can undermine the cohesion, effectiveness, and adaptability of the force. For example, inattention to protection can deplete combat power unnecessarily, thereby undermining reserves and degrading the force’s ability to capitalize on an opportunity or respond to an unforeseen problem. Likewise, inattention to intelligence can leave the force with inadequate information to support decision making or identify opportunities in time to exploit them.
Most functions are mutually supporting. For example, movement and maneuver, such as freedom of navigation operations, can support the information joint function. Likewise, information about joint function activities that leverage information to affect behavior, such as deception operations or attacks on adversary/enemy information, information systems, and information networks can enable movement and maneuver.

Plans describe how the JFC uses military capabilities (i.e., organizations, people, and systems) to perform tasks associated with each joint function. However, forces are not characterized by the functions for which the JFC is employing them. Individual Service capabilities can often support multiple functions simultaneously or sequentially while the joint force is executing a single task.

The joint functions are discussed in detail in JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

c. Red Teaming

(1) Gathering and analyzing information—along with discerning the perceptions of adversaries, enemies, partners, and other relevant actors—is necessary to correctly frame the problem, which enables planning. A red team, an independent group that challenges an organization to improve its effectiveness, can aid a commander and the staff to think critically and creatively; see things from varying perspectives; challenge their thinking; avoid false mind-sets, biases, or group thinking; and avoid the use of inaccurate analogies to frame the problem. Red teaming provides an independent capability to fully explore alternatives in plans and operations in the context of the OE and from the perspective of adversaries and other relevant actors.

(2) In addition to red teams, planning may include a red cell, which performs threat emulation, looking at friendly operations from an enemy’s or adversary’s point of view. The red team crosses staff functions and time horizons in the JPP, which is different than a red cell, which is composed of members of the J-2 or a JIOC red team as an additive element on the J-2 staff to improve the intelligence analysis, products, and processes.

For more discussion on red teams, see Appendix J, “Red Teams.”
d. Joint enablers are DOD resources that provide commanders with the ability or functional means to plan and execute joint operations. They provide capabilities that can accelerate the response and increase the capability of the joint force. During planning, they can contribute unique specialized joint capabilities and subject matter experts via collaboration, staff augmentation, and/or reachback support for campaign and contingency plans.
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CHAPTER IV
OPERATIONAL DESIGN

1. Overview

a. Operational art and operational design enable understanding. Understanding is more than just knowledge of the capabilities and capacities of the relevant actors or the scope and nature of the OE; it provides context for decision making and how the many facets of the problem are likely to interact, enabling commanders and planners to identify hazards, threats, consequences, opportunities, and risk.

b. Operational art is the cognitive approach used by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, means, and risks. Operational art is inherent in all aspects of operational design.

    (1) Operational art relies on the ability of the commander and planners to identify what tools are needed to address the planning problem presented. Execution of planning is based on the commander and planners’ experience and time available. Different commanders and planners will need different tools to help them as each person has inherent strengths, weaknesses, and prejudices. Similarly, every problem is different and may require different tools to analyze and address it. The tools chosen by the planner should be appropriate for the problem and should complement the planners’ strengths and weaknesses.

    (2) The amount of data readily available can quickly overwhelm the planning process. Planners and commanders need to understand that a good timely decision with incomplete information may present a better solution than waiting until all information is available. Operational art supports a commander’s ability to sort through the mass of information, identify key and critical information, and make decisions or provide guidance with incomplete information. Operational art aids the commander in identifying the point of diminishing returns in collection and analysis.

c. Operational design is the analytical framework that underpins planning. Operational design supports commanders and planners in organizing and understanding the OE as a complex interactive system. Commanders must understand the audience and political environment to give the best military advice to civilian decision makers. Planners must consider how they will translate often-times confusing military jargon and concepts into a universally understood language; interagency partners are critical to this discussion. Operational design is interwoven with the planning process to fill in gaps in guidance and information and provide a framework in which to plan, enabling planners to address the complexity of the OE, support mission analysis and COA development, and develop CONOPS with the highest likelihood of success.
(1) Operational design provides a framework for coordinating the operations and activities of the joint force within space and time to achieve strategic objectives. Operational design also aids in identifying trade-offs in the plan or operation. Planners can use operational design to look across factors of force, space, and time to identify the ability to exchange between those broad categories to best use the force available to achieve the objective at the lowest risk and cost. Planners employ the elements of operational design to identify the best method of identifying required forces and organizing the forces available, based on the OE. Operational design supports arranging and timing operations and organizing the OE to meet mission requirements.

(2) Operational design supports the planner’s requirement to develop a C2 structure that effectively supports the operation.

(3) While the JPP guides a planner from the receipt of guidance to issuance of the plan or order, operational design is a methodology planners can use to ensure the problem is correctly identified, develop COAs once guidance is given, and identify the best methods for addressing the problem. Operational design is a tool, not dogma. The process described can be modified to support the specific operation or mission, based on the planner’s analysis. Not all elements of operational design are required for all plans.

2. Operational Design Methodology

a. Overview. Operational design requires recurring touch points between the commander and staff in developing an understanding of the strategic environment and OE, higher-level guidance, defining the problem to be solved, and developing an operational approach. The components have characteristics that exist outside of each other and are not necessarily sequential. However, an understanding of the OE and problem must be established prior to developing operational approaches and is critical in conducting mission analysis and in providing planning guidance. As commanders and staffs develop their operational approach, they account for how information impacts the OE and the inherent informational aspects of activities. In doing so, joint force planners consider how information is used by, and affects the behavior of, friendly, neutral, and adversarial audiences across the competition continuum.

b. Operational design is one of several tools available to help the JFC and staff understand the broad solutions for mission accomplishment and to understand the uncertainty in a complex OE. The process is continuous and cyclical in that it is conducted prior to, during, and for follow-on joint operations. Additionally, it supports ongoing civil-military dialogue concerning the nature of the problem and an operational approach to achieve the desired objectives.

c. Methodology. The general methodology for operational design is:

(1) Understand the strategic direction and guidance.

(2) Understand the strategic environment (e.g., policies, diplomacy, and politics) and the related contested environments.
(3) Understand the OE and relevant contested environments.

(4) Define the problem (create shared understanding; planning with uncertainty).

(5) Identify assumptions needed to continue planning (strategic and operational assumptions).

(6) Develop options (the operational approach).

(7) Identify decisions and decision points (external to the organization).

(8) Refine the operational approach(es).

(9) Develop planning and assessment guidance.

d. Iteration and reexamination of earlier work is essential to identify how later decisions affect earlier assumptions and to fill in gaps identified during the process.

3. Operational Design Methodology Steps

a. Understand the Strategic Directions and Guidance

(1) Planning usually starts with the assignment of a planning task through a directive, order, or cyclical strategic guidance, depending on how a situation develops. The commander and staff must analyze all available sources of guidance. These sources include written documents such as the CPG and JSCP, written directives, oral instructions from higher headquarters, domestic and international laws, policies of other organizations that are interested in the situation, communication synchronization guidance, and higher headquarters’ orders or estimates.

(2) Direction from strategic guidance documents can be vague, incomplete, outdated, or conflicting. This is due to the different times at which they may have been produced, changes in personnel that result in differing opinions or policies, and the staffing process where compromises are made to achieve agreement within the documents. During planning, commanders and staff must read the directives and synthesize the contents into a concise statement. Since strategic guidance documents can be problematic, the JFC and staff should obtain clear, updated direction through routine and sustained civilian-military dialogue throughout the planning process. When clarification does not occur, planners and commanders identify those areas as elements of risk.

(3) Additionally, senior leaders will provide additional guidance throughout the planning process. This can be through formal processes such as IPRs or through informal processes such as e-mails, conversations, and meetings. All of this guidance needs to be disseminated throughout the command to ensure a common understanding of higher commander’s intent, vision, and expectations.
(4) In particular, commanders maintain dialogue with leadership at all levels to resolve differences of interpretation of higher-level objectives and the ways and means to achieve these objectives. Understanding the OE, defining the problem, and devising a sound approach are rarely achieved the first time. Strategic guidance addressing complex problems can initially be vague, requiring the commander to interpret and filter it for the staff. While CCDRs and national leaders may have a clear strategic perspective of the problem from their vantage point, operational-level commanders and subordinate leaders often have a better understanding of specific circumstances that comprise the operational situation and may have a completely different perspective on the causes and solutions. Both perspectives are essential to a sound plan. Subordinate commanders should be aggressive in sharing their perspective with their higher headquarters, and both should resolve differences at the earliest opportunity. While policy and strategic guidance clarify planning, it is equally true that planning informs policy formulation. A strategy or plan that cannot be realistically executed at the tactical level can be as detrimental to long-range US interests as tactical actions that accomplish a task but undermine the strategic or operational objectives.

(5) Strategic guidance is essential to operational art and operational design. As discussed in Chapter I, “Joint Planning,” the President, SecDef, and CJCS all promulgate strategic guidance. In general, this guidance provides long-term as well as intermediate objectives. It should define what constitutes victory or success (ends) and identify available forces, resources, and authorities (means) to achieve strategic objectives. The operational approach (ways) of employing military capabilities to achieve the objectives (ends) is for the supported JFC to develop and propose, although policy or national positions may limit options available to the commander. Connecting resources and tactical actions to strategic ends is the responsibility of the operational commander—the commander must be able to explain how proposed actions will result in desired effects, as well as the potential risks of such actions. The commander must also articulate what critical capabilities are necessary to accomplish the assigned mission and what the effects or risks are associated with the delay and/or disruption of those critical capabilities.

(6) For situations that require the employment of military capabilities (particularly for anticipated large-scale combat), the President and SecDef may establish a set of operational objectives. However, in the absence of coherent guidance or direction, the CCDR/JFC may need to collaborate with policymakers in the development of these objectives. Achievement of these objectives should result in contributing to the strategic objective—the broadly expressed conditions that should exist after the conclusion of a campaign or operation. Based on the ongoing civilian-military dialogue, the CCDR will determine the military end state and military objectives, which define the role of military forces. These objectives are the basis for operational design.

b. Understand the Strategic Environment

(1) After analyzing the strategic guidance, commanders and planners build an understanding of the strategic environment. The strategic environment is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect national interests beyond the OE
and may impact the composition of alliances, establish competing requirements or priorities, and/or affect deployment and distribution operations (e.g., degrade or disrupt force flow) executed across the JDDE. This forms boundaries within which the operational approach must fit. Some considerations are:

(a) What actions or planning assumptions will be acceptable given the current US policies and the diplomatic and political environment?

(b) What impact will US activities have on third parties (focus on military impacts but identify possible political, economic or commercial ramifications that may impact third-party willingness to support US activities including, but not limited to, access, basing, and overflight decisions)?

(c) What are the current national strategic objectives of the USG? Are the objectives expected to be long-lasting or short-term only? Could they result in unintended consequences (e.g., is there sufficient time to develop strong controls so that weapons provided to a nation will not be used for unintended purposes)?

(2) Strategic-Level Considerations. Military activities are undertaken to support achievement of national strategic objectives, which in turn advance or defend national interests. Fundamentally, all military activities must be evaluated against that strategic measure—does the activity, on the whole, contribute positively to national objectives and advance or defend national interests? CCPs do this through reasoned sequencing of military operations, definition of limits, and assessment of benefits, costs, and risks for the use of military forces and capabilities.

(a) Within the OE, strategic-level considerations may include global factors such as international law; the capability of adversary/enemy diplomatic, information, military, and economic activities to influence domestic and world opinion; adversary and friendly organizations and institutions; and the capability and availability of national and commercial transportation, space capabilities, and information technology. Strategic-level considerations of the OE are analyzed in terms of geopolitical regions and nations rather than local considerations.

(b) Nonmilitary aspects of the OE assume increased importance at the strategic level. For example, the industrial and technological capabilities of a nation or region will influence the type of military force it fields and may influence the ability of a nation or region to endure a protracted conflict without outside assistance. In many situations, nonmilitary considerations may play a greater role than military factors in influencing adversary, partner, and neutral state COAs.

(c) The JIPOE process analyzes relevant aspects of the OE. This analysis should also consider possible intervention by third parties. The main JIPOE focus is to provide intelligence that helps the JFC discern the enemy’s or adversary’s capabilities, probable intent, and most likely and most dangerous COAs. During COA development, analysis, comparison, and approval during the JPP, JIPOE-based COA models consider the
range of resources available to the adversary, to include activities to influence the mindset of key personalities and populations, and the financial flows and convergence of threat and illicit networks to fund adversary operations. JIPOE-based COA models identify both military and nonmilitary methods of power projection and influence, specify the theaters of main effort and the forces committed to each, and depict national as well as strategic- and theater-level objectives of the relevant actors.

c. Understand the OE

(1) The OE is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. It encompasses physical areas and factors of the air, land, maritime, and space domains; the information environment (which includes cyberspace); and the electromagnetic spectrum. The OE includes not only the immediate OA but also all factors outside the OA that are impacting or will likely impact the JFC’s objectives. Included within these areas are the enemy, adversary, friendly, and neutrals that are relevant to a specific joint operation. Understanding the OE helps the JFC to better identify the problem; anticipate potential outcomes; and understand the results of various friendly, adversary, enemy, and neutral actions and how these actions affect attaining the military end state (see Figure IV-1).

(2) To visualize an approach to solving the problem, the commander must be able to describe both the current state of the OE, the assessed OE throughout the operation or campaign, and the desired state of the OE when operations conclude. Desired conditions should include a description of relevant actor behaviors. Planners should compare the current conditions of the OE with the desired conditions. Identifying necessary objective conditions early in planning will help the commander and staff devise an operational approach with LOEs/LOOs that link each current condition to a desired end state condition and assess risk.

(3) Describe the Current OE. The JIPOE process is a comprehensive analytic tool to describe all aspects of the OE relevant to the operation or campaign.

(4) Operational-Level Considerations

(a) In analyzing the current and future OE, the staff can use a PMESII analytical framework to determine relationships and interdependencies relevant to the specific operation or campaign (see Figure IV-2).

(b) The size and scope of the analysis will vary depending on particular aspects of the OE. For example, if a landlocked adversary has access to space-based services (indigenous or provided by third parties) or the capability to conduct cyberspace operations, then the relevant portions of the contested environment would extend worldwide, while maritime considerations might be minimal. While most joint operations at the operational level may encompass many or all PMESII considerations and characteristics, the staff’s balanced JIPOE efforts should vary according to the relevant OE
Operational Design: Understanding the Operational Environment

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**NOTES:**
1. Supports the joint planning process step 1 (Planning Initiation).
2. All inputs/outputs are reviewed throughout the planning process and updated as changes occur in the operational environment, the problem, or the strategic guidance.
3. Commanders and staffs are cautioned against definitively describing the environment: It is inherently complex and eludes definition. Time spent on analysis must be balanced with the rest of the planning process.

**Legend**
- ASCOPE: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, events
- COG: center of gravity
- METT-T: mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available
- PMESII: political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure

**Figure IV-1. Operational Design: Understanding the Operational Environment**

Aspects of the operation or campaign. The CCDR’s J-2 must also coordinate with supporting CCDRs’ J-2(s) to ensure the assessed OE sufficiently identifies and characterizes threats that may degrade, disrupt, or deny missions executed by supporting CCDRs. See JP 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*, for additional information on analyzing and understanding the OE.

(c) Analysis of the OE should include an analysis of the information environment. This should include how information impacts the OE and is the basis for incorporating the use and application of information into the planning, execution, and assessment of joint operations. The JIPOE process should provide the analysis that
answers the following questions related to describing the current OE in terms of its informational, physical, and human aspects:

1. How does information move in and through the OE; how is it received, processed, and used; by whom is it received, processed, and used; and for what purposes is that information used?

2. Who are the known or potential relevant actors? Who are the decision makers and key influencers? Which individuals play multiple roles?

3. What key human and automated decision-making processes do the relevant actors use?

4. What are the information systems and networks that are used by the relevant actors?

5. What are the joint force activities that relevant actors are/will be observing?
6. How will relevant actors perceive, and what meaning will relevant actors assign to, joint force activities? What details and features of those activities (e.g., timing, duration, presence, posture, profile) will have the most impact on the meaning that relevant actors assign?

7. What relevant actor behaviors are manifested or anticipated as a result of those perceptions?

(d) Additional factors that should be considered, include:

1. Geographic, meteorological, and oceanographic features and characteristics.

2. Population demographics (i.e., ethnic groups, tribes, ideological factions, religious groups and sects, language dialects, gender roles, age distribution, income groups, public health issues).

3. Social and cultural factors of enemies, adversaries, neutrals, and allies in the OE.

4. Political and socioeconomic factors (e.g., economic system, political factions, tribal factions, commercial influence).

5. Infrastructure, such as transportation, energy, and information systems and its foreign or third party ownership.

6. Operational limitations, such as ROE/RUF, or legal restrictions on military operations as specified in US law, international law, or HN agreements.

7. All friendly, adversary, and enemy conventional, irregular, and paramilitary forces and their general capabilities and strategic objectives (including all known and/or suspected chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards).

8. Environmental conditions (e.g., earthquakes, volcanic activity, pollution, naturally occurring diseases).

9. Location of toxic industrial materials in the area of interest that may produce chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear hazards.

10. All locations of foreign embassies, international organizations, and NGOs.

11. Friendly, adversary, and enemy space capabilities (which may be indigenous military, civil, or commercial assets, or provided by a third party); their current or potential use; and critical vulnerabilities.
12. Knowledge of the capabilities and intent; COGs; and critical vulnerabilities of forces, individuals, or organizations conducting cyberspace operations.

13. Financial networks that could impact an adversary’s or enemy’s ability to sustain operations.

14. Psychological characteristics of enemy or adversary decision making.

15. The presence, role, and objectives of friendly, neutral, and threat networks and their interrelationships.

16. Enemy and adversary capability to employ or develop improvised threat devices, weapons, or systems.

(e) To produce a holistic view of the relevant enemy, adversary, neutral, and friendly systems within a larger system that includes many external influences, analysis should define how these systems interrelate. Most important to this analysis is describing the relevant relationships within and between the various systems that directly or indirectly affect the problem at hand. Although the J-2 manages the JIPOE process, other directorates and agencies can contribute valuable expertise to develop and assess the complexities of the OE.

For more information on JIPOE, see JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

(f) Network engagement analysis can provide additional understanding of relationships, particularly in complex OEs or when dealing with networked threat environments. Network engagement can provide a framework for understanding the interrelationships and motivations of groups and networks. Network analysis also facilitates identification of significant information that might otherwise go unnoticed. This can include uncovering unrecognized positions of power within related groups, accounting for structure and organization, finding individuals or nodes who are critical, and facilitating measuring change over time. Once the JFC identifies the networks in the OE and understands their interrelationships, functions, motivations, and vulnerabilities, the commander can tailor the force to apply the most effective tools to partner with friendly networks, engage neutral networks, and counter the threat networks.

For more information on network engagement, see JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks.

(g) **Tendencies and Potentials.** In developing an understanding of interactions and relationships in the OE, commanders and staffs consider observed tendencies and potentials in their analyses. Tendencies reflect the inclination to think or behave in a certain manner. Tendencies are not considered deterministic but rather model thoughts or behaviors. Tendencies help identify the range of possibilities that may develop with or without external influence. Once identified, commanders and staffs evaluate the potential of
these tendencies to manifest within the OE. Potential is the inherent ability or capacity for the growth or development of a specific interaction or relationship. However, not all interactions and relationships support attaining the desired end state. The desired end state accounts for tendencies and potentials or other aspects of the OE. Early in the JPP, pertinent lessons learned should be collected and reviewed as part of the analysis to allow previously learned lessons to make their way into the plan. The Joint Lessons Learned Information System provides a database of lessons learned. However, people experienced in the mission, OE, and lessons learned functions should be sought for their knowledge and experience.

(h) Describe the key conditions that must exist in the future OE to achieve the objectives. Planners should put a temporal aspect to this set of conditions to be able to conduct feasibility and acceptability analyses.

(i) Determine the relevant actor’s objectives that affect the OE. Each participant will have different sets of conditions for achieving their respective objectives. Relevant actors who oppose US and partner nations’ objectives can be expected to take actions to thwart those objectives. Others, whether neutral or friendly, may not have an opposing mindset but may have desired conditions (including their unintended consequences) that jeopardize achievement of the JFC’s objectives. In the course of developing the plan, planners should ask themselves if the COA being considered addresses these conflicts. For example, a CCDR’s assessment (e.g., partnership assessment) while conducting security cooperation may identify conflicts of interest amongst parties within the partner nation.

For more information on understanding friendly, neutral, and threat networks, see JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks.

d. Define the Problem

(1) Defining the problem is essential to addressing the problem. It involves understanding and isolating the root causes of the issue that are the essence of a complex, ill-defined problem. Defining the problem begins with a review of the tendencies and potentials of the relevant actors and identifying the relationships and interactions among their respective desired conditions and objectives. The problem statement articulates how the operational variables can be expected to resist or facilitate transformation of current conditions and how inertia in the OE can be leveraged to enable the desired conditions to achieve the objectives.

(a) The problem statement identifies the areas that, when successfully acted upon, will help transform the existing condition into the desired condition. Defining the problem extends beyond analyzing interactions and relationships in the OE (see Figure IV-3). It identifies areas of tension, competition, and contested environments—as well as opportunities and challenges—that commanders must address to transform current or anticipated conditions to achieve the desired objective. Tension is the resistance or friction among and between participants. The commander and staff identify the tension by analyzing tendencies and potentials within the OE.
(b) Critical to defining the problem is determining what needs to be acted on to reconcile the differences between existing and desired conditions. Some of the conditions are critical to success, some are not. Some may change as a secondary or tertiary result of another condition. In identifying the problem, the planning team identifies the tensions among the desired conditions and identifies the areas of tension that merit further consideration as areas of possible intervention.

(c) The JFC and staff must identify and articulate (see Figure IV-4):

1. Tensions between current conditions and desired conditions at the objective or military end state.

2. Elements within the OE that must change or remain the same to achieve the objective or attain desired military end state, including relevant actors’ behaviors, which impede or support changing the current conditions in the OE to the desired conditions in the OE.

3. Opportunities and threats that can be exploited or will impede the JFC from attaining the desired end state.

4. Operational limitations.
A clear, concise, and precise problem statement is essential to provide definitive focus for development of a plan. The problem statement is the planner’s answer to the question “what’s going on here?” In other words, what situation or condition is threatening or presenting an opportunity, for which interests, and how. The problem statement considers how tension and competition affect the OE by identifying pathways to transform current conditions in new, more desirable conditions.

e. **Identify Assumptions**

(1) Where there is insufficient information or guidance, the commander and staff identify assumptions to assist in framing solutions. At this stage, assumptions address strategic and operational gaps that enable the commander to develop the operational approach.

(a) Assumptions should be kept to the minimum required, as each assumption adds to the probability of error in the plan and requires specific CCIRs to continuously check its validity.
(b) Assumptions should only address gaps in information or guidance that are essential to the plan’s success. If the plan will not fail if the assumption proves invalid, the assumption is unnecessary.

(c) Assumptions address key and critical decisions required by senior leaders to enable the continuation of planning.

(d) Assumption should not assume away a likely hostile COA or a friendly inability to execute or sustain the plan that could cause the plan to fail.

(2) Commanders and staff should review strategic guidance and direction to see if any assumptions are imposed on the planning process. They should also regularly discuss planning assumptions with supporting CCDRs, OSD, and DOD leadership to see if there are changes in the strategic environment, OE, global requirements, policy, or guidance that affect the planning assumptions (examples could be basing or access permissions, allied or multinational contributions, alert and warning decision timelines, or anticipated threat actions and reactions). Assumptions should be phrased in terms of will or will not (rather than using “should” or “may”) to establish specific conditions that enable planning to continue.

(3) During the JPP, the commander may develop additional assumptions to support detailed COA development as noted earlier in this chapter.

f. Develop Operational Approaches

(1) The operational approach is a commander’s description of the broad actions the force can take to achieve an objective in support of the national objective or attain a military end state. The operational approach is based largely on an understanding of the OE and the problem facing the JFC (see Figure IV-5). A discussion of operational approaches within and between options forms the basis of the IPRs between the CCDR and SecDef and staff (to ensure consistency with US policy and national objectives). Once SecDef approves the approach, it provides the basis for beginning, continuing, or completing detailed planning. The JFC and staff should continually review, update, and modify the approach as policy, the OE, end states, or the problem change. This requires frequent and continuing dialogue at all levels of command.

(2) There are three purposes for developing an operational approach:

(a) It provides the foundation for the commander’s planning guidance to the staff and other partners by providing the commander’s visualization of how the joint force’s operations will transform current conditions into the desired conditions—the way the commander envisions the OE at the conclusion of operations to support national objectives.

(b) It provides the model for execution of the campaign or operation and development of assessments for that campaign or operation.

(c) It enables a better understanding of the OE and of the problem.
(3) Commanders and their staffs can use operational design when planning any joint campaign or operation. Notwithstanding a commander’s judgment, education, and experience, the OE often presents situations so complex that just understanding them—let alone attempting to change them—exceeds individual capacity. This complexity complicates coherent planning. Bringing adequate order to complex problems to facilitate further detailed planning requires an iterative dialogue between commander, supporting commanders, the planning staffs, and policy staffs. Rarely will members of either staff recognize an implicit operational approach during their initial analysis and synthesis of the OE. Successful development of the approach requires continuous assessment of activities and changes in the OE, analysis, learning, dialogue, and collaboration between commander and staff, as well as other subject matter experts. The challenge is even greater when the joint operation involves other agencies, the private sector, and multinational partners (which is typically the case), whose unique considerations can complicate the process. Some friendly and neutral networks might also provide new capabilities, information, perspectives, or solutions to enable mission success.

(4) It is essential that commanders, through a dialogue with their staffs, planning teams, initiative groups, and any other relevant sources of information, first gain an initial
understanding of the OE, to include the US policy perspective, and define the problem facing the joint force prior to conducting detailed planning. The problem as presented and characterized in strategic guidance documents rarely includes all available information and may actually identify and describe symptoms rather than the actual problem. From this understanding of the OE and definition of the problem, commanders develop their broad, operational approach for transforming current conditions into desired conditions. The operational approach will underpin the operation and the detailed planning that follows. The JFC and staff continually refine the operational approach as detailed planning occurs. The operational approach is refined as operations are conducted and understanding of the problem, the OE, and how joint force actions impact them increases.

(5) In developing an appropriate operational approach, the commander should address the following questions:

(a) What are the strengths, weaknesses, intentions, and interrelationships of the various actors?

(b) What vulnerabilities will the actor(s) likely seek to exploit?

(c) What are the opportunities and threats?

(d) How do the existing conditions change to the desired conditions?

(e) What will be the likely consequences of shaping the OE toward a desired set of conditions?

(f) How well can the consequences of actions or changes in the OE be understood?

g. Identify Decisions and Decision Points

(1) During planning, commanders inform leadership of the decisions that will need to be made, when they will have to be made, and the uncertainty and risk accompanying decisions and delay. This provides military and civilian leaders a template and warning for decisions in advance and helps facilitate collaboration with interagency partners and allies to develop alternatives and exploit opportunities short of escalation. The decision matrix also identifies the expected indicators needed in support of operation assessment and intelligence requirements and collection plans.

(2) Decision points are the latest point in space and time when a commander can make a key decision concerning a specific COA. Initiating a decision is the point at which the commander and staff anticipate initiating actions that will result in a key decision. The space between the decision initiation and the decision point is the decision time available to the staff and commander. Early decision initiation may lead to overwhelming the staff battle rhythm, premature decisions, and telegraphing operations to the enemy or adversary.
(3) Commanders ensure senior leaders understand the risk and time lines associated with the decision points and the possible impacts on the mission of delayed decisions.

h. **Refine the Operational Approach**

(1) Throughout the planning processes, commanders and their staffs conduct formal and informal discussions at all levels of the chain of command, supporting CCDRs, and subordinate commands. These discussions help refine assumptions, limitations, and decision points that could affect the operational approach and ensure the plan remains feasible, acceptable, and suitable.

(2) The commander adjusts the operational approach based on feedback from the formal and informal discussions at all levels of command and other information.

i. **Prepare Planning Guidance**

(1) **Develop Commander’s Planning Guidance.** The commander provides a summary of the OE and the problem, along with a visualization of the operational approach, to the staff and to other partners through commander’s planning guidance. As time permits, the commander may have been able to apply operational design to think through the campaign or operation before the staff begins the JPP. In this case, the commander provides initial planning guidance to help focus the staff in mission analysis. Commanders should continue the analysis to further understand and visualize the OE as the staff conducts mission analysis. Upon completing analysis of the OE, the commander issues planning guidance, as appropriate, to help focus the staff efforts. At a minimum, the commander issues planning guidance, either initial or refined, at the conclusion of mission analysis and provides refined planning guidance as understanding of the OE, the problem, and visualization of the operational approach matures. It is critical for the commander to provide updated guidance as the campaign or operation develops, to adapt the operational approach to a changing OE or changed problem.

(2) The format for the commander’s planning guidance varies based on the personality of the commander and the level of command but should adequately describe the logic to the commander’s understanding of the OE, the methodology for reaching the understanding of the problem, and a coherent description of the operational approach. It may include the following elements:

(a) **Describe the Strategic Environment.** Some combination of graphics showing key relationships and tensions and a narrative describing the strategic environment will help convey the commander’s understanding to the staff and other partners. The description of the strategic environment must include assessed/anticipated enemy, adversary, or other relevant actor actions that extend beyond the OA, particularly those that may impact deployment, distribution, and other critical strategic capabilities.

(b) **Describe the OE.** Some combination of graphics showing key relationships and tensions, and a narrative describing the OE, will help convey the
The commander’s understanding to the staff and other partners. The description of the OE must include assessed and anticipated adversary, enemy, and other relevant actor action that could degrade, disrupt, or deny successful accomplishment of the unit’s mission and achievement of assigned objectives.

(c) **Define the problem to be solved.** A narrative problem statement that includes a time frame to solve the problem will best convey the commander’s understanding of the problem.

(d) **Describe the operational approach.** A combination of a narrative describing objectives, decisive points, potential mission areas, LOEs, and LOOs, with a summary of limitations (constraints and restraints) and risk (what can be accepted and what cannot be accepted) will help describe the operational approach.

(e) **Provide the commander’s initial intent.** The commander should also include the initial intent in planning guidance. The commander’s initial intent describes the purpose of the operations, desired national strategic objective, military end state, and operational risks associated with the campaign or operation and describes the desired conditions in terms of behaviors needed to support enduring outcomes. It also includes where the commander will and will not accept risk during the operation. It organizes (prioritizes) desired conditions and the combinations of potential actions in time, space, and purpose. The JFC should envision and articulate how military power and joint operations, integrated with other applicable instruments of national power, will achieve strategic success and how the command intends to measure the progress and success of its military actions and activities. It should help staff and subordinate commanders understand the intent for unified action using interorganizational coordination among all partners and participants. The commander’s intent identifies the major unifying efforts during the campaign or operation, the points and events where operations must succeed to control or establish conditions in the OE, and where other instruments of national power will play a central role. The intent must allow for decentralized execution. It provides focus to the staff and helps subordinate and supporting commanders take actions to achieve the military objectives or attain the end state without further orders, even when operations do not unfold or result as planned. While there is no specified joint format for the commander’s intent, a generally accepted construct includes the purpose, end state, and risk. Chapter I, “Joint Planning,” discusses purpose, end state, and risk in more detail.

1. The intent may also include operational objectives, method, and effects guidance.

2. The commander may provide additional planning guidance, such as information management, resources, or specific effects that must be created or avoided.

4. **Elements of Operational Design**

   a. The elements of operational design are considered in four broad categories: overarching, space (OE), time, and forces.
(1) **Overarching** elements of operational design are those that drive the operation. Some, such as the objective or military end state, may be provided in higher-level guidance. Others, such as the COG, effects, and culmination, must be determined from planners’ analysis of the OE and other considerations such as available forces and time.

(2) The space of the OE requires planners to consider the physical characteristics, conditions, and geometry of the environment, to include how the commander should divide the operation for C2 purposes. The OE also accounts for the integration of the information environment including cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum into planning, even though some, but not all, aspects of the OE exist outside the physical terrain. Analysis of the OE must also consider the distances required for deployment and physics of movement through environment.

(3) **Time** considerations lead planners to identify how long it could take to conduct operations from an initial decision to commit forces through planning, mobilization, deployment, and execution. When considering the factor of time, a commander needs to identify what information is needed and when it is needed to make timely decisions, how operations might be sequenced, or how an operation might be phased to ensure the force achieves its objective without culminating. Time can also drive other factors such as the resources required by a commander to successfully operate throughout the duration of an operation. Unlike space or forces, time cannot be reconstituted or recaptured once passed.

(4) **Force** requires planners to know the science of warfare, the capabilities and limitations of blue force weapon systems and tactics, and the capabilities and limitations of the enemy’s weapon systems and tactics. Force also requires planners to understand how to synchronize multiple simultaneous network engagements. Force accounts for the intangible factors of leadership and morale surrounding the planning process, as well as the capabilities of interagency, international, and commercial actors in the OE.

(5) The characterization of elements into categories is not meant to be exclusive. Many factors affect more than one condition. For example, a **decisive point** could be an enemy force, a key terrain feature, or ensuring sufficient food and medical supplies are delivered on time (for humanitarian assistance).

b. **Integration.** Operational design should be used in conjunction with the principles of joint operations and the joint functions (see Figure IV-6). Throughout the planning process, planners should continuously evaluate the plan to ensure joint functions are adequately addressed and the plan does not violate the principles of joint operations.

5. **Overarching Elements of Operational Design**

a. **Objective.** The **objective** is the single most important element of operational design. The objective is why the mission is being conducted and should be determined first. **Objectives may be broad or defined by a military end state as directed or informed by policy and strategy.**
(1) Military missions are conducted to achieve objectives and are linked to national objectives. Military objectives are an important consideration in plan development because they specify what must be accomplished and provide the basis for describing desired effects.
An objective is clearly defined, decisive, and attainable. Joint planning integrates military actions and capabilities with other instruments of national power in time, space, and purpose to provide unity of effort to achieve the JFC’s military objectives, which contributes to strategic national objectives. Objectives and their supporting effects provide the basis for identifying tasks to be accomplished. In JSCP-directed campaign plans, objectives (and their subordinate conditions or effects), rather than an end state, define the path of the command’s actions in contributing to national objectives.

A clear and concise end state enables planners to better examine objectives that must be achieved to attain the desired end state. Objectives describe what must be achieved to reach or attain the end state. These are usually expressed in military, diplomatic, economic, and informational terms and help define and clarify what military planners must do to support the national strategic objectives. Objectives developed at the national-strategic and theater-strategic levels are the defined, decisive, and attainable goals toward which all military operations, activities, and investments are directed within the OA.

Achieving objectives ties execution of tactical tasks to reaching the military end state.

There are four primary considerations for an objective:

(a) An objective establishes a single result.

(b) An objective (and its associated conditions/effects) should link directly or indirectly to higher-level objectives (and their associated conditions/effects) or to the end state (nested). Planners need to know the higher-level objective and should be able to identify how their objective supports the next higher level objective.

(c) An objective is specific and unambiguous.

(d) An objective does not imply ways and/or means—it is not written as a task.

b. Military End State

A military end state is the set of required conditions that defines achievement of all military objectives. Once the objective is identified, planners have to define the military-related conditions that, once accomplished, lead to achievement of the objective. It normally represents a point in time and/or circumstances beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of national power as the primary means to achieve remaining national objectives. Aside from its obvious association with strategic or operational objectives, clearly defining the military end state promotes unity of effort, facilitates synchronization, and helps clarify (and may reduce) the risk associated with the campaign or operation. Commanders should include the military end state in their planning guidance and commander’s intent statement.
(2) After developing an understanding of the OE and ensuring they understand the strategic guidance, planners should develop a range of possible outcomes that identify the military end state—the point when the military no longer leads the operation. In the early stages of planning commanders and their staffs think through the conditions and behaviors that must exist to conclude military-led operations on terms favorable to the United States and its partners. A hasty or ill-defined end to the operation may bring with it the possibility an enemy will renew hostilities or third parties may interfere and potentially renew hostilities.

(3) The military end state should account for a wide variety of operational tasks the joint force may need to accomplish, to include disengagement, force protection, and appropriate transition to competition.

(4) Military end states are briefed to SecDef as part of the IPR process to ensure the military end states support policy objectives. Once approved, however, the criteria may change. As a result, commanders must remain aware of their military end states that are in the review process. Any change could result in modifications to the military end state as well as the commander’s operational approach.

c. COG

(1) One of the most important tasks confronting the JFC’s staff during planning is identifying and analyzing the COGs of friendly, enemy, and adversary forces. The **COG** is the source of power or strength that enables a military force to achieve its objective and is what an opposing force can orient its actions against that will lead to enemy failure. COGs are determined by their impact on the military end state. Success requires protecting the friendly COG while defeating the enemy COG.

(a) COGs can exist at different levels. At the strategic level, a COG could be a military force, an alliance, political or military leaders, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national will. At the operational level, a COG is often associated with the threat’s military capabilities such as a powerful element of the armed forces but could include other capabilities in the OE.

(b) COGs may change in time as the strategic environment or OE changes due to shifts in friendly, neutral, or threat diplomatic, information, military and/or economic/commercial conditions or objectives. A force’s will to fight, for example, may increase or decrease throughout the course of an operation with dramatic impact on the joint force’s success. Similarly, victories or defeats may cause adversaries or enemies to reassess objectives or strategies that can alter the COG.

(2) **COGs exist in an adversarial context** involving a clash of moral wills and/or physical strengths. COGs do not exist in a strategic or operational vacuum; they are formed out of the relationships between adversaries and enemies. They define COGs through their unique view of the threats in the strategic environment and OE as well the requirements to develop and maintain power relative to their own objectives. Commanders, therefore, must not only consider their threat’s COGs but they must also identify and protect their own.
(3) The COG construct is useful as an analytical tool to help commanders analyze friendly and adversary or enemy sources of strength as well as weaknesses and vulnerabilities. This process cannot be taken lightly. A faulty conclusion resulting from a poor or hasty analysis can have serious consequences; such as the inability to achieve strategic and operational objectives at an acceptable cost. The identification of COGs is not a static J-2 process conducted once during JIPOE. Planners must continually analyze and refine COGs due to actions taken by friendly forces and the threat’s reactions to those actions. Figure IV-7 shows a number of characteristics that may be associated with a COG.

(4) The determination and analysis of COGs (friendly and threat), as well as understanding the relationships between them, is a key step in operational design. Joint force intelligence analysts determine potential options for the threat COG by identifying what needs to be weakened or destroyed to defeat the enemy. The J-2, in conjunction with other operational planners, then determine if the proposed COGs are truly critical to the enemy’s strategy. This analysis is a linchpin in the planning effort. Planners in all sections on the joint force staff conduct similar analysis to identify friendly COGs and their strengths and weaknesses. Once COGs have been approved, JFCs and their staffs determine how to attack enemy COGs while protecting friendly COGs. Understanding the relationship among COGs facilitates greater precision in thought and expression in operational design.

Figure IV-7. Characteristics of a Center of Gravity
(5) A CCP may have multiple COGs if it includes operations along multiple, independent LOEs. Without a well-defined threat, there will often be no enemy or adversary COG.

(6) **Identifying a COG**

(a) Critical factors analysis is a framework to assist in analyzing and identifying a COG and to aid operational planning against threat networks within the OE, including insurgent, resistance, terrorist, and criminal organizations that operate in the human dimension of complex OEs. During critical factor analysis, planners evaluate the operational design elements and identify those considered crucial for mission accomplishment. This analysis identifies those characteristics of a threat that present challenges to friendly forces and provide capabilities to that threat.

1. The analysis should identify the threat’s critical strengths. Critical strengths are capabilities considered essential for achieving a given or assumed military objective. Typically, the threat COG will be found among its critical strengths.

2. The analysis of networks considers both tangible and intangible factors that not only motivate individuals to join a network but also promotes their will to act to achieve the network’s objectives. A COG for networks will often be difficult to target directly because of its complexity and accessibility.

(b) A proper analysis of threat critical factors must be based on the best available knowledge of how they organize, fight, think, and make decisions along with their physical and psychological strengths and weaknesses. JFCs and their staffs must develop an understanding of the threat’s capabilities and vulnerabilities, as well as the factors that would compel them to abandon their own strategic objectives. They must also envision how friendly forces and actions appear from the threat’s viewpoints. Otherwise, the JFC and the staff may fall into the trap of ascribing to the threat attitudes, values, and reactions that mirror their own. A rational decision in the threat’s perspective may appear irrational from the friendly perspective.

(7) **Attacking a Threat’s COG.** Once planners have identified the likely threat COG, they need to identify the best method to attack or weaken it (see Figure IV-8). This process forms the core of COA development and assists with the identification of missions and tasks.

(a) Identifying the missions and tasks can be accomplished by analyzing and deconstructing the COG within a framework of three components: critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities. In general, a JFC must possess sufficient operational reach and combat power or other relevant capabilities to take advantage of an enemy’s critical vulnerabilities while protecting friendly critical capabilities within the operational reach of an enemy. The JFC should seek opportunities to aggressively apply force against critical vulnerabilities in as many dimensions as possible.
1. Critical capabilities are the primary abilities essential to the accomplishment of the mission.

2. Critical requirements are essential conditions, resources, and means the COG requires to employ the critical capability.

3. Critical vulnerabilities are aspects of critical requirements vulnerable to attack.

(b) When identifying friendly and threat critical vulnerabilities, planners often want to focus their efforts against the critical vulnerabilities that will do the most decisive damage to a threat’s COG. However, in selecting those critical vulnerabilities, planners must also compare their criticality with their accessibility, redundancy, resiliency, and impact on other military and national objectives to balance those factors against friendly capabilities to affect the critical vulnerabilities.

(c) Before solidifying COGs into the plan, planners should analyze and test the validity of the COGs. The defeat, destruction, neutralization, or substantial weakening of a valid COG should cause an adversary or enemy to change its COA or prevent them from achieving strategic objectives. If, through analysis and/or wargaming, this does not occur, the COG was misidentified and the critical factors analysis must be reexamined.
The conclusions, while important to the planning process, must be paired with continuous evaluation because COGs and critical vulnerabilities may change during the campaign due to the interactive nature of warfare and changes in the objectives of either combatant. JFCs and staffs should be prepared to adjust friendly plans and operations should the COGs change due to shifts in the threat or friendly objectives.

8. On completion of the COG analysis, planners should consider:

(a) Will the joint force achieve its objectives if the threat COG is destroyed?

(b) Does accomplishment of this mission lead to the achievement of the objective? Does it support the next higher level objective?

(c) If the COG is destroyed, what gaps, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, or vacuums will it create that may create unforeseen consequences (second- and third-order effects)?

(d) Is a direct attack on the COG feasible or desirable? Identifying COGs is useful in understanding the system. Planners, however, should refrain from automatically assuming a strike on the COG is the solution to every operation.

1. The COG may be too difficult to attack or influence due to insufficient forces, complexity, or enemy or adversary defenses. In this case, an indirect approach may be more feasible than a direct attack.

2. Consideration must be placed on whether total collapse of the enemy or system is commensurate with the objectives and end state. Striking a COG could lead to escalation or fracturing of the system that might leave the commander and planning staffs with multiple unforeseen consequences resulting in the complexity and risk of the mission increasing. Even if the commander and planning staffs identify a COG critical to an enemy, it may not be advantageous to strike it if the commander wants to avoid second- and third-order effects or the overall objective is to ensure stability within the system.

PROTECTING FRIENDLY CENTERS OF GRAVITY

In conducting the analysis of friendly vulnerabilities, the supported commander must decide how, when, where, and why friendly military forces are (or might become) vulnerable to hostile actions and then plan accordingly. The supported commander must achieve a balance between prosecuting the main effort and protecting critical capabilities and vulnerabilities in the operational area to protect friendly centers of gravity (COGs). At times, especially at the strategic level, the military may need to prioritize support to other entities (e.g., diplomats, politicians, law enforcement) to protect friendly COGs; even when such prioritization increases the risk to military operations.

Various Sources
3. Planners may recommend affecting smaller elements of the whole enabling continued balance until the entire problem is reduced to manageable parts or the COG changes. If this approach is taken, planners must take into consideration that as the system changes, the COG may change in relation to the remaining whole.

(9) COG analysis may require operations to strengthen or protect the friendly COG, such as building interoperability with allies and partners.

For more information on COGs and the systems perspective, see JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

d. Effects. An effect is a physical and/or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. A desired effect can be thought of as a condition that can support achieving an associated objective and an undesired effect is a condition that can inhibit progress toward an objective.

(1) The CCDR plans joint operations based on analysis of national strategic objectives (and associated desired effects, for example as published in GCPs) and development of theater strategic objectives supported by measurable strategic and operational desired effects and assessment indicators (see Figure IV-9). At the operational level, a subordinate JFC develops supporting plans that can include objectives supported by measurable operational-level desired effects and assessment indicators. This may increase operational- and tactical-level understanding of the purpose reflected in the

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**End State, Objectives, Effects, Tasks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Guidance</th>
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<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Effects</th>
<th>Tasks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National strategic</td>
<td>Strategic end state</td>
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<td>Objectives</td>
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<td>Theater strategic</td>
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<td>Objectives</td>
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<td>Operational</td>
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<td>Tactical</td>
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**End state** describes the set of conditions to meet conflict termination criteria.

**Objectives** prescribe friendly goals.

**Effects** describe the conditions related to the objectives.
- Desired effects describe conditions needed to achieve objectives.
- Undesired effects describe conditions that will impede achievement of objectives.

**Tasks** describe friendly actions to create desired effects or preclude undesired effects.

**Mission** describes the organization’s essential task or task(s) and purpose.

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Figure IV-9. End State, Objectives, Effects, Tasks
higher-level commander’s mission and intent. At the same time, commanders consider potential undesired effects and their impact on the tasks assigned to subordinate commands.

(2) There are four primary considerations for writing a desired effect statement.

(a) Each desired effect should link directly to one or more objectives.

(b) The effect should be measurable. However, cognitive effects are not easily measured and planners must identify indicators to enable assessment of these effects.

(c) The statement should not specify ways and means for accomplishment.

(d) The effect should be distinguishable from the objective it supports as a condition for success, not as another objective or a task.

(3) The proximate cause of effects in complex situations can be difficult to predict particularly when they relate to influencing the decision making of relevant actors in the environment and shaping behavior. Further, there will always be gaps in our understanding of the OE. Commanders and their staffs must appreciate that unpredictable third-party actions, unintended consequences of friendly operations, subordinate initiative and creativity, and the fog and friction of conflict contributes to an uncertain OE. While gaps in understanding may be unavoidable, often the best strategy to mitigate them involves working with partners. Partners, particularly local relevant actors, can provide additional information and perspective that can help mitigate surprise from hard-to-predict effects or avoid unintended consequences.

(4) The use of effects in planning can help commanders determine the tasks required to achieve objectives. Additionally, they facilitate the use of other elements of operational design more effectively by clarifying the relationships between COGs, LOOs, LOEs, objectives, effects, tasks, decisive points, and military end states. Effects also enable a more intentional linking with higher-level objectives’ required effects. Once a systems perspective of the OE has been developed (and appropriate links and nodes have been identified), the linkage and relationship between COGs, LOOs, and decisive points can become more obvious. This linkage enables efficient use of desired effects in planning. The JFC and planners continue to develop and refine desired effects throughout the JPP. Monitoring progress toward creating desired effects and avoiding undesired effects continues throughout execution.

e. Culmination

(1) Culmination is that point in time and/or space when the operation can no longer maintain momentum. In the offense, the culminating point is when effectively continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause. Here the attacker greatly risks counterattack and defeat and continues the attack only at great peril. Success in the attack at all levels is to secure the objective before reaching culmination. A defender reaches culmination when the defending force no longer has the capability to go on the
counteroffensive or defend successfully. Success in the defense is to draw the attacker to offensive culmination, then conduct an offensive to expedite the enemy’s defensive culmination. During stabilization efforts, culmination may result from the erosion of national will, decline of popular support, questions concerning legitimacy or restraint, or a political resolution.

(2) The JFC must ensure forces arrive at the appropriate times and places to support the campaign and that sufficient resources are available in the later stages of the campaign. Integration and synchronization of sustainment with combat operations can forestall culmination and help commanders control the tempo of their operations. At both tactical and operational levels, theater logistic planners forecast the drain on resources associated with conducting operations over extended distance and time. They respond by generating enough military resources at the right times and places to enable their commanders to achieve military strategic and operational objectives before reaching their culminating points. If commanders cannot generate these resources, they should revise their CONOPS.

6. Operational Environment

The OE includes tangible and intangible factors that affect combat and support operations. Tangible factors include, but are not limited to, physical size, weather/climate, and geography (including lines of communication, distances, interior/exterior lines). Intangible factors include culture (including gender considerations), the information environment (including cyberspace), and population. Some key planning considerations are:

a. LOOs and LOEs. In addition to the physical and cultural aspects of the environment, planners evaluate for operations. Planners need to identify the method of organizing the operation to achieve the objective. The two primary methods are LOOs and LOEs.

(1) LOOs

(a) A LOO defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the adversary COG that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s). **LOOs describe and connect a series of decisive actions that lead to control of a geographic or force-oriented objective** (see Figure IV-10). Operations designed using LOOs generally consist of a series of actions executed according to a well-defined sequence, although multiple LOOs can exist at the same time (parallel operations). Combat operations are typically planned using LOOs. These lines tie offensive, defensive, and stability tasks to the geographic and positional references in the OA. Commanders synchronize activities along complementary LOOs to attain the military end state.

(b) A force operates on **interior lines** when its operations diverge from a central point. Interior lines usually represent central position where a friendly force can
reinforce or concentrate its elements faster than the enemy force can reposition. With interior lines, friendly forces are closer to separate enemy forces than the enemy forces are to one another. Interior lines enable an isolated force to mass combat power against a specific portion of an enemy force by shifting capabilities more rapidly than the enemy can react.

(c) A force operates on **exterior lines** when its operations converge on the enemy. Operations on exterior lines offer opportunities to encircle and annihilate an enemy force. However, these operations typically require a force stronger or more mobile than the enemy.

(d) The relevance of interior and exterior lines depends on the time and distance relationship between the opposing forces. Although an enemy force may have interior lines with respect to the friendly force, this advantage disappears if the friendly force is more agile and operates at a higher tempo. Conversely, if a smaller friendly force maneuvers to a position between larger but less agile enemy forces, the friendly force may be able to defeat them in detail before they can react effectively.

(2) **LOEs**

(a) **An LOE links multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose—cause and effect—to focus efforts toward establishing operational-level objectives that can lead to strategic objectives.** LOEs provide utility to operational design when positional references to an adversary or enemy have little relevance, such as in counterinsurgency operations or stability activities. Similarly, mission areas link and focus multiple operational-level objectives and corresponding LOEs that lead to achieving strategic objectives. In operations involving many nonmilitary factors, they may be the only way to link tasks, effects, conditions, and the desired end state (see Figure IV-11). LOEs and mission areas are often essential to helping commanders visualize how military capabilities can support the other instruments of national power. They are a particularly valuable tool when used to achieve unity of effort in operations involving MNFs and civilian organizations, where unity of command is elusive.
(b) Commanders at all levels may use LOEs to develop missions and tasks and to determine force capability requirements. Commanders synchronize and sequence related actions along multiple LOEs. Seeing these relationships helps commanders assess progress toward attaining the end state as forces perform tasks and accomplish missions.

(c) Commanders typically visualize stability activities along LOEs. For stability activities, commanders may consider linking primary stability tasks to their corresponding DOS, post-conflict, technical sectors. These stability tasks link military actions with the broader interagency effort across the levels of warfare. A full array of LOEs might include offensive and defensive lines, a line for public affairs and other
information activities, and a line for counter-threat finance. All typically produce effects across multiple LOEs.

(d) Planners should focus LOEs for military plans on what the military does even though many LOEs require more than one instrument of national power to effectively achieve the desired objective. LOEs should include awareness of, and support for, other instruments of national power when relevant, especially when those instruments are more likely to attain the strategic ends the military is supporting. Cross-cutting LOEs, such as establishing essential services or civil security, create a tendency toward more dynamic and open interagency coordination during execution because they require the synchronization of efforts of multiple USG departments and agencies. This type of construct brings to bear the capabilities and expertise of multiple elements of the USG, which makes it particularly effective toward achieving more complex objectives. Planners should remain aware that other departments and agencies lack the military’s capacity and therefore need to actively seek participation from other organizations on overarching issues and critical specifics at the right time. Overwhelming partners with opportunities to interact will reduce partner input and buy in.

(3) Combining LOOs and LOEs. Commanders may use both LOOs and LOEs to connect objectives to a central, unifying purpose. LOEs can also link objectives, decisive points, and COGs. Combining LOOs and LOEs helps commanders include nontraditional military activities and expected contributions from nonmilitary entities in the operational design. This combination helps commanders incorporate stability tasks necessary to attain the end state into their operational approach and allows commanders to consider the less tangible aspects of the OE, where the other instruments of national power or nontraditional military activities may dominate. Nontraditional military activities occur in stability operations and conventional warfare—demonstrated by the military’s control of towns in World War II by graduates of the School of Military Government. Commanders can then visualize concurrent and post-conflict stability activities. Making these connections relates the tasks, effects, and objectives identified in the operation or campaign plan.

b. Decisive Points

(1) A decisive point is key terrain, key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, enables a commander to gain a marked advantage over an enemy or contributes materially to achieving success (e.g., creating a desired effect, achieving an objective). Decisive points can greatly influence the outcome of an action. Decisive points can be terrain features such as a constricted sea lane, a hill, or a geosynchronous orbit. Decisive points can also be specific things like a weapons of mass destruction material cache or facility, or an air base, but they could also include other elements, such as command posts, a satellite downlink station, or an undersea cable. In some cases, specific key events may also be decisive points, such as achievement of air, space, or maritime superiority, opening a supply route during humanitarian operations, or gaining the trust of a key leader. In other cases, decisive points may have a larger systemic impact and, when acted on, can substantially affect the threat’s information, financial, economic, or social systems. When dealing with an irregular threat, commanders and their staffs should
consider how actions against decisive points affect not only the threat but also the relevant population’s perception of threat and friendly forces. Collateral effects on the local populace may impact stability in the area or region of interest.

(2) The most important decisive points can be determined from analysis of critical factors. Understanding the relationship between a COG’s critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities can illuminate direct and indirect approaches to the COG. It is likely most of these critical factors are decisive points and should be addressed further in the planning process.

(3) There may often be cases where the JFC’s combat power and other capabilities are insufficient to affect the enemy’s or adversary’s COGs rapidly with a single action. In this situation, the supported JFC must selectively focus a series of actions against the enemy’s or adversary’s critical vulnerabilities until the cumulative effects of these actions lead to mission success. Just as a combined arms approach is often the best way to attack an enemy’s field force in the military system, attacking several vulnerable points in other systems may offer an effective method to influence an enemy or adversary COG. The indirect approach may offer the most effective method to exploit enemy and adversary critical vulnerabilities through the identification of decisive points. Although decisive points usually are not COGs, they are the keys to attacking or protecting them.

c. Direct and Indirect Approach. The approach is the manner in which a commander contends with a COG. A direct approach attacks the enemy’s COG or principal strength by applying combat power directly against it. However, COGs are generally well-protected and not vulnerable to a direct approach. Thus, commanders usually choose an indirect approach. An indirect approach attacks the enemy’s COG by applying combat power against critical vulnerabilities that lead to the defeat of the COG while avoiding enemy strength.

(1) Direct attacks against adversary or enemy COGs resulting in their neutralization or destruction provide the most direct path to victory. Since direct attacks against COGs mean attacking an opponent’s strength, JFCs must determine if friendly forces possess the power to attack with acceptable risk. Commanders normally attack COGs directly when they have superior forces, a qualitative advantage in leadership, and/or technological superiority over enemy weapon systems. In the event a direct attack is not a reasonable solution, JFCs should consider an indirect approach until conditions are established that permit successful direct attacks (see Figure IV-12). Whenever applicable, JFCs should consider developing simultaneous and/or synchronized action with both direct and indirect approaches. In this manner, the enemy or adversary’s derived vulnerabilities can offer indirect pathways to gain leverage over its COGs.

(2) At the strategic level, indirect methods of defeating the enemy or adversary’s COG could include depriving them of allies or friends, emplacing sanctions, weakening the national will to fight by undermining the public support, and breaking up cohesion of the threat alliances or coalitions.
(3) At the operational level, the most common indirect method of defeating an enemy’s COGs is to conduct a series of attacks against selected aspects of the enemy’s combat power. For example, the JFC may sequence combat actions to force an enemy to divide its forces in theater, destroy the enemy’s reserves or elements of the enemy’s base of operations, or prevent or hinder the deployment of the enemy’s major forces or reinforcements into the OA. Indirect methods of attacking the enemy’s COGs (through critical vulnerabilities) could entail reducing the enemy’s operational reach, isolating the force from its C2, and destroying or suppressing key protection functions such as air defense. Additionally, in irregular warfare, a persistent indirect approach helps enable a legitimate and capable local partner to address the conflict’s causes and to provide security, good governance, and economic development.

d. **Operational Reach**

(1) **Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a joint force can successfully employ military capabilities.** Reach may be constrained by the geography, threats, and environmental conditions in and around the OA. Reach may be extended through forward positioning of capabilities and resources, using information activities, increasing the range and effectiveness of weapon systems, leveraging HNS and contracted support (e.g., system support, external support, theater support), and maximizing the throughput efficiency of the distribution architecture. Operational reach can be unintended. Joint force messages and images may reach outside of the OA to unintended audiences creating effects that are contrary to the JFC’s objectives. This type of operational reach can be mitigated with properly synchronized communication and proper execution of operations security procedures.
(2) Operational reach is inextricably tied to the construct of LOOs. The geography surrounding and separating our threats influences operational reach. Locating forces, reserves, bases, pre-positioned equipment sets, and logistics forward extends operational reach. Operational reach is also affected by increasing the range of weapons and by improving transportation availability and the effectiveness of lines of communications and throughput capability. Given the appropriate level of superiority, some forces, such as air, space, and cyberspace, maintain a responsive global capability that significantly extends operational reach. Nevertheless, for any given campaign or major operation, there is a finite range beyond which predominant elements of the joint force cannot prudently operate or maintain effective operations.

(3) Basing, in the broadest sense, is an indispensable part of operational art, since it is tied to the construct of LOOs and directly affects operational reach. Basing directly affects the combat power and other capabilities a joint force can generate. In particular, the arrangement and positioning of advanced bases (often in austere, rapidly emplaced configurations) underwrites the ability of the joint force to shield its components from enemy and adversary action and deliver symmetric and asymmetric attacks. It also directly influences the combat power and other capabilities the joint force can generate because of its impact on critical factors such as sortie or resupply rates. Political and diplomatic considerations often affect basing decisions.

(4) US force basing options span the range from permanently based forces to temporary sea-basing during crisis response in littoral areas of instability. Bases are typically selected to be within operational reach of enemies and adversaries. Analysis during planning must determine whether sufficient infrastructure, including ports and airfields, and diplomatic support exist or can be obtained to support the operational and sustainment requirements of deployed forces and where they can be assured of some degree of security from attack. Determining where to locate infrastructure and bases poses critical challenges for planners since infrastructure and basing play a key role in enabling campaigns and operations. Enemies and adversaries will likely try to develop anti-access or area denial capabilities to prevent the buildup and sustainment of forces. One such approach could be a preemptive attack against US forces located outside the enemy or adversary’s boundaries, so planners must also consider the risk of placing US combat capabilities within the enemy or adversary’s operational reach. Planners must determine how to mitigate an enemy or adversary’s efforts to deny access to the theater and its infrastructure and conduct operations as part of the campaign to set conditions for future operations.

See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, for additional considerations in organizing the OA for joint operations.

7. Time

a. Arranging Operations

(1) Commanders must determine the best arrangement of joint force and component operations to conduct the assigned tasks and joint force mission. This
arrangement will often be a combination of simultaneous and sequential operations to attain the end state conditions with the least cost in personnel and other resources. Commanders consider a variety of factors when determining this arrangement such as geography of the OA, available strategic lift, changes in command structure, force protection, distribution and sustainment capabilities, enemy reinforcement capabilities, and public opinion. Thinking about the best arrangement helps determine the tempo of activities in time, space, and purpose. Planners should consider factors such as simultaneity, depth, timing, and tempo when arranging operations. Phases, branches and sequels, operational pauses, and the development of a notional TPFDD all improve the ability of the planner to arrange, manage, and execute complex operations.

(a) **Simultaneity refers to the simultaneous application of integrated military and nonmilitary power against an enemy or adversary’s key capabilities and sources of strength.** Simultaneity in joint force operations contributes directly to an enemy or adversary’s collapse by placing more demands on their forces and functions than can be handled. This does not mean all elements of the joint force will be employed or will be employed with equal priority.

(b) **Simultaneity also refers to the concurrent conduct of operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.** Tactical commanders fight engagements and battles understanding their relevance to the contingency plan. JFCs set the conditions for battles within a major operation or campaign to achieve military strategic and operational objectives. CCDRs integrate theater strategy and operational art. At the same time, they remain acutely aware of the impact of tactical events. Because of the inherent interrelationships between the various levels of warfare, commanders cannot be concerned only with events at their respective echelon. Commanders at all levels must understand how their actions contribute to the military end state.

(c) The joint force should conduct operations at a tempo and time that maximizes the effectiveness of friendly capabilities and inhibits enemies and adversaries. With proper timing, JFCs can dominate the action, remain unpredictable, and operate beyond the adversary’s ability to react.

(d) The tempo of warfare has increased over time as technological advancements and innovative doctrines have been applied to military operations. In many situations, JFCs may find it advantageous to maintain an operational tempo that stretches the capabilities of both friendly and enemy or adversary forces. On other occasions, JFCs may find it advantageous to conduct operations at a reduced pace. During selected phases of a campaign, JFCs could reduce the pace of operations, frustrating enemy or adversary commanders while buying time to build a decisive force or tend to other priorities in the OA such as relief to displaced persons. During other phases, JFCs could conduct high-tempo operations designed specifically to overwhelm enemy defensive capabilities. Assuring strategic mobility preserves the JFC’s ability to control tempo by enabling freedom of theater access.
(2) Several tools are available to planners to assist with arranging operations. Phases, branches and sequels, and operational pauses all improve the ability of the planner to arrange, manage, and execute complex operations.

(a) **Phases.** Phasing is a way to organize and conduct a complex joint operation in manageable parts. The phases are unique for each operation or campaign as a tool to integrate and synchronize related activities, thereby enhancing C2 to improve flexibility and unity of effort during execution. Phasing should help the commander and staff understand the sequence of actions forces must execute to be successful. Attaining the end state often requires arranging an operation or campaign in several phases. Phases in a contingency plan are sequential, but during execution, there are often some simultaneous and overlapping activities between the phases. In a campaign, a phase can consist of one or more operations in varying scope, scale, and geographic location, while within an operation, a phase normally consists of several subordinate tasks, or a series of related activities.

1. **A phase can be characterized by the focus that is placed on it.** Phases are distinct in time, terrain, or purpose but must be planned in mutual support and should represent a natural progression and subdivision of the campaign or operation. Each phase should have starting conditions and ending conditions. The ending conditions of one phase are the starting conditions for the next phase.

2. Phases are linked and gain significance in the larger context of the campaign. As such, it is imperative that the campaign not be broken down into numerous arbitrary components that may inhibit tempo and lead to a plodding, incremental approach. Since a campaign is required whenever pursuit of a strategic objective is not achievable through a single major operation, the theater operational design includes provisions for related phases that may or may not be executed.

3. Although phases do not overlap, activities from one phase may continue into subsequent phases. The commander’s vision of how a campaign or operation should unfold drives subsequent decisions regarding phasing. Phasing, in turn, assists with synchronizing the CONOPS and aids in organizing the assignment of tasks to subordinate commanders. By arranging operations and activities into phases, the JFC can better integrate capabilities and synchronize subordinate operations in time, space, and purpose. Each phase should represent a natural subdivision of the campaign or operation’s intermediate objectives. As such, a phase represents a definitive stage during which a large portion of the forces and joint/multinational capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities.

4. As a general rule, phasing should be conceived in condition-driven rather than time-driven terms. However, resource availability depends in large part on time-constrained activities and factors—such as sustainment or deployment rates—rather than the events associated with the operation. The challenge for planners is to reconcile the reality of time-oriented deployment of forces and sustainment with the condition-driven phasing of operations.
5. Effective phasing must address how the joint force will avoid reaching a culminating point. If resources are insufficient to sustain the force until attaining the end state, planners should consider phasing the campaign or operation to account for necessary operational pauses between phases. Such phasing enables the reconstitution of the joint force, but the JFC must understand this may provide the enemy an opportunity to reconstitute as well. In some cases, sustainment requirements and diplomatic factors may even dictate the purpose of certain phases as well as the sequence of those phases. For example, phases may shift the main effort among Service and functional components to maintain momentum while one component is being reconstituted.

6. Commanders determine the number and purpose of phases used during a campaign or operation. Within the context of these phases established by a higher-level JFC, subordinate JFCs and component commanders may establish additional phases that fit their CONOPS. For example, the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) or a subordinate commander might have the following operations inside a single phase of a higher headquarters: deploy, forcible entry, and defend the beachhead. The JFLCC could use the offense phase as a transition to the dominate phase.

   a. During planning, the JFC establishes conditions, objectives, or events for transitioning from one phase to another and plans sequels and branches for contingencies. Phases are planned to be conducted sequentially, but some activities from a phase may begin in a previous phase and continue into subsequent phases. For instance, the commander may transition to stabilization efforts in some areas while still conducting combat operations in other areas. The JFC adjusts the phases to exploit opportunities presented by the adversary, enemy, operational situation, or to react to unforeseen conditions. A joint campaign or operation may be conducted in multiple phases simultaneously if the OA has widely varying conditions.

   b. Transitions between phases are planned as distinct shifts in focus by the joint force and may be accompanied by changes in command or support relationships. The activities that predominate during a given phase, however, rarely align with neatly definable breakpoints. Transitioning between phases is usually event or objective driven versus time or activity driven. The need to transition to another phase occurs when objectives for the current phase are achieved or the adversary or enemy has acted in a manner requiring a major change in focus for the joint force.

   (b) Branches and Sequels. Many plans require adjustment beyond the initial stages of the operation. Consequently, JFCs build flexibility into plans by developing branches and sequels to preserve freedom of action in rapidly changing conditions. They are primarily used for changing deployments or direction of movement and accepting or declining combat.

1. Branches. Branches are planned contingencies that provide a range of alternatives often built into the basic plan. Branches add flexibility to plans by anticipating situations that could alter the basic plan.
2. **Sequels.** Sequels anticipate and plan for subsequent operations based on the possible outcomes of the current operation—victory, defeat, or stalemate.

3. Once the commander has determined possible branches and sequels, they should determine what or where the decision points (not to be confused with decisive points) should be. Such decision points capture in space or time decisions a commander must make. To aid the commander, planners develop synchronization matrices, as well as a DSM to link those decision points with the earliest and latest timing of the decision, the appropriate PIR (things the commander must know about the adversary, enemy, and the OE to make the decision), and FFIRs (things the commander must know about friendly forces to make the decision).

(c) **Operational Pause**

1. The supported JFC should aggressively conduct operations to obtain and maintain the initiative. However, there may be certain circumstances when this is not feasible due to logistic constraints or force shortfalls. **Operational pauses may be required when a major operation is reaching the end of its sustainability.** Operational pauses can provide a safety valve to avoid potential culmination while the JFC retains the initiative in other ways. When an operational pause is properly executed, the enemy or adversary will lack sufficient combat power to threaten the joint force or regain the initiative during the pause.

2. **Operational pauses are useful tools for obtaining the proper synchronization of sustainment and operations.** Normally, operational pauses are planned to regenerate combat power or augment sustainment and forces for the next phase. **When properly planned and sequenced, operational pauses ensure the JFC has sufficient forces to achieve strategic or operational objectives.** However, planners must guard against cutting the margin of sustainment and combat effectiveness too thin. Executing a pause before it is necessary provides for flexibility in the timing of the pause and allows for added agility under urgent conditions without unduly endangering the future effectiveness of the force.

3. Operational pauses can also be utilized to support strategic decisions such as opportunities for de-escalation or negotiation.

4. **The primary drawback to operational pauses is the risk of forfeiting strategic or operational initiative.** It is therefore incumbent upon the JFC to plan for as few operational pauses as possible. If pauses are necessary, the JFC can alternate pauses among components to ensure continuous pressure on the enemy or adversary through offensive actions by some components while other components pause. Appropriately planned operational pauses provide opportunities for activities such as military deception.

b. **Anticipation**
(1) Anticipation is key to effective planning. JFCs must consider what might happen and look for indicators of forecasted events. During execution, JFCs should remain alert for the unexpected and be prepared to exploit opportunities. JFCs continually gather information by personally observing and communicating with higher headquarters, subordinates, partner nations, and other organizations in the OA. JFCs may avoid surprise by gaining and maintaining the initiative at all levels of command, forcing the enemy or adversary to react rather than initiate, and by continuously wargaming to identify probable enemy or adversary reactions to joint force actions. Thorough wargaming assists JFCs in understanding and planning for the effects of operations, as well as the effects they have on the enemy, adversary, interagency and multinational partners, and civilian population.

(2) A shared, common understanding of the OE aids commanders and their staffs in anticipating opportunities and challenges. Knowledge of friendly capabilities; enemy and adversary capabilities, intentions, and likely COAs; and the location, activities, and status of dislocated civilians enables commanders to focus joint efforts where they can best, and most directly, contribute to achieving military objectives.

(3) Anticipation is critical to the decision-making process. At times, reducing risk requires JFCs to make decisions well in advance. Decisions such as mobilization of Reserve Component forces and deploying or repositioning forces often require anticipation to ensure those capabilities are available when needed or when an opportunity arises.

(4) Anticipation is not without risk. If a commander plans for an anticipated action from the enemy or adversary, the commander could be susceptible to deception efforts or having forces out of position should opportunities or threats appear in other places. Therefore, commanders and their staffs should carefully consider all available information upon which decisions are based. Where possible, multiple or redundant sources of information should be employed to reduce risk in the decision-making process.

8. Forces and Functions

a. Forces

(1) Commanders and planners can plan campaigns and operations that focus on defeating either enemy or adversary forces, functions, or a combination of both. Typically, JFCs structure operations to attack both forces and functions concurrently to create the greatest possible impact on the enemy and chance for success. These types of operations are especially appropriate when friendly forces enjoy technological or numerical superiority.

(2) Commanders and planners must know the technical capability of the enemy or adversary’s forces as well as their own. During planning and wargaming, commanders and planners use this information to identify the best method to defeat an enemy or counter the adversary while minimizing risk to the joint force.

(3) Commanders should also use available resources to understand the intangible aspects of the threat, such as their doctrine, leadership, and morale. These factors
contribute to the way a threat fights and supports the way the commander and planners should plan operations.

(4) JFCs can focus on destroying and disrupting critical enemy or adversary functions such as C2, sustainment, and protection. Attacking an enemy or adversary’s functions normally intends to destroy their balance; thereby, creating vulnerabilities for exploitation. The direct effect of destroying or disrupting critical enemy or adversary functions can create the indirect effects of uncertainty, confusion, and panic in their leadership and forces, which may contribute directly to the collapse of their capability and will. When determining whether functional attack should be the principal operational approach, JFCs should evaluate several variables within the context of anticipated events such as time required to cripple the enemy or adversary’s critical functions, time available to the JFC, the enemy or adversary’s current actions, and likely responses to such actions.

b. **Force Employment Mechanisms.** Force employment mechanisms complement COG analysis. While COG analysis helps us understand a problem, these mechanisms suggest ways to solve it. They provide a useful tool for describing how a JFC intends to achieve an operational or strategic objective and ensure understanding of the commander's intent by establishing common references for force employment.

(1) **Defeat Mechanisms.** Defeat mechanisms are the methods used by friendly forces in combat operations against an enemy force. Defeating an enemy means creating the conditions necessary to impose the desired strategic outcome on the enemy against the enemy’s will to oppose or resist that outcome. These aim at defeating armed enemies through the organized application of force to kill, destroy, or capture. **The three basic defeat mechanisms** are: destruction, attrition, and exhaustion. Destruction aims to eliminate the ability of an enemy’s armed forces ability to fight as a cohesive and coordinated organization. Attrition aims to disrupt, degrade, or neutralize an enemy's armed forces or war-making capabilities by applying combat power over time to have a cumulative operational or strategic impact, destroys the adversary’s war-making capabilities over time. Exhaustion aims to impose unacceptable costs that erode the will of an enemy to continue fighting, even if that enemy is achieving tactical or even operational military success. Successful combat often involves a combination of all three mechanisms, traditional warfare conditionally favors destruction. When waging traditional warfare from a position of disadvantage, attrition may be the appropriate mechanism for gaining time and space to increase combat power and seize the initiative. In irregular warfare, the weaker force may choose to exhaust an enemy’s will because it cannot win by destruction or attrition of the enemy’s armed forces or war-making capabilities. Defeat mechanisms may include:

(a) **Destroy.** Eliminate enemy forces and capabilities by applying combat power over time or a single, decisive attack.

(b) **Dislocate.** Compel the enemy or adversary to expose forces by reacting to a specific action. This mechanism forces enemy or adversary commanders to either accept neutralization of part of their force or risk its destruction while repositioning.
(c) **Disintegrate.** Exploit the effects of dislocation and destruction to shatter the enemy’s coherence. This mechanism typically follows destruction and dislocation, coupled with the loss of capabilities that enemy commanders use to develop and maintain situational understanding.

(d) **Isolate.** Limit the enemy or adversary’s ability to conduct operations effectively by marginalizing critical capabilities or limiting the adversary’s ability to influence events. This mechanism exposes the adversary to continued degradation through the massed effects of other defeat mechanisms.

(e) **Disrupt.** Interrupt or reduce the effectiveness of an enemy or adversary’s operations and activities without significantly degrading their ability to conduct future operations and activities. This mechanism is appropriate when policy, resource, or risk limitations prevent friendly forces from inflicting greater costs on an enemy or adversary.

(f) **Degrad e.** Reduce an enemy’s ability and/or will to conduct future operations and activities. This mechanism imposes greater costs on the enemy than disruption when policy, resource, or risk limitations prevent friendly forces from defeating an enemy militarily.

(g) **Deny.** Prevent an enemy or adversary from achieving strategic objectives without significantly increasing resources or accepting higher risk. This mechanism is appropriate in competition, irregular warfare, or in a traditional economy of force operation when policy, resource, or risk limitations prevent friendly forces from defeating an enemy militarily.

(h) **Neutralize.** Render an enemy’s ability to conduct operations or activities ineffective without necessarily destroying or degrading the enemy’s capabilities. To achieve this, planners should consider employing nonlethal weapons as an intermediate force capability for both counter personnel and counter material applications.

(2) **Stabilization Mechanisms.** Stabilization is an inherently political endeavor requiring aligning USG efforts—diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and defense—to create conditions in which locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent violence. To the extent authorized by law, DOD plans and conducts stabilization in support of mission partners to counter subversion, prevent and mitigate conflict, and consolidate military gains in support of strategic objectives. If directed, and consistent with available authorities, DOD leads USG stabilization efforts in extreme situations and less permissive environments until it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other USG departments and agencies. Stabilization mechanisms may include compel, control, influence, and support.

(a) **Compel.** The threat or use of lethal or nonlethal force to establish control and dominance; affect behavioral change; enable USG or international stabilization efforts; or enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, or other political arrangements. Legitimacy and compliance are interrelated. While legitimacy is vital to achieving and
sustaining the compliance of local populations, compliance also depends on how the local populace perceives the joint or collation force’s ability to secure the OA and protect them from threats. The appropriate and discriminate use of force often forms a central component to success in stabilization activities; it closely ties to the perceived legitimacy of the joint force and supported local government. Depending on the circumstances, the threat or use of force can reinforce or complement efforts to stabilize a situation, gain consent, and ensure compliance with mandates and agreements. The misuse of force—or even the perceived threat of the misuse of force—can adversely affect the legitimacy of the mission or the joint or MNF conducting the mission.

(b) Control. Establish public order and safety; secure borders, routes, sensitive sites, population centers, and individuals; physically occupy key terrain and facilities; and provide for the immediate needs of the population. DOD’s core responsibility during stabilization is to support and reinforce the civilian efforts of the USG lead agencies consistent with available statutory authorities, primarily by providing forces in support of these missions. As a stabilization mechanism, control closely relates to the primary stabilization task: establish civil control. However, control is also fundamental to effective, enduring security. When combined with the stabilization mechanism compel, it is inherent to the activities that comprise disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, as well as broader security sector reform programs. Without effective control, efforts to establish civil order—including efforts to establish both civil security and control over an area and its population—will not succeed. Establishing control requires time, patience, and coordinated, cooperative efforts across the OA.

(c) Influence. To alter the opinions and attitudes of targeted populations. DOD considers how US or partner military forces promulgate a coherent narrative consistent with USG objectives to counter adversaries and affirm effective and legitimate local governance. DOD uses civil-military teams to integrate key instruments of national power that complement indigenous, international, allied, partner, civil society, and private entities to achieve stabilization objectives. Influence applies nonlethal capabilities to complement and reinforce the compelling and controlling effects of stability mechanisms. Influence also aims to effect behavioral change through nonlethal means. Results are more a product of public perception than a measure of operational success. It reflects the ability of forces to operate successfully among the people of the HN, interacting with them consistently and positively while accomplishing the mission in support of advancing integrated USG stabilization efforts. Here, consistency of actions, words, and deeds is vital. Influence requires legitimacy, a thorough cultural understanding, and assessment of conflict to including intelligence collection and related activities to improve understanding of and ability to influence stability. Military forces must earn the trust and confidence of the people through the constructive activities. It contributes to success across the LOEs and engenders support among the people. Once achieved, influence is best maintained by consistently exhibiting respect for, and operating within, the cultural and societal norms of the local populace.

(d) Support. To establish, reinforce, or set the conditions necessary for the other instruments of national power to function effectively. DOS is the overall lead federal agency for US stabilization efforts; the USAID is the lead implementing agency for non-
security US stabilization assistance; and DOD is a supporting element, including providing requisite security and reinforcing civilian efforts where appropriate and consistent with available statutory authorities. When required to achieve US objectives, and to the extent authorized by law, DOD reinforces and complements civilian-led stabilization efforts, including providing logistical support, services, and other enabling capabilities to other USG departments and agencies. DOD solicits participation from mission-critical USG departments and agencies to plan, exercise, and wargame stabilization aspects of military plans, including transition from combat operations. As such, this mechanism requires coordinating and cooperating closely with HN civilian agencies and assisting aid organizations as necessary to secure humanitarian access to vulnerable populations. The joint force brings unique expeditionary capabilities that can quickly address the immediate needs of the HN and local populace. This is typically achieved by combining a number of stabilization activities in collaboration with the interagency partners such as establishing civil security, providing access to dispute resolution, delivering targeted basic services, and establishing a foundation for the return of displaced people and longer-term development. Improperly used, support has the potential to destabilize a situation by disrupting local power structures.

(e) Competition Mechanisms. When military forces are employed in operations that do not rise to the level of armed conflict, in either supporting or supported roles, planners should identify competition mechanisms for use during periods of competition below the level of armed conflict. These mechanisms are ways to maintain or establish favorable conditions.

9. Balancing

a. Balancing Across and Tradeoff Between Factors

(1) The operational commander must understand the operational factors and their inter-relationships within the command. Commanders will rarely have all the resources or time desired for an operation. By understanding the relationship between the elements of operational design, commanders and planners can balance different factors to maximize the likelihood of success in the most efficient manner.

(2) The operational commander must decide which tradeoffs will produce the best balance. For example, commanders may decide to use an indirect approach and several phases, due to insufficient forces, or a direct assault on a COG. Similarly, a commander may plan for an operational pause to use additional time to mobilize, deploy, or reconstitute forces.

(3) Commanders cannot regain lost time, which may lead them to commit forces before they are completely ready, to use forces which do not fit well, or to trade terrain for the time needed to deploy forces. This enables commanders to take advantage of opportunities as they appear or prevent an enemy or adversary from gaining the initiative.
(4) Alternatively, a commander may alter operational objectives to fit the balance of operational factors he can affect, ensuring the intermediate objectives continue to support the directed strategic objective.

b. **Risk.** During planning commanders must assess risk as an element of operational design to ensure the plan has an acceptable level of risk across all elements of design regarding risk-to-mission and risk-to-force.

See Chapter I, “Joint Planning,” and CJCSM 3105.01, Joint Risk Analysis, for more information on assessing and presenting risk analysis as part of planning.

10. **Check the Plan**

During all steps of planning, and again on completion of the plan, commanders and planners should review the plan to ensure:

a. The plan does not violate any principles of joint operations.

b. The joint functions are addressed, interlaced, and reinforcing.

c. The plan achieves the objective or attains the military end state within an acceptable level of risk.

d. The plan does not foreclose future options.
CHAPTER V
CAMPAIGNING

“Oh, I am heartily tired of hearing about what Lee is going to do. Some of you always seem to think he is suddenly going to turn a double somersault, and land in our rear and on both of our flanks at the same time. Go back to your command, and try to think what we are going to do ourselves, instead of what Lee is going to do.”

Ulysses S. Grant

1. Overview

a. DOD is tasked to conduct operations in support of achieving national objectives. To support the national strategy (as identified in the NSS and NDS), the CJCS oversees the development of the NMS, JSCP, GCPs, and GIFs. In turn, CCDRs develop campaigns to support the global campaign and shape the OE in a manner that supports those strategic objectives. They conduct their campaigns primarily through military engagement, operations, posture, and other activities that seek to achieve US national objectives, protect US national interests, and prevent the need to resort to armed conflict while setting conditions to transition to contingency operations when required.

(1) The NDS and NMS prioritize actions and resources to achieve future desired objectives. These documents acknowledge current conditions as their starting point, envision a future, then plot the road to get there. National strategy prioritizes the CCMD’s efforts within and across theater, functional, and global responsibilities and considers all means and capabilities available in the CCMD’s operations, activities, and investments to achieve the national objectives and complement related USG efforts over a specified timeframe (currently five years).

(2) Campaign plans address detailed execution to implement the strategy. In this construct, the CCDRs and their planners develop campaign plans to integrate joint operations with national-level resource planning and policy formulation and in conjunction with other USG departments and agencies. Contingency plans are prepared to address known threats and possible crises that could prevent achievement of national objectives (see Figure V-1).

b. CCPs

(1) The CCDRs’ campaigns operationalize the guidance in the UCP, NSS, NDS, CPG, NMS, and JSCP by organizing and aligning operations, activities, and investments with resources to achieve the CCDRs’ objectives and complement related USG efforts in the theaters or functional areas.

(2) CCDRs translate the guidance into executable actions to accomplish identifiable and measurable progress toward achieving the CCDRs’ objectives, and thus
the national objectives. The achievement of these objectives is reportable to DOD leadership through IPRs and operation assessments (such as the CCDRs’ input to the AJA).

(3) CCPs consolidate operational requirements identified across all the GCPs, RCPs, FCPs, as they pertain to the CCDR’s specific responsibilities identified in the UCP. The CCDR’s independent analysis could identify additional requirements the commander decides to include in the campaign.

(4) CCPs integrate posture, resources, requirements, subordinate campaigns, operations, activities, and investments that prepare for, deter, or mitigate identified contingencies into a unified plan of action.

(5) The purpose of CCMD campaigns is to shape the OE, deter aggressors, mitigate the effects of a contingency, and, when necessary, execute combat operations in support of the overarching national strategy.

(a) Shaping the OE seeks to change current conditions within the OE to conditions more favorable to US interests. It can entail both combat and noncombat
operations and activities to establish conditions that support future US activities or operations, or validate planning assumptions.

(b) Deterrence activities, as part of a CCMD campaign, are those actions or operations executed specifically to alter adversaries’ decision calculus. These actions or operations may demonstrate US commitment to a region, ally, partner, or principle. They may also demonstrate a US capability to deny an adversary the benefit of an undesired action. Theater posture and certain exercises are examples of possible deterrent elements of a campaign. These actions most closely link the campaign to contingency plans directed in the CPG and JSCP as they can demonstrate commitment to a region or demonstrate US ability to defend or reinforce a region in the event of aggression. Additionally, deterrence activities are associated with early phases of a contingency plan, usually directed and executed in response to changes in threat posture.

(c) A campaign can also set conditions that mitigate the impact of a possible contingency. Activities conducted as part of the campaign, such as posture and security cooperation activities (e.g., military engagement with allies and partners or building partner capacity and capability) can set the stage for more rapid, successful execution of a contingency plan if conflict arises, by leveraging the capabilities and capacities of allies and partners. Campaign activities can also validate or invalidate planning assumptions used during contingency planning.

(d) A campaign can support stabilization, and stabilization should be considered in planning as early as possible to shape operational design and strategic decisions. Where US national security objectives depend upon maintaining or reestablishing stability, stabilization is required to translate combat success into lasting strategic gains, achieve the objectives for which the military operation was conducted, and is a necessary complement to joint combat power. Stabilization links the application of joint force combat power and security assistance capabilities with the achievement of strategic and policy objectives. Stabilization efforts focus on the root causes of instability and mitigating the drivers of conflict for an affected HN, thus helping the HN reach a sustainable political settlement that allows societal conflicts to be resolved peacefully.

c. Differences Between CCPs and Contingency Plans

(1) CCPs seek to shape the OE and achieve national objectives. They establish operations, activities, and investments the command undertakes to achieve specific objectives (set conditions) in support of national policy and objectives.

(a) CCMD campaigns are proactive and rarely feature a single measure of military success implying victory in the traditional sense.

(b) The campaign may include operations across the competition continuum, to include ongoing combat operations, such as counterterrorism operations. In the event a contingency operation is executed, that operation is subsumed into the campaign and becomes an element the CCDR considers when identifying the impact of US operations on
the OE, the opportunities to favorably affect the OE to achieve national-level and theater-level objectives, and examining MOEs that may impact the campaign’s intermediate objectives.

(c) Operations must be continuously assessed to see if they are changing the conditions as desired. As objectives are achieved (or determined to be infeasible), the CCDR and planners update the campaign plan with new objectives and develop associated assessment measures.

(d) Unlike contingency plans, JSCP-directed CCMD campaigns do not end with the achievement of military objectives. Campaign plan objectives neither affirm nor imply military victories but instead focus CCMD operations, activities, and investments to further US national security by supporting US national security objectives. It helps to identify desired OE conditions to focus campaign planning (the purpose of the CCDR’s vision), with the understanding that campaign objectives and US interests may change as the OE evolves and policies change.

(e) The increasing global influence of hostile non-state actors challenges the process of identifying enemy and adversary COGs and vulnerabilities. Therefore, a campaign plan identifies mostly nonlethal means to favorably influence the OE to achieve specific intermediate objectives.

(f) Campaign plans seek to capitalize on the cumulative effect of multiple coordinated and synchronized operations, activities, and investments that cannot be accomplished by a single major operation.

(2) Contingency plans identify how the command might respond in the event of a crisis or the inability to achieve objectives. Contingency plans specifically seek to favorably resolve a crisis that either was not or could not be deterred or avoided by directing operations toward achieving specified objectives.

(a) Contingency plans have specified end states that seek to reestablish conditions favorable to the United States. They react to conditions beyond the scope of the CCP.

(b) Contingency plans have identified military objectives and an end state. Upon achieving the military objective(s) or attaining the military end state, operations transition back to campaigning through competition under the new conditions, possibly with new objectives. To deal with the consequences of armed conflict, the joint force will likely have to employ a new approach and possibly execute different military activities to sustain the new security conditions.

(c) Although campaign plan operations, activities, and investments can have deterrent effects, a contingency plan’s deter activities specifically refer to actions for which separate and unique resourcing and planning are required. These actions are executed on
order of the President or SecDef and generally entail specific orders for their execution and require additional resources allocated through GFM processes.

2. Campaign Planning

   a. Campaigns and campaign planning follow the principles of joint operations while synchronizing efforts throughout the OE with all participants. Examples include:

      (1) Objective. Clear campaign objectives must be articulated and understood across the joint force. Objectives may change as national and military leaders gain a better understanding of the situation, or they may occur because the situation itself changes. The JFC should remain sensitive to shifts in political goals necessitating changes in the military objectives toward achievement of the national strategic objectives.

      (2) Unity of Command. Unity of command means all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. During multinational operations and interagency coordination, unity of command may not always be possible, but unity of effort, the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, becomes paramount for successful unified action.

      (3) Economy of Force. Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces to achieve campaign objectives.

      (4) Legitimacy. Legitimacy maintains legal and moral authority in the conduct of operations. Legitimacy is based on the actual and perceived legality, morality, and rightness of actions from the perspectives of interested audiences.

See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, for more information on the principles of joint operations.

   b. Campaign plans are informed by operation assessments that continuously measure progress or regression regarding objectives nested under campaign objectives. During the planning functions, planners can use a combination of operational design and the JPP that asks four questions:

      (1) What are the current conditions of the OE (where are you)?

      (2) What are the future conditions you want to establish (where do you want to go; what are the objectives)?

      (3) How will you get there (resources and authorities)?

      (4) How will you know that you have been successful (assessment)? Assessment is not just measuring achievement of an intermediate or campaign objective. It also requires measuring the performance and the effects of joint activities to determine whether they can or will generate the desired effects or establish the desired conditions.

c. Campaigns are informed by strategic guidance and the requirement to be ready to execute contingency plans. Throughout the four planning functions, beginning with mission analysis within the JPP, the CCDR and staff develop and update the CCIRs. This concurrently complements assessment activities by including information requirements critical to addressing key assessment indicators, required contingency preparations, deterrent opportunities, and the critical vulnerabilities of the threat. Through backward planning, CCMDs identify precursor actions, campaign activities, and necessary authorities that should be executed (or provided) as part of the campaign to deter, prepare for, or mitigate contingencies outside of crisis conditions. If successfully conducted, the campaign mitigates the risk for conflict in the context of the directed contingency plan, sets conditions for more rapid and successful transition of the contingency plan to execution if conflict proves unavoidable, and sets conditions to forestall future crises.

d. The same construct of operational activities and planning functions, processes, procedures, and tools is used by planners to develop contingency plans and campaign plans. The applications of these can be tailored.

(1) Because military end states are not specified for GCPs, FCPs, and RCPs, the objectives established in these plans are guideposts rather than goalposts and map a route in support of US objectives. The JSCP-directed campaign plans do not seek to defeat an enemy in combat but to improve the OE in support of US national interests. As one objective is achieved, another should be designated.

(2) The frame of reference for the campaign plan must be critically examined. When trying to map a complex system, planners tend to map it from their point of view. The relationships and logic chains developed during planning reflects their perspective. Other participants in the system, to include allies, partners, adversaries, and enemies, often come from different backgrounds with different rules and relationships, so the effects of US actions may not result in the desired conditions. What may seem like cooperation from a US perspective may appear to be coercion from the partner’s perspective. Information and perspectives from partners can support critical examination, broaden understanding of problems, and challenge institutional biases. Red teaming can also be a means to improve understanding by challenging assumptions.

(3) Rather than having an enemy COG, the CCPs may identify several COGs or areas the command may affect to achieve its objectives. Since the campaign addresses a large, complex problem, it may not be a single issue but a confluence of several issues interacting that affect the OE.

(4) **LOEs**

(a) In JSCP-directed campaigns, it is often easier to organize the campaign along LOEs. An LOE links multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose—cause
and effect—to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions. Because a campaign is conditions-based and must be adaptive to events, LOEs indicate a route rather than a precise timetable of events. They indicate how, and in what order (and with what dependencies), the activities of the joint force will contribute to the achievement of desired objectives and whether the actions should be sequential or if they can run concurrently.

(b) LOEs may intersect and interact. The campaign should identify how success or failure along an LOE will impact the LOOs and other LOEs and, if necessary, how resources can be redirected to respond to unexpected effects (successes, failures, or unintended consequences) of operations on both its own and other LOEs.

c) Everyone involved with conducting a campaign should know the intermediate and national objectives for the theater. Each tactical activity should be related to its military and theater objective through the LOE or LOO on which it is located. The operator or executor of each campaign activity should know both the success criteria of the specific task assigned as well as how that task relates to and supports the larger command objective.

For detailed discussion of LOOs and LOEs, see Chapter IV, “Operational Design.”

e. Campaign plans will have some similarities with contingency plans.

(1) Measurable and Time-Bound. Campaign plans, like contingencies, must have measurable objectives and a process for associating CCMD actions to the changes in the OE. The commander must be able to identify within a directed time-span the ability to effect change and whether or not given actions successfully affected an associated change.

(2) Changeable and Flexible

(a) Campaigns must adapt to changes in the OE and changes in resourcing and priorities based on national and defense priorities.

(b) However, a campaign should not necessarily change every time a commander or staff changes. Well-designed campaigns can withstand changes in foreseeable national leadership fluctuations in the United States and by the countries addressed in the campaign. Continuity does not imply that changes in the COA or approach should be avoided; not adapting to the changes in the OE will lead to failure.

f. When a campaign addresses a persistent threat that spans multiple commands, such as terrorism, threats to space and cyberspace forces or capabilities, or distribution operations, the President or SecDef may designate coordinating authority to one CCDR to lead the planning effort, with execution accomplished across multiple CCMDs. CCMDs may identify those activities that support the overall plan through the development of a separate subordinate campaign plan or through inclusion in their overall campaign plan.
(1) The CCDR with coordinating authority coordinates planning efforts of CCDRs, Services, and applicable DOD agencies in support of the designated GCP, FCP, and RCP. The phrase “coordinated planning” pertains specifically to planning efforts only and does not, by itself, convey authority to execute operations or direct execution of operations. Unless directed by SecDef, the CCDR leading the planning effort collaborates to align the GCPs, FCPs, and RCPs. Execution of the individual plans remains the responsibility of the CCDR in whose UCP authority it falls.

(2) CCDRs may be required to develop supporting or subordinate campaign plans to satisfy the planning requirements of DOD GCPs. CCDRs remain the supported commanders for the execution of their plans unless otherwise directed by SecDef.

(3) If directed to serve as the coordinating authority (to develop or synchronize a DOD-wide campaign plan), the CCDR:

(a) Provides a common plan structure and strategic framework to guide and inform development of CCDR, CSA, or component supporting campaign plans and mitigate seams and vulnerabilities from a global perspective.

(b) Establishes a common process for the development of subordinate and supporting plans.

(c) Organizes and executes coordination and collaboration conferences in support of the GCPs, FCPs, and RCPs to coordinate and conduct synchronization activities.

(d) Disseminates lessons learned to CCDRs, Services, and applicable DOD agencies. This includes the consolidation and standardization of planning efforts, products, and collaborative tools.

(e) Reviews and coordinates all subordinate and supporting plans to align them with the DOD GCP (GCPs, RCPs, FCPs).

(f) Collaborate with other CCDRs to assess force sufficiency for the campaign and provide force allocation recommendations to senior military and civilian leadership from a global perspective.

(g) Collaborate with other CCDRs to assess supported and supporting plans to integrate force and capability shortfalls and request sourcing options. These shortfalls and options inform SecDef of the challenges to executing the campaign plan and the decisions that will likely be required should a GCP, FCP, or RCP transition to execution.

(h) Provides advice and recommendations to CCDRs, JS, and OSD to enhance alignment of campaign operations with the DOD GCPs, FCPs, and RCPs.

(i) Accompanies supporting CCDRs as they brief their supporting plans through final approval, as required. To ensure coordination, all plans should be briefed at the same time.
(j) Collaborates with supporting CCDRs to develop assessment criteria and timelines. Collects and collates assessments, and provides feedback on plan success (e.g., achievement of intermediate objectives, milestones) through IPRs and the AJA process.

(k) In coordination with the JS, makes recommendations for the communication annex.

(l) The JSCP may provide additional guidance on coordinating authority, based on specific planning requirements.

(4) Supporting CCDRs, Services, the NGB, and applicable DOD agencies:

(a) Provide detailed planning support to the lead CCMD to assist in development of the DOD-wide campaign plan.

(b) Support plan conferences and planning efforts.

(c) Develop supporting plans consistent with the strategic framework and planning guidance, and process established by the lead planner.

(d) Provide subordinate or supporting plans to the lead planner prior to IPRs with enough time for the lead CCMD to review and propose modifications prior to the IPR.

g. The CJCS supports global campaign planning and execution as part of the responsibilities for global integration. This does not affect command relationships but takes advantage of the CJCS’s position to look across the CCMDs and provide a global perspective of opportunities and risk in developing and resourcing globally integrated plans.

h. Global campaigns may change on execution of a contingency plan or in response to an unanticipated crisis. GIFs enable the SecDef to make risk-informed decisions on global reprioritization of effort and resources. GIFs also identify potential decisions for the SecDef or President to employ a range of global options intended to return to campaigning.

i. For CCPs, the CCDR develops military objectives to aid in focusing the strategy and campaign plan. CCDRs’ strategies establish long-range objectives to provide context for intermediate objectives. Achieving intermediate objectives sets conditions to achieve the command’s objectives. The CCDR and planners update the CCMD’s strategy and CCP based on changes to national objectives, achievement of CCP objectives, and changes in the OE.

3. Resource-Informed Planning (Capability Assignment, Apportionment, Allocation)

a. JSCP-directed campaigns, unlike contingency plans, are not just plans, they are campaigns in execution. They are constrained by the readiness and availability of
resources and authorities and forecast future requirements based on projected results of current on-going operations and activities.

b. CCDRs plan, assess, and execute their JSCP-directed campaign plans. The CCMDs, however, receive limited budgeting and rely on the Services and the CCMD component commands to budget for and execute campaign activities. As such, the components, JS, and FPs must be involved during the planning process to identify resources and tools that are likely to be made available to ensure the campaign plan is executable. The component commands can also identify options and activities of which the CCMD might not be aware.

c. Campaign planning requires planning across four resource timeframes (see Figure V-2).

(1) Ongoing operations are executed with the current budget with assigned and/or currently allocated resources. As the operations progress and the CCMD conducts its assessment, the commander may redesignate assigned and allocated resources, with the proper authorities, to other operations and activities or to address critical issues that may arise. Simultaneously, the commander uses the ongoing assessment to project a resource requirement for two years in the future (the program year). The commander uses assessment of the OE and the projection of the impact of activities in both the current and budget year (which are already locked in).

(2) The commander develops and briefs the campaign plan for the upcoming year, considering the budget year forecast, assigned and allocated forces, and force apportionment tables. The commander updates intermediate objectives, develops new ones as appropriate, and prioritizes resources, based on the ongoing assessment of current year actions. This plan is briefed through the JS to SecDef (or designated representative). The commander also identifies gaps and shortfalls in capabilities, along with associated risk, and includes them in the integrated priority list and strategic and military risk in the commander’s input to the annual AJA. These reports support the command’s budget and force request for the budget and apportionment in development (program year).

(3) The commander uses the current and budget year allocation, combined with the assessment, to develop a budget and resource request for the program years. Working with the JS, the command identifies opportunities for military engagement, exercises (joint and combined), and identifies future posture requirements that support the CCMD’s campaign. Posture changes, in particular, require long-lead times to implement, so the commander has to identify these in time to conduct required diplomacy and stationing requirements (such as construction) to meet any posture changes.

(4) The commander can only execute those operations and activities for which there are resources and authorities. The commander may be further restricted by the authorizations or laws that limit the use of the resources for specific programs or require specific conditions be met before conducting the operation or activity.
Figure V-2. Campaign Planning and Execution
4. Elements of a Combatant Command Campaign Plan

a. Overview. The CCP consists of all plans contained within the established theater or functional responsibilities, to include contingency plans, subordinate and supporting plans, posture plans, CSCSs for country plans (for CCMDs with designated AORs), and operations in execution.

b. Campaign Plan

(1) The campaign plan should show the linkages between operations, activities, investments, and expenditures and the campaign objectives and associated strategic objectives that available resources will support. The campaign plan should identify the assessment process by which the command assesses progress toward or regression from the national security objectives.

(2) CCPs are composed of the CCMD-specific requirements established by global, regional, and FCPs; support plans for other CCMDs; posture plans; theater logistics and distributions plans; and other requirements based on the CCDR’s assessment, such as a country-specific plan in the CSCS (see Figure V-3).

See CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance, for additional information on how to develop campaign plans.

c. Posture Plan. The posture plan is the CCMD’s proposal for forces, footprint, and agreements required and authorized to achieve the command’s objectives and set conditions for accomplishing assigned missions.

For more information, see Appendix G, “Posture Plans.”

d. Theater Logistics and Distribution Plans

(1) TDP. The TDP provides detailed theater mobility and distribution analysis to ensure sufficient capacity or planned enhanced capability throughout the theater and synchronization of distribution planning throughout the global distribution network. The TDP includes a comprehensive list of references, country data, and information requirements necessary to plan, assess, and conduct theater distribution and JRSOI operations. As required, the CCDRs develop their TDPs using the format in USTRANSCOM’s Campaign Plan for Global Deployment and Distribution 9033; CJCSI 3110.01, (U) 2018 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP); and CJCSI 3110.03, (U) Logistics Supplement (LOGSUP) for the 2015 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

TDPs and posture plans complement each other by posturing forces, footprints, and agreements that will interface with the theater distribution network to provide a continuous flow of material and equipment into the AOR. This synchronization enables a theater distribution pipeline to have sufficient capacity and capability to support development of CCPs, OPLANs, and CONPLANs.
For more information, see Appendix H, “Theater Distribution Plans.”

2) **TLO.** The TLO codifies the CCDR’s theater logistics analysis (TLA) within the posture plan. The TLO provides a narrative overview, with supporting matrices of key findings and capabilities from the TLA, which is included in the posture plan as an appendix.

3) **TLA.** The TLA provides detailed country-by-country analysis of key infrastructure by location or installation (e.g., main operating base [MOB], forward operating site [FOS], cooperative security location [CSL]), footprint projections, HN agreements, existing contracts, and task orders required to logistically support CCPs and their embedded contingency operations (e.g., contingency locations).

c. **Regional and CSCSs Plans**
(1) As needed or directed, CCDRs prepare country-specific security cooperation plans (codified in CSCS) within their campaign plans for each country where the CCMD intends to apply significant time, money, and/or effort. CCDRs may also prepare separate regional plans. These are useful to identify and call out activities directed toward specific regional or country objectives and provide focus for the command.

(2) Regional-specific security cooperation plans and country-specific security cooperation plans can also serve to better harmonize activities and investments with other agencies. By isolating the desired objectives, planners can more easily identify supporting efforts and specific assessment measures toward achieving US objectives.

(3) Where the United States has identified specific objectives with a country or region (through strategic guidance or policy), separate regional or CSCSs/country plans help to identify resource requirements and risk associated with resource limitations that may be imposed.

For more information, see JP 3-20, Security Cooperation; see CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance, for more information on security cooperation guidance.

f. Subordinate, Supporting, and Campaign Support Plans

(1) Subordinate Campaign Plan. JFCs subordinate to a CCDR or other JFC may develop subordinate campaign plans in support of the higher plan to better synchronize operations in time and space. It may, depending upon the circumstances, transition to a supported or supporting plan in execution.

(2) Supporting Plans. Supporting plans are prepared by a supporting commander, a subordinate commander, or the head of a department or agency to satisfy the requests or requirements of the supported commander’s plan.

(3) Campaign Support Plans. Campaign support plans are developed by the Services, NGB, and DOD agencies that integrate the appropriate USG activities and programs, describe how they will support the CCMD campaigns, and articulate institutional or component-specific guidance.

g. Contingency Plans. Contingency plans are branch plans to the campaign plan that are based upon hypothetical situations for designated threats, catastrophic events, and contingent missions outside of crisis conditions. The campaign plan should address those known issues in the contingencies that can be addressed prior to execution to establish conditions, conduct deterrence, or address assumptions. As planners develop contingency plans, issues and concerns in the contingency should be included as an element of the campaign.
5. Assessing Campaign Plans

a. Campaign plan assessments determine the progress toward creating the conditions necessary to achieve campaign plan objectives. Campaign assessments enable the CCDR and supporting organizations to refine or adapt the campaign plan and supporting plans to achieve the campaign objectives or, with SecDef approval, to adapt the JSCP-directed objectives to changes in the strategic and operational environments.

b. The campaign assessment is also DOD’s bridging mechanism from the CCDR’s strategy to the strategic, resource, and authorities planning processes, informing DOD’s strategic direction; assignment of roles and missions; and force employment, force posture, force management, and force development decision making. Through the AJA, the campaign assessment also informs the CJCS’s risk assessment and SecDef’s risk mitigation plan.

c. The campaign assessment provides the CCDR’s input to DOD on the capabilities needed to accomplish the missions in the contingency plans of their commands over the planning horizon of the CCDR’s strategy, taking into account expected changes in threats and the strategic and operational environments.

d. Assessments enable the CCDR to make the case for additional resources or to recommend re-allocating available resources to the highest priorities. The assessment allows SecDef and senior leaders to do the same across all CCMDs and to make the case to Congress to add or re-allocate resources through the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).

6. Risk

a. CCMDs assess how strongly US interests are held within their respective areas, how those interests can be threatened, and their ability to execute assigned missions to protect them and achieve US national objectives. This is documented in the CCDR’s strategic estimate and input to the AJA.

b. CCDRs and DOD’s senior leaders work together to reach a common understanding of integrated risk (the strategic risk assessed at the CCMD level combined with the military risk), decide what risk is acceptable, and minimize the effects of accepted risk by establishing appropriate risk controls.

c. For strategic risk, CCDRs identify the probability and consequence of near (0-3 years) and mid-term (3-10 years) strategic events or crises that could harm US national interests, and they identify the impacts of long-term (10-20 years) trends and future adversary capabilities.

d. For military risk, CCMDs evaluate the impact of the difference between required and available capability, capacity, readiness, plans, and authorities on their ability to execute assigned missions. Assessments include, but are not limited to:
(1) FYDP budgetary priorities, tradeoffs, or fiscal constraints.

(2) Deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities identified during preparation and review of campaign and contingency plans.

(3) Projected readiness of forces required to execute the campaign in future years.

(4) Assumptions or plans about contributions or support of:

(a) Other USG departments and agencies.

(b) Alliances, coalitions, and other friendly nations.

(c) Commercial support to operations and contract support.

(d) Changes in adversary capabilities identified during the preparation of the strategic estimate and other intelligence products.

e. Commanders must be willing to stop unproductive and minimally productive activities. Although there is currently no proven cost-benefit analysis for strategic assessment, the commanders should be willing to try new activities to see if there are better or less risky methods to achieve theater and national objectives.

For additional information on risk, see CJCSM 3105.01, Joint Risk Analysis.

7. Opportunity

a. CCDRs need to identify opportunities they can exploit to influence the situation in a positive direction. Limited windows of opportunity may open and the CCDR must be ready to exploit these to set the conditions that will lead to successful transformation of the conflict and thus to transition. This should be done in collaboration with interagency partners, international partners, and partner nations who may have assessment tools that look for opportunities to enhance resilience and mitigate conflict.

b. Commanders need to comprehend dynamics in the environment such as evolving strategic guidance and mandates, the type of conflict, the strategic logic of perpetrators, the impact of operations, and changing vulnerabilities and threats that relate to protection of civilians, resiliencies, and emerging opportunities, to enhance positive changes in the OE or among the actors.

c. Assessing the OE from the perspective of the root causes and immediate drivers of instability is essential to identify and create opportunities for longer-term processes to deal with the root causes.

d. Successful conflict transformation relies on the ability of the joint force along with the other intervening actors and local stakeholders to identify and resolve the primary
sources of instability by focusing on the underlying sources of that instability, while also managing its visible symptoms. In countries seeking to transition from conflict to stability, a limited window of opportunity exists to mitigate sources of instability. To enable this transition, joint forces must incorporate all available resources. This may include deterring adversaries and mitigating their effects on local populaces and institutions, as well as developing approaches that include marginalized groups, consensus-building mechanisms, checks and balances on power, and transparency measures.

*For more information on root causes and drivers of conflict, see JP 3-07, Stability.*
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CHAPTER VI
OPERATION ASSESSMENT

1. Overview

a. Operation assessments are an integral part of planning and execution of any operation, fulfilling the requirement to identify and analyze changes in the OE and to determine the progress of the operation. Assessments involve the entire staff and other sources such as higher and subordinate headquarters, interagency and multinational partners, and other stakeholders. They provide perspective, insight, and the opportunity to correct, adapt, and refine planning and execution to make military operations more effective. Operation assessment applies to all levels of warfare and during all military operations.

b. Commanders maintain a personal sense of the progress of the operation or campaign, shaped by conversations with senior and subordinate commanders, key leader engagements (KLEs), and battlefield circulation. Operation assessment complements the commander’s awareness by methodically identifying changes in the OE, identifying and analyzing risks and opportunities, identifying and analyzing commander decision points, and formally providing recommendations to improve progress toward mission accomplishment. Assessment should be integrated into the organization’s planning (beginning in the plan initiation step) and operations battle rhythm to best support the commander’s decision cycle.

c. The starting point for operation assessment activities coincides with the initiation of joint planning. Integrating assessments into the planning cycle helps the commander ensure the operational approach remains feasible and acceptable in the context of higher policy, guidance, and orders. This integrated approach optimizes the feedback senior leadership needs to appropriately refine, adapt, or terminate planning to be effective in the OE.

d. CCMDs, subordinate Service, joint functional components, and JTFs devote significant effort and resources to plan and execute operations. They apply appropriate rigor to determine whether an operation is being effectively planned and executed as needed to achieve specified objectives and attain end states. Assessment complements that rigor by analyzing the OE objectively and comprehensively to estimate the effectiveness of planned tasks and measure the effectiveness of completed tasks with respect to desired conditions in the OE.

e. Background

Assessment: Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing capabilities during military operations.
(1) CCPs and CSCSs/country plans are continuously in some stage of implementation. Accordingly, CCMD planners should annually extend their planning horizon into the future year. The simultaneity of planning for the future while implementing a plan requires a CCMD to continually assess its implementation to appropriately revise, adapt, or terminate elements of the evolving (future) plan. This synergism makes operation assessment a prerequisite to plan adaptation. Operation assessment is thus fundamental to revising implementation documents ahead of resource allocation processes.

(a) Events can arise external to the CCMD’s control that affect both plan execution and future planning. Some of these events can impede achievement of one or more objectives while others may present opportunities to advance the plan more rapidly than anticipated.

(b) External events generally fall into two categories. The first are those that change the strategic or OE in which a CCMD implements a plan (typically a J-2 focus). The second category involves those events that change the resource picture with respect to funding, forces, and time available (typically a force structure, resource, and assessment directorate of a joint staff [J-8] focus). This document treats these two types of external events as separate considerations because they can influence plan implementation independent of each other.

(2) Throughout campaign planning and execution, the CCDR and staff continually observe the OE and assess the efficacy of the campaign plan. Assessment at the CCMD level is often referred to as theater or global campaign assessment or, generically, as campaign assessment. Because campaigns are conducted in a complex and dynamic environment, commands must be able to detect, analyze, and adapt to changes in the OE during execution. Local relevant actors are typically the best suited to detect and understand changes in a complex OE, and their input can be instrumental for assessment. Planners refine or adapt the plan based on the guidance, their understanding of the OE, their understanding of the impact of actions or changes within the OE, the campaign objectives, and the decisions that underpinned the original operational approach to refine or adapt the plan, or the approach.

(3) In addition to the command’s internal assessment efforts, analysis and assessment of the strategic and operational environments by interagency partners is available to the CCMD. OSD and the JS can assist in obtaining these inputs. Promote cooperation events enable interagency partners’ insights on environmental changes to be shared with the CCMDs.

(4) The overall purpose of operation assessment is to provide recommendations to make operations more effective. As it relates to campaigns, where strategic objectives frame the CCMD’s mission, assessments help CCDRs and supporting organizations refine or adapt the campaign plan and supporting plans to achieve the campaign objectives or, in coordination with SecDef and CJCS, to adapt the CPG- and/or JSCP-directed strategic objectives in response to changes in the OEs.
(5) The assessment process serves as part of the CCMD’s feedback mechanism throughout campaign planning and execution. It also feeds external requirements such as the CCDR’s inputs to the CJCS AJA. Assessment analysis and products should identify where the CCMD’s ways and means are sufficient to attain their ends, where they are not and why not, and support recommendations to adapt or modify the campaign plan or its components. The analyses might provide insight into basic questions such as:

(a) Are the objectives (strategic and intermediate) achievable given changes in the OE and emerging diplomatic/political issues?

(b) Is the current plan still suitable to achieve the objectives?

(c) Do changes in the OE impose additional risks or provide additional opportunities to the command?

(d) To what degree are the resources employed making a difference in the OE?

(6) Campaign assessment analyses and products should provide the CCDR and staff with sufficient information to make, or recommend, necessary adjustments to plans, policy, resources, and/or authorities in the next cycle of planning to make operations more effective. Assessment can be used to inform OSD and CJCS reporting requirements as mandated by strategic planning documents.

(a) Campaign assessment activities should facilitate the CCDR’s input to SecDef specifically, and DOD more broadly, regarding the capabilities and authorities required to accomplish the missions in the CCMD’s contingency plans over the CCDR’s strategic planning horizon. The campaign assessment should take into account expected changes in threats and the strategic and operational environments.

(b) Campaign assessment analyses and products should also help the CCDR request additional resources or to recommend re-allocating available resources to desired priorities. Assessment analyses and products likewise inform SecDef and senior leaders’ resourcing decisions across all CCMDs and DOD requests to Congress to add or reallocate resources through the FYDP.

f. Campaign Assessments

(1) Campaign assessments determine whether progress toward achieving CCMD campaign objectives is being made by evaluating whether progress toward intermediate objectives is being made. Essentially, intermediate objectives (and associated conditions/effects) are multiple time- or condition-based objectives that are between initiation of the campaign and achievement of campaign objectives. Accordingly, at the strategic assessment level, intermediate objectives are criteria used to observe and measure progress toward campaign desired conditions and evaluate why the current status of progress exists.
(a) Functional campaign assessments assist the CCDRs in evaluating progress toward, or regression from, achieving their global functional objectives. Functional CCDRs provide unique support to all CCDRs in their respective specialties and are required to assess progress toward their intermediate objectives in support of their global functional objectives or DOD-wide activities.

(b) The CJCS aggregates CCP assessments and sets assessment standards for functional objectives and DOD-wide activities. DOD-wide activities campaign plan assessments will be compiled into this assessment framework to inform an integrated evaluation of global progress against geographic and functional objectives. Planners developing GCPs will collaborate with CCDRs on common LOEs and intermediate objectives that affect functional objectives (e.g., distribution or DOD-wide activities).

(2) The CPG, NMS, JSCP, and other strategic guidance provide CCMDs with strategic objectives. CCMDs translate and refine those long-range objectives into near-term (achievable in 2-5 years) intermediate objectives. Intermediate objectives represent unique military contributions to the achievement of strategic objectives. In some cases, the CCMD’s actions alone may not achieve strategic objectives. Consequently, other instruments of national power may be required, with the CCMD operating in a supported or supporting role.

(3) The basic process for campaign assessment is similar to that used for contingency and crisis applications but the scale and scope are generally much larger. While operational-level activities such as, JTF operations, typically focus on a single military end state with multiple desired conditions, the campaign plan must integrate products from a larger range of strategic objectives, each encompassing its own set of intermediate objectives and desired conditions, subordinate operations, and subordinate plans (i.e., regional and country-specific security cooperation plans, contingency plans not in execution, on-going operations, directed missions) (see Figure VI-1).

(4) One common method to establish more manageable campaign plans is for CCMDs to establish LOEs with associated intermediate objectives for each campaign objective. This method allows the CCMD to simultaneously assess each LOE and then assess the overall effort using products from the LOE assessments. The following discussion uses several cross-functional staff organizations. The names merely provide context for the process and are not intended to be a requirement for organizations to follow (see Figure VI-2).

(5) The assessment needs to nest with and support the campaign and national objectives and cannot rely on accomplishment of specific tasks. Commanders and staffs should make certain the established intermediate objectives will change the OE in the manner desired.

(a) **LOE Assessment**
1. **Leads.** LOE leads should guide the development and assessment of LOE intermediate objectives, critical conditions, indicators, tasks, associated metrics, and recommendations through the LOE working groups.

2. **Output.** The LOE assessment produces updated findings, insights, and recommendations by LOE. These are consolidated for presentation and validation during the strategic assessment working group (SAWG).

   (b) **SAWG**

   1. **Leads.** Designated lead (typically from a J-3, J-5, or J-8 element) chairs this O-6-level review working group. LOE assessors and leads brief their sub-campaign assessments, findings, insights, and recommendations to this group.
2. **Output.** The SAWG produces an assessment brief and recommendations for presentation and approval during the commander’s assessment board (CAB).

(c) **CAB**

1. **Leads.** CCDRs chair this board. LOE leads present a consolidated assessment brief with SAWG-validated, command-level recommendations for the commander’s decision. As a note, this board may occur as part of the commander’s council or the commander’s update brief.

2. **Outputs.** The CAB validates recommendations for staff action and higher-level coordination and produces refined commander’s guidance.

(6) **Component Command Assessment.** If required by the CCDR, component and subordinate commands provide an annual assessment to the CCDR detailing their progress toward key objectives and conduct of key operations and activities. CCDRs should account for all functions and activities that impact the information environment.
2. The Purpose of Operation Assessment in Joint Operations

   a. Operation assessments help the commander and staff determine progress toward mission accomplishment. Assessment results enhance the commander’s decision making, enable more effective operations, and help the commander and the staff to keep pace with a constantly evolving OE. A secondary purpose is to inform senior civil-military leadership dialogue to support geopolitical and resource decision making throughout planning and execution.

   b. Integrating assessment during planning and execution can help commanders and staffs to:

      (1) Develop mission success criteria.

      (2) Compare observed OE conditions to desired objectives and/or end state conditions.

      (3) Determine validity of key planning facts and assumptions.

      (4) During execution, determine whether or not the desired effects have been created and whether the objectives are being achieved.

      (5) During execution, determine the effectiveness of allocated resources against specific task and mission performance and effects, and test the validity of intermediate objectives.

      (6) Determine whether an increase, decrease, or change to resources is required.

      (7) Identify the risks and barriers to mission accomplishment.

      (8) Identify opportunities to accelerate mission accomplishment.

3. Tenets of Operation Assessment

   The following tenets should guide the commander and the staff throughout assessment:

   a. Commander Centricity. The commander’s involvement in operation assessment is essential. The assessment plan should focus on the information and intelligence that directly support the commander’s decision making.

   b. Subordinate Commander Involvement. Assessments are more effective when used to support conversations between commanders at different echelons. Operation assessments link echelons of command by identifying the activities and impacts critical to success and sharing the assessment methods used to shape operational decisions. A
common understanding of operational priorities allows subordinate commanders to directly communicate their most relevant information.

c. Integration. Staff integration is crucial to planning and executing effective assessments. Operation assessment is the responsibility of commanders, planners, and operators at every level and not the sole work of an individual advisor, committee, or assessment entity. It is nested within the planning process and integrates roles across the staff. Properly structured, operation assessments enable the staff to examine and understand how actions are related. Integrating perspectives from across the staff should minimize errors that arise from limited focus (i.e., duplication of effort, incorrect identification of causes, or insufficient information to prioritize issues by level of impact).

d. Integration into the Planning Process and Battle Rhythm. To deliver information at the right time, the operation assessment should be synchronized with the commander’s decision cycle. The assessment planning steps occur concurrently with the steps of the JPP. The resulting assessment plan should support the command’s battle rhythm.

e. Integration of External Sources of Information. Operation assessment should allow the commander and staff to integrate information that updates the understanding of the OE to plan more effective operations. To get a more complete understanding of the OE, it is important to share and solicit relevant information with the HN, interagency, multinational, private sector, and nongovernmental partners. For aspects of the OPLAN for which nonmilitary influence has high impact or is not well understood, input from these sources is critical to refine understanding of the OE and to reduce risk. To this end, CCDRs and staff should ensure security classifications, foreign disclosure policy, and information sharing systems lend themselves to coordination with non-US military entities.

f. Credibility and Transparency. Assessment reports should cite all sources of information used to build the report. The staff should use methods that are appropriate to the environment and to the task of assessing a complex operation. As much as possible, sources and assessment results should be unbiased. All methods used, and limitations in the collection of information and any assumptions used to link evidence to conclusions, should be clearly described in the assessment report.

g. Continuous Operation Assessment. While an operation assessment product may be developed on a specific schedule, assessment is continuous in any operation. The information collected and analyzed can be used to inform planning, execution, and assessment of operations.

4. Commander and Staff Involvement

a. The commander’s requirements for decision making should focus the assessment plan and activity. Assessment is a key component of the commander’s decision cycle, helping to determine the results of operations, activities, and investments in the context of the overall mission objectives and providing recommendations for the refinement of plans
and orders. If assessment products and analyses do not provide the commander with answers to specific questions pertaining to recommended actions to improve operational progress, acting on opportunities, or mitigating risks, they do not provide value.

b. Commanders establish priorities for assessment through their planning guidance, CCIRs, and decision points. Commanders tell their staff and subordinate commanders what they need, when (how often) they need it, and how they wish to receive it. Commanders also give their staff's guidance on where to focus limited collection and analytical resources.

   (1) Commanders and staff must balance collection and monitoring efforts between “what they can know” versus “what they need to know.” The collecting and monitoring effort should reject the tendencies to measure things simply because they are measurable, demand measures where valid data does not exist, or ignore something pertinent because it is hard to measure. Understanding the difference may also help commanders and their staffs avoid burdening subordinates with overly detailed assessment and collection tasks.

   (2) Commanders should leverage staff and subordinate commander assessments, personal observation of the OA, discussions with stakeholders, and experience and instincts to formulate their own assessment.

   (3) Commanders should regard a plan which does not include assessment considerations and guidance as incomplete.

c. Assessment informs and strengthens the commander’s understanding of the OE. Effective staffs leverage and integrate planning and operations processes and existing reporting mechanisms whenever possible to enable synchronized assessments without adding significant additional requirements to personnel and subordinate units.

d. Significant challenges that staffs must often overcome to enable an effective operation assessment activity include:

   (1) Integrating assessment into planning and execution from the outset. The ongoing activities of situational awareness and assessment shape ongoing planning and execution and influence the overall decision cycle of the commander. The most successful staffs are those that routinely integrate and implement assessment activity at the onset of the planning process. Concurrently considering operational assessment during planning supports the development of well-written objectives and associated conditions or effects. Failing to consider how to assess an operation during planning can lead to objectives that are not assessable and tasks that are not tied to or support operational objectives.

   (2) Conducting adequate analysis before acting. The assessment process, which includes detailed JIPOE products, is designed to improve the understanding of the OE, including understanding of the causal links between friendly operations, activities, and investments and changes in the OE; creating conditions favorable to mission
accomplishment; and identifying actionable opportunities and risk mitigation measures to improve the likelihood of mission success. Close coordination between the assessment staff and intelligence personnel conducting JIPOE will also support brainstorming effective requests for information for baseline data. Adequate analytic rigor is required to address complex issues to portray recommendations accurately. The staff should recognize the entire breadth of assessment contributing to the assessment operational activity of the command. The staff should consider leveraging already existing assessments and how the assessment of a specific plan contributes to the overall decision cycle of the command’s higher headquarters. Recommendations provided by the assessment process provide insight to the commander and staff, enabling adjustments to current operations, activities, and investments and identifying planning refinement and adaptation efforts to enhance operational effectiveness.

(3) **Ensuring assessment keeps pace with a commander’s appreciation of the OE.** The commander’s understanding of the OE is driven by continual interaction with subordinate commanders, KLEs, stakeholders, and battle space circulation. Conversely, most staffs must rely upon information provided by operational and intelligence reporting, usually within a set battle rhythm, and requiring consolidation, analysis, and some level of cross-staff vetting, often in the form of an assessment working group. Therefore, formal assessment reports and briefings are often delivered behind the pace of the operation. Further, senior staff and commanders will not wait for formal reports to act when necessary to adjust the operation. Staffs should leverage the collection management process, effectively calibrate assessment activity to the pace of operations, and recalibrate assessment requirements as the operation progresses to keep pace with and contribute meaningfully to the commander’s understanding of the OE.

(4) **Ensuring recommendations facilitate the commander’s decision making.** The staff must consider what kinds of decisions the commander will have to make to achieve objectives and attain the end state. Decisions include both internal and external action. As such, recommendations developed during the assessment process should not be limited to only those resources and authorities over which the commander has control. Optimally, assessment recommendations should facilitate the commander’s ability to provide guidance and directions to subordinates; request additional support from supporting organizations; and recommend additional diplomatic, informational, military, or economic actions to interagency and multinational partners.

(5) **Resolving cross-organization resistance to assessment process requirements.** All staff directorates should be aware of the importance of operations assessment to the commander as incomplete or missing data could lead to an inaccurate assessment and faulty decisions. Operation assessment is a cross-command process, and developing ownership in the process and briefings (for example, where insights and recommendations are presented to the commander by LOE working groups at the O-6 level) stimulates broader interest and quality.

(6) **Integrating joint force component activities and efforts into the campaign assessment process.** In most CCMDs, joint force components own most of the
resources that operationalize the campaign plan. They will be focused on their own component support plan and Title 10, USC, activities, so it may require more effort by the CCDR’s campaign assessment process to make certain component operations and activities can be developed and focused to achieve the CCDR’s objectives.

(7) **Lack of advocacy or commander disinterest.** Senior staff needs to ensure the commander appreciates the value of assessment and strives to meet the assessment needs.

5. **Staff Organization for Operation Assessment**

   a. Cross-functional staff representation is required to effectively analyze progress toward achieving objectives. This provides the assessment activity with varied perspectives and broad expertise that are necessary for the assessment’s credibility and rigor.

   b. Roles and responsibilities for the assessment team is a key consideration. The ability to work across the staff will impact the quality and relevance of assessment efforts. The commander or chief of staff (COS) should identify the director or staff entity responsible for the collective assessment effort to synchronize activities, achieve unity of effort, avoid duplication of effort, and clarify assessment roles and responsibilities across the staff. The assessment activity should be routine and not ad hoc. The responsible director or staff entity should have the authority to integrate and synchronize the staff when conducting the assessment process. The COS should play a pivotal role in staff synchronization for operation assessments, as the COS typically leads the command’s operational cycle. Within typical staff organizations there are three basic locations where the responsible element could reside:

      (1) **Special Staff Section.** In this approach, the assessment element reports directly to the commander, via the COS or deputy commander. Advantages of this approach may include increased access to the commander and visibility on decision making requirements, as well as an increased ability to make recommendations to the commander as part of the assessment process. Disadvantages may include being isolated from the other staff sections and not having access to the information being collected and monitored across the staff.

      (2) **Separate Staff Section.** In this approach, the assessment element is its own staff section, akin to plans, operations, intelligence, logistics, and communications. The advantage of this approach is that it legitimizes assessment as a major staff activity equivalent with the other staff functions and allows the assessment team to participate in staff coordination and activities as co-equals with the other staff sections. A disadvantage to this approach is that it has the potential to create stove-piped assessment efforts without full collaboration for a whole-of-staff assessment.

      (3) **Integrated in Another Staff Section.** In this approach, the assessment element is typically integrated into the operations or plans sections, and the assessment
chief reports to the plans chief or the operations chief. The advantage of this approach is that it tends to create close ties between the assessment team and either the plans or operations teams, but a significant disadvantage is that this approach limits the access of the assessment team to the commander and other elements of the staff and typically introduces another layer of review (and potential bias) of the assessment team’s products.

6. Conducting Operation Assessment

The assessment process is continuous. Throughout the JPP, assessment provides support to and is supported by operational design and operational art. The assessment process complements and is concurrent with the JPP in developing specific and measurable task-based end states, objectives, and effects during operational design. These help the staff identify the information and intelligence requirements (including CCIRs). During execution, assessment provides information on progress toward creating effects, achieving objectives, and attaining desired end states. Assessment reports are based on continuous situational awareness and OE analysis from internal and external sources and address changes in the OE and their proximate causes, opportunities to exploit and risks to mitigate, and recommendations to inform decision making throughout planning and execution.

CHAPTER VII
TRANSITION TO EXECUTION

“A good plan, violently executed now, is better than a perfect plan next week.”

General George S. Patton, United States Army

1. Overview

a. Plans are rarely executed as written. Regardless of how much time and effort went into the planning process, commanders and their staffs should accept that the plan, as written, will likely need changes on execution. Often, the decision to deploy the military will be in conditions significantly different from the original planning guidance or the conditions planned. Planning provides a significant head start when called to deploy the military. Assessments and reframing the problem, if required, inform the applicability of, or necessary modifications to, the plan in response to changes in the OE.

(1) Effective planning enables transition. Integrated staff effort during planning ensures the plan is a team effort and the knowledge gained across the staff in the planning process is shared and retained. This staff work assists in identifying changes in the OE and guidance, speeding transition to execution.

(2) Detailed planning provides the analysis of the threat and the OE. The knowledge and understanding gained enables a well-trained staff to quickly identify what is different between their plan and current conditions and make recommendations based on their prior work.

(3) Detailed OPLANs (levels 3 or 4) may require more significant changes due to their specificity. Forces identified in the plan may not be available, assumptions may not be validated, and policy and strategic decisions (and the decision timeline) may have changed or not support the original concept. However, the extra time spent on analysis provides a deeper understanding of the OE, threats, and the technical issues with projecting forces.

(4) Less detailed plans (levels 1-2) may be more readily adaptable to execution due to their generality. However, they may require significantly more analysis (e.g., forces, transportation, logistics) to provide the detail required to enable decisions at the strategic level and ensure the plan’s executability and suitability for the problem at hand.

b. The decision to execute will often be presented as an examination of options in response to a developing crisis or action by a competitor state or threat (state or non-state) rather than a specific directive to execute a specific CONPLAN or OPLAN.

(1) If an existing plan is appropriate, the commander and staff should review and update the plan. See paragraph 3, “Transition Process,” for additional information.
(2) If no existing plan meets the guidance, the commander and staff conduct crisis planning (planning in reduced timeline). More often than not, the commander and staff have conducted some previous analysis of the OE that will speed the planning process.

2. Types of Transition

a. There are three possible conditions for transitioning planning to execution.

(1) Contingency Plan Execution

(a) Contingency plans are planned in advance to typically address an anticipated crisis. If there is an approved contingency plan that closely resembles the emergent scenario, that plan can be refined or adapted as necessary and executed. The execution functions are used for all plans.

(b) Members of the planning team may not be the same as those responsible for execution. They may have rotated out or be in the planning sections of the staff rather than the operations. This is the most likely situation where the conditions used in developing the plan will have changed, due to the time lag between plan development and execution. Staff from the planning team need to provide as much background information as possible to the operations team.

(c) The planning team should be a key participant, if not the lead, in updating the plan for the current (given) conditions. This enables the command to make effective use of the understanding gained by the staff during the planning process. The operations team should be the co-lead for the plan update to ensure they understand the decision processes and reasoning used in development of the operational approach and COAs. This will speed plan update, ease transition, and minimize the time required to revisit the issues that arose during the initial plan development.

(d) GIF. If the contingency plan is associated with a GIF, initial planning has been conducted to identify the requirements to reallocate and reassign forces across the globe to meet the crisis or contingency execution requirements, including the impact of executing the crisis or contingency on ongoing GCPs, RCPs, and FCPs. Even with this preparation, all CCDRs and their planners must reassess the risk associated with cessation of ongoing campaign activities and ensure the CJCS is informed of changes in the assessment. The CJCS uses the GIF as a tool to advise the SecDef and the President on global risks, trade-offs, and potential decision points across plans and combatant commands.

(2) Crisis Planning to Execution. Crisis planning is conducted when an emergent situation arises. The planning team analyzes approved contingency plans with like scenarios to determine if an existing plan applies. If a contingency plan is appropriate to the situation, it may be executed through an OPORD or FRAGORD. In a crisis, planning usually transitions rapidly to execution, so there is limited deviation between the plan and initial execution. Planners from the command J-5 can assist in the planning process.
through their planning expertise and knowledge gained of the OE during similar planning efforts.

(3) **Campaign Plan Execution.** Activities within CCPs are in constant execution.

b. Planning is conducted based upon assumed forces and resources. Upon a decision to execute, these assumptions are replaced by the facts of actual available forces and resources. Disparities between planning assumptions and the actual OE conditions at execution drive refinement or adaption of the plan or order. Resource informed planning during plan development allows planners to make more realistic force and resource planning assumptions. Enabled by the common formats and collaborative systems, tools and processes, resource informed planning is intended to facilitate the transition of a plan or order by reducing the scope of required plan adjustments or refinements upon execution.

c. During execution, commanders often have to consider updating the operational approach. It could be triggered by significant changes to understanding of the OE and/or problem, validation or invalidation of assumptions made during planning, identifying (through continuous assessment process) that the tactical actions are not resulting in the expected effects, changes in the conditions of the OE, or the end state. The commander may determine one of three ways ahead:

  (1) The current contingency plan is suitable, with either no change or minor change (such as execution of a branch)—the current operational approach remains feasible.

  (2) The contingency plan’s mission and objectives are sound, but the operational approach is no longer feasible or acceptable—a new operational approach is required.

  (3) The mission and/or objectives are no longer valid, thus a new COA is required—a new operational approach is required to support the further detailed planning.

d. Assessment could cause the JFC to shift the focus of the operation, which the JFC would initiate with a new visualization manifested through new planning guidance for an adjusted operation or campaign plan.

3. **Transition Process**

a. **Overview.** The transition process to contingency plan execution originates in the planning section with significant support from the intelligence staff. Planners synthesize strategic guidance from intelligence and existing plans. The output of this synthesis is a hand-off briefing to the crisis planning lead for the command (see Figure VII-1 and Figure VII-2). For crisis planning execution, plan transition follows similar steps but within the staff section responsible for crisis planning. The transition from plan to execution should consider the following points. These are not meant to be exclusive and may be conducted simultaneously.
b. **Transition Requirements**

1. Planning team validates and, if required, updates existing mission analysis.

2. Evaluate environmental frame and intelligence analysis in the plan. Planners either validate or, if required, update existing products. Identify what has changed since plan development and assess potential impacts to planned execution.

3. Identify any changes to strategic direction or guidance. This requires dialogue with senior civilian leadership to ensure the military objectives remain synchronized with policy and strategic objectives.

   a. Confirm and update strategic objectives or end states.

   b. Confirm and update operational limitations (constraints and restraints).
(c) Validate assumptions.

(d) Review and validate assessment criteria.

1. External (strategic) assumptions, especially those dealing with policy, diplomacy, and multinational partners, should be validated as part of the plan review with senior civilian leadership. These are usually the assumptions dictated to the command through strategic directives (e.g., CPG, JSCP) or previous planning IPRs.

2. Internal (operational) assumptions should be validated by the staff through their update of the OE.

(e) Identify partners and allies.

(f) Identify interagency participation, actions, and responsibilities.
(4) Identify forces and resources, to include transportation. The forces assumed in planning are for planning purposes only; execution sourced forces may or may not match those assumed in planning. Execution sourcing requires a dialogue between the supported CCDR, the JS, JFPs, Services, and USTRANSCOM.

(5) Identify decision points and CCIRs to aid in decision making. Ensure consideration is taken to include lead times, to include notification and mobilization for reserve forces, transportation timelines, procurement acquisition lead time (for contracts or commercial capabilities), and JRSoI requirements. These decision points are critical for senior DOD leadership to understand when decisions should be made to enable operations and reduce risk. During this discussion, commanders and planners should identify alternative COAs and the cost and risk associated with them should decisions be delayed or deferred. If decision points and CCIRs do not exist, they are developed in crisis planning. CCIRs and decision points in existing plans are evaluated and updated within the context of the new mission analysis and strategic guidance.

(a) **FDOs.** When and what FDOs should be deployed and the expected impact. The discussion should identify indicators that the FDOs are creating the desired effect.

(b) **FROs.** FROs, usually used in response to terrorism, can also be employed in response to aggression by a competitor or adversary. Like FDOs, the discussion should include indicators of their effectiveness and probability of consequences, desired and undesired.

(c) **De-Escalation.** During transition to execution, commanders should identify a means for de-escalation and steps that could be taken to enable de-escalation without endangering US forces or interests.

(d) **Escalation.** Similarly, commanders need to identify decision points at which senior leaders must make decisions to escalate to ensure strategic advantage, to include the expected risk associated should the adversary gain the advantage prior to US commitment.

(6) **Confirm Authorities for Execution.** Request and receive presidential or SecDef authority to conduct military operations. Authorities granted may be for execution of an approved plan or for limited execution of select phases of an approved plan.

(7) **Direct Execution.** The JS, on behalf of the CJCS, prepares orders for the President or SecDef to authorize the execution of a plan or order. The authorities for execution, force allocation, and deployment are often provided separately vice in a comprehensive order. Upon approval, CCDRs and Services pass orders down the chain of command directing action ordered by higher headquarters. The following orders are some of those that may be used in the process of transitioning from planning to execution: WARNORD, PLANORD, ALERTORD, OPORD, PTDO, DEPORD, EXORD, and FRAGORD.
(a) **Contingency Plans.** The authority to execute a contingency plan may be provided incrementally. Initial execution authority may be limited to early phase activities (e.g., FDOs, FROs) and CCDRs should be prepared to request additional or modified execution authorities as an operation develops.

(b) **CCPs.** CCPs are in constant execution. While they are reviewed by SecDef, the authorization to execute a campaign plan does not provide complete authority for the CCDR to execute all of the individual military activities that comprise the plan. Additional CCMD coordination is required to execute the discrete military activities within a campaign plan to include posture, force allocation, and country team coordination. See CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance, for more information on the content and format of orders.

c. **Impact on Other Operations.** As the plan transitions to execution, the commander and staff synchronize that operation with the rest of the CCMD’s campaign. Responses to contingencies will likely change the operational and strategic environments. This necessitates revisiting and updating the existing campaign plan based upon new conditions.

   (1) The commander identifies how the additional operation will affect the campaign.

   (a) **Resources.** Resources may be diverted from lower priority operations and activities to support the new operation. This may require modifying the campaign or adjusting objectives.

   (b) **Secondary Effects.** Adding new operations, especially combat operations, will impact the perception and effects of other operations within the AOR (and likely in other CCMD’s AORs as well). Both the new operation and existing ones may need to be adjusted to reflect the symbiotic effect of simultaneous operations.

   (2) The commander may require support from other CCMDs. In addition to support within the plan transitioning to execution, the CCDR may require external support to ensure continued progress toward theater or functional objectives. By using a pre-established capability (force) sharing agreement, a CCDR can gain the support needed without requiring additional JS or OSD coordination. Support from other CCMDs often requires shared battle rhythm activities. Balancing the benefit of improved awareness without overburdening commanders and their staffs remains a challenge. Informal cross-CCMD, directorate-level coordination has proven beneficial and can expand when security conditions necessitate deeper coordination and synchronization. However, identifying standardized staff organizations provides additional structure when planning and scheduling across organizational boundaries.

   (3) Depending on the significance of the new operation, the CCDR may need to update campaign objectives. This requires a conversation with senior civilian leaders to
see if the US national objectives should be adjusted given the change in the strategic landscape.

4. **Tools to Aid Transition**

   a. **Rehearsals, Exercises, and Staff Walks.** For most likely contingencies, the commander may hold rehearsals to ensure transition activities are understood and the staff assessed. When the situation allows, the commander could also conduct a staff walk of key events or use the scenario for an exercise (command post or field training exercise).

   b. **Transition Book.** Commands may develop a condensed primer for the commander and staff that provides a rapid overview of options and requirements for a response. This could include checklists, a DST, FDOs, FROs, and location of key files and TPFDD. This would speed the preparation of products to support the commander’s discussion with higher headquarters or senior decision makers.

   c. **Staff Checklists.** Staff section should develop detailed checklists by both functional areas and timeline on actions required to support crisis execution. Checklists should also include

      (1) **CCIRs.** Which of the CCIRs fall within the staff’s responsibilities? What else does the commander need to know within the staff’s responsibilities?

      (2) **POC Lists.** Although not specifically part of the plan, planners should have available a list of key POCs such as:

         (a) USTRANSCOM.

         (b) USCYBERCOM.

         (c) Supporting and collaborating commands.

         (d) CSAs (e.g., Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency).

         (e) JS POCs (JS J-5, Joint Staff J-4 [Logistics Directorate], and JS J-3).

         (f) POCs for plan-related SAP or special technical operations programs.

         (g) Service and other JFPs.
APPENDIX A
JOINT OPERATION PLAN EXAMPLE

SECTION A. INTRODUCTION

a. Below is a sample format that a joint force staff can use as a guide when developing a joint OPLAN. The exact format and level of detail may vary somewhat among joint commands, based on command-specific requirements and other factors. However, joint OPLANs/CONPLANs will always contain the basic five paragraphs (such as paragraph 3, “Execution”) and their primary subparagraphs (such as paragraph 3a, “Concept of Operations”). The JPEC typically refers to a joint contingency plan that encompasses more than one major operation as a campaign plan, but JFCs prepare a plan for a campaign in joint contingency plan format.

b. The CJCSM 3130 series describe joint planning interaction among the President, SecDef, CJCS, the supported CCDR, and other JPEC members, and provides models of planning messages and estimates. CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance, provides the formats for joint plans in more detail.

SECTION B. NOTIONAL OPERATION PLAN FORMAT

a. Copy Number
b. Issuing Headquarters
c. Place of Issue
d. Effective Date-Time Group
e. OPERATION PLAN: (Number or Code Name)
f. USXXXXCOM OPERATIONS TO . . .
g. References: (List any maps, charts, and other relevant documents deemed essential to comprehension of the plan.)

1. Situation

(This section briefly describes the composite conditions, circumstances, and influences of the theater strategic situation that the plan addresses [see national intelligence estimate, any multinational sources, and strategic and commanders’ estimates].)

a. General. (This section describes the general politico-military variables that would establish the probable preconditions for execution of the contingency plans. It should summarize the competing political goals that could lead to conflict, identify primary antagonists, state US policy objectives and the estimated objectives of other parties, and
outline strategic decisions needed from other countries to achieve US policy objectives and conduct effective US military operations to achieve US military objectives. Specific items can be listed separately for clarity as depicted below.)

(1) **Assessment of the Conflict.** (Provide a summary of the national and/or multinational strategic context [CPG, JSCP, UCP].)

(2) **Policy Goals.** (This section relates the strategic guidance, end state, and termination criteria to the theater situation and requirements in its global, regional, and space dimensions, interests, and intentions.)

   (a) **US/Multinational Policy Objectives.** (Identify the national security, multinational or military objectives, and strategic tasks assigned to or coordinated by the CCMD.)

   (b) **End State.** (Describe the national strategic end state and relate the military end state to the national strategic end state.)

(3) **Non-US National Strategic Decisions**

(4) **Operational Limitations.** (List actions that are prohibited or required by higher or multinational authority [e.g., ROE, RUF, law of war, termination criteria].)

b. **Area of Concern**

   (1) **OA.** (Describe the JFC’s OA. A map may be used as an attachment to graphically depict the area.)

   (2) **Area of Interest.** (Describe the area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission.)

c. **Deterrent Options.** (Delineate FDOs and FROs desired to include those categories specified in the current JSCP. Specific units and resources must be prioritized in terms of latest arrival date relative to C-day. Include possible diplomatic, informational, or economic deterrent options accomplished by non-DOD agencies that would support US mission accomplishment.)

   (See Appendix E, “Flexible Deterrent Options and Flexible Response Options,” for examples of FDOs and FROs.)

d. **Risk.** (Risk is the probability and severity of loss linked to hazards. List the specific hazards that the joint force may encounter during the mission. List risk mitigation measures.)
e. **Enemy Forces.** (Identify the opposing forces expected upon execution and appraise their general capabilities. Refer readers to annex B [Intelligence] for details. However, this section should provide the information essential to a clear understanding of the magnitude of the hostile threat. Identify the strategic and operational COGs and critical vulnerabilities as depicted below.)

(1) **Enemy COGs**

(a) Strategic.

(b) Operational.

(2) **Enemy Critical Factors**

(a) Strategic.

(b) Operational.

(3) **Enemy COAs** (most likely and most dangerous to friendly mission accomplishment).

(a) General.

(b) Enemy’s End State.

(c) Enemy’s Strategic Objectives.

(d) Enemy’s Operational Objectives.

(e) Enemy CONOPS, including contesting the friendly force flow.

(4) **Enemy Logistics and Sustainment**

(5) **Other Enemy Forces/Capabilities**

(6) **Enemy Reserve Mobilization**

f. **Friendly Forces**

(1) **Friendly COGs.** (This section should identify friendly COGs, both strategic and operational; this provides focus to force protection efforts.)

(a) Strategic.

(b) Operational.
(2) **Friendly Critical Factors**

(a) Strategic.

(b) Operational.

(3) **MNF**

(4) **Supporting Commands and Agencies.** (Describe the operations of unassigned forces, other than those tasked to support this contingency plan that could have a direct and significant influence on the operations in the plan. Also list the specific tasks of friendly forces, commands, or government departments and agencies that would directly support execution of the contingency plan, for example, USTRANSCOM, USSTRATCOM, USSPACECOM, USCYBERCOM, and Defense Intelligence Agency.)

g. **Assumptions.** (List all reasonable assumptions for all participants contained in the JSCP or other tasking on which the contingency plan is based. State expected conditions over which the JFC has no control. Include assumptions that are directly relevant to the development of the plan and supporting plans and assumptions to the plan as a whole. Include both specified and implied assumptions that, if they do not occur as expected, would invalidate the plan or its CONOPS. Specify the mobility [air, space, and sea lift, as well as space maneuver], the degree of mobilization assumed [i.e., total, full, partial, selective, or none].)

(1) **Threat Warning/Timeline.**

(2) **Pre-Positioning and Regional Access** (including international support and assistance).

(3) **In-Place Forces.**

(4) **Strategic Assumptions** (including those pertaining to nuclear weapons employment).

h. **Legal Considerations.** (List those significant legal considerations on which the plan is based.)

(1) ROE/RUF.

(2) International law, including the law of war.

(3) US law.

(4) HN and partner nation policies.

(5) Status-of-forces agreements.
(6) Other bilateral treaties and agreements.

(7) HN agreements to include HNS agreements.

(8) Additional US sources of legal authority as relevant (e.g., operational authority delegation memoranda or directives).

2. **Mission**

(State concisely the essential task[s] the JFC has to accomplish. This statement should address who, what, when, where, and why.)

3. **Execution**

   a. **CONOPS.** (For a CCDR’s contingency plan, the appropriate commander’s estimate can be taken from the campaign plan and developed into a strategic concept of operation for a campaign or OPLAN. Otherwise, the CONOPS will be developed as a result of the COA selected by the JFC during COA development. The concept should be stated in terms of who, what, where, when, why, and how. It also contains the JFC’s strategic vision, intent, and guidance for force projection operations, including mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of all participating forces, activities, and agencies.) (Refer to annex C [Operations] in the CONOPS.)

      (1) **Commander’s Intent.** (This should describe the JFC’s intent [purpose and end state], overall and by phase. This statement deals primarily with the military conditions that lead to mission accomplishment, so the commander may highlight selected objectives and their supporting effects. It may also include how the posture of forces at the end state facilitates transition to future operations. It may also include the JFC’s assessment of the enemy commander’s intent and an assessment of where and how much risk is acceptable during the operation. The commander’s intent, though, is not a summary of the CONOPS.)

         (a) **Purpose and End State.** (See Chapter II, “Strategic Guidance and Coordination,” for details on determining the end state.)

         (b) **Objectives.**

         (c) **Effects (if discussed).**

      (2) **General.** (Base the CONOPS on the JFC’s selected COA. The CONOPS states how the commander plans to accomplish the mission, including the forces involved, the phasing of operations, the general nature and purpose of operations to be conducted, and the interrelated or cross-Service support. For a CCDR’s contingency plan, the CONOPS should include a statement concerning the perceived need for Reserve Component mobilization based on plan force deployment timing and Reserve Component force-size requirements. The CONOPS should be sufficiently developed to include an estimate of the level and duration of conflict to provide supporting and subordinate
commanders a basis for preparing adequate supporting plans. To the extent possible, the CONOPS should incorporate the following:

(a) JFC’s military objectives, supporting desired effects, and operational focus.

(b) Orientation on the enemy’s strategic and operational COGs and critical factors.

(c) Protection of friendly strategic and operational COGs and critical factors.

(d) Phasing of operations, to include the commander’s intent for each phase.

1. Phase I

   a. JFC’s intent.

   b. Timing.

   c. Objectives and desired effects.

   d. Risk.

   e. Execution.

   f. Employment.

      (1) Land forces.

      (2) Air forces.

      (3) Maritime forces.

      (4) Space forces.

      (5) Cyberspace forces.

      (6) Special operations forces.

   g. Operational Fires. List those significant fires considerations on which the plan is based. The fires discussion should reflect the JFC’s concept for application of available fires. Guidance for joint fires may address the following:

      (1) Joint force policies, procedures, and planning cycles.

      (2) Joint fire support forces for planning purposes.
(3) Priorities for target acquisition.

(4) Areas that require joint fires to support operational maneuver.

(5) Anticipated joint fire support requirements.

(6) Fire support coordination measures (if required).

2. **Phases II through XX.** (Cite information as stated in subparagraph 3a(2)(d)1 above for each subsequent phase based on expected sequencing, changes, or new opportunities.)

   b. **Tasks.** (List the tasks assigned to each element of the supported and supporting commands in separate subparagraphs. Each task should be a concise statement of a mission to be performed either in future planning for the operation or on execution of the OPORD. The task assignment should encompass all key actions that subordinate and supporting elements must perform to fulfill the CONOPS, including operational and tactical deception. If the actions cannot stand alone without exposing the deception, they must be published separately to receive special handling.)

   c. **Coordinating Instructions.** (Provide instructions necessary for coordination and synchronization of the joint operation that apply to two or more elements of the command. Explain terms pertaining to the timing of execution and deployments. Coordinating instructions should also include CCIRs and associated reporting procedures that may be expanded upon in annex B [Intelligence], annex C [Operations], annex G (Civil-Military Operations), annex I [Knowledge and Information Management], annex V (Interagency-Interorganizational Coordination), and annex R [Reports].)

4. **Administration and Logistics**

   a. **Concept of Sustainment.** (This should provide broad guidance for the theater strategic sustainment concept for the campaign or operation, with information and instructions broken down by phases. It should cover functional areas of logistics, transportation, personnel policies, and administration.)

   b. **Logistics.** (This paragraph addresses the CCDR’s logistics priorities and intent: basing, combat, general, and geospatial engineering requirements, HNS, required contracted support, environmental considerations, mortuary affairs, and Service responsibilities. Identify the priority and movement of logistic support for each option and phase of the concept.)

   c. **Personnel.** (Identify detailed planning requirements and subordinate taskings. Assign tasks for establishing and operating joint personnel facilities, managing accurate and timely personnel accountability and strength reporting, and making provisions for staffing them. Discuss the administrative management of participating personnel, the
reconstitution of forces, command replacement and rotation policies, and required
capabilities and functions to command headquarters and other operational requirements.)
Refer to annex E (if published).

d. Public Affairs. Refer to Annex F.

e. Civil–Military Operations. Refer to Annex G.

f. Meteorological and Oceanographic Services. Refer to Annex H.

g. Environmental Considerations. Refer to Annex L.

h. Geospatial Information and Services. Refer to Annex B.

i. Health Service Support. Refer to Annex Q. (Identify planning requirements and
subordinate taskings for joint health services functional areas. Address critical medical
supplies and resources to include military working dog patient and movement. Assign
tasks for establishing joint medical assumptions and include them in a subparagraph.)

5. Command and Control

a. Command

(1) Command Relationships. (State the organizational structure expected to
exist during plan implementation. Indicate any changes to major C2 organizations and the
time of expected shift. Identify all command arrangement agreements and memorandums
of understanding used and those that require development.)

(2) Command Posts. (List the designations and locations of each major
headquarters involved in execution. When headquarters are to be deployed or the plan
provides for the relocation of headquarters to an alternate command post, indicate the
location and time of opening and closing each headquarters.)

(3) Succession to Command. (Designate in order of succession the commanders
responsible for assuming command of the operation in specific circumstances.)

b. Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems. (Provide a
general statement concerning the scope of communications systems and procedures
required to support the operation. Highlight any communications systems or procedures
requiring special emphasis.) Refer to Annex K.

[Signature]

[Name]

[Rank/Service]
Commander

Annexes:

A—Task Organization
B—Intelligence
C—Operations
D—Logistics
E—Personnel
F—Public Affairs
G—Civil-Military Operations
H—Meteorological and Oceanographic (METOC) Operations
I—Knowledge and Information Management
J—Command Relationships
K—Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems
L—Environmental Considerations
M—Not currently used
N—Assessments
O—Foreign Disclosure
P—Host-Nation Support
Q—Health Services
R—Reports
S—Special Technical Operations
T—Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Response (CBRN-R)
U—Notional Counterproliferation Decision Guide
V—Interagency-Interorganizational Coordination
Appendix A

W—Operational Contract Support
X—Execution Checklist
Y—Commander’s Communication Strategy
Z—Distribution
APPENDIX B
STRATEGIC ESTIMATE

SECTION A. INTRODUCTION

1. Background

   a. The strategic estimate is an analytical tool available to CCDRs before developing theater or functional strategies; theater, functional or DOD-wide campaign plans; subordinate campaign plans; and OPLANs. Strategic estimates provide the commander’s perspective of the strategic and operational levels of the OE, threats, and opportunities that could facilitate or hinder the achievement of NDS- and NMS-directed objectives, desired changes to meet specified regional or functional objectives, and the commander’s visualization of how those objectives might be achieved. Developed annually and regularly updated, the strategic estimate is the basis for developing the CCDR’s theater or functional strategy.

   b. The CCDR, the CCMD staff, supporting commands, and agencies assess the broad, strategic factors that influence OE, thus informing the ends, ways, means, and risks involved in achieving the prescribed campaign objectives.

   c. Both supported and supporting CCDRs prepare strategic estimates based on assigned tasks. CCDRs who support multiple commands may prepare strategic estimates for each supporting operation.

   d. Section B, “Notional Strategic Estimate Format,” presents a format a CCMD staff can use as a guide when developing a strategic estimate. The J-5 may provide the lead staff organization for the conduct of the strategic estimate with significant participation from the other staff directorates. The exact format and level of detail may vary somewhat among commands, based on theater-specific requirements and other factors.

   e. The result of the strategic estimate is a better understanding and visualization of the complete OE. The strategic estimate process is dynamic and continuous and provides input for developing theater strategies and campaign plans. This strategic estimate is also the starting point for conducting more detailed staff estimates, as well as the commander’s estimate of the situation for a potential contingency.

   f. The CCDRs strategic estimate should identify potential for spillover, both from the AOR and functional area perspective, into other CCDRs’ AORs or functional areas and into the CCDR’s AOR or functional area, based on operations and activities outside the AOR.
SECTION B. NOTIONAL STRATEGIC ESTIMATE FORMAT

2. Strategic Direction

(This section analyzes broad policy, strategic guidance, and authoritative direction to the theater or global situation and identifies strategic requirements in global and regional dimensions.)

a. **US Policy Goals.** (Identify the US national security or military objectives and strategic tasks assigned to or coordinated by the CCMD.)

b. **Non-US/Multinational Policy Goals.** (Identify the multinational [alliance or coalition] security or military objectives and strategic tasks that may also be assigned to, or coordinated by the CCMD.)

c. **Opposition Policy Goals and Desired End State**

d. **End State(s).** (Describe the campaign or operation objective[s] or end state[s] and related military objectives to achieve and end states to attain and maintain.)

3. Operational Environment

a. **AOR.** (Provide a visualization of the relevant geographic, political, economic, social, demographic, historic, and cultural factors in the AOR assigned to the CCDR.)

b. **Area of Interest.** (Describe the area of interest to the commander, including the area of influence and adjacent areas and extending into adversary territory. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces that could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission.)

c. **Adversary Forces.** (Identify all states, groups, or organizations expected to be hostile to, or that may threaten US and partner nation interests, and appraise their general objectives, motivations, and capabilities. Provide the information essential for a clear understanding of the magnitude of the potential threat, including threats to power projection activities.)

d. **Friendly Forces.** (Identify all relevant friendly states, forces, and organizations. These include assigned US forces, regional allies, and anticipated multinational partners. Describe the capabilities of the other instruments of national power [diplomatic, economic, and informational], US military supporting commands, and other USG departments and agencies that could have a direct and significant influence on the operations in this AOR.)

e. **Neutral Forces.** (Identify all other relevant states, groups, or organizations in the AOR and determine their general objectives, motivations, and capabilities. Provide the information essential for a clear understanding of their motivations and how they may impact US and friendly multinational operations.)
4. **Assessment of the Major Strategic and Operational Challenges**
   
a. This is a continuous appreciation of the major challenges in the AOR with which the CCDR may be tasked to deal.

   b. These may include a wide range of challenges, from direct military confrontation, peace operations, and security cooperation activities (that include security force assistance for building partner capacity and capability), to providing response to atrocities, foreign humanitarian assistance, and stability activities.

5. **Potential Opportunities**
   
a. This is an analysis of known or anticipated circumstances, as well as emerging situations, that the CCMD may use as positive leverage to improve the theater strategic situation and further US or partner nation interests.

   b. Each potential opportunity must be carefully appraised with respect to existing strategic guidance and operational limitations.

6. **Assessment of Risks**
   
a. This assessment matches a list of the potential challenges with anticipated capabilities in the OE.

   b. Risks associated with each major challenge should be analyzed separately and categorized according to significance or likelihood (e.g., most dangerous or most likely).

   c. The CCMD staff should develop a list of possible mitigation measures to these risks.
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APPENDIX C
STAFF ESTIMATES

SECTION A. INTRODUCTION

1. Role of Estimates

   a. Staff estimates are central to formulating and updating military action to meet the requirements of any situation. Staff estimates should start with the strategic estimate and be comprehensive and continuous and visualize the future, while optimizing the limited time available so as not to become overly time-consuming. Comprehensive estimates consider both the quantifiable and the intangible aspects of military operations. They translate friendly and enemy strengths, weapons systems, training, morale, and leadership into combat capabilities. The estimate process requires the ability to visualize the battle or crisis situations requiring military forces.

   b. Estimates are an essential part of the operational design process. Through their estimates, the staff provides expert assessment of the OE and relevant factors affecting effective planning and execution toward achievement of objectives and attainment of end states.

   c. Estimates must be as thorough as time and circumstances permit. The JFC and staff must constantly collect, process, and evaluate information. They update their estimates:

      (1) When the commander and staff recognize new facts.

      (2) When they replace assumptions with facts or find their assumptions invalid.

      (3) When they receive changes to strategic direction based on high-level civilian-military dialogue or when assessment recommendations are accepted to refine, adapt, or terminate planning.

   d. Estimates for the plan in execution can often provide a basis for estimates for future plans, as well as changes to the plan in execution. Technological advances and near-real-time information estimates ensure that estimates can be continuously updated. Estimates must visualize the future and support the commander’s visualization. They are the link between planning and execution and support continuous assessment. The commander’s vision articulated in the strategic estimate directs the end state. Each subordinate unit commander must also possess the ability to envision the organization’s desired end state, as well as those desired by their opposition counterpart. Estimates contribute to this vision. Failure to make staff estimates can lead to errors and omissions when developing, analyzing, and comparing COAs.

   e. Not every situation will allow or require an extensive and lengthy planning effort. It is conceivable that a commander could review the assigned task, receive oral briefings,
Appendix C

make a quick decision, and direct writing of the plan to commence. This would complete the process and might be suitable if the task were simple and straightforward.

f. Most commanders, however, are more likely to demand a thorough, well-coordinated plan that requires a complex staff estimate process. Written staff estimates are carefully prepared, coordinated, and fully documented.

g. Because of the unique talents of each directorate, involvement of all is vital. Each staff estimate takes on a different focus that identifies certain assumptions, detailed aspects of the COAs, and potential deficiencies that are simply not known at any other level but, nevertheless, must be considered. Such a detailed study of the COAs involves the corresponding staffs of subordinate and supporting commands.

h. Each staff directorate:

(1) Reviews the OE, mission, and situation from its own staff functional perspective.

(2) Examines the factors and assumptions for which it is the responsible staff.

(3) Analyzes each COA from its staff functional perspective.

(4) Concludes whether the mission can be supported.

i. The products of this process are revised, documented staff estimates. These are extremely useful to the commander’s J-5 staff, which extracts information from them for the commander’s estimate. The estimates are also valuable to planners in subordinate and supporting commands as they prepare supporting plans. Although documenting the staff estimates can be delayed until after the preparation of the commander’s estimate, they should be sent to subordinate and supporting commanders in time to help them prepare annexes for their supporting plans.

j. The principal elements of the staff estimates normally include mission, situation and considerations, analysis of opposing COAs, comparison of friendly COAs, and conclusions. The coordinating staff and each staff principal develop facts, assessments, and information that relate to their functional field. Types of estimates generally include, but are not limited to, operations, personnel, intelligence, logistics, communications, civil-military operations, military deception, and special staff. The details in each basic category vary with the staff performing the analysis. The principal staff directorates have a similar perspective—they focus on friendly COAs and their supportability. The J-2 staff estimate is separate from the intelligence estimate provided at the beginning of the planning process. The staff estimate is completed during the strategic guidance planning function and identifies available CCMD intelligence collection and analytic capabilities and anticipated shortfalls that may limit the J-2’s ability to support the proposed friendly COAs. Also during the strategic guidance planning function, based on continuous JIPOE, the J-2 produces the intelligence estimate that serves as the baseline assessment of the OE,
adversary capabilities (including requirements, vulnerabilities, and COGs), and an analysis of the various COAs available to the adversary according to its capabilities. The intelligence estimate conclusion will indicate the adversary’s most likely COA, identify the effects of that COA on the accomplishment of the assigned mission, and, where applicable, list exploitable adversary vulnerabilities associated with that COA. The intelligence estimate informs the commander’s estimate.

k. In many cases, the activities in the JPP COA development step are not separate and distinct, as the evolution of the refined COA illustrates. Staff estimates and assumptions used in the initial COA development may be based on limited staff support. But as concept development progresses, COAs are refined and evolve to include many of the following considerations:

(1) What military operations are considered?

(2) Where they will be performed?

(3) Who will conduct the operation?

(4) When is the operation planned to occur?

(5) How will the operation be conducted?

l. An iterative process of modifying, adding to, and deleting from the original tentative list is used to develop these refined COAs. The staff continually evaluates the situation as the planning process continues. Early staff estimates are frequently given as oral briefings to the rest of the staff. In the beginning, they tend to emphasize information collection more than analysis. It is only in the later stages of the process that the staff estimates are expected to indicate which COAs can be best supported.

m. Sample Estimate Format. The following is a sample format that can be used as a guide when developing an estimate. The exact format and level of detail may vary somewhat among joint commands and primary staff sections based on theater-specific requirements and other factors. Refer to the CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance, for the specific format when there is a requirement for the supported JFC to submit a commander’s estimate.

SECTION B. SAMPLE ESTIMATE FORMAT

2. Mission

a. Mission Analysis

(1) Determine the higher command’s purpose. Analyze national security and national military strategic direction, as well as appropriate guidance in partner nations’ directions, including long- and short-term objectives.
(2) Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks and their priorities.

(3) Determine objectives and consider desired and undesired effects.

(4) Reassess if the strategic direction and guidance support the desired objectives or end state.

b. Mission Statement

(1) Express in terms of who, what (essential tasks), when, where, and why (purpose).

(2) Frame as a clear, concise statement of the essential tasks to be accomplished and purpose—the action to be taken and the reason for doing so.

3. Situation and Courses of Action

a. Situation Analysis

(1) Geostrategic Context

(a) Domestic and international context: political and/or diplomatic long- and short-term causes of conflict; domestic influences, including public will, competing demands for resources and political, economic, legal, gender, and moral constraints; and international interests (reinforcing or conflicting with US interests, including positions of parties neutral to the conflict), international law, positions of international organizations, and other competing or distracting international situations. Similar factors must be considered for theater and functional campaigns and noncombat operations.

(b) A systems perspective of the OE: all relevant PMESII, and other relevant aspects.

(2) Analysis of Enemy, Adversary, and Competitors. Scrutiny of the situation, including capabilities and vulnerabilities (at the theater level, commanders normally will have available a formal intelligence estimate), should include the following:

(a) National and military intentions and objectives (to extent known).

(b) Broad military COAs being taken and available in the future.

(c) Military strategic and operational advantages and limitations.

(d) Possible external military support.

(e) COGs (strategic and operational) and decisive points (including geographic places, key events, and critical factors).
(f) Specific operational characteristics such as strength, composition, location, and disposition; reinforcements; logistics; time and space factors (including basing utilized and available); and combat/noncombat efficiency and proficiency in joint operations.

(g) Reactions of third parties/competitors in theater and functional campaigns.

3 **Friendly Situation.** Should follow the same pattern used for the analysis of the adversary. At the theater level, CCDRs normally will have available specific supporting estimates, including personnel, logistics, and communications estimates. Multinational operations require specific analysis of partner nations’ objectives, capabilities, and vulnerabilities. Interagency coordination required for the achievement of objectives should also be considered.

4 **Operational Limitations.** Actions either required or prohibited by higher authority, such as constraints or restraints, and other restrictions that limit the commander’s freedom of action, such as diplomatic agreements, political or economic conditions in affected countries, and HN issues.

5 **Assumptions.** Assumptions are intrinsically important factors upon which the conduct of the operation is based and must be noted as such. Assumptions should only be made when necessary to continue planning.

6 **Deductions.** Deductions from the above analysis should yield estimates of relative combat power, including enemy capabilities that can affect mission accomplishment.

b. **COA Development and Analysis.** COAs are based on the above analysis and a creative determination of how the mission will be accomplished. Each COA must be suitable, feasible, and acceptable. State all practical COAs open to the commander that, if successful, will accomplish the mission. For a CCDR’s strategic estimate, each COA typically will constitute an alternative theater strategic or operational concept and should outline the following:

1. Major strategic and operational tasks to be accomplished in the order in which they are to be accomplished.

2. Major forces or capabilities required (to include joint, interagency, and multinational).

3. C2 concept.

4. Sustainment concept.

5. Deployment concept.
(6) Estimate of time required to achieve the objectives.

(7) Concept for establishing and maintaining a theater reserve.

4. Analysis of Enemy and Adversary Capabilities and Intentions

a. Determine the probable effect of possible enemy or adversary capabilities and intentions on the success of each friendly COA from mobilization and projection of forces through achievement of campaign objectives.

b. Conduct this analysis in an orderly manner by time phasing, geographic location, and functional event. Consider:

   (1) The potential actions of subordinates two echelons down.

   (2) Transition issues; think through own action, enemy reaction, and counteraction.

   (3) The potential impact on friendly desired effects and likelihood that the enemy’s or adversary’s actions will cause specific undesired effects.

c. Conclude with revalidation of friendly COAs. Determine additional requirements, make required modifications, and list advantages and disadvantages of each enemy or adversary capability.

5. Comparison of Own Courses of Action

a. Evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of each COA.

b. Compare with respect to evaluation criteria.

   (1) Fixed values for joint operations (the principles of joint operations, the fundamentals of joint warfare, and the elements of operational design).

   (2) Other factors (for example, political constraints).

   (3) Mission accomplishment.

c. If appropriate, merge elements of different COAs into one.

d. Identify risk specifically associated with the assumptions (i.e., what happens if each assumption proves false).
6. Recommendation

Provide an assessment of which COAs are supportable, an analysis of the risk for each, and a concise statement of the recommended COA with its requirements.
APPENDIX D
GLOBAL FORCE MANAGEMENT

1. Purpose

a. SecDef directs resourcing CCDRs with forces to further strategic and operational objectives through the GFM processes. GFM is a series of processes that weigh the Services’ capacity to generate forces against CCDR requirements while building readiness and a credible deterrent force. This is accomplished via five, related processes: directed readiness, assignment, allocation, apportionment, and assessment. Directed readiness supports force planning and contains SecDef direction prescribing the force capacity, availability, and readiness to achieve strategic objectives. The assignment and allocation processes provide SecDef the C2 mechanisms to distribute forces to CCDRs. Apportionment provides an estimate of quantities of force types reasonably expected to be available over general timelines for planning purposes. These processes provide data to conduct assessments of risks to operations and to the force. The Global Force Management Board (GFMB) is a general officer/flag officer/senior executive service-level body from across OSD, JS, CCMDs, Services, and CSAs that is organized by the JS and chaired by the Director of the Joint Staff. The GFMB provides oversight and guidance for planning and executing all aspects of GFM and recommends near- and mid-term strategic opportunities. GFM enables DOD to meet the intent of the strategic guidance contained in the UCP, CPG, NDS, defense planning guidance, NMS, and other strategic direction at acceptable risk.

b. Figure D-1 shows the conceptual relationships of assignment, allocation, and apportionment within the DOD force structure. The force structure, shown in gray, consists of all Service forces and is divided into forces “assigned to CCDRs” to conduct CCDR operational missions and forces “not assigned to CCDRs.” Operational forces, shown in light gray, are typically grouped into combat, combat support and combat service support and designed to conduct operations. The operational forces assigned to CCDRs are labeled as “assigned to CCDRs.” CCDRs exercise combatant command (command authority) of the forces assigned to them and have authority to employ their assigned forces to execute authorized missions. Forces “not assigned to CCDRs,” or “unassigned” remain assigned to the Military Department Secretary with an administrative control relationship. Unassigned forces consist of operational forces, labeled “Service retained,” and “Service institutional” forces. Unassigned forces do not have a C2 relationship with any CCDR until allocated or otherwise attached. The Service institutional forces, shown in dark gray, perform Title 10, USC, Sections 7013, 8013, and 9013 functions of the Services such as training commands, recruiting commands, and Service headquarters. The total number of operational forces, shown in light gray, is known. The number of employed forces, shown in red, can be determined or projected. From these two quantities, the Services can apportion forces, which is a Service estimate of the number of forces reasonably expected to be available to execute a major operation. The quantity of apportioned forces is shown in blue.
c. **Directed Readiness.** Directed readiness specifies the force that must be ready and available to execute the NDS within acceptable risk. The directed readiness tables (DRTs), contain SecDef’s direction to DOD, prescribing the quantity of forces required within specific windows to achieve strategic objectives within a fiscal year. Services use this readiness directive for budgetary planning and programming purposes. The CJCS uses SecDef-approved GCPs and select CONPLANs as the foundation of a global analysis to determine the appropriate required quantity.

d. **Assignment.** SecDef provides direction to the Secretaries of the Military Departments to assign specified forces to CCDRs and the United States Element, North American Aerospace Defense Command to perform missions assigned to those commands per Title10, USC, Section 162. The assignment of forces is conducted annually and documented in the assignment tables of the GFMIG or, in years the GFMIG is not updated, as an attachment to the Forces For Unified Commands Memorandum (short title: “Forces For”).

e. **Allocation.** Per Title 10, USC, Section 162, a force assigned to a CCMD or the United States Element, North American Aerospace Defense Command under this section
may be transferred from the command to which it is assigned only by authority of the Secretary and under procedures prescribed by SecDef and approved by the President. Under this authority, SecDef allocates forces to CCDRs from other CCDRs, Services, and DOD agencies. Two sub-processes, annual and emergent, are used to allocate forces.

f. The annual allocation process begins with the JS J-3, in coordination with JFPs and Services, proposing the initial global distribution of forces to support SecDef’s priority strategic objectives laid out in the NDS and refined in the GCPs and CCPs while building readiness and providing a credible deterrent force. When approved by the CJCS, this initial plan is called the *Top-Down Allocation Guidance*. The globally integrated plan to allocate forces sets the force posture. CCDR’s then submit force and joint individual augmentation (JIA) requirements in their annual submission. The JS J-3 and JFPs consider the validated CCDR requirements and recommend adjustments to the plan as bottom-up refinement of the top-down guidance. When complete, the CJCS recommends the allocation of forces to SecDef. SecDef decisions are transmitted in an annual global DEPORD called the GFMAP and its associated annexes. The GFMAP specifies the command relationship the gaining CCDR exercises and the losing CCDR relinquishes, as well as the time the force is to be allocated. The intent is to posture forces against the strategic priorities first and adjust to meet the operational priorities while balancing risk to the force, current operations, and potential future contingencies.

g. The emergent allocation process adjusts the distribution of forces and individual augmentees among the CCDRs to resource ongoing operations, crises, and strategic opportunities while mitigating near-term and strategic risk. CCDRs submit requests for forces. Those requests are staffed similarly to the annual process resulting in the JS J-3 and JFPs’ risk- and resource-informed recommended sourcing solutions to SecDef through the CJCS. SecDef decisions to allocate forces are published as modifications to the GFMAP and its associated annexes. Further discussion of the GFM allocation process can be found in the GFMIG and CJCSM 3130.06, *(U) Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures.*

h. **Apportionment.** Apportioned forces provide an estimate of the capacity to generate capabilities that can reasonably be expected to be available along general timelines. This estimate informs and shapes CCDR resource-informed planning but does not identify the actual forces that may be allocated for use if a plan transitions to execution. This informs senior leadership’s assessment of plans based on force inventory, force generation capacity, and availability. The apportionment of a force does not establish a command relationship. Apportionment is dependent on the number of operational forces, the readiness and availability of the forces, and the number of forces employed globally. Apportioned forces not only support planning but, when compared to the DRTs, the apportionment tables provide a periodic measurement of DOD’s ability to meet its level of readiness. The GFMIG provides strategic guidance with respect to the apportionment process.

i. **Assessment.** The Joint Force Sufficiency Assessment (JFSA) informs DOD’s assessment processes by identifying imbalances among Services’ force/capability supply and current demand. The JFSA consists of two separate assessments. The GFMAP
Appendix D

Sufficiency Assessment addresses current GFM shortfalls in meeting CCDR requirements, and the Strategic Requirements Sufficiency Assessment focuses on the joint forces’ ability to meet global demands of the CPG, NDS, NMS, and the associated GCPs and CCPs. The JFSA supports building a more lethal force and rebuilding warfighting readiness. The JFSA also evaluates why DOD was, or was not, able to meet its DRT target.

2. Authorities and Responsibilities

a. Strategic Guidance for GFM

(1) Title 10, USC; UCP; CPG; NDS; and NMS all provide GFM guidance.

(2) GFMIG. The GFMIG, approved by SecDef, integrates complementary policy and guidance on directed readiness, assignment, allocation, apportionment, and assessment into a single authoritative GFM document in support of the DOD strategic guidance. It provides SecDef guidance and assigns responsibilities for performing all aspects of GFM.

(3) CJCSI 3110.01, (U) 2018 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP). The JSCP provides CJCS strategic guidance as the execution document to implement strategic guidance from the President and SecDef. The JSCP provides measurable intermediate objectives and guidance for CCMDs, Services, and CSAs focused on planning and employing the joint force at current resource levels. The JSCP fulfills the CJCS’s Title 10, USC, requirement for the preparation of a strategic framework and strategic plans; providing for the preparation of contingency plans; and the relationship between strategy and the GCPs, CCPs, other campaign and contingency plans, and operations.

b. GFM Stakeholders Responsibilities

(1) SecDef. Title 10, USC, Section 131, authorizes SecDef to act as the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the DOD. SecDef directs the OSD in the development of DOD guidance and policy. SecDef is the authority for GFM directed readiness, assignment, allocation, and assessment decisions.

(2) CJCS. Title 10, USC, Sections 151-153, 162, and 163, authorizes the CJCS to act as the principal military advisor to the President, NSC, Homeland Security Council, and SecDef to address global threats and recommend the readiness, assignment, and allocation of forces. The CJCS is the decision authority for GFM apportionment and the top-down guidance. The CJCS issues orders implementing the President or SecDef’s direction. Staffing processes ensure the CJCS’s recommendations are timely and represent differing opinions of the CCDRs and other members of the JCS. At the direction of the CJCS, the JS conducts the following activities in support of GFM:

(a) Joint Staff J-8 [Director for Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment] prepares the DRTs, Forces For assignment tables for SecDef approval. The JS J-8 also prepares the apportionment tables for CJCS approval and leads the JFSA assessment processes.
Global Force Management

(b) JS J-3 is responsible to the CJCS for leading and coordinating the GFM allocation process to validate and provide recommended sourcing solutions to meet CCDRs’ force and JIA requirements that cannot be met with assigned forces, while building readiness for future operations. The JS J-3 is the staff lead for preparation and coordination of the GFMAP and consolidating JFP allocation recommendations for SecDef decision. The JS J-3 also performs the duties of the JFP for conventional forces responsible for identifying and recommending contingency and execution sourcing solutions in coordination with the Secretaries of Military Departments, CCMDs, DOD agencies, other JFPs, and the JFM for all force and individual requirements. Individual augmentee requirements are not normally contingency sourced.

(3) CCDRs. Per Title 10, USC, Sections 161, 162, 164-167, CCDRs are responsible to the President and SecDef for the performance of missions assigned to their CCMD. CCDRs perform their duties under the authority, direction, and control of SecDef and provide guidance to subordinate commands and forces assigned to their respective CCMD. CCDRs have the authority to employ assigned forces to carry out missions assigned to the CCMD. CCDRs act as the supported commander for the execution of their assigned missions, which involves the responsibility of synchronizing military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities required to achieve the desired objectives. They may simultaneously be a supporting commander to other CCDRs’ missions. The GFM responsibilities of CCDRs include the following:

(a) FPs. CCDRs with assigned forces are designated FPs and develop and provide force-sourcing solutions, with the JS J-3 or one of the JFPs, in response to CCDR force requirements.

(b) JFPs. Commander, USSOCOM, serves as the JFP for special operations forces. Commander, USTRANSCOM, serves as the JFP for mobility forces; Commander, USCYBERCOM, serves as the JFP for cyberspace forces; and Commander, USSPACECOM, serves as the JFP for space forces. Each identifies and recommends force sourcing solutions in coordination with the Secretaries of Military Departments, CCDRs, DOD agencies, other FPs and JFPs, and the JFM for validated force requirements.

(c) JFM. Commander, USSTRATCOM, serves as the JFM for global missile defense. In coordination with the JS J-3 and supported CCDRs, USSTRATCOM collaborates to develop and provide sourcing recommendations for global missile-defense force requirements.

(4) Secretaries of Military Departments. Title 10, USC, Section 111, specifies the Secretaries of the Military Departments as part of the executive structure of DOD. They are subject to the direction and control of SecDef and responsible for the organization, development, and programming for their respective Military Departments, consistent with policy and national security objectives. The GFM responsibilities of the Military Department Secretaries include:
(a) Assignment of forces under DOD jurisdiction, as directed by SecDef in the assignment tables, Secretaries of the Military Departments shall assign forces to the unified and specified CCMDs or to the United States Element, North American Aerospace Defense Command to perform missions assigned to those commands.

(b) Prepare and deploy ready, trained, and equipped forces to the CCDRs to carry out missions assigned to the CCDRs. Unless otherwise assigned to a CCDR, forces are assigned to the Services until allocated by SecDef to support a CCDR’s mission. The allocation order will specify the command relationship.

(c) Military Departments coordinate directly with CCMDs, JFPs, and the JS J-3 to develop recommended global sourcing solutions. Providing Service sourcing nominations may be delegated to Service FPs.

(5) **United States Coast Guard (USCG).** The GFM responsibilities of the USCG include:

(a) Coordinate directly with CCMDs and the JS J-3 to develop recommended global sourcing solutions for USCG forces.

(b) Apportion USCG forces for CCMD planning (normally USCG forces are not assigned to CCMDs but are allocated through the GFM process).

(c) Prepare and deploy trained and equipped forces to CCDRs to carry out CCMD missions for which the USCG is especially qualified, as prescribed in the 2008 Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security on the use of US Coast Guard Capabilities and Resources in Support of the National Military Strategy.

(6) **DOD Agencies and Field Activities.** DOD agencies coordinate directly with CCMDs, JFPs, and the JS J-3 to develop recommended global sourcing solutions.

### 3. Global Demand

The demand for forces originates with the CCDRs as they require forces to execute their GCPs, CCPs, other campaign and contingency plans, operations, exercises, and other military activities. Prior to SecDef decisions impacting the force pool, a comprehensive risk analysis is conducted identifying the nature of risk, who incurs risk, risk duration and risk mitigation options. Risk analysis is conducted at all levels throughout the planning and execution process. SecDef must also consider the entire demand on the force pool, priority of each military operation or activity, and impact on the readiness and availability of the remaining forces to respond. Global demand originates primarily from the CCDRs as follows:

a. **Campaign Plans.** Executing the military activities in support of campaign plans requires forces and joint individual augmentees. These force and JIA requirements may be met with assigned and/or allocated forces.
b. **Military Operations.** CCDRs require forces and joint individual augmentees to execute operations. These force requirements may be met with forces assigned to the CCDR or forces and JIAs requested and allocated by SecDef in the GFMAP. During a time-constrained crisis, staffing procedures may be expedited and SecDef allocation decisions may be made verbally. Verbal orders should always be followed up with a written order as soon as practicable.

c. **Rotational Force Planning.** Requirements for allocated forces and joint individual augmentees may be enduring for a period of time beyond a single deployment cycle. Supported CCDRs identify enduring requirements and request forces through the allocation process for SecDef approval. CJCSM 3130.06, *(U) Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures,* provides detailed guidance for rotational force planning.

d. **Joint Exercises.** Encompasses all CCDR requirements for CJCS-directed and CCDR high-priority exercises. Forces participating in joint exercises are not usually allocated by SecDef. Military Departments provide forces in support of CCDR joint exercises under Title 10, USC, authority to conduct training. Forces sourced to joint exercises may be subsequently allocated to meet a higher-priority operational force requirement. CJCSM 3500.03, *Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States,* provides detailed procedures for sourcing forces for joint exercises.

e. **Potential Military Operations.** Contingency plans contain requirements for forces to respond to potential future operations. When developing these plans, CCDRs consider their assigned, currently allocated, and apportioned forces. CCDRs also consider the need to request additional forces, including rotational forces, should the plan be executed. The risks to GCPs, CCPs, potential future contingencies, and maintaining a credible deterrent force are considered when execution sourcing forces to respond to current operations and campaign events.

4. **Sourcing**

The concept of strategy-driven and resource-informed planning requires the development of plans based on the near-term readiness of the force. GFM procedures allow proactive resource and risk-informed planning assumptions and estimates and execution decision making regarding Armed Forces of the United States. Time-phased force requirements are documented in a TPFDD. Within GFM, there are three levels of matching forces to requirements, depending on the end state required:

a. **Preferred Force Identification.** As a planning assumption, CCMD planners identify actual units as preferred forces necessary to continue planning and assess the feasibility of a plan. The number of identified preferred forces should be within the quantities of those force types apportioned. Preferred forces are planning assumptions only and do not indicate that those forces will be contingency or execution sourced. Although not preferred forces, CCMD planners can consider capabilities available in current contracts, diplomatic agreements, and task orders as available for planning.
b. **Contingency Sourcing.** Contingency sourcing is led by the JS J-35 and JFPs as a sourcing feasibility assessment. This is normally performed prior to the final IPR for plan approval and during the plan assessment process as part of the joint combat capability assessment during plan development and plan assessment planning functions. The JS J-5 provides specific guidance through a list of sourcing assumptions and planning factors contained in the contingency sourcing message. The resultant contingency sourced forces represent a snapshot in time, sourcing feasibility of the plan for senior leaders. CJCSI 3401.01, *Joint Combat Capability Assessment*, details the joint combat capability assessment process, and CJSCM 3130.06, *(U) Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures*, provides detailed contingency sourcing procedures.

c. **Execution Sourcing.** The supported CCDR may task assigned forces to fill force requirements to perform authorized missions. These requirements constitute the assigned force demand. If additional forces are required, the supported CCDR requests those forces through the GFM allocation process for consideration by SecDef. SecDef’s decision to allocate forces involves weighing the FP’s risks of sourcing with strategic and operational risks to both current operations and potential future contingencies. SecDef’s decisions are ordered in the GFMAP directing an FP to source the force. The FP identifies the unit and issues DEPORDS, via the chain of command, to the unit or individual. CJCSM 3130.06, *(U) Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures*, provides detailed execution sourcing procedures.
APPENDIX E
FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS AND FLEXIBLE RESPONSE OPTIONS

FDOs and FROs are executed on order and provide scalable options to respond to a crisis. Commanders include FDOs and FROs as part of their plans to provide adaptive military options for SecDef or the President to deter or respond to a crisis. Both provide the ability to scale up (escalate) or de-escalate based on continuous assessment of an adversary’s actions and reaction. While FDOs are primarily intended to prevent the crisis from worsening and allow for de-escalation, FROs are generally punitive in nature. A planning outline for FDOs and FROs is included in CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance.

SECTION A. FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS

1. General

   a. FDOs are preplanned, deterrence-oriented actions tailored to signal to and influence an adversary’s actions. They are established to deter actions before or during a crisis. If necessary, FDOs may be used to prepare for future operations, recognizing they may well create a deterrent effect.

   b. FDOs are developed for each instrument of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—but they are most effective when combined across the instruments of national power. FDOs facilitate early strategic decision making, rapid de-escalation, and crisis resolution by laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths.

   c. FDOs provide options for decision makers during emerging crises to allow for gradual increase in pressure to avoid unintentionally provoking full-scale combat and to enable them to develop the situation and gain a better understanding of an adversary’s capabilities and intentions. FDOs are elements of contingency plans executed to increase deterrence in addition to, but outside the scope of, the ongoing operations.

   d. Examples of FDOs for each instrument of national power are listed in Figure E-1 through Figure E-4. Key objectives of FDOs are:

      (1) Communicate the strength of US commitments to treaty obligations and regional peace and stability.

      (2) Confront the threat with unacceptable costs for their possible aggression.

      (3) Isolate the threat from regional neighbors and attempt to split the adversary coalition.

      (4) Rapidly improve the military balance of power in the AOR without precipitating armed response from the threat.
(5) Develop the situation, without provoking the threat, to better understand their capabilities and intentions.

e. Deterrence is perception-based. The United States must be certain the audiences to be deterred are aware of the actions.

2. Description of Deterrent Actions

   a. **Deterrence seeks to prevent the threat’s undesired action.** Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the threat’s perception of three factors: the likelihood of being denied the expected benefits of action, the likelihood of having excessive costs imposed for taking the action, and the acceptability of restraint as an alternative. These effects are the results of a synchronized and coordinated use of all instruments of national power. **FDOs are deterrent-oriented response options** that are requested and may be initiated based on evaluation of indicators of heightened regional tensions.

   b. **FDOs serve two basic purposes.** First, they provide a visible and credible message to shape adversary perceptions about the costs and benefits of undesired activity. Second, they position US forces in a manner that facilitates implementation of OPLANs/CONPLANs or OPORDs if hostilities are unavoidable. They also facilitate an early decision by laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths that are carefully tailored to avoid the classic response of “too much, too soon, or too little, too late.” They are initiated before and after unambiguous warning. Although they are not intended to place US forces in jeopardy if deterrence fails, risk analysis should be an inherent step in determining which FDO to use and how and when that FDO should be used. FDOs have the advantage of rapid de-escalation if the situation precipitating the FDO changes.

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**Examples of Requested Diplomatic Flexible Deterrent Options**

- Alert and introduce special teams (e.g., public diplomacy). Reduce international diplomatic ties.
- Increase cultural group pressure.
- Promote democratic elections.
- Initiate noncombatant evacuation procedures.
- Identify the steps to peaceful resolution.
- Restrict activities of diplomatic missions.
- Prepare to withdraw or withdraw US embassy personnel.
- Take actions to gain support of allies and friends.
- Restrict travel of US citizens.
- Gain support through the United Nations. Demonstrate international resolve.

*Figure E-1. Examples of Requested Diplomatic Flexible Deterrent Options*
Examples of Requested Informational Flexible Deterrent Options

- Impose sanctions on communications systems and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) technology transfer.
- Protect friendly communications systems and intelligence collection assets (defensive space control, cyberspace defense, operations security, cyberspace security).
- Increase public awareness of the problem and potential for conflict.
- Make public declarations of nonproliferation policy.
- Increase communication systems and ISR processing and transmission capability.
- Interrupt satellite downlink transmissions.
- Publicize violations of international law.
- Publicize increased force presence, joint exercises, military capability.
- Increase informational efforts:
  - Influence adversary decision makers (political, military, and social).
  - Promote mission awareness.
  - Increase measures directed at the opponent’s military forces.
- Implement beaconing, interference, jamming, and intrusion of enemy informational assets.
- Maintain an open dialogue with the news media.
- Take steps to increase US public support.
- Ensure consistency with strategic guidance.

Figure E-2. Examples of Requested Informational Flexible Deterrent Options

3. Flexible Deterrent Option Implementation

a. The President or SecDef directs FDO implementation, and the specific FDO or combination selected will vary with each situation. FDOs can be used individually, in packages, sequentially, or concurrently but are primarily developed to be used in groups that maximize integrated results from all the instruments of national power. It is imperative that extensive, continuous coordination occurs with interagency and multinational partners to maximize the impact of FDOs.

b. Once FDOs are implemented, the commander and staff conduct assessments to monitor changes in the OE. The commander, in consultation with senior leadership, prepares to review and adjust objectives of the plan as needed to accommodate new conditions in the OE.
SECTION B. FLEXIBLE RESPONSE OPTIONS

4. General

An FRO is an operational- to strategic-level concept of operation that is easily scalable, provides military options, and facilitates rapid decision making by national leaders in response to heightened threats or attacks against the US homeland or US interests. They are usually used for response to terrorist actions or threats.

5. Description of Flexible Response Options

Examples of Requested Economic Flexible Deterrent Options

- Freeze or seize real property in the United States where possible.
- Freeze monetary assets in the US where possible.
- Freeze international assets where possible.
- Encourage US and international financial institutions to restrict or terminate financial transactions.
- Encourage US and international corporations to restrict transactions.
- Embargo goods and services.
- Enact trade sanctions.
- Enact restrictions on technology transfer.
- Cancel or restrict US-funded programs.
- Reduce security assistance programs.

Figure E-3. Examples of Requested Economic Flexible Deterrent Options

Examples of Requested Military Flexible Deterrent Options

- Increase readiness posture of in-place forces.
- Upgrade alert status.
- Increase intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
- Initiate or increase show-of-force actions.
- Increase training and exercise activities.
- Increase defense support to public diplomacy.
- Increase information operations.
- Deploy forces into or near the potential operational area.
- Increase active and passive protection measures.

Figure E-4. Examples of Requested Military Flexible Deterrent Options
a. The basic purpose of FROs is to preempt and/or respond to attacks against the United States and/or US interests. FROs are intended to facilitate early decision making by developing a wide range of prospective actions carefully tailored to produce desired effects, congruent with national security policy objectives. An FRO is the means by which various military capabilities are made available to the President and SecDef, with actions appropriate and adaptable to existing circumstances, in reaction to any threat or attack.

b. FROs are used to address both specific, transregional threats and nonspecific, heightened threats. FROs are operations that are first and foremost designed to preempt enemy attacks but also provide DOD the necessary planning framework to fast-track requisite authorities and approvals necessary to address dynamic and evolving threats.

c. FROs are developed as directed by the CJCS and maintained by the CCMDs to address the entire range of possible threats. FROs should support both long-term regional and national security policy objectives. Initially, FROs are developed pre-crisis by CCMDs, based on intelligence collection and analysis and critical factors analysis, and then modified and/or refined or developed real-time. FRO content guidelines are listed in Figure E-5.

d. FROs should not be limited to current authorities or approvals; rather, planning should be based on DOD’s capabilities (overt, low visibility, clandestine, and covert) to achieve objectives, independent of risk. While entirely unconstrained planning is not realistic or prudent, the intent of FROs is to provide national leaders a full range of military options, to include those prohibited in the current OE. Planning must also identify expected

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flexible Response Option Content Guidelines</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Identify critical enemy vulnerabilities and specific targets for each major vulnerability</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Operation objectives</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Desired effects</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Essential tasks</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Major forces and capabilities required</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Concept of deployment</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Concept of employment to include phasing, timing, major decision points, and essential interagency supporting actions</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Concept for sustainment</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Estimated time to achieve objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Military end state(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Additional resources or shifts essential for execution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Additional recommended changes in authority and approval required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Additional risks associated with execution and mitigation approaches</td>
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</tbody>
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*Figure E-5. Flexible Response Option Content Guidelines*
effects (to include effects on third parties, partners, and allies), resources required, and risk associated with each option.

e. FROs are divided into three broad categories. These planning categories determine the scope of FRO planning efforts:

1. Interdict terrorist or proxy organizations to deny a subgroup, affiliate, and ally or network the capability to function with global reach, access, and effectiveness.

2. Interdict sanctuary to deny the enemy and associated networks specific geographic sanctuary and/or support bases.

3. Interdict enemy critical network capabilities to deny the enemy specific functional capabilities.

f. FRO Characteristics

1. Provides military options to national leadership.

2. Military CONOPS at the operational or strategic level.

3. Provides a start point for iterative planning.

4. Scalable based on situation and SecDef guidance.

5. Focused on enemy critical vulnerabilities.

6. Nested with national and regional strategy.

7. Deliberate and synchronized expansion of the campaign rather than disparate actions

8. A combination of direct and indirect actions.

9. Decisive action or set conditions for follow-on operations.

10. Must include a discussion of risk and probability of escalation.

6. Flexible Response Option Implementation

a. The planning engine for FROs is the contingency planning process. In the event SecDef directs the execution of an FRO, the supported CCMD would initiate planning to determine existing options or develop new ones for SecDef. Additionally, the supported CCMD coordinates the acquisition of authorities and approvals necessary to conduct appropriate military operations to disrupt threats and/or respond to attacks on the United States or US interests.
b. Applications of FROs

(1) **Disrupt** is used to address both specific threats and heightened nonspecific threats. Disrupt options are developed to preempt enemy attacks.

   (a) **Specific Threats.** Disrupt contingencies are triggered by specific warning intelligence or identified attack plans spanning more than one AOR or otherwise requiring global integration, as determined by the CJCS.

   (b) **Nonspecific Threats.** Disrupt is also triggered by general indications of increased threats, in the absence of actionable intelligence against a specific threat. Periodically, intelligence assessments indicate enemy strength has increased despite current operations or attack preparations have progressed to the point that national leadership is willing to consider additional operations, actions, and activities.

(2) **Response.** Respond contingencies are triggered as a result of a successful or unsuccessful attack against the United States or its interests. If efforts fail to preempt, disrupt, or defeat a major attack, respond options rapidly provide flexible and scalable options to respond with global operations against the entire scope of the enemy (see Figure E-6). The following are examples of FRO scalability. Operations in each category can be executed individually, concurrently, or sequentially.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flexible Response Option Scalability</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rapid Response</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Demonstrate Resolve</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Priority of Effort:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Speed</td>
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<td><strong>Advantages:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Demonstrate resolve</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Least impact of current operations</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Disadvantages:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Limited strategic effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• More likely lethal in nature</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Probable negative international reaction</td>
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<td>• More likely unilateral action</td>
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</tbody>
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*Figure E-6. Flexible Response Option Scalability*
(a) **Rapid Response.** Priority of effort is to demonstrate US resolve through speed of action. Rapid responses would most likely be unilateral strikes, raids, cyberspace operations, and information-related activities against known targets with low collateral damage.

(b) **Limited Response.** Priority of effort is to attack organizations directly attributed to the attack. The objective of this category is to maximize perceived legitimacy of US response. Limited response demonstrates restraint and is more likely to garner international cooperation. Disadvantages may include uncertain timeline due to requirement for attribution and continued vulnerability to networks not directly associated with the current attack.

(c) **Decisive Response.** Priority of effort is to attack the enemy operational COG to achieve a long-term disruption of its operational capability. This category is proactive vice reactive and seeks greater long-term impact on, or defeat of, the enemy. Disadvantages may include perception of US overreaction with possible negative public opinion consequences and the potential provocation of retaliatory responses.
APPENDIX F
COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON

1. Overview

The most common technique for COA comparison is the weighted numerical comparison, which uses evaluation criteria to determine the preferred COA, based upon the wargame. COAs are not compared to each other directly until each COA is considered independently against the evaluation criteria. The CCDR may direct some of these criteria, but most criteria are developed by the JPG, as detailed in Chapter III, “Joint Planning Process.” Below are examples of common methods.

2. Weighted Numerical Comparison Technique

a. Numerical methods should be used with caution given the inherently subjective values and weighting assigned. The example below provides a numerical method for differentiating COAs. Values reflect the relative preference of each COA within each criterion. All criteria have been weighted to reflect their relative preference to one another (see Figures F-1 and F-2).

b. Recall the weight of each criterion determined in COA analysis. The staff leader responsible for a functional area scores each COA using those criteria. Multiplying the score by the weight yields the criterion’s value. The staff leader then totals all values. The staff member must not portray this simplified numeric method as the result of a rigorous mathematical analysis. Comparing COAs by criterion is more accurate than comparing total values.

(1) Evaluation criteria are those selected through the process described in Chapter III, “Joint Planning Process.”

(2) The evaluation criteria can be weighted. The most important criteria are rated with the highest numbers. Lesser criteria are weighted with progressively lower numbers.

(3) The highest number is best. The best criterion and the most advantageous COA ratings are those with the highest number. Values reflect the relative strengths and weaknesses of each COA.

(4) Each staff section does this separately, perhaps using different criteria on which to base the COA comparison. The staff then assembles and arrives at a consensus for the criterion and weights. The COS or JTF deputy commander should approve the staff’s recommendations concerning the criteria and weights to ensure completeness and consistency throughout the staff sections.
## Example Numerical Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>COA 1 Rating</th>
<th>COA 1 Product</th>
<th>COA 2 Rating</th>
<th>COA 2 Product</th>
<th>COA 3 Rating</th>
<th>COA 3 Product</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exploits maneuver</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks COGs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrates maneuver and interdiction</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploits deception</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provides flexibility</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS (best use of transportation)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weighted total</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>23</strong></td>
<td><strong>31</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** The higher the number, the better.

- The joint force commander’s intent explained that the most important criterion was “attacking the enemy’s COGs.” Therefore, assign a value of 3 for that criterion and lower numbers for other criteria that the staff devises (this is the **weighing criterion**).

- For attacking the enemy COGs, COA 2 was rated the best (with a number of 3). Therefore, COA 2 = 9, COA 1 = 6, and COA 3 = 3.

- After the relative COA rating is multiplied by the weight given each criterion and the product columns are added, COA 2 (with a score of 31) is rated the most appropriate according to the criteria used to evaluate it.

**Legend**

- COA  course of action
- COG  center of gravity
- CSS  combat service support

---

**Figure F-1. Example Numerical Comparison**
3. **Non-Weighted Numerical Comparison Technique**

   The same as the previous method except the criteria are not weighted. Again, the highest number is best for each of the criteria.

4. **Narrative or Bulletized Descriptive Comparison of Strengths and Weaknesses or Advantages and Disadvantages**

   Summarize comparison of all COAs by analyzing strengths and weaknesses or advantages and disadvantages for each criterion. See Figures F-3 and F-4 for examples.
### Criteria for Strengths and Weaknesses Example

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COA</th>
<th>Criteria 1</th>
<th>Criteria 2</th>
<th>Criteria 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengths</td>
<td>Weaknesses</td>
<td>Strengths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend

COA: course of action

---

### Descriptive Comparison Example

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COA</th>
<th>Criteria 1</th>
<th>Criteria 2</th>
<th>Criteria 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Advantages</td>
<td>Disadvantages</td>
<td>Advantages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend

COA: course of action

---

Figure F-3. Criteria for Strengths and Weaknesses Example

Figure F-4. Descriptive Comparison Example
5. **Descriptive Comparison**

This is simply a description of advantages and disadvantages of each COA (Figure F-4).

6. **Plus/Minus/Neutral Comparison**

Base this comparison on the broad degree to which selected criteria support or are reflected in the COA. This is typically organized as a table showing (+) for a positive influence, (0) for a neutral influence, and (−) for a negative influence. Figure F-5 is an example.

### Plus/Minus/Neutral Comparison Example

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>COA 1</th>
<th>COA 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Casualty estimate</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualty evacuation routes</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suitable medical facilities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend**  

COA course of action

*Figure F-5. Plus/Minus/Neutral Comparison Example*
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APPENDIX G
POSTURE PLANS

1. Overview

   a. Posture plans are key elements of CCMD campaigns and strategies. They describe the forces, footprint, and agreements the commander needs to successfully execute the campaign and respond in a contingency.

   b. Posture Plans

      (1) CCMDs prepare posture plans, outlining their posture strategy, link to national and theater objectives with the means to achieve them and identify posture requirements and initiatives to meet campaign objectives.

      (2) The posture plan is the primary document used to advocate for changes to posture and to support resource decisions, the posture management processes, and departmental oversight responsibilities. It delineates the CCMD’s posture status, with gaps, risks, required changes, and proposed initiatives substantiated by strategic direction provided in the NDS and NMS.

      (3) Posture plans address the overseas posture requirements of other DOD stakeholders in theater. Stakeholders include other CCMDs, Military Departments, DOD agencies, non-DOD agencies, and field activities. CCMDs responsible for a geographic AOR coordinate their posture plans with these stakeholders to incorporate their requirements.

      (4) Functional posture plans enable CCMDs with functional responsibilities to identify their posture requirements to other CCMDs. USSOCOM prepares the Global Special Operations Forces Posture Plan, USSTRATCOM prepares the Strategic Infrastructure Master Plan, USTRANSCOM prepares its posture plan, and USCYBERCOM prepares the Functional Posture Plan for Cyberspace Operations. Each functional posture plan includes a strategic narrative that assesses posture gaps, associated risks, and posture initiatives recommended to address those gaps/risks. Functional posture plans are coordinated with the geographic CCMDs to facilitate consideration and incorporation of functional requirements into their posture plans.

SAMPLE POSTURE PLAN

   a. Executive Summary. This short summary includes key strategy concepts, posture status, significant challenges, notable issues, and proposed changes.

   b. Strategic Narrative. This section provides the broad view of the theater as context for forces, footprints, and agreements and their support to strategic objectives.
c. Forces
   (1) Approach to Force Posture.
   (2) Gaps and Risk and Implications.
   (3) Recommended Force Changes.

d. Footprint
   (1) Approach to Footprint. Identify the specific posture approach for footprint (e.g., bases, locations) in the region. Discuss how the current footprint supports theater and national objectives.
      (2) Gaps and Risk.
      (3) Footprint Changes Required.
      (4) Contingency Locations.

e. Agreements
   (1) Approach to Agreements.
   (2) Status of Current Agreements.
   (3) Gaps and Risk.
   (4) Agreements in Development.
      (a) Status of Agreements in Development.
      (b) Priority of need of Agreements in Development.
   (5) HN Agreements.
   (6) Basic ordering agreements (e.g., current contracts or task orders).

f. Appendices. The TPP should include:
   (1) Theater Maps.
   (2) Charts of Footprint by Location.
   (3) Project Summary Sheets.
   (4) Enduring Location Changes.
c. **Process**

   (1) GDP is managed by the OUSD(P) and the JS J-5. CCMD posture plans outline the current posture and propose posture initiatives for a two-to-five-year time frame and beyond. Campaign planners are informed by posture subject matter experts on strategic and operational access issues. In turn, the strategy and the operational approach of the campaign plan inform the posture plan.

   (2) The Global Posture Executive Council (GPEC) is DOD’s senior posture governance body. The GPEC facilitates senior leader posture decision making; enables the CCMDs, Military Departments and Services, and DOD agencies to collaborate in DOD’s GDP planning; and oversees the implementation and assessment of DOD’s posture plans. The JS J-5, in coordination with OUSD(P), annually provides GPEC-endorsed posture guidance to guide the development of posture plans.

2. **Elements of a Posture Plan**

   a. **Strategic Narrative.** The CCDR outlines the vision of posture linked to theater and national strategic plans and objectives.

   b. **Forces.** Forces are composed of assigned, allocated, and enabling units, personnel, and assets. It includes rotational and mobility forces. They execute the mission through offensive, defensive, and stability activities.

   c. **Footprint.** The footprint includes enduring locations, supporting infrastructure, and prepositioned equipment.

   d. **Agreements.** Agreements provide access, basing, lawful mission execution, protection, and relationships that allow the footprint to be established and forces to execute their missions. Examples are access agreements, basic ordering agreements, transit agreements, status-of-forces agreements, and treaties.

   e. **Appendices.** Four appendices convey the commander’s posture:

      (1) Theater maps.

      (2) Summary chart of footprint by location.

      (3) Project summary sheets.

      (4) Enduring location change nominations.

3. **Format for Posture Plans**

   For detailed information and guidance on GDP and posture plans, see GPEC Posture Planning Guidance; supplemental guidance to the JSCP; and CJCSI 3110.01, (U) 2018 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP).
4. Posture Terminology

a. **GDP Locations.** DOD uses an established lexicon for the types of overseas (in foreign countries or US territories overseas) locations from which it operates in its GDP framework.

(1) **Contingency Location.** A non-enduring location outside of the United States that supports and sustains operations during named and unnamed contingencies or other operations as directed by appropriate authority and is categorized by mission life-cycle requirements as initial, temporary, or semi-permanent.

(2) **Enduring Location.** A location is enduring when DOD intends to maintain access and or use of that location for the foreseeable future. Enduring locations play a critical role in allowing DOD to deploy, or employ, US forces when and where necessary but need not have a continuous force presence or permanent structure sustained or constructed through US appropriations. CCDRs nominate locations as enduring. The GPEC reviews and endorses the list and OSD validates these nominations in consultation with DOS. The following types of sites are considered enduring for USG purposes: CSL, FOS, and MOB. All three types of locations may be composed of more than one distinct site. A geographic site is designated by the DOD for strategic access and used to support US security interests for the foreseeable future.

   (a) **CSL.** An enduring location characterized by the periodic presence of rotational US forces, with little or no permanent US military presence or US-owned infrastructure, used for a range of missions and capable of supporting requirements for contingencies. CSLs may feature a small permanent presence of assigned support personnel (military or contractor). CSLs typically consist of mostly HN infrastructure, and CSL real property is often not US-owned (i.e., not part of the US real property inventory). However, CSLs may require US-funded infrastructure to meet operational requirements. CSLs are a focal point for security cooperation activities and provide contingency access, logistic support, and rotational use by operational forces and can support an increased force presence during contingencies of finite duration.

   (b) **FOS.** An enduring location characterized by the sustained presence of rotational US forces, with infrastructure and quality of life amenities consistent with that presence, capable of providing forward staging for operational missions and support to regional contingencies. FOSs consist of US-owned real property, and they may feature a small, permanent presence of assigned support personnel (military or contractor). FOSs often support the stationing of pre-positioned force, equipment, or supplies, and they can serve as a regional hub in support of regional contingencies.

   (c) **MOB.** An enduring location characterized by the presence of permanently assigned US forces and robust infrastructure that typically includes C2; highly developed force protection measures; and significant quality of life amenities, often including family support facilities. MOBs consist of US-owned real property and represent
primary training and deployment locations for the United States overseas. MOBs can support both small- and large-scale operations and global contingencies.

(3) **En Route Location.** A term specific to global distribution: an intermediate node outside of the continental United States distribution network that supports refueling, maintenance, crew change/rest, or transload of cargo/passengers for onward movement to final destination. These nodes can be a fixed or a temporary location. En route locations may be designated as MOBs, FOSs, or CSLs.

b. **Other Terms**

(1) **Posture Initiative.** A required change to US GDP that meets any one of the following criteria:

   (a) Has policy significance.

   (b) Comprises a significant change to an element of defense posture (forces, footprint, or agreements).

   (c) Comprises a significant change in capability.

   (d) Has significant impact on resourcing.

(2) **Policy Significance.** A change, or proposed change, expected to result in HN or United States domestic political discussions at the national level and/or HN media coverage that may create political controversy at the national level. Examples include actions that directly affect foreign or defense relations between the United States and another government; require approval, negotiation, or signature at the OSD or diplomatic level of an international agreement or other document relating to US forces’ presence in a foreign country; or generate a major increase or decrease in US operational or sustainment capability at one or more locations.
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APPENDIX H
THEATER DISTRIBUTION PLANS

1. Overview

a. TDPs provide comprehensive analysis of theater distribution networks that effectively integrate the concepts of agility, resiliency, and scalability in support of CCPs. They also codify detailed information about the theater distribution network, the expectations of the network, and how they interface with the global network. Network analysis informs senior leadership decisions about changes that must occur when a geographic CCMD theater transitions from current operations to a different state.

b. The JSCP directs USTRANSCOM to develop the TDP schedule, content guidance, and format. The JSCP also directs CCDRs to provide analysis that identifies deployment and distribution issues and related solutions within the context of the problem sets and associated support plans. TDPs fulfill this requirement and are nested within the USTRANSCOM Campaign Plan for Global Deployment and Distribution (see Figure H-1).

2. Format for Theater Distribution Plans

a. The TDP template is in CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance. TDPs are organized into three annexes: distribution network design, distribution network intelligence and information systems, and distribution network processes. This structure organizes subject areas into higher-level functions and facilitates analysis of each individually or as a group (see Figure H-2). It also facilitates the identification of network limitations and provides guidance on assigning a risk level for command action.

b. USTRANSCOM developed a TDP Writing Guide to provide CCDRs with guidance on format and content. TDP templates can be found on the USTRANSCOM Intellink SharePoint site at: https://intelshare.intelink.sgov.gov/sites/ustc/USTCJ54/ustcj4_1/TDP/layouts/15/start.aspx. The templates provide examples of overall structure, sample products, and best practices.
United States Transportation Command’s Functional Campaign Plan for Global Deployment and Distribution 9033

Legend
- TDP: theater distribution plan
- USTRANSCOM: United States Transportation Command

Figure H-1. United States Transportation Command’s Functional Campaign Plan for Global Deployment and Distribution 9033
### Theater Distribution Plan Structural Format

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Base Plan</td>
<td>Base Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tab A</td>
<td>Strategic Limitations and Risk Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex A</td>
<td>Distribution Network Design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 1</td>
<td>Distribution Plans, Operations, and Exercises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 2</td>
<td>Operations (Command and Control)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 3</td>
<td>Distribution Networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 4</td>
<td>Freedom of Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 5</td>
<td>Materiel Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tab A</td>
<td>Class III-B, Bulk Petroleum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tab B</td>
<td>Non-Nuclear Munitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tab C</td>
<td>Class VII A/B, Medical Supplies and Blood Products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tab D</td>
<td>Other Classes of Supply (As Required)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 6</td>
<td>Theater Pre-Positioning (PREPO) and Theater Provided Equipment (TPE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex B</td>
<td>Distribution Network Intelligence and Information Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 1</td>
<td>Distribution Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 2</td>
<td>In-Transit Visibility (ITV)/Asset Visibility (AV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 3</td>
<td>Logistics Information Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex C</td>
<td>Distribution Network Processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 1</td>
<td>Mortuary Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 2</td>
<td>Health Services (Patient Movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 3</td>
<td>Operational Contract Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 4</td>
<td>Container and Pallet Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 5</td>
<td>Interagency Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix 6</td>
<td>Multinational and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure H-2. Theater Distribution Plan Structural Format*
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APPENDIX J
RED TEAMS

1. Background

The use of red teams contributes to reduce risk, avoid surprise, see opportunities, increase operational flexibility, broaden analysis, and enhance decision making. Red teams help organizations adapt to change and improve military planning and intelligence analysis by stimulating critical and creative thought. The JS has recommended the routine employment of red teams.

2. The Red Team Overview

a. All organizations, staff agencies, and work groups that study issues, draw conclusions, make plans, develop concepts, produce intelligence, create scenarios, conduct experiments, simulate adversaries, make recommendations, or decide issues can benefit from red teams. Red teams can help any staff element frame problems, challenge assumptions, counter institutional biases, stimulate critical and creative thought, and support decision making in every organization.

b. Joint forces should use red teams to enhance and complement regular processes and help ensure all aspects of key problems are understood and the fullest range of potential options are considered.

c. Implicit tasks include countering the influence of institutional and individual bias and error; providing insight into the mindsets, perspectives, and cultural traits of adversaries and other relevant actors; and helping explore unintended consequences, follow-on effects, and unseen opportunities and threats. Red teams reduce risk by helping organizations anticipate, understand, prepare, and adapt to change.

**KEY TERM**

Red Team: An organizational element comprised of trained and educated members that provide an independent capability to fully explore alternatives in plans and operations in the context of the operational environment and from the perspective of adversaries, and others.

d. The red team is a specially trained, decision-support staff organization that can be employed throughout the joint force. The red team can complement all staff problem-solving and analytical efforts by serving as a “devil’s advocate” and generalized contrarian but is normally focused on supporting plans, operations, and intelligence.

(1) **Plans and Operations.** The red team supports planning and mission execution. This includes helping identify vulnerabilities, opportunities, and faulty or unstated assumptions; helping ensure all aspects of the OE are fully understood; and critically reviewing strategies, operational concepts, estimates, plans, and orders.
(2) **Intelligence.** The red team complements intelligence efforts by offering independent, alternative assessments and differing interpretations of information. This includes critical reviews of intelligence products, considering problem sets from alternative perspectives, and helping contribute informed speculation when reliable information is lacking.

### 3. Red Team Support to Joint Planning

a. **Support to joint planning is a core red team function.** Organizations that plan and execute operations may employ red teams to help them think critically and creatively and see planning issues and proposed COAs from alternative perspectives. The red team may also help the staff avoid common sources of error.

b. The red team could be used to support virtually all aspects of the JPP. However, the team’s capacity will seldom match the scale of requirements. Accordingly, this guidance focuses on those functions where red teams can have the greatest impact on planning. **Participation in the JPP, Step 2 (Mission Analysis), is normally the most effective use of the team in joint planning.**

c. Red team support to joint planning is usually provided via active participation in planning groups and the production of tailored papers and briefings that support the planning effort. When addressing key issues that may have wide-ranging effects on planning, it may be prudent to circulate comprehensive stand-alone red team products for the staff’s review. While the red team may suggest alternatives for consideration, these inputs should be weighed and either incorporated or set aside as appropriate before planning products are finalized. Critical red team observations may be, at the planners’ discretion, developed into branch plans.

d. During multinational planning efforts, red teams should ensure foreign staff officers understand the red team’s role as a devil’s advocate, so they understand the purpose of the team’s contrarian perspective. It should also be noted that some foreign services may have their own style of red teaming, and they might be able to make valuable contributions to the overall planning efforts once their red teaming efforts are integrated with those of their US counterparts.

e. The strategic estimate is used to develop campaign plans. It encompasses all aspects of the commander’s OE and is the basis for the development of the CCMD’s theater or functional strategy. It provides the commander’s perspective of the strategic and operational levels of the OE, the contested environment, desired changes required to meet specified regional or functional objectives, and the commander’s visualization of how those objectives might be achieved. It addresses a number of core issues which can benefit from red team scrutiny, such as an analysis of all states, groups, or organizations in the OE; a review of relevant geopolitical, economic, and cultural factors; an assessment of strategic and operational challenges facing the CCMD; an analysis of known or anticipated opportunities; and an assessment of risks inherent in the OE. Accordingly, the draft strategic estimate should be carefully reviewed by the red team.
4. Joint Planning Activities, Functions, and Products

a. Planning is supported by intelligence assessments of current or projected situations and threats. It is generally not practical or advisable for the red team to offer independent, alternative assessments for each intelligence estimate, but within its capability, the red team should judiciously review key assessments and estimates and, when appropriate, suggest alternative assessments to alert the staff to previously unseen threats and opportunities that may require new planning initiatives.

b. The red team supports all planning functions through active participation in planning teams and critical reviews of draft planning materials. The red team should participate in the early stages of planning functions to ensure the staff has sufficient time to consider the red team’s inputs before key decisions are made. The red team should not produce duplicative or competing planning materials but should instead seek to incorporate its inputs into the planning team’s final products. In some cases, however, it may be useful to circulate comprehensive stand-alone “think pieces” to help the staff consider specific issues, but these should never be cast as criticisms of the planning team’s products.

c. Support to IPRs. Planning is facilitated by periodic IPRs that provide up-and-down-channel feedback, shaping and refining as the plan is developed. Ideally, prior to an IPR, the red team should review their organizations’ draft IPR briefings and papers and offer suggestions as appropriate. The red team’s most critical contributions to any new plan will usually come during mission analysis, although preparations for later IPRs may actually involve more of the team’s time and resources.

d. The red team should be fully integrated into the planning process and assist in the initial development and revision of JPP products. When the red team is unable to support all aspects of a specific planning effort, the commander or J-5 should establish priorities for red team support. In most cases, the red team will have the greatest impact on planning during JPP Step 2 (Mission Analysis) and Step 4 (COA Analysis and Wargaming).

e. Potential red team roles in planning are outlined below:

(1) **Step 1 (Planning Initiation).** Commanders typically provide initial planning guidance to planning teams. The red team typically participates in the planning team’s review of that guidance and recommending refinements back to the commander.

(2) **Step 2 (Mission Analysis)**

(a) One key input to mission analysis is JIPOE. If the red team has not participated in the JIPOE process, then it should conduct an independent, alternative assessment of the enemy or adversary’s COG, critical capabilities, and critical vulnerabilities. The red team should then offer its alternative assessments for consideration by both the intelligence staff and the planners.
(b) One primary red team task during mission analysis is to help the planners frame the problem, define desired end states, and assess known facts and key assumptions. The red team should challenge weak assumptions or suspect facts and, as the situation evolves, consider whether the assumptions remain valid.

(c) If possible, the red team should help determine operational limitations, transition criteria, military end state (if applicable), military objectives, and mission success criteria, providing alternative perspectives and exploring how political will and cultural viewpoints might constrain operations and limit options. In addition, the team may also participate in developing specified, implied, and essential tasks, conducting risk analysis, writing the CCIRs, and drafting the mission statement. If possible, the team should participate in drafting the mission analysis brief and the commander’s refined planning guidance.

(3) **Step 3 (COA Development).** The red team can often make useful contributions to COA development by helping the planners expand the range of COAs under consideration including those addressing contested friendly force deployment.

(4) **Step 4 (COA Analysis and Wargaming)**

(a) During COA analysis, the red team should advise planners of the potential contested environment and the cultural implications associated with each COA and should help explore the potential unintended consequences and likely second- and third-order effects associated with each COA.

(b) During COA wargaming, the red team should help both the simulated friendly force and the opposition (enemy or adversary) force (red cell) consider the widest range of options during their respective moves. The red team should also advise both sides regarding how their moves might be perceived by relevant actors or impacted by wildcard events.

(5) **Step 5 (COA Comparison).** COA comparison is often seen as an objective measurement of the relative merits of the COAs developed and analyzed in earlier steps. The red team should participate in the development of the COA comparison criteria and highlight those areas in which subjective and cultural issues might outweigh more tangible, more easily quantified factors.

(6) **Step 6 (COA Approval).** Planners should consider including a summary of wildcards, unintended consequences, and second- and third-order effects in the COA decision briefing to the commander.

(7) **Step 7 (Plan or Order Development)**

(a) If the decision is to develop an order, and the red team has been actively participating to this point, then order development may continue without additional red team input. Future revisions, however, should be supported by the red team. If the red
team has not been involved in planning prior to this point, then the team should review assumptions and evaluate the potential impact of cultural factors. In addition, the team should explore likely unintended consequences, second- and third-order effects, and wildcards. Revising the order at this point can be extremely disruptive. Accordingly, if the red team’s review suggests serious shortcomings, the senior planner should be advised.

(b) If the decision is to develop a plan, then continuing red team support will be required. The team should participate in developing appendixes, making certain themes, messages, and media are compatible with the mindsets of participants and that potential unintended consequences are explored. The team should also participate in developing the assessment annex, using its understanding of the OE to help ensure the relevance of the measurements.

c) The OE and situation may evolve as the plan is drafted, and the red team should remain sensitive to developing threats and opportunities, wildcards, and other issues. In addition, plans typically address more issues, and in more detail, than were addressed during the working groups, and these can usually benefit from red team support.

d) The red team should review key sections of the plan and offer recommendations while those sections are still in the draft stage. If the red team has not been involved in the planning effort before the decision brief, a red team review of these draft sections is critical.

e) During plan development, it may be useful for the red team to circulate a document that consolidates its observations and concerns. This document can provide complete, fully reasoned descriptions of issues the red team might have previously raised in closed work groups, or it may propose new issues that planners should consider. Issues could include potential unanticipated and low probability/high impact events, likely unintended consequences and second- and third-order effects, and unseen threats and opportunities. In some cases, it may be prudent to include this document in the final plan as a reference for mission execution or to support future plan revisions, but in all cases, it must be understood that the primary purpose of the document is to support the development of the plan rather than serve as an after-the-fact critique.

f) Completed plans are frequently refined or adjusted over time, and refinement continues even after execution. During refinement and adaptation, the red team helps assess the situation, develop new guidance, and support continued planning efforts.

5. Joint Planning During Execution

a. Red team support during mission rehearsal generally parallels that of wargaming. During rehearsal, the primary objective is to test the plan’s CONOPS and COAs. As the plan is rehearsed, the red team should focus on helping the staff uncover previously unseen weaknesses, opportunities, and unintended effects. During rehearsal, the red team should be attuned to potential alternative COAs and assessments, which it may propose after rehearsal, when the staff may be actively seeking improvements or alternatives to the plan.
b. A crisis action team is often stood up during the initial stages of a crisis. While not part of its critical analysis function, the red team may support the crisis action team by providing expertise in alternative interpretations of dynamic, uncertain situations; by helping frame problems; and by broadening the search for potential responses. A crisis action team normally uses streamlined decision-making procedures, and the primary red team mode of support will often consist of active participation in work groups rather than formal written products.

c. Planning continues throughout execution in three venues, each focused on distinct but overlapping timeframes: future plans, future operations, and current operations. The red team plays distinct roles in each of these but should normally concentrate its efforts in future plans.

(1) Future plans addresses the next phase of operations or sequels to the current operation. Red team support to future plans will generally follow that provided during JPP step 2 (Mission Analysis), but in an abbreviated form.

(2) Future operations addresses branches to current, on-going operations. It is normally addressed by the J-3 or, in some commands, an operations planning element. Red team support to future operations will often resemble that of future plans but with a more truncated time horizon and more streamlined processes.

(3) Current operations addresses immediate or very near-term issues associated with ongoing operations. Current operations are usually addressed by the organization’s joint operations center. Due to the compressed decision cycle, opportunities for the red team to influence the staff’s thinking may be limited to providing alternative assessments of selected aspects of the ongoing situation.

d. In some commands, a number of working groups are used to manage the flow of information to decision makers and to coordinate recurring decisions within the headquarters’ battle rhythm. These cross-functional staff organizations are often referred to as boards, cells, centers, and working groups. The red team should support the following groups (or their equivalents), if formed:

(1) Long-range planning group.

(2) Operations planning element.

(3) Commander’s communication synchronization working group.

(4) CAB.

e. Assessment entails two distinct tasks: monitoring the situation and the progress of the operations, and evaluating operations against established MOEs and MOPs to determine progress relative to established objectives. Dynamic interactions between friendly forces, adaptable adversaries and enemies, and populations can complicate
assessment. Commanders must be attuned to changes in the OE, including the political variables in the OE and surrounding areas.

f. During assessment, the red team should analyze the situation from the perspective of the threat and other stakeholders. The most important measure of success may be how the threat assesses his own situation, rather than whether friendly forces are maximizing MOP and effectiveness scores. Operation assessment especially during combat operations, should be weighed against the enemy’s perspective of his own condition, his own objectives, and his own unique mindset and world view. Even if all objective measurements and assessments portray the enemy as defeated, he may not believe he is beaten. For example, an enemy that has suffered extreme attrition, but can still conduct sporadic offensive operations, may see himself as heroic and undefeated, even when objective measures suggest otherwise. Overall, the red team should have access to the same information as the assessment elements, and whenever the red team’s assessment of the threat’s mindset portrays a significantly different picture than that implied by assessment analyses, the red team input should be presented as a supplement to the assessment analyses.

g. As assessments and observations are translated into lessons learned, the red team’s external vantage point can be invaluable. The team’s relative independence will often help it see issues and potential solutions that might not be apparent to those closer to the problem. The team will also be less inhibited in highlighting issues and proposing corrective measures than staff elements that might bear some responsibility for the problem or that might be obligated to implement solutions.

6. Red Team Support to Intelligence Planning

a. IP is conducted by US, ally, and partner-nation intelligence organizations. IP procedures are fully integrated and synchronized with joint planning. The IP process is a methodology to coordinate and integrate available intelligence capabilities to meet CCDR intelligence collection and production requirements. It ensures prioritized intelligence support is aligned with CCDR objectives for each phase of an operation. The available US, ally, and partner-nation intelligence organizations develop intelligence products that are used by the joint force J-2 to provide the JFC and staff with situational understanding of the OE. Products developed by the CCMD J-2 during IP include intelligence estimates and the annex B (Intelligence).

b. These intelligence products provide substantial support to senior leader decision making throughout planning and execution, should be free from analytical error and organizational bias, and make certain all reasonable alternative interpretations have been considered. As such, red teams should be utilized in drafting these products.
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APPENDIX K
OPERATION ASSESSMENT PLAN

SECTION A. THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND DEVELOPING AN ASSESSMENT PLAN

1. General

   a. **There is no single way to conduct assessment.** Every mission and OE has its own unique challenges, making every assessment unique. The following steps can help guide the development of an effective assessment plan and assessment performance during execution. Assessment steps provide an orderly, analytical process to help organizations understand the underpinnings of desirable or undesirable action or behavior. Organizations should consider these steps as necessary to fit their needs. Figure K-1 provides an overview of the assessment process and is further explained in subsequent paragraphs.

   b. The assessment approach should be developed as the plan and operational design are developed and appropriately nested with the operational design. The assessments team should determine the right measures and indicators to inform the collection effort as end states, objectives, desired effects, decision points, and tasks are identified. The ever-changing OE requires continuous monitoring and adjustment of the plan. The operation assessment complements the planning process in answering three primary questions: “Where are we,” “How did we get here,” and “What’s next?” The complexity of an operation often makes it difficult to determine the criteria of success. Constructed properly, the assessment plan enables appropriate monitoring and collection of necessary information and intelligence to inform critical decisions throughout planning and execution. The assessment does not replace, but complements the commander’s intuition enabled through battlefield circulation and discussions with subordinate leaders.

   c. Operation assessment enhances the effectiveness of planning and execution by identifying and measuring observable key indicators toward progress or regression, as well as providing recommendations to senior decision makers to correct deficiencies and exploit success. A major challenge for the assessment team is to understand “How much is enough” to not overstretch finite collection assets.

   d. The assessment approach should identify the information and intelligence needed to assess progress and inform decision points throughout planning and execution. This information and intelligence should be included in the CCIRs and should provide the basis for identifying changes in conditions within the OE related to specific objectives or end states. Because success requires identifying specific conditions within the OE, assessment considerations should be part of their development. Integration, refinement, and adaptation of assessment requirements throughout planning and execution help ensure decision points, objectives, and tasks enhance the effective allocation and employment of joint capabilities.
### Operation Assessment Steps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Primarily in Planning or Execution</th>
<th>Personnel Involved</th>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Associated Staff Activity</th>
<th>Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Develop Assessment Approach</td>
<td>Planning • Operational Design • JPP Steps 1-6</td>
<td>• Commander • Planners • Primary staff • Special staff • Assessment element</td>
<td>Strategic guidance Commander’s Initial Planning Guidance Description of OE Problem to be solved Operational approach Commander’s intent (purpose, end state, risk)</td>
<td>• Conduct JIPOE • Develop operational approach • Support development and refinement of end states, objectives, effects, and tasks • Conduct Joint Planning (JPP and operational design) • Determine and develop how to assess tasks, effects, objectives, and end state progress for each course of action • Identify indicators</td>
<td>Assessment approach which includes: • Assessment framework and construct • Specific outcomes (end state, objectives, effects) • Commander’s estimate/CONOPS (from JPP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop Assessment Plan</td>
<td>Planning • JPP Step 7</td>
<td>• Commander • Planners • Primary staff • Special staff • Assessment element • Operations planners • Intelligence planners • Subordinate commanders • Interagency and multinational partners Others, as required</td>
<td>Assessment approach which includes: assessment framework and construct Specific outcomes (end state, objectives, effects) Commander’s estimate/CONOPS (from JPP)</td>
<td>• Document assessment framework and construct • Finalize the data collection plan • Coordinate and assign responsibilities for monitoring, collection, and analysis • Identify how the assessment is integrated into battle rhythm/feedback mechanism • Vet and staff the draft assessment plan</td>
<td>Approved assessment plan Data collection plan Approved contingency plan/operation order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collect Information and Intelligence</td>
<td>Execution</td>
<td>• Intelligence analysts • Current operations • Assessment element • Subordinate commanders • Interagency and multinational partners Others, as required</td>
<td>Approved assessment plan Data collection plan Approved contingency plan/operation order</td>
<td>• JIPOE • Staff estimates • IR management • ISR planning and optimization</td>
<td>Data collected and organized, relevant to joint force actions, current and desired conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyze Information and Intelligence</td>
<td>Execution</td>
<td>• Primary staff • Special staff • Assessment element</td>
<td>Data collected and organized, relevant to joint force actions, current and desired conditions</td>
<td>• Assessment working group • Staff estimates • Vet and validate recommendations</td>
<td>Draft assessment products Veted and validated recommendations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communicate Feedback and Recommendations</td>
<td>Execution</td>
<td>• Commander • Subordinate commanders (periodically) • Primary staff • Special staff Assessment element</td>
<td>Draft assessment products Veted and validated recommendations</td>
<td>• Provide timely recommendations to appropriate decision makers</td>
<td>Approved assessment products, decisions, and recommendations to higher headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adapt Plans or Operations/ Campaigns</td>
<td>Execution Planning</td>
<td>• Commander • Planners • Primary staff • Special staff Assessment element</td>
<td>Approved assessment products, decisions, and recommendations to higher headquarters</td>
<td>• Develop branches and sequels • Modify operational approach/plan • Modify objectives, effects, tasks • Modify assessment approach/plan</td>
<td>Revised plans or fragmentary orders Updated assessment plan Updated data collection plan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Repeat Steps 3-6 until operation terminated/replaced/transitioned. (Adjust using steps 1 and 2 as required during execution.)

#### Legend
- **CONOPS**: concept of operations
- **IR**: intelligence requirement
- **ISR**: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
- **JIPOE**: joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment
- **JPP**: joint planning process
- **OE**: operational environment

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**Figure K-1. Operation Assessment Steps**
2. Operation Assessment Process

   a. Operation assessment applies to both campaign plans and contingency plans and is continuous throughout planning and execution. For CCPs, an assessment plan is prepared as an annex or appendix of the campaign plan as the campaign’s operational approach is being developed and continues to be refined and adapted so long as the plan is in execution. The intermediate objectives and accompanying metrics are established that directly and measurably contribute to achieving campaign objectives. The campaign assessment plan is modified should a contingency plan or crisis-generated order go into execution as a new campaign operation. For contingency plans, the supported CCDR determines whether an assessment plan is required to support the four planning functions and to enhance effectiveness and keep it up to date and ready for transition to execution. As the contingency plan is modified, the assessment plan, if required, may likewise need refinement and adaptation.

   b. The impacts of friendly, threat, and neutral actions in the OE to a military plan and its execution must be considered. Operation assessment can help to identify significant actions and evaluate the results of these actions. This typically requires collaboration with other agencies and multinational partners—preferably within a common, accepted process—in the interest of unified action and facilitating the commander’s understanding of the OE. The CCDR should receive campaign objective report progress, as specified in the campaign plan assessment annex or appendix, from the following: intelligence collection and analysis, Service and functional components and JTFs, supporting commands and defense agencies, and country teams.

   c. The prescribed format for an assessment plan is in accordance with CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance. The CCP assessment plan is included within the campaign plan as annex N. Contingency plan assessment plans, as required, should be annex N (Assessments) to the contingency plan.

3. Assessment Steps

   A common method for an assessment uses six steps identified in Figure K-1.

   a. **Step 1. Develop the Assessment Approach.** In conducting an assessment, the first step is to determine what needs to be assessed and how the assessment will be conducted (see Figure K-2).

      (1) Operation assessment begins during the initiation step of the JPP when the command identifies possible operational approaches and their associated objectives, tasks, effects, and desired conditions in the OE. Concurrently, the staff begins to develop the operation assessment approach by identifying and integrating the appropriate assessment plan framework and structure needed to assess planning and execution effectiveness. The assessment approach identifies the specific information needed to monitor and analyze effects and conditions associated with achieving operation or campaign objectives. The assessment approach becomes the framework for the assessment plan and will continue to
Appendix K

Step 1 – Develop Operation Assessment Approach

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inputs</th>
<th>Staff Activity</th>
<th>Outputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Guidance CIPG</td>
<td>• Conduct JIPOE</td>
<td>Assessment approach which includes: framework for assessment and construct, and identification of reporting SME for MOEs and MOPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Description of OE</td>
<td>• Develop operational approach</td>
<td>Specific outcomes (end state, objectives, effects)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Problem to be solved</td>
<td>• Support development and refinement of end states, objectives, effects, and tasks</td>
<td>Commander’s estimate/CONOPS (from JPP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Operational approach</td>
<td>• Conduct joint planning (JPP and operational design)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Commander’s intent (purpose, end state, risk)</td>
<td>• Determine and develop how to assess tasks, effects, objectives, and end state progress for each course of action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Identify indicators</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure K-2. Step 1—Develop Operation Assessment Approach

mature through plan development, refinement, adaptation, and execution to understand the OE and measure whether anticipated and executed operations are having the desired impact on the OE (see Figure K-4). In short, the command tries to answer the following questions: “How will we know we are creating the desired effects,” “Are we achieving the objectives,” “What information do we need,” and “Who is best postured to provide that information?”

(2) The first step of the assessment approach aligns to all JPP steps, as assessment should complement and be concurrent with the planning effort. A common error is not considering assessment until the plan is completed. Upon receipt of a new mission or significantly revised strategic direction, assessment roles and responsibilities should be identified and understood. Identifying an experienced assessment development lead can help planners throughout mission analysis, CCIR development, success criteria, COA selection, and eventual plan development. Forming an assessment team of the right subject matter experts across the key staff, as well as inclusion of interagency and multinational partners, encourages transparency, unity of effort, and avoids duplicative efforts. Additionally, focusing on future assessment requirements throughout planning and execution can ensure the anticipated and executed tasks and objectives are assessable and help establish a logical hierarchy from measured task completion status and the creation of effects toward achievement of objectives in support of attaining the end states. Before any assessment development occurs, the purpose of the assessment and key decisions to inform throughout planning and execution should be understood.
(3) **Identify Information Requirements.** Strategic guidance documents such as the CPG and JSCP serve as the primary guidance to begin planning at the CCMDs. CCDRs and other commanders may also initiate planning on their own authority when they identify a planning requirement not directed by higher authority. Subordinate components and commands typically begin planning based on higher headquarters guidance but should be aware of strategic guidance to properly nest supporting plans within plans being developed at higher headquarters. Military options are normally developed in combination with other nonmilitary options so the President can respond with the appropriate instruments of national power. Staffs begin updating their estimates and gather the information necessary for mission analysis and continued planning. Specific information gathered regarding assessment includes, but is not limited to:

(a) The higher headquarters’ plan or order, including the assessment annex if available.

(b) If replacing a unit, any current assessment products.

(c) Relevant assessment products (classified or open-source) produced by civilian, government, military, and partner nation organizations.

(d) The draft desired end state, objectives, and effects of the organization.

(4) **Understand Current and Desired Conditions**

(a) Fundamentally, operation assessment is about understanding current and desired conditions in the OE, observing changes in the OE, ascertaining the contribution of anticipated or completed tasks or missions to observed OE changes, and assessing progress or regression toward the desired OE conditions relative to the specified objective or end state. Staffs compare current conditions in the OA against the desired conditions. During mission analysis, JIPOE, and component-level intelligence preparation of the battlefield help develop an understanding of the current situation. The commander and staff identify the desired conditions and key underlying assumptions for an operation during joint planning. During execution, operational and intelligence reporting, the update of staff estimates, and any relevant information from external sources help them update and improve their understanding of the current conditions of the OE. Assumptions should be validated as soon as possible during execution. Likewise, desired conditions should be reevaluated as needed during execution.

(b) Understanding current and desired conditions requires acknowledging the underlying assumptions. Assumptions identified during planning are challenged during data analysis throughout operation assessment. If the assumptions are subsequently disproven, then reframing the problem may be appropriate.

(c) During initiation and operational design, commanders and selected key personnel develop and issue planning guidance that includes initial intent. That guidance is reviewed during mission analysis. Following mission analysis, commanders issue
CCIRs, approve the mission statement, and issue additional guidance to guide the planning team during COA development. The end state in the initial commander’s intent describes the conditions the commander wants to change. The staff section responsible for the assessment plan reviews each desired condition mentioned in the operational approach and commander’s intent. These individual conditions provide focus for the overall planning, execution, and assessment of the operation. If the conditions that define the end state change during planning and execution, the staff updates these changes for the assessment plan.

(d) To assess progress, the staff identifies both the current situation and the desired end state. For example, the commander provides the end state condition “Essential services restored to pre-hostility levels.” The staff identifies appropriate joint forces tasks, observable key indicators of task performance and effect(s) of task completion on OE conditions, and develops a plan to collect and analyze key indicator information while continuously monitoring OE conditions relative to this desired end state. These indicators also identify the current and pre-hostility levels of essential services across the OA. By taking these actions, the staff establishes a mechanism to assess progress toward these required conditions so that operations planned to change them are most effective.

(5) Identify Assessment Indicators

(a) An assessment plan should have a structure that begins with the operation or campaign’s implied, specified, and essential tasks that, if successfully accomplished, should achieve the campaign objectives or attain contingency end states. These tasks are used to establish measurable, achievable military objectives and accompanying metrics based on carefully selected MOEs and MOPs from among available indicators. Combined with continuous JIPOE, the MOEs and MOPs facilitate staff observations and analysis of changes in the OE and their impact on planning and execution.

(b) The assessment plan should focus on identifying those indicators and associated information and intelligence that accurately reflect changes in the OE. Analyses should identify whether desired objectives are being achieved and continually evaluate assumptions to validate or invalidate them. It should be noted that indicators, associated information, and intelligence may require modification or replacement during planning and execution to respond to the dynamic conditions of the OE. In complex and dynamic OEs, indicators should be periodically re-assessed and validated or adjusted as required.

(c) Collection requirements must be established once data requirements have been identified. Essentially, the organization must consider the rules and content of the data collection plan (DCP)—the “who, where, when, how, and who (again)” (see Figure K-3). Collection requirements should be developed with functional subject matter experts, vetted throughout the staff, and included in the DCP. These broad actions typically fall under one of three categories: organize and collect, analyze, and communicate.
1. Organize and Collect

   a. Organizing for assessment involves identifying the information needed to assess effectiveness throughout planning and execution. In the case of assessment, the required information should promote understanding of the OE. This understanding is critical to assess the difference between present and desired OE conditions toward achieving the objective or attaining the end state, as well as to assess the performance and effects of completed tasks and missions.

   b. **Identifying the required information must be an integral part of joint planning.** Assessment considerations should be informed and shaped by operational design and reflect the operational approach. Because success requires identifying specific conditions within the OE, assessment considerations should be part of their development. Integration, refinement, and adaptation of the required information throughout planning and execution help make certain that recommendations regarding the effectiveness of anticipated and completed tasks and missions are synchronized to support decision points.

   c. **Once information requirements have been identified, it should be determined whether the required information exists or needs to be collected and collection requirements established.** Information requirements should be vetted throughout the staff and included in the initial and subsequent CCIRs. This establishes an OE baseline against which the effectiveness of anticipated and completed operations can be compared. While often considered part of execution, collection efforts for assessment should begin during planning. This process continues until planning or execution of an operation transitions to the next logical event.

2. Analyze. Analysis identifies operationally significant trends and changes to the OE; their impact on planning and execution (including risks and opportunities); and develops recommendations to refine, adapt, or terminate planning and execution. Information considerations are included in the development of the assessment approach and included in the assessment plan. Command internal analysis begins with plan initiation and continues throughout planning and execution. External analysis support
typically follows plan or order approval, but informal collaboration with supporting CCMDs, Services, and DOD agencies should begin at plan initiation. The analysis should include the limitations of assessment plan indicators, such as degree of uncertainty, correlations versus causation, or gaps that may exist.

3. **Communicate.** The communicate action provides appropriate assessment products to all stakeholders and interested audiences. Internal communication includes the commander (for decisions regarding the overall operation or areas where the commander has expressed interest), staff elements and subordinate commands requiring information related to the analyses (for additional analysis or internal functional decisions), and external audiences (whose products may require commander approval for release). Communication considerations should be addressed during development of the assessment approach and included in the assessment plan. However, the “communicate” action typically follows plan or order approval (e.g., CONPLAN, OPLAN) and analysis.

(d) During planning for an operation or campaign, a baseline understanding of the OE assists the commander and staff in setting objectives, if useful, for desired rates of change within the OE and thresholds for success and failure. This also focuses the assessment process on answering specific questions relating to the desired objectives of the plan.

1. Identifying the desired objective or end state and the associated conditions is critical to determining progress in any operation or campaign. Poorly defined objectives or end states typically result in ineffective planning and execution. Poorly defined objectives and end states also increase the risks of wasting time, resources, and opportunities to successfully accomplish the mission. To avert this, the staff should identify clear objectives and tasks having performance and effects criteria that can be observed, measured, refined, and adapted throughout planning and execution. In turn, analysis of anticipated and completed tasks should generate assessment recommendations to communicate.

2. Throughout planning and execution the command defines the desired observable changes in the OE necessary to achieve the objective or attain the end state and may develop a DSM. The DSM is a written record of a wargamed COA that describes decision points and associated actions at those decision points. Among other information, the DSM lists decision points and the criteria to be evaluated at decision points. It also lists the units responsible for observing and reporting information affecting the criteria for decisions. This information should be incorporated into the assessment plan and reflect the required information considerations in Figure K-4.
3. Nonmilitary aspects of the OE may be critically important in some operations. Information derived from multiple external sources should contribute to tailored JIPOE products that address the relevant nonmilitary actors and relationships within the OE. Analysis addressing all relevant actors within the OE improves and informs the understanding of how conditions may be changed within the OE.

For more detailed discussion on developing indications, see Section B “Linking Effects, Objectives, and End States to Tasks through Indicators.”

b. Step 2—Develop Operation Assessment Plan

(1) Developing, refining, and adapting the assessment plan is concurrent and complementary throughout joint planning and execution. This step overlaps with the previous step during identification of the objectives and effects. Developing the assessment plan is a whole-of-staff effort and should include other key stakeholders to better shape the assessment effort. The assessment plan should identify staff or subordinate organizations to monitor, collect, analyze information, and develop recommendations and assessment products as required. Requirements for staff coordination and presentation to the commander should also be included in the plan and integrated into the command’s battle rhythm to support the commander’s decision cycle (Figure K-4).
(2) The plan framework (i.e., LOEs, objectives, effects, and supporting MOEs and MOPs) is the foundation for the assessment. As such, the assessment plan should link end states to objectives or to intermediate objectives to effects and finally to tasks (and supporting operations, activities, and investments, if appropriate or available). Within this framework, performance and effects can be measured based on observable key indicators. The assessment plan should also include required information oversight responsibilities to gather, update, process and exploit, analyze and integrate, disseminate, classify, and archive the required information.

c. Step 3—Collect Information and Intelligence

(1) Commands should collect relevant information throughout planning and execution (see Figure K-5).

(2) Throughout planning and execution the joint force refines and adapts information collection requirements to gather information about the OE and the joint force’s anticipated and completed actions as part of normal C2 activities. Typically, staffs and subordinate commands provide information about planning and execution on a regular cycle through specified battle rhythm events. Intelligence staffs continually provide intelligence about the OE and operational impact to support the collective staff assessment effort. In accordance with the assessment plan, assessment considerations may help the staff determine the presence of decision-point triggers and other mission impacts.

d. Step 4—Analyze Information and Intelligence

(1) Accurate, unbiased analysis seeks to identify operationally significant trends and changes to the OE and their impact on the operation or campaign. To increase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 3 – Collect Information and Intelligence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inputs</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approved assessment plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data collection plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approved contingency plan/operation order (from JPP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend

JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment

JPP joint planning process

*Figure K-5. Step 3—Collect Information and Intelligence*
credibility and transparency, **analysis should be conducted with, and vetted through, functional experts within the staff.** Some assessment elements may lack the expertise required to judge the impact to a particular functional area.

(2) Based on analysis, the staff can estimate the effects of force employment and resource allocation, determine whether objectives are being achieved, or determine if a decision point has been reached. Using these determinations, the staff also may identify additional risks and challenges to mission accomplishment or identify opportunities to accelerate mission accomplishment (see Figure K-6).

(3) To identify trends and changes, it is necessary to collect and analyze observable key indicators of those differences in conditions in the OE that are the result of completed tasks and missions rather than simply OE “noise” or normal variation. Analysis seeks to identify positive or negative movement toward creating desired effects, achieving objectives, or attaining end states.

(a) While individual staff elements may be responsible for analysis within their functional area, vetting and validation across the staff should enable coherent, holistic assessment products that reflect and encompass numerous discrete analyses.

(b) **Cautionary Notes**

1. Military operations are inherently human endeavors. In contrast, models are abstract representations of the OE, limited by the perspectives of their developers and what their users are attempting to evaluate. Consequently, models may not include all the critical variables and relationships in the OE. The presence of numbers or

---

**Step 4 – Analyze Information and Intelligence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inputs</th>
<th>Staff Activity</th>
<th>Outputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Information collected, processed and integrated, and disseminated to intelligence analysts and command’s functional experts | • Update JIPOE products to baseline/update insights into measurable operational environment conditions  
• Update staff estimates and appendix 11 (Intelligence Estimate) to annex B (Intelligence)  
• Vet analysis and validate recommendations | Draft assessment products  
Vetted and validated recommendations |

**Legend**

JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment

**Figure K-6. Step 4—Analyze Information and Intelligence**
mathematical formulae in an assessment does not imply deterministic certainty, rigor, or quality. However, despite the inherent presence of uncertainty in modeling outputs, with the appropriate supporting context, assessment models can assist in analyzing and understanding complex, ill-structured OEs. Models can assist planners and assessors in producing assessments by providing objective, rational, structured approaches toward complex systems and issues.

2. Military units often find stability activities the most challenging to assess accurately. Staff elements should use caution when seeking to quantify data related to social phenomena. They should ensure military and nonmilitary subject matter experts validate data quality and its appropriateness to the phenomena and answers being sought. This type of data normally requires a sound statistical approach and expert interpretation to be meaningful in analysis.

3. When dealing with complex problems and OEs, such as stability, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism, a complete picture and predicting the impacts of activities and changes in the OE may not be possible. While there can be seemingly predictable patterns, these may rest on foundations that change in ways not easily observed or fully understood. Given the challenges of gaining and maintaining understanding of complex environments and the need to maintain awareness of underlying changes, combining the perspectives of multiple groups and organizations can be a key enabler. No single group or organization has all the information or the complete perspective on the complex environment. Analysis of complex environments should include subject matter experts on the range of issues being addressed as well as experts or local relevant actors knowledgeable about the local context and environment. Further, organizational biases need to be challenged and alternate perspectives developed, either through inviting differing views from partners or through deliberate efforts such as red teaming. Success in complex OEs requires innovation and rapid, iterative adaptation based on assessment of results from activities and changes in the OE.

4) Using professional military judgment, the assessment describes progress toward or regression from attaining the end state, achieving the objectives, decisive conditions, and creating effects by answering the assessment-essential questions:

(a) Where are we?
(b) What happened?
(c) Why do we think it happened?
(d) So what?
(e) What are the likely future opportunities and risks?
(f) What do we need to do?
(5) The conclusions generated by the staff analyses regarding achievement of the
objective or attainment of the desired end state, force employment, resource allocation,
validity of planning assumptions, and decision points should lead the staff to develop
recommendations for consideration. Recommendations should highlight ways to improve
the effectiveness of operations and plans by informing all decisions, including the
following:

(a) Update, change, add, or remove critical assumptions.

(b) Transition between phases (as appropriate).

(c) Execute branches and sequels.

(d) Realign resources.

(e) Adjust operations.

(f) Adjust orders, objectives, and end states.

(g) Adjust priorities.

(h) Change priorities of effort.

(i) Change support commands.

(j) Adjust command relationships.

(k) Adjust decision points.

(l) Refine or adapt the assessment plan.

(6) Before recommendations are presented to the commander for action, they must
be vetted and validated through the staff. The assessment plan should detail the staff processes
required to ensure assessment products are valid and any associated recommendations are
achievable and improve the effectiveness of operations. A notional example of battle rhythm
activities used to vet and validate assessment products is found in Figure K-7. Many
recommendations will involve decision makers below the commander. Those
recommendations, once vetted and validated, should be implemented at the appropriate level.
Remaining recommendations, including contentious issues, should be presented to the
commander for approval and implementation guidance.

e. **Step 5—Communicate Feedback and Recommendations**

(1) The staff may be required to develop assessment products (which may include
summary reports and briefings) containing recommendations for the commander based
upon the guidelines set forth in the assessment plan. The commander’s guidance is the
most critical step in developing assessment products. Regardless of quality and effort, the
(2) Assessment products are not the assessment itself. Neither are they the data collected for analysis. Assessment products serve the functions of informing the commander about current and anticipated conditions within the OE, evaluate the ability of the joint force to impact the OE, evaluate progress toward intermediate objectives and end states, provide accountability to higher authority, and communicate progress to multinational and interagency partners.

(3) Staffs should strive to align their efforts when communicating assessment results and recommendations (see Figure K-8). Inclusion of various staff products may gain efficiencies by possibly eliminating duplicative briefings and decision boards. It also serves to convey proper context and assure staff-wide dialogue with the commander.
f. Step 6—Adapt Plans or Operations/Campaigns

(1) Once feedback and recommendations have been provided, commanders typically direct changes or provide additional guidance that dictate updates or modifications to an operation or campaign plan. The commander’s guidance may also induce modifications to the assessment plan (see Figure K-9). Even without significant changes to the plan or order, changes to the assessment plan may be necessary to reflect changes in the OE or adjustments to the information or intelligence requirements.

(2) As the operation or campaign transitions between phases, if applied, the assessment plan will likely require updates to adjust to changes in objectives, effects, and tasks associated with the new phase. While some of these changes can be anticipated during the original assessment plan development, revisions may be necessary to reflect actual conditions in the OE or changes to the plan or order.
(3) There should be organizational procedures associated with capturing the commander’s decisions and guidance to ensure necessary actions are taken. The ongoing assessment process should account for these decisions and the actions taken.

4. Cyclical Nature of Assessment

a. Until the military end state has been attained, the objectives achieved, or the operation transitions, operational assessment remains an on-going process.

b. Adjustments to the plan or order based on commander’s updated guidance or changes within the OE will require similar updates or changes to the assessment plan and perhaps its DCP. Updates to the plan or order should be formalized as FRAGORDs for the widest possible dissemination. Each completed analysis will identify new baseline conditions for the OE and the new basis for analyses of progress.

c. If the operation is incorporated into the command’s campaign plan, appropriate intelligence and information requirements should be incorporated into the CCIRs and the assessment plan (and perhaps its DCP) for the campaign plan.

d. Once the planning is terminated, or when refined or adapted, commands should document their assessment approach and assessment results as part of their lessons learned.

5. Assessment Plan Essentials

During the development of the assessment plan, the staff should:

a. Document the MOEs and MOPs in terms of acceptable conditions, rates of change, thresholds of success/failure, and technical/tactical triggers.

b. Document the selection of relevant aspects of the OE during mission analysis.

c. Document the development of information and intelligence requirements and record the linkage to key MOE and MOP indicators.

d. Document information and intelligence collection and analysis methods.

e. Establish methods to estimate risk integrated with the command’s risk management process.

f. Establish methods to determine progress toward the desired end state.

g. Establish a method to evaluate triggers to the commander’s decision points.

h. Develop a terms-of-reference document.

i. Establish the format for assessment products.
j. Coordinate development of recommendations.

SECTION B. LINKING EFFECTS, OBJECTIVES, AND END STATES TO TASKS THROUGH INDICATORS

6. Introduction

a. An operation’s desired effects, objectives, and end states should help focus the staff’s assessment efforts by identifying and analyzing a subset of the overall changes within the overall OE. As the staff develops the desired effects, objectives, and end states during planning, they should concurrently identify the specific pieces of information needed to infer changes in the OE supporting them. These pieces of information are commonly referred to as indicators.

b. Indicators share common characteristics with carefully selected MOPs and MOEs and link tasks to effects, objectives, and end states (see Figure K-10). Commanders and staffs should develop an approach that best fits their organization, operation, and requirements.

7. Guidelines for Indicator Development

a. Indicators should be relevant, observable or collectable, responsive, and resourced.

(1) Relevant. Indicators should be relevant to a desired effect, objective, or end state within the plan or order. A valid indicator bears a direct relationship to the desired effect, objective, or end state and accurately signifies the anticipated or actual status of something about the effect, objective, or end state that must be known. This criterion helps avoid collecting and analyzing information that is of no value to a specific operation. It also helps ensure efficiency by eliminating redundant efforts.

(2) Observable and Collectable. Indicators must be observable (and therefore collectable) such that changes can be detected and measured or evaluated. The staff should make note of indicators that are relevant but not collectable and report them to the commander. Collection shortfalls can often put the analysis quality at risk. The commander must decide whether to accept this risk, realign resources to collect required information, or modify the plan or order.

(3) Responsive. Indicators should signify changes in the OE timely enough to enable effective response by the staff and timely decisions by the commander. Assessors...
must consider an indicator’s responsiveness to stimulus in the OE. Should indicators react too slowly, opportunities for response are likely to be missed and if too quickly it exposes the staff and commander to false alarms. The JFC and staff should consider the time required for a task or mission to produce desired results within the OE and develop indicators that can respond accordingly. Many actions directed by the JFC require time to implement and may take even longer to produce a measurable result.

(4) **Resourced.** The collection of indicators should be adequately resourced so the command and subordinate units can obtain the required information without excessive effort or cost. Indicator information should be derived from other staff processes whenever possible. Assessors should avoid indicators that require development of an additional collection system. Staffs should ensure resource requirements for indicator collection efforts and analysis are included in plans and monitored. Data collection and analysis requirements associated with the threat and the OE should be embodied in the commander’s PIRs with relevant tasks specified through annex B (Intelligence) to a plan or an order. Given the focus of PIRs, the collection and analysis they drive provides the commander with insights on changes associated with MOEs. On the other hand, FFIRs provide insights to the commander on the ability of major force elements and other critical capabilities to execute their assigned tasks. Thus, they are associated with MOPs and should be published in annex C (Operations) with reporting requirements and procedures specified in annex R (Reports) and managed via the guidance in annex I (Knowledge and

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**Figure K-10. Linking End State, Objectives, Effects, Tasks, Conditions, and Mission to Tasks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desired Outcomes</th>
<th>What links them together?</th>
<th>Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Developed in Planning)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Identified in planning, modified in execution)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Possible Ways**
  - Strategic questions
  - Assessment questions
  - Information and intelligence requirements
  - Measures of effectiveness
  - Measures of performance
  - Present operational environment conditions
  - Desired operational environment conditions

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Information Management). Effective assessment planning can help avoid duplicating tasks and unnecessary actions, which in turn can help preserve combat power.

b. Collection plans must clearly articulate why an indicator is necessary for the accurate assessment of an action. Collection may draw on subordinate unit operations, KLEs, joint functions and functional estimates, and battle damage assessment. Staffs need to understand the fidelity of the available information, choose appropriate information, and prioritize use of high demand collection resources.

c. Some assessment indicators must compete for prioritization and collection assets. Assessors should coordinate with intelligence planners throughout planning and execution to identify collection efforts already gathering indicator information, alternative indicator information that might be available, and coordinate and synchronize assessment-related collection requirements with the command’s integrated collection plan.

8. Selecting Indicators

a. The two types of indicators commonly used by the joint forces are MOPs and MOEs.

   (1) MOPs are indicators used to assess friendly (i.e., multinational) actions tied to measuring task accomplishment. MOPs commonly reside in task execution matrices and confirm or deny proper task performance. MOPs help answer the question: “Are we doing things right,” “Was the action taken,” or “Was the task completed to standard?”

   (2) MOEs are indicators used to help measure a current system state with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time to gauge the achievement of objectives and attainment of end states. MOEs help answer the question, “Are we doing the right things to create the effects or changes in the conditions of the OE that we desire?”

b. Choose distinct indicators. Using indicators that are too similar to each other can result in the repetitious evaluation of change in a particular condition. In this way, similar indicators skew analyses by overestimating, or “double-counting,” change in one item in the OE.

c. Include indicators from different causal chains. When indicators have a cause and effect relationship with each other, either directly or indirectly, it decreases their value in measuring a particular condition. Measuring progress toward a desired condition by multiple means adds rigor to the analyses.

d. Use the same indicator for more than one end state, objective, effect, task, condition, or mission when appropriate. This sort of duplication in organizing OE information does not introduce significant bias unless carried to an extreme.

e. Avoid or minimize additional reporting requirements for subordinate units. In many cases, commanders may use information generated by other staff elements as
appendix k

indicators in the assessment plan. Units collect many assessment indicators as part of routine operational and intelligence reporting. With careful consideration, commanders and staffs can often find viable alternative indicators without creating new reporting requirements. Excessive reporting requirements can render an otherwise valid assessment plan untenable.

f. Maximize clarity. An indicator describes the sought-after information, including specifics on time, information, geography, or unit, as necessary. Any staff member should be able to read the indicator and precisely understand the information it describes.

g. For complex situations or challenging-to-assess activities, developing multiple indicators may be necessary. In such cases, these indicators should be drawn from different sources (i.e., qualitative, quantitative, subjective, objective) to provide a more comprehensive and robust understanding of trends and developments.

9. Understanding Information Categories and Data Types

a. Information Categories. The specific type of information expressed in indicators can typically be categorized as quantitative or qualitative as well as subjective or objective.

(1) The following information categories provide a guide to their meanings since they are susceptible to misinterpretation with regards to assessments:

(a) Quantitative. Numerical information relating to the quantity or amount of something.

(b) Qualitative. Information reflecting an observation of, relating to, or involving quality or kind, typically expressed as a word, sentence, description, or code that represents a category.

(c) Subjective. Information based on an individual interpretation of an observed item or condition.

(d) Objective. Information based on facts and the precise measurement of conditions or concepts that actually exist without distortion by personal feelings, prejudices, or interpretations.

(2) To ensure value and credibility, assessors must understand and apply categorization considerations in their assessments and recommendations. Indicator information is usually a combination of the four information categories: quantitative-objective, quantitative-subjective, qualitative-objective, and qualitative-subjective (as shown in Figure K-11). As a standard of analytical rigor, an information category must be considered when formulating analyses, reports, and recommendations.

b. Information Types. Assessment information is used to calculate, analyze, and recommend. Whenever possible, information should be empirical—originating in or based on observation or experience. Generally, there are four information types. Knowing the
type is essential to understand the type of analysis that can be performed and whether the information can be interpreted to draw conclusions, such as the quantity and speed of change in an OE condition over time. In increasing level of complexity and information content the information types are:

(1) **Nominal.** Nominal information can be organized or sorted into categories, with no difference in degree or amount between category and any ordering by category is arbitrary. For example, friendly forces are categorized by the sending nation (e.g., from Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria).

(2) **Ordinal.** Ordinal information has an order but does not indicate the magnitude of discrete intervals within the information. A Likert Scale is a common application of ordinal information where “strongly agree” represents more agreement than “agree” but without specifying how much more. An example of ordinal data might include the rating of the capability of a unit from “able to perform independent operations” as the highest rating and “unable to perform operations without assistance” as the lowest rating.

(3) **Interval.** Interval information is ordinal data with the extra property of having the discrete intervals qualified or able to be meaningfully added or subtracted. However, an interval scale has no meaningful value for zero and, therefore, ratios are meaningless. An example is temperature scales where 0º Celsius does not mean there is no temperature. To illustrate, the average daily temperature in Kabul, Afghanistan, in June may be 25º Celsius and in December 5º Celsius. While a difference of 20º Celsius between these months is meaningful, it cannot be stated that June is 5 times as hot as December.

(4) **Ratio.** Ratio information has meaning in both intervals and ratios between measurements. Ratio information has a natural zero indicating the absence of whatever is being measured. For example, the number of personnel in the armed forces of NATO nations (1999 figures, in thousands) is United States, 1,372; Turkey, 639; Germany, 322; and so on. It is valid to say both that Turkey has 317,000 more military personnel than

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**Figure K-11. Information Category Example**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information Type</th>
<th>Quantitative</th>
<th>Qualitative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>The number of no-fly zone violations that have occurred in the last week</td>
<td>The mandate to enforce a no-fly zone is approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective</td>
<td>The air component's assessment of the effectiveness of the no-fly zone, on a scale of 1 to 10</td>
<td>Enemy freedom of action is limited by the no-fly zone</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Germany and that the United States has more than twice as many military personnel as Turkey.

10. Linking Effects, Objectives, and End States to Tasks Through Indicators

a. Ensuring effects, objectives, and end states are linked to tasks through carefully selected MOPs and MOEs is essential to the analytical rigor of an assessment framework. Establishing strong, cogent links between tasks and effects, objectives, and end states through MOPs and MOEs facilitates the transparency and clarity of the assessment approach. Additionally, links between tasks and effects, objectives, and end states assist in mapping the plan’s CONOPS to actual activities and conditions in the OE and subsequently to desired effects, objectives, and end states.

b. Using Assessment Questions and Information and Intelligence Requirements. This approach uses the model shown in Figure K-12 to guide the development of assessment questions and information and intelligence requirements to identify indicators.

1) Statements about effects, objectives, or end states can refer to anything that specifies the change(s) in the OE being sought. Within Figure K-13, the refinement of a statement into “smaller statements” refers to any statement or question that increases the specificity of the original statement. For example, for a military end state, we may have several objectives; for an objective, we may have several effects; or, for a strategic objective, we may have to achieve several operational-level objectives. During this portion of the process, assessors help develop and refine specific indicators to measure effectiveness. These nested operational design elements may have one or more associated assessment questions.

2) Assessment questions are those that, when answered, provide the commander and staff with direct answers to critical information pertaining to the OE and progress toward desired effects, objectives, or end states. Assessment questions take the general form of “How well are we creating our desired effects” and related questions such as, “How can we achieve our objectives more effectively—more quickly, qualitatively better, at less cost, or at less risk?” Answers to the CCIRs should ground the assessment process in the desired effects. They should be answerable with the information or data available to the command, relevant to the desired effects, objectives, or end states and commander priorities; and useful to evaluate whether the mission is being performed, desired effects are being created, objectives are being achieved, and end states are being attained.

3) Information and intelligence requirements should be related to the desired effects, objectives, or end states of the plan and should be developed from the assessment questions. Information and intelligence requirements provide a foundation for the development of indicators and record the logical connection between indicators and assessment questions and the effects, objectives, or end states they support. Within the context of assessments, intelligence requirements are typically used to understand conditions within the OE while information requirements are used to determine whether the joint force properly executed planned actions. By using both intelligence and
For each desired outcome: Specific or require breakdown?

- Yes: Requires breakdown.
  - Break down into smaller "statements."

- No: intelligence and information requirements (as many as required)

  For each intelligence and information requirement: Can we answer this question with empirical evidence?
  - Yes: Indicators (as many as required)
  - No: Can we ask more specific questions?
    - Yes: Ask more specific questions.
    - No: Identify Shortfall/Risk

Specific

Assessment Question(s)

For each assessment question: Questions we need to answer to know we are doing this.

End State, Objectives, Effects, Tasks, Conditions, and Mission

Figure K-12. Linking End State, Objectives, Effects, Tasks, Conditions, and Mission to Indicators

information, assessment can provide more comprehensive analyses of the current OE and the joint force’s impact on it. When developing information and intelligence requirements, here are some of the questions the staff may ask to determine the value of proposed requirements:
### Comparison and Use of Information and Intelligence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective</th>
<th>Information</th>
<th>Intelligence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sources</td>
<td>Staff section and subordinate command reports, host-nation reports, nongovernmental organization information.</td>
<td>All-source intelligence, intelligence agency reports, host-nation reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use in Plans</td>
<td>Friendly force information requirements assumptions linking force posture to operations.</td>
<td>Priority intelligence requirements assumptions linking operations to effects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use in Assessments</td>
<td>Identifies if planned actions are executed properly.</td>
<td>Identifies if desired outcomes are achieved.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Example of Information or Intelligence Requirement | • Allocation of coalition trainers to train host-nation security forces within a specific region.  
• Readiness assessment of host-nation security forces. | Security assessment within a particular region. |

**Figure K-13. Comparison and Use of Information and Intelligence**

(a) **Usage.** What aspect of the desired effects, objectives, or end states does this information or intelligence requirement inform?

(b) **Source.** How will the required information or intelligence be collected? Who is collecting it? What is our confidence level in the reporting?

(c) **Measurability.** Is the information or intelligence requirement measurable? If the information or intelligence requirement is unavailable, are there other information or intelligence requirements that can serve as proxies?

(d) **Impact.** What is the impact of knowing the required information or intelligence? What is the impact of not knowing it? What is the risk if it is false?

(e) **Timeliness.** When is the required information or intelligence no longer valuable?

(f) **Cost.** What is the cost of data collection to answer the information and intelligence requirements (e.g., the risk to forces, resources, and or mission)?
(4) Indicators should answer information and intelligence requirements. Indicator characteristics are discussed in paragraph 7, “Guidelines for Indicator Development.”

SECTION C. DATA COLLECTION PLAN

11. Developing the Data Collection Plan

a. After the assessment indicators have been established, the staff develops a DCP in coordination with planners. This process should include members of staff who will become responsible for collecting data. Although there is no set format for a DCP, it should identify the following for each indicator:

(1) Data parameters, such as:
   (a) Units of measurement.
   (b) Scale, if appropriate.
   (c) Categorization for nominal or interval data.
   (d) Upper and lower bounds (if required).
   (e) Additional criteria.

(2) Source of the data.

(3) Method of collection.

(4) Party responsible for collection.

(5) Format in which data should be recorded.

(6) Required frequency of collection.

(7) Data recipients (who needs the data), recognizing that recipients may change over time.

(8) Required frequency of reporting.

(9) Additional information.

b. The creation of the data collection matrix assists in clarifying the “measurability” of the selected indicator and may result in further refinement. The DCP should always be synchronized and deconflicted with established reports across the command.
(1) Some data for indicators, particularly those associated with performance, may already be organic—generated, captured, and reported by units within the command structure—while some might be reported by external nonmilitary organizations. While some of this information may be available prior to execution, the majority of performance related reporting occurs following execution.

(2) Other data for indicators associated with impacts on the OE will require the designation of observers as part of the intelligence collection plan or the development of another mechanism for collection. Generally, it is helpful to establish a baseline as early as possible from which subsequent change can be determined. It may be possible to collect on some indicators prior to beginning an operation. In other cases, the operation will begin, and data are collected as early as feasible.

c. The DCP should be published with the final operation or campaign plan/order and incorporated into annex I (Knowledge and Information Management). Once the campaign or operation is approved by the commander, all levels of command should start the operation assessment collection process. Throughout planning and execution, the collection plan should be modified as required until planning is terminated or the operation transitions.

12. Data Sources

a. Staff elements, in conjunction with commander’s communication synchronization personnel, should identify expected and available sources of data. Data can originate from a variety of sources, including but not limited to:

- Local population (formal or informal surveys of both men and women).
- HN officials (formal or informal surveys).
- HN records.
- Other USG departments and agencies (i.e., embassies, development departments).
- International organizations working in area (e.g., UN, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, European Union, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development).
- NGOs working in area.
- Friendly force observations (e.g., patrol reports, intelligence).
- Media and other open sources (e.g., local, national, and home radio, Internet, social media, television, and print sources).
(9) Commercial data sources (e.g., datacards).

(10) Assessment products from superior, subordinate, and supporting commands.

(11) Subject matter experts within the command.

(12) Lessons learned and historical records.

b. Each data source requires appropriate scrutiny prior to and during use. When classification rules allow, the source should always be linked to the information collected to help provide full disclosure when reporting. Without this information, the credibility of any recommendation could be disputed if the analysis and communication products appear to be overly positive or negative when compared with general perceptions and expectations.

c. Some data sources may be using that data for their own assessment purposes. It should be considered whether data sourced from other organizations is raw or processed. In the case of processed data, knowledge about the raw data, assumptions, and processing methods involved should be obtained.

d. The staff should specify the expected source of data for each indicator and, if available, identify back-up or corroborating sources for the following reasons:

(1) **Data From Multiple Sources is More Easily Verified.** A data item from one source is not as valuable as when the same data item is corroborated by other sources.

(2) **Mitigate Human Bias.** If the data item involves visual observations (e.g., number of open shops) or perceptive observations (e.g., sense of security in the town), the data may vary significantly depending on the source chosen. Bias is a danger when using human subjects.

(3) **Keep Track of Data and Its Origin.** Whether data is taken from one or multiple sources, source identity is important for analysis purposes. An effective annex I (Knowledge and Information Management) should support manage and track data sources.

(4) **Data Archiving.** Historical records and data backups are essential. In addition to capturing lessons learned, analysts can work to improve measures by performing trend analysis of data over time. Improved historical data capture can also improve the ability to use predictive analytical techniques where opportunities arise.

13. **Methods of Collection**

a. Throughout planning and execution, planners and staff should identify assessment-related data collection methods. They should identify resources required for data collection, prepare data collection orders for subordinate and supporting commands, and identify appropriate liaison with mission partners to set up data exchange procedures. The
command’s mindset should be: “Everyone is a collector.” Those responsible for the assessment process should remember this when determining collection methods. Since collection resources are often limited, planners and staffs should seek to establish a balance between the resources used for data collection and resources for other military tasks.

b. Figure K-14 provides some examples of data collection methods and associated advantages and disadvantages.

14. **Assign Responsibility for Data Collection**

   a. The staff should normally assign individual units or organizations with responsibility for each data collection item in the data collection matrix. In some situations, an individual could be assigned the responsibility for one or more indicators.

   b. Codifying responsibility is important for the following reasons:

      1. Assigning responsibility increases the likelihood of the task being accomplished.

      2. A reporting chain is clearly identified and communicated.

      3. In the event of a data query, the analyst can direct questions to the person, unit or organization responsible for that data item.

      4. Facilitates data archiving and data analysis.

      5. If data collection tasks fall to persons or organizations outside the military, a flag is raised for an action to establish links with those particular persons or organizations.

      6. If data originates from an organization not likely to be compliant, then a flag is raised to seek an alternative source of data or even an alternative indicator.

15. **Collection and Reporting Timelines**

    Planners and staff, with guidance from the commander, should determine the frequencies for data collection and reporting.

    a. **Data Collection Frequency.** For each indicator, the number of times (e.g., per day, week, month) the data should be collected.

       1. Is the requested frequency commensurate with the possible observable change? It makes no sense to record the number of enemy aircraft sorties per day when only a few occur each month. Conversely, if the incidence of a highly contagious disease in a refugee camp was being monitored, daily figures would be more appropriate than the number of new infections each month.
Is the data collection likely to be influenced by important events? For example, while “attacks per month” is sufficient for most cases, in the month leading up to the regional elections it may be prudent to capture “attacks per day.”
b. **Data Reporting Frequency.** The number of times (e.g., per day, week, or month) that the data should be reported to identified users. Data may be reported to different users at different frequencies.

c. **Data collection frequency and data reporting frequency may not be the same.** Typically the requested collection frequency will support the most rapid reporting frequency. For example, the requirement to collect the “number of attacks” on a daily basis can support a tactical commander who requires reporting on the attacks per day, but also support a higher command’s requirement for attacks per week or attacks per month.
APPENDIX L
POINTS OF CONTACT

**Joint Staff/J-7/Joint Doctrine Branch**
Comm: 703-692-7276 (DSN 222)
E-mail: js.pentagon.j7.jedd-support@mail.mil

**Joint Staff Doctrine Sponsor/J-5, Director for Strategy, Plans &Policy**
Strategy Development Division
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Room 2E765
Washington, D.C. 20318-0001
Comm: 703-697-6126
E-mail: js.pentagon.j5.list.dd-jsp-strat-dev-div-all@mail.mil
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APPENDIX M
REFERENCES

The development of JP 5-0 is based on the following primary references:

1. General
   
a. Title 10, USC.

   b. Title 22, USC.


2. Department of Defense Publications


   c. Defense Strategy Review.


   g. DODD 3000.05, Stabilization.

   h. DODD 3000.07, Irregular Warfare (IW).

   i. DODD 3000.10, Contingency Basing Outside the United States.

   j. DODD 4500.09E, Transportation and Traffic Management.
k. DODD 5100.01, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components.*

l. DODD 5100.03, *Support of the Headquarters of Combatant and Subordinate Unified Commands.*

m. DODD 5205.14, *Department of Defense Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Policy.*

n. DODI 1100.22, *Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix.*

o. DODI 3000.12, *Management of US Global Defense Posture (GDP).*

p. DODI 3020.41, *Operational Contract Support (OCS).*

q. DODI 5000.68, *Security Force Assistance (SFA).*


3. **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications**

   a. CJCSI 2300.01D, *International Agreements.*

   b. CJCSI 2420.01E, *(U) United States Freedom of Navigation Program.*

   c. CJCSI 3050.01, *(U) Implementing Global Integration (S).*

   d. CJCSI 3100.01D, *Joint Strategic Planning System.*

   e. CJCSI 3110.01K, *(U) 2018 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP).*

   f. CJCSI 3110.02H, *(U) Intelligence Planning Objectives, Guidance, and Tasks.*

   g. CJCSI 3141.01F, *Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans.*

   h. CJCSI 3150.25G, *Joint Lessons Learned Program.*

   i. CJCSI 3210.06A, *Irregular Warfare.*

   j. CJCSI 3401.01E, *Joint Combat Capability Assessment.*

   k. CJCSI 3401.02B, *Force Readiness Reporting.*

   l. CJCSI 3500.01H, *Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States.*

   m. CJCSI 3500.02B, *Universal Joint Task List Program.*
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n. CJCSI 5120.02D, Joint Doctrine Development System.

o. CJCSI 5714.01D, Policy for the Release of Joint Information.

p. CJCSI 5715.01C, Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs.

q. CJCSI 8501.01B, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, Chief, National Guard Bureau, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Process.

r. CJCSM 3105.01, Joint Risk Analysis.

s. CJCSM 3122.02D, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume III, Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution.

t. CJCSM 3130.03A, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance.

u. CJCSM 3130.06B, (U) Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures.

v. CJCSM 3150.01C, Joint Reporting Structure General Instructions.

w. CJCSM 3314.01A, Intelligence Planning.

x. CJCSM 3500.03E, Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States.

y. CJCSM 4301.01, Planning Operational Contract Support.

z. JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support.

aa. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

bb. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

c. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

dd. JP 3-05, Special Operations.

ee. JP 3-07, Stability.

ff. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.

gg. JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.
hh. JP 3-11, *Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments*.

ii. JP 3-12, *Cyberspace Operations*.


kk. JP 3-14, *Space Operations*.


mm. JP 3-20, *Security Cooperation*.


oo. JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*.

pp. JP 3-25, *Countering Threat Networks*.


ss. JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*.

tt. JP 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations*.


ww. JP 3-41, *Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response*.


zz. JP 3-61, *Public Affairs*.

aaa. JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*.

bbb. JP 4-01, *The Defense Transportation System*.

ccc. JP 4-02, *Joint Health Services*.

ddd. JP 4-05, *Joint Mobilization Planning*.
References


fff. JP 6-0, *Joint Communications System*.

4. Service Publications


c. AFDA 3-05, *Special Operations*.

d. AFDA 3-12, *Cyberspace Operations*.

e. AFDA 3-13, *Information Operations*.

f. AFDA 3-14, *Counterspace Operations*.

g. AFDA 3-17, *Air Mobility Operations*.

h. AFDA 3-30, *Command and Control*.

i. AFDA 3-40, *Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Operations*.

j. AFDA 3-70, *Strategic Attack*.

k. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-2, *Campaigning*.


m. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Operations*.

n. ADP 3-05, *Army Special Operations*.

o. ADP 3-07, *Stability*.

p. ADP 3-90, *Offense and Defense*.

q. ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*.

r. ADP 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*.

s. Field Manual (FM) 3-14, *Army Space Operations*.

t. FM 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*.

u. FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*.
v. Naval Doctrine Publication 1, *Naval Warfare*.


5. **Multiservice Publications**


6. **Other Publications**


APPENDIX N
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication using the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

a. The lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Strategy, Plans, and Policy (J-5).

b. The following staff, in conjunction with the joint doctrine development community, made a valuable contribution to the revision of this joint publication: lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor, Mr. Stephen Townsend; Mr. John Gniadek, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Analysis Branch; and LCDR Adam Yates, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Branch.

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 5-0, Joint Planning, 16 June 2017.

4. Change Recommendations

a. To provide recommendations for urgent and/or routine changes to this publication, please complete the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at: https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it to: js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

5. Lessons Learned

The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine
development process by providing lessons and lessons learned derived from operations, events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Lessons and lessons learned are routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of the development process. The JLLIS Website can be found at https://www.jllis.mil (NIPRNET) or http://www.jllis.smil.mil (SIPRNET).

6. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be IAW DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, DOD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification, and Declassification, and DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, DOD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information.

7. Distribution of Electronic Publications


b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Defense attachés may request classified JPs by sending written requests to Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100.

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CD-ROM will be updated not less than semiannually and when received can be locally reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies.
### Glossary

#### Part I—Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>Army doctrine publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFDA</td>
<td>Air Force doctrine annex</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFTTP</td>
<td>Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<td>AJA</td>
<td>Annual joint assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>AJP</td>
<td>Allied joint publication</td>
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<td>ALERTORD</td>
<td>Alert order</td>
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<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of responsibility</td>
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<td>BPLAN</td>
<td>Base plan</td>
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<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and control</td>
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<td>CAB</td>
<td>Commander’s assessment board</td>
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<td>Combatant commander</td>
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<td>CCIR</td>
<td>Commander’s critical information requirement</td>
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<td>Combatant command</td>
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<td>Combatant command campaign plan</td>
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<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>CJSI</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction</td>
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<td>CJSIM</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual</td>
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<td>Course of action</td>
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<td>COG</td>
<td>Center of gravity</td>
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<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>Concept of operations</td>
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<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>Concept plan</td>
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<td>CPG</td>
<td>Contingency Planning Guidance</td>
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<td>Combat support agency</td>
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<td>Country-specific security cooperation section</td>
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<td>Cooperative security location</td>
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<td>Data collection plan</td>
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<td>DSM</td>
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<td>EXORD</td>
<td>Execute order</td>
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<td>FCP</td>
<td>Functional campaign plan</td>
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<td>FDO</td>
<td>Flexible deterrent option</td>
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### Glossary

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<td>FFIR</td>
<td>friendly force information requirement</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>field manual (USA)</td>
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<td>FOS</td>
<td>forward operating site</td>
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<td>FP</td>
<td>force provider</td>
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<td>FRAGORD</td>
<td>fragmentary order</td>
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<td>FRO</td>
<td>flexible response option</td>
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<td>global force management</td>
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<td>GFMAP</td>
<td>Global Force Management Allocation Plan</td>
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<td>GFMB</td>
<td>Global Force Management Board</td>
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<td>GFMI</td>
<td>Global Force Management Implementation Guidance</td>
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<td>GIF</td>
<td>global integration framework</td>
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<td>Global Posture Executive Council</td>
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<td>host nation</td>
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<td>J-3</td>
<td>operations directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<td>J-5</td>
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<td>J-8</td>
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<td>joint force land component commander</td>
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<td>joint functional manager</td>
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<td>JFP</td>
<td>joint force provider</td>
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<td>JFSA</td>
<td>Joint Force Sufficiency Assessment</td>
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<td>joint individual augmentation</td>
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<td>joint intelligence operations center</td>
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<td>JIPOE</td>
<td>joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment</td>
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<td>JOA</td>
<td>joint operations area</td>
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<td>JOPES</td>
<td>Joint Operation Planning and Execution System</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
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<td>joint planning and execution community</td>
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<td>JPG</td>
<td>joint planning group</td>
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### Additional Definitions

- **GCP**: Global Campaign Plan
- **GDP**: Global Defense Posture
- **GFM**: Global Force Management
- **GFMAP**: Global Force Management Allocation Plan
- **GFMB**: Global Force Management Board
- **GFMI**: Global Force Management Implementation Guidance
- **GIF**: Global Integration Framework
- **GPEC**: Global Posture Executive Council
- **HN**: Host Nation
- **HNS**: Host-Nation Support
- **IP**: Intelligence Planning
- **IPR**: In-Progress Review
- **ISR**: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
- **JCS**: Joint Chiefs of Staff
- **JDDE**: Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise
- **JFC**: Joint Force Commander
- **JFLCC**: Joint Force Land Component Commander
- **JFM**: Joint Functional Manager
- **JFP**: Joint Force Provider
- **JFSA**: Joint Force Sufficiency Assessment
- **JIA**: Joint Individual Augmentation
- **JIOC**: Joint Intelligence Operations Center
- **JIPOE**: Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
- **JOA**: Joint Operations Area
- **JOPES**: Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
- **JP**: Joint Publication
- **JPEC**: Joint Planning and Execution Community
- **JPG**: Joint Planning Group
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<td>JPP</td>
<td>joint planning process</td>
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<tr>
<td>JRSOI</td>
<td>joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration</td>
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<td>JS</td>
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<td>Joint Strategic Planning System</td>
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<td>joint task force</td>
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<td>KLE</td>
<td>key leader engagement</td>
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<td>line of operation</td>
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<td>multinational force</td>
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<td>MOB</td>
<td>main operating base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>measure of effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOP</td>
<td>measure of performance</td>
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<td>Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy</td>
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<td>PLANORD</td>
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<td>PMESII</td>
<td>political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure</td>
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<td>POC</td>
<td>point of contact</td>
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<td>PTDO</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
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<td>rules for the use of force</td>
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<td>SAP</td>
<td>special access program</td>
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<td>strategic assessment working group</td>
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<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>USC</td>
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<td>United States Coast Guard</td>
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<td>United States Strategic Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td>United States Transportation Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>WARNORD</td>
<td>warning order</td>
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acceptability. The plan review criterion for assessing whether the contemplated course of action is proportional, worth the cost, consistent with the law of war, and is militarily and politically supportable. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

Adaptive Planning and Execution. None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.)

adequacy. The plan review criterion for assessing whether the scope and concept of planned operations can accomplish the assigned mission and comply with the planning guidance provided. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

alert order. 1. A planning directive normally associated with a crisis, issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on behalf of the President or Secretary of Defense, that provides essential planning guidance and directs the development, adaptation, or refinement of a plan/order after the directing authority approves a military course of action. 2. A planning directive that provides essential planning guidance, directs the initiation of planning after the directing authority approves a military course of action, but does not authorize execution. Also called ALERTORD. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

allocation. 1. Distribution of limited forces and resources for employment among competing requirements. 2. The temporary transfer of forces to meet the operational demand of combatant commanders, including rotational requirements and requests for capabilities or forces (unit or individual) in response to crisis or emergent contingencies. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

apportionment. The quantities of force capabilities and resources provided for planning purposes only, but not necessarily an identification of the actual forces that may be allocated for use when a plan transitions to execution. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

assumption. A specific supposition of the operational environment that is assumed to be true, in the absence of positive proof, essential for the continuation of planning. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

base plan. A type of operation plan that describes the concept of operations, major forces, sustainment concept, and anticipated timelines for completing the mission without annexes or time-phased force and deployment data. Also called BPLAN. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

branch. 1. A subdivision of any organization. 2. A geographically separate unit of an activity, which performs all or part of the primary functions of the parent activity on a smaller scale. 3. An arm or service of the Army. 4. The contingency options built into the base plan used for changing the mission, orientation, or direction of movement of a force to aid success
of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

campaign. A series of related operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

campaign plan. A joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

C-day. The unnamed day on which a deployment operation commences or is to commence. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

center of gravity. The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. Also called COG. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

combat support agency. A Department of Defense agency so designated by Congress or the Secretary of Defense that supports military combat operations. Also called CSA. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

commander's estimate. The commander’s initial assessment in which options are provided in a concise statement that defines who, what, when, where, why, and how the course of action will be implemented. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

commander’s required delivery date. The original date relative to C-day, specified by the combatant commander for arrival of forces or cargo at the destination; shown in the time-phased force and deployment data to assess the impact of later arrival. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

completeness. The plan review criterion for assessing whether operation plans incorporate major operations and tasks to be accomplished and to what degree they include forces required, deployment concept, employment concept, sustainment concept, time estimates for achieving objectives, description of the military end state, mission success criteria, and mission transition criteria. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

concept of operations. A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. Also called CONOPS. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

concept plan. An operation plan in an abbreviated format that may require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into a complete operation plan or operation order. Also called CONPLAN. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

constraint. In the context of planning, a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that dictates an action, thus restricting freedom of action. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)
contingency. A situation requiring military operations in response to natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or as otherwise directed by appropriate authority to protect United States interests. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

contingency plan. A branch of a campaign plan that is planned based on hypothetical situations for designated threats, catastrophic events, and contingent missions outside of crisis conditions. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

course of action. 1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow. 2. A scheme developed to accomplish a mission. Also called COA. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

critical capability. A means that is considered a crucial enabler for a center of gravity to function as such and is essential to the accomplishment of the specified or assumed objective(s). (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

critical requirement. An essential condition, resource, and means for a critical capability to be fully operational. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

critical vulnerability. An aspect of a critical requirement which is deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack that will create decisive or significant effects. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

culminating point. The point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

current force. The actual force structure and/or manning available to meet present contingencies. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

decision. In an estimate of the situation, a clear and concise statement of the line of action intended to be followed by the commander as the one most favorable to the successful accomplishment of the assigned mission. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

decision point. A point in space and the latest time when the commander or staff anticipates making a key decision concerning a specific course of action. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

decisive point. Key terrain, key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, enables commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy or contribute materially to achieving success. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

deployment order. 1. A directive for the deployments of forces for operations or exercises. 2. A directive from the Secretary of Defense, issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that authorizes the transfer of forces between combatant commanders, Services, and Department of Defense agencies and specifies the
authorities the gaining combatant commander will exercise over the specific forces to be transferred. Also called **DEPORD**. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**deployment planning.** Operational planning directed toward the movement of forces and sustainment resources from their original locations to a specific operational area to conduct operations contemplated in a given plan. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

**dispersion.** 1. The spreading or separating of troops, materiel, establishments, or activities, which are usually concentrated in limited areas to reduce vulnerability. (JP 5-0) 2. In chemical and biological operations, the dissemination of agents in liquid or aerosol form. (JP 3-41) 3. In airdrop operations, the scatter of personnel and/or cargo on the drop zone. (JP 3-17) 4. In naval control of shipping, the reberthing of a ship in the periphery of the port area or in the vicinity of the port for its own protection in order to minimize the risk of damage from attack. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 4-01.2)

**employment.** The strategic, operational, or tactical use of forces. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**essential task.** A specified or implied task an organization must perform to accomplish the mission. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**estimate.** 1. An analysis of a foreign situation, development, or trend that identifies its major elements, interprets the significance, and appraises the future possibilities and the prospective results of the various actions that might be taken. 2. An appraisal of the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and potential courses of action of a foreign nation or combination of nations in consequence of a specific national plan, policy, decision, or contemplated course of action. 3. An analysis of an actual or contemplated clandestine operation in relation to the situation in which it is or would be conducted to identify and appraise such factors as available as well as needed assets and potential obstacles, accomplishments, and consequences. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**execute order.** 1. An order issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, to implement a decision by the President to initiate military operations. 2. An order to initiate military operations as directed. Also called **EXORD**. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**feasibility.** The plan review criterion for assessing whether the assigned mission can be accomplished using available resources within the time contemplated by the plan. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**flexible deterrent option.** None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.)

**flexible response.** None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.)
force planning. 1. Planning associated with the creation and maintenance of military capabilities by the Military Departments, Services, United States Special Operations Command, and United States Cyber Command. 2. In the context of joint planning, it is an element of plan development where the supported combatant command, in coordination with its supporting and subordinate commands, determines force requirements to accomplish an assigned mission. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

force sourcing. The identification of the actual units, their origins, ports of embarkation, and movement characteristics to satisfy the time-phased force requirements of a supported commander. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

fragmentary order. An abbreviated operation order issued as needed to change or modify an order or to execute a branch or sequel. Also called FRAGORD. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

global campaign plan. Primary means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or designated combatant commander arranges for unity of effort and purpose and through which they guide the planning, integration, and coordination of joint operations across combatant command areas of responsibility and functional responsibilities. Also called GCP. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

global integration framework. Strategic framework that integrates joint force actions, provides initial crisis options, and identifies potential senior leader decisions based on the global response to a priority challenge. Also called GIF. (Approved for inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.)

H-hour. 1. The specific hour on D-day at which a particular operation commences. (JP 5-0) 2. In amphibious operations, the time the first landing craft or amphibious vehicle of the waterborne wave lands or is scheduled to land on the beach and, in some cases, the commencement of countermine breaching operations. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)

implementation. Procedures governing the mobilization of the force and the deployment, employment, and sustainment of military operations in response to execute orders issued by the Secretary of Defense. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

implied task. In the context of planning, a task derived during mission analysis that an organization must perform or prepare to perform to accomplish a specified task or the mission, but which is not stated in the higher headquarters order. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

indicator. 1. In intelligence usage, an item of information which reflects the intention or capability of an adversary to adopt or reject a course of action. (JP 2-0) 2. In operations security usage, data derived from friendly detectable actions and open-source information that an adversary can interpret and piece together to reach
conclusions or estimates of friendly intentions, capabilities, or activities. (JP 3-13.3) 3. In the context of assessment, a specific piece of information that infers the condition, state, or existence of something, and provides a reliable means to ascertain performance or effectiveness. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**joint planning.** Planning activities associated with military operations by combatant commanders and their subordinate commanders. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**joint planning and execution community.** Those headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in the training, preparation, mobilization, deployment, employment, support, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of military forces assigned or committed to a joint operation. Also called JPEC. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**joint planning group.** A planning organization consisting of designated representatives of the joint force headquarters principal and special staff sections, joint force components (Service and/or functional), and other supporting organizations or agencies as deemed necessary by the joint force commander. Also called JPG. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**joint planning process.** An orderly, analytical process that consists of a logical set of steps to analyze a mission, select the best course of action, and produce a campaign or joint operation plan or order. Also called JPP. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**Joint Strategic Planning System.** One of the primary means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, carries out the statutory responsibilities to assist the President and Secretary of Defense in providing strategic direction to the Armed Forces. Also called JSPS. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**leverage.** In the context of planning, a relative advantage in combat power and/or other circumstances against the enemy or adversary across any variable within or impacting the operational environment sufficient to exploit that advantage. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**L-hour.** 1. The specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to commence. (JP 5-0) 2. In amphibious operations, the time at which the first helicopter or tiltrotor aircraft of the airborne ship-to-shore movement wave touches down or is scheduled to touch down in a landing zone. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-02)

**limitation.** An action required or prohibited by higher authority, such as a constraint or a restraint, and other restrictions that limit the commander’s freedom of action, such as diplomatic agreements, rules of engagement, political and economic conditions in affected countries, and host nation issues. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**limiting factor.** A factor or condition that, either temporarily or permanently, impedes mission accomplishment. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)
**line of effort.** In the context of planning, using the purpose (cause and effect) to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions by linking multiple tasks and missions. Also called **LOE.** (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**line of operation.** A line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s). Also called **LOO.** (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**major force.** A military organization comprised of major combat elements and associated combat support, combat service support, and sustainment increments. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**measure of effectiveness.** An indicator used to measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time. Also called **MOE.** (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**measure of performance.** An indicator used to measure a friendly action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. Also called **MOP.** (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**mission statement.** A short sentence or paragraph that describes the organization’s essential task(s), purpose, and action containing the elements of who, what, when, where, and why. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**multinational.** Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**objective.** 1. The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which an operation is directed. 2. The specific goal of the action taken which is essential to the commander’s plan. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**operational approach.** A broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the mission. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**operational characteristics.** Those military characteristics that pertain primarily to the functions to be performed by equipment, either alone or in conjunction with other equipment; e.g., for electronic equipment, operational characteristics include such items as frequency coverage, channeling, type of modulation, and character of emission. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**operational design.** The conception and construction of the framework that underpins planning. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

**operational pause.** A temporary halt in operations. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)
operation assessment. 1. A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing capabilities during military operations to achieve stated objectives. 2. Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, changing a condition, or achieving an objective. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

operation order. A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. Also called OPORD. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

operation plan. A complete and detailed plan containing a full description of the concept of operations, all annexes applicable to the plan, and a time-phased force and deployment list. Also called OPLAN. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

phase. In planning, a definitive stage of a campaign or operation during which a large portion of the forces and capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities for a common purpose. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

planning factor. A multiplier used in planning to estimate the amount and type of effort involved in a contemplated operation. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

planning order. A planning directive that provides essential planning guidance and directs the development, adaptation, or refinement of a plan/order. Also called PLANORD. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

preferred forces. Specific units that are identified to provide assumptions essential for continued planning and assessing the feasibility of a plan. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

prepare to deploy order. An order to a force provider to have a unit ready and to deploy within a specified response time. Also called PTDO. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

restraint. In the context of planning, a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that prohibits an action, thus restricting freedom of action. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

scheme of maneuver. The central expression of the commander’s concept for operations that governs the development of supporting plans or annexes of how arrayed forces will accomplish the mission. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

sequel. The subsequent operation or phase based on the possible outcomes of the current operation or phase. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

shortfall. The lack of forces, equipment, personnel, materiel, or capability, reflected as the difference between the resources identified as a plan requirement and those
quantities identified as apportioned for planning that would adversely affect the command’s ability to accomplish its mission. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**specified task.** In the context of planning, a task that is specifically assigned to an organization by its higher headquarters. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**staff estimate.** A continual evaluation of how factors in a staff section’s functional area support and impact the planning and execution of the mission. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**strategic direction.** The strategy and intent of the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in pursuit of national interests. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**strategic estimate.** The broad range of strategic factors that influence the commander’s understanding of the operational environment and the determination of missions, objectives, and courses of action. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**strategic guidance.** The written products by which the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide strategic direction. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**subordinate campaign plan.** A combatant command-prepared plan that satisfies the requirements under a Department of Defense campaign plan, which, depending upon the circumstances, transitions to a supported or supporting plan in execution. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**supporting plan.** An operation plan prepared by a supporting commander, a subordinate commander, or an agency to satisfy the requests or requirements of the supported commander’s plan. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**time-phased force and deployment data.** The time-phased force, non-unit cargo, and personnel data combined with movement data for the operation plan, operation order, or ongoing rotation of forces. Also called **TPFDD.** (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**times.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff coordinates the proposed dates and times with the commanders of the appropriate unified and specified commands, as well as any recommended changes to when specified operations are to occur (C-, D-, M-days end at 2400 hours Universal Time [Zulu time] and are assumed to be 24 hours long for planning). (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**transportation feasible.** A determination made by the supported commander that a draft operation plan can be supported with the identified or assumed transportation capabilities. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
**Universal Time.** A measure of time that conforms, within a close approximation, to the mean diurnal rotation of the Earth and serves as the basis of civil timekeeping. Also called **ZULU time.** (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**validate.** Execution procedure used by combatant command components, supporting combatant commanders, and providing organizations to confirm to the supported commander and United States Transportation Command that all the information records in a time-phased force and deployment data not only are error-free for automation purposes, but also accurately reflect the current status, attributes, and availability of units and requirements. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)

**warning order.** 1. A preliminary notice of an order or action that is to follow. 2. A planning directive that initiates the development and evaluation of military courses of action by a commander. Also called **WARNORD.** (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 5-0)
All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0 is in the Plans series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

**STEP #1 - Initiation**
- Joint doctrine development community (JDDC) submission to fill extant operational void
- Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts front-end analysis
- Joint Doctrine Planning Conference validation
- Program directive (PD) development and staffing/joint working group
- PD includes scope, references, outline, milestones, and draft authorship
- JS J-7 approves and releases PD to lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant command, JS directorate)

**STEP #2 - Development**
- LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first draft (FD)
- PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC
- FD comment matrix adjudication
- JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system
- Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment matrix
- FC joint working group

**STEP #3 - Approval**
- JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7
- JS J-7 prepares publication for signature
- JSDS prepares JS staffing package
- JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for signature

**STEP #4 - Maintenance**
- JP published and continuously assessed by users
- Formal assessment begins 24-27 months following publication
- Revision begins 3.5 years after publication
- Each JP revision is completed no later than 5 years after signature

**Joint Doctrine Publication (JP) 5-0**
- Plans
- Communications System

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